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ORIGINAL 
"We are forced to speak in images 
and parables which do not express 
precisely what we mean. Nor can 
we avoid occasional contradictions; 
nevertheless, the images help us to 
draw nearer to the real truth. " 
Werner Heisenberg. 
ABSTRACT 
The autistic child's ability to identify others' faces and their 
expressions was investigated in comparison with the ability of non- 
autistic children. A study of the children's ability to identify 
peers' from isolated facial areas revealed that the autistic children 
were abnormally good at this task. Reasons for these findings were' 
investigated in a series of experiments which revealed that the 
autistic children were also abnormally good at recognising inverted 
faces and inverted text. The conclusion was drawn that the autistic 
children's performance was due to their possessing a perceptual 
integration deficit which prevents them seeing stimuli like faces and 
words as meaningful wholes. This was investigated further by tests 
of their ability to discern facial expression and the results of these 
studies supported the above conclusion. Tests of the children's ability 
to lip read revealed that the autistic children also had problems with 
between modality perceptual integration. Studies of their ability 
to produce facial expressions showed them to be poor at both 
spontaneous and elicited expressions. Further, whilst they were as 
good as controls at copying facial expression, they were less able to 
make use of visual feedback to improve their attempts. This was seen 
as further evidence for a perceptual integration deficit. Finally, a 
computerised study of autistic children's eye movements whilst viewing 
live facial expressions and other stimuli supported much of the previous 
findings, adding the finding that they had abnormally brief visual 
fixation times and that they engaged in very few feature-to-feature 
gaze shifts. The results were discussed and found to favour a theory 
in which the autistic child's problems with social and communicative 
competence are linked to his problems with perceptual integration. 
The possession versus the use of abilities was discussed, as was 
possible sites of neurological damage, and the possibility that 
autistic children lack some vital usually 'innate' abilities and 
propensities. 
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WHYS AND WHEREFORES: A FOREWORD 
Autism is a syndrome characterised by an impaired ability to form 
social relationships and an impaired use of language for communicative 
purposes. Not surprisingly, the anecdotal and clinical literature is 
dominated by descriptions of the autistic child's problems in these 
areas. However, scientific investigations have tended to be based 
upon hypotheses about the nature of autism and have thus often only 
investigated one aspect of the condition. The assumption has often 
been that one aspect is central to the syndrome and all the other 
symptoms are secondary: social competence and language have predictably 
been the most common suggestions for central aspects, and there has 
ensued a conflict over which underlies the other. Empirical studies 
of autistic children have investigated various aspects of their 
perception, cognition, memory and language competence. In brief, such 
studies have found that a central cognitive deficit may underlie the 
autistic children's problems in perception, thinking and transference 
to long-term memory. A central cognitive deficit may also account for 
the trouble some autistic children have with syntax and semantics. 
However, the intersection of most of the autistic child's problems, 
which might be described as the cognitive implications of person 
perception, has rarely been studied. It was thus the primary aim 
of this thesis to examine autistic children's perception of social 
stimuli and discuss the cognitive implications of any findings. But 
this immediately raised the question "What is a social stimulus? " 
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Social stimuli include speech, bodily gestures, facial expression 
and the representation of faces. Various aspects relating to human 
beings such as items of clothing, immobile limbs etc, cannot be classed 
as social stimuli. Rather it is those aspects which are directly related 
to interpersonal relations which can be referred to as 'social'. Thus 
the face epitomises social stimuli and perception of it stands at the 
intersection of the autistic child's problems. 
There is some controversy in the literature on face perception as 
to whether faces form a unique class of visual stimuli. However 
there can be little doubt of the primary role that the face plays in 
human social relations. At least three levels of information can be 
gathered from other's faces: the relatively invariant facial aspects 
may be used for identification, both mobile and static elements may 
be utilized to determine how another feels, and lip movements may 
provide linguistic information. It is not surprising, then, to find 
that the face plays an important part in the socialisation of the 
child (Schaffer, 1971). The normal infant is found to smile more at 
faces than at other stimuli (Wolff, 1963), and from the first few 
weeks of life the infant can discriminate a pattern of two dots which 
resemble eyes (Ahrens, 1954). It seems equally significant that the 
infant should initially have his focus of vision fixed at some 8 
inches away - approximately the distance he is from the mother's face 
during breast feeding (Schaffer, ibid). 
As the normal child develops he progresses from a basic tendency 
to respond to eye-like patterns, to the discrimination of an increasing 
number of facial features, and eventually to being able to distinguish 
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his mother's face from that of strangers. Gradually he learns the 
meaning of others' facial expressions, and becomes increasingly able to 
read more and more subtle emotions and feelings into these expressions 
(Ekman, 1973). Although from around 7 months evidence suggests that 
infants perceive faces as gestalts (Ahrens, 1954; Phillips, 1977), 
the eye area retains primary importance in identification of faces, 
and the determination of most facial expressions. 
Nothing is known, by contrast, about the development of face 
perception in autistic children. Some insight into the deviance of 
the autistic's condition may be gained from the following passage 
(my emphasis): 
As the name 'autism' implies, one of the key 
features consists of an autistic-type 
abnormality in interpersonal relationships. 
This may be shown in early childhood by a 
relative lack of eye-to-eye gaze, limited 
emotional attachments to parents, little 
variation in facial expression, and an 
appearance of aloofness and distance 
together with an apparent lack of interest 
in people. 
(Rutter and Bartak, 1971). 
From birth the autistic child may have failed to form an 
anticipatory posture prior to being picked up, or when picked up he may 
have failed to adjust his position to the shape of his mother (Wing, 
1976b). In addition many autistic babies are reported to lack the 
basic propensity to communicate to others. They may be very 'good' 
babies who never learn that crying can be used to request or demand 
something, or they may be very difficult babies who cry unconsolably. 
Many mothers of such babies also report that they could never have a 
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'conversation without words' with their child - although they knew the 
experience from a former normal child they had cared for (Newson, 1980). 
In what way does the autistic child's initial lack of responsiveness 
to social stimuli like human faces affect the manner in which he 
perceives faces at a later age? What parts of the face does he use to 
identify others by, or utilise to formulate impressions of how they 
feel (if indeed he does formulate them)? 
These questions are the primary concern of this thesis. In 
particular it will address itself to such questions as whether or not 
the autistic child does tend to actively avoid mutual gaze (as some 
workers have suggested), or whether their abnormal social behaviour 
can best be understood in terms of an underlying cognitive deficit. 
The first chapter will deal with an overview of the present state 
of knowledge of the syndrome, and includes coverage of some of the many 
theories about it. The chapter will also survey the results from 
psychological experiments with autistics and will end with a discussion 
of the problems of diagnosis and the selection of subjects for the 
present studies. 
The second chapter will con5isr of an overview of the 
literature on face perception by normal children from birth to 
adolescence. This chapter includes a discussion of the role of mutual 
gaze in normal children and contrasts normal gaze activity with 
autistic children's problems with interpersonal relations. A third 
chapter is devoted to an experimental study of autistic children's 
ability to recognise peoples' faces, and the issues that arise from 
V 
this study. In the fourth chapter a survey of the literature on normal 
children's abilities to identify and produce facial expressions will be 
given, whilst the fifth chapter will report several experimental studies 
of such abilities in autistics. The sixth chapter deals with a 
computerised study of the eye movements of children who are looking at 
faces. Finally, the seventh chapter will attempt to bring the results 
and conclusions of the thesis together, suggest implications for the 
study and theory of autism, and give ideas for further research. 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
AUTISM: A SYNOPSIS 
1.1. An introduction 
Cases of mental disturbance in childhood which might be termed 
'psychotic' date back to at least the eighteenth century (Haslan, 1799), 
and Bender (1969) relates the details of many of these. Notable among 
them was the case of "the wild boy of Averyon" (Itard, 1801), who may 
well have been an autistic child. However, Maudsley (1867) was the 
first psychiatrist to attempt an overview of psychoses in childhood, 
and it was considerably later that such conditions became more generally 
recognised. In 1906 De Sanctis coined the term 'dementia precocissima' 
to describe psychoses in prepubital children. Later Heller (1930) 
described a disintegrative psychosis in which relatively normal 
development up to about 3 years of age is followed by a severe 
regression to a speechless state with the onset of stereotypies and 
restless behaviour. Potter (1933) proposed a set of criteria for 
childhood examples of schizophrenia, and in 1943 Kanner published the 
first clear delineation of a syndrome he called 'infantile autism'. 
In the same year Frye (published 1968) was working with what appears 
to be the same type of children as Kanner described. The following 
year saw Asperger's (1944) clinical description of a similar condition 
which he independently called 'autistic psychopathy'. Bender then 
(1947) wrote about a broad and ill-defined group of children 
labelled as 'childhood schizophrenics'. Several concepts of psychosis 
appeared over the ensuing years, such as Mahler and Gosliner's (1955) 
'symbiotic psychosis', and Rank's (1955) 'atypical child'. Since that 
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time many papers on the topic of childhood psychosis have been written 
and a host of classification schemes have been forthcoming (Laufer and 
Gair, 1969; Rutter et al., 1969; Churchill et al., 1971; Rutter, 1971; 
Ornitz, 1973; Miller, 1974; Wing, 1976). 
From the late 1950's onwards there was a tendency to group all 
childhood psychoses together under the general title of 'childhood 
schizophrenia' (see Creak, 1961). However, there has been a substantial 
amount of evidence in the literature attesting to the fact that adult 
schizophrenia is quite unlike the syndromes seen in early childhood in 
many ways. For instance, there are clear genetic factors in 
schizophrenia, autistic children rarely have halucinations which are a 
characteristic of schizophrenia, and whereas autistic children's parents 
tend to be middle class there is no class bias in schizophrenia (see 
Rutter, 1974). Broadly speaking, it is now accepted that childhood 
psychoses fall into three main groups. First are those children whose 
onset of symptoms is in the first 30 months of life and who are 
characterised by a lack of signs of brain damage, and who possess the 
characteristics of 'autism'. Next are the children whose onset is 
after about seven years of age and who resemble adult schizophrenics 
in many of their symptoms. Finally, the group in between, which is 
less well defined. These children may fall into Heller's 'disintegrative 
psychosis' category, and they frequently show signs of brain damage and 
evidence of a specific causatory factor, such as a traumatic event. 
The most characteristic 'psychosis' of childhood, though, is autism 
(Rutter, 1976). As mentioned above it was first delineated by Kanner 
in 1943, who wrote a paper entitled "Autistic Disturbances of Affective 
Contact". He began his paper by saying: 
3 
Since 1938, there have come to our attention 
a number of children whose condition differs 
so markedly and uniquely from anything reported 
so far, that each case merits ... a detailed 
consideration of its fascinating perculiarities. 
He went on to describe in detail the cases of 11 children who he 
felt constituted an otherwise undelineated syndrome. The main 
characteristics of these children included a profound lack of affective 
contact with people, an anxiously obsessive desire for the preservation 
of sameness, a fascination for objects which are handled with skill in 
fine movements, mutism or a kind of language which does not seem intended 
to communicate, and finally the retention of an intelligent physiognomy 
and evidence of good cognitive potential. 
There are several reasons why the application of Kanner's description 
for diagnostic purposes is problematic. The issue of which diagnostic 
criteria one should use will be dealt with later in this section. 
However, it should be noted here that Kanner's last point mentioned 
above is particularly misleading. While it is true that many autistic 
children have islets of relatively good ability amongst an otherwise low 
level of functioning, it is spurious to take this good ability as 
indicative of their 'real' cognitive potential. Similarly, there is 
a host of evidence suggesting that autistic children are poor at 
expressing their feelings through gesture. It is thus also misleading 
to refer to their physiognomies as 'intelligent'. Nonetheless, it 
is notable that autistic children tend not to look subnormal even 
though about 75% of them are reported to be so (Rutter, 1975). 
The following 4 points may be kept in mind as giving the best 
description of autism to date: 
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1. An impairment development of language and all modes 
of communication, which has certain well defined 
characteristics and is out of keeping with the child's 
general intellectual level. 
2. Impaired social development which is characterised 
by a number of special features such as a failure 
to develop empathy. This impairment of social 
relations is out of keeping with the child's 
general intellectual level. 
3. Evidence of rigidity and inflexibility of thought 
processes reflected in an insistence upon sameness, 
stereotypies, abnormal preoccupations, and a 
resistance to change. 
4. An onset of symptoms before 30 months of age. 
(After, Rutter, 1978; Newson, 1980). 
As mentioned above the problems of diagnosis will be returned to 
later in this chapter. 
Two. major presenting characteristics of autism are thus impairments 
in social development and in communicating with others. It has also 
been noted that the first three above aspects are not isolated factors which 
are unrelated to each other (Newson, 1977). Newson (ibid) has pointed 
out that what makes the autistic child stand out is the interrelationship 
of his difficulties. Ulis language and attempts at communication are 
characterised by the rigidity of thought processes noted in the third 
point above. The act of communication itself is social in nature, and 
the development of language occurs in the social environment of early 
mother/infant interaction (see, Bruner, 1975a, b; Lock, 1978). 
As will be noted in a later section, theories of autism have 
frequently been criticised for positing a single generalised factor 
(such as poor mothering, chronic high arousal, or excessive 'shyness) 
to explain the complex pattern of behaviours which autistics' present. 
Additionally, it will be noted that relatively few experimental studies 
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have been done on the fundamental characteristics of language disorder 
and social abnormalities. Whilst many excellent studies have investigated 
the possibility of a central cognitive deficit being at the core of 
autism, there is still room for a study of the relationships between 
social perception, cognition and communication. It is noteworthy, for 
instance, that some children (for instance some Down's children) exhibit 
poor cognitive performance, yet are affectionate and warm in their 
interactions with others. Such children may be poor at speech, or even 
mute, but show a clear understanding of what 'communicating with others' 
is all about. They will often also show good ability at the use of 
gesture to make their needs, requests and comments known to others. 
There is thus a strong body of evidence which suggests that a child 
may be socially aware and communicatively competent (albeit less so 
than a normal child with greater intelligence), yet be essentially 
functioning at an idiot level. But in the case of the autistic child 
the reverse may be true; an autistic child may be performing at normal 
or near normal in certain areas of cognitive ability yet be very impaired 
in his social relationships. One must be careful, then, not to make 
any simple assumptions about the links between the autistic child's 
cognitive abilities and his social incompetence. Nonetheless, there 
is reason to believe that the particular cognitive deficit in autism 
might well also underlie their poor ability in social situations 
(Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970; Frith and Hermelin, 1971). 
The aim of this thesis is thus to study the autistic child's 
abilities in areas of social perception which include elements of 
cognitive processing and communication. It was felt that the human 
face is unique insofar as it may be regarded as a social stimulus 
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(that is, one with social meaning to the normal person). Because the face 
serves several different functions (it can tell you who a person is, 
what they are feeling, and offers other information such as lip 
movement components of speech) it thus has few rivals for richness 
of information about others in social situations. This is important, 
not the least because the face is one of the earliest stimuli that the 
child perceives, and he does so in the pre-linguistic stage of development 
in which autism begins. 
Consequently, if one was to find any abnormalities in the manner 
in which autistic children view faces, then such a discrepancy might 
reflect upon the nature of the dysfunction in their thought processes. 
Moreover, analysing how autistic children view faces could allow one 
to find additional information on the way they look at people and thus 
determine whether there is evidence for their avoiding gaze contact, 
or if there is evidence for their failing to use the information 
available in the eye area. Later sections will deal with this topic 
more fully. 
Thus a study of the autistic child's manner of perceiving faces 
may offer insight into his perceptual, social, communicative, and 
cognitive abilities. To date, though, there have been no studies of 
autistic children's abilities to recognise faces or determine facial 
expressions, or indeed any other aspect of face perception. 
The next section will be devoted to a short overview of the 
theories about the aetiology of autism. Following that will be a 
section concerned with previous experimental studies of autistic 
children. To close this chapter there will be a section on the 
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selection of subjects for the studies in this thesis. This last 
section will include a discussion of the problems of diagnosis, and 
will also give an outline of the case histories of each of the autistic 
children studied herein. 
1.1.1 Theories of Aetiology 
Many causes for autism have been proposed and these fall into two 
basic categories: those which note that autism can occur in the absence 
of any obvious neurological damage and hence take a psychogenic viewpoint, 
and those which note that the autistic child may be born with a 
physiological or metabolic dysfunction but that this need not show 
itself in any readily apparent signs. In addition, some workers have 
proposed theories about the psychological problems in autism, which are 
thought to be there regardless of the original cause (Wing, 1976). 
Several workers have proposed that autism is due to poor child- 
rearing in one way or another (Bettelheim, 1967; Despert, 1951; 
Goldfarb, 1961; Kanner, 1943,1949; Rank, 1959; Zaslow, 1967). It 
has been suggested that the parents of autistic children are cold and 
remote, intellectual people (Kanner, 1943), or that the father alone 
may have such a personality (Eisenberg, 1957). Others have noted that 
the early environment may be very lacking in stimulation for the child, 
and have likened autism to the effects upon war captives of solitary 
confinement (Bettleheim, ibid). Yet others have put forth behaviouristic 
theories and claim that mothers of autistic children give inadequate 
or inappropriate reinforcement of early behaviour (Ferster, 1961; 
Phillips, 1957). 
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There has been no firm support for any of these theories in the 
experimental literature. Creak and Ini (1961) found no abnormalities 
in the personalities of autistic children's parents. Rutter et al 
(1971) have more recently confirmed this finding of normal personalities 
in autistic's parents. Wing (1976) noted that about half of the 
parents of autistic children may have at some time had neurotic or 
depressive disorders, but this was also true of parents of aphasics, 
and is thus probably a result of the strains of caring for handicapped 
children. The only finding which emerged consistently from the studies 
of parents was that those of autistic children tended to be unusually 
frequently of the higher social classes (Rutter et al., ibid). 
DeMyer et al (1972) have noted in this regard that higher social class 
and intelligence are not usually factors which are associated with 
poor child-rearing practices. Additionally, Wing (1980) has provided 
evidence to suggest that there may not be a social class bias in the 
parents of autistic children. She has noted that in her sample of 
children drawn from the Camberwell region of London, parental class 
membership showed no class bias when referral factors had been accounted 
for. She also noted that there was a higher class bias in the people 
joining the National Society for Autistic Children nearer its inception, 
but that this had now tailed off as autism had become more widely known. 
Faulty conditioning of autistic children in early childhood and 
infancy also seems unlikely. On the one hand it is doubtful that 
conditioning theories can even account for the development of normal 
babies, and on the other hand it is hard to imagine how caretakers the 
world over could have conditioned such similar abnormalities of behaviour 
into their children (Wing, 1976). In conclusion, there is very little 
support for any of the psychogenic theories of the aetiology of autism. 
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Genetic abnormalities have been suggested (for example, Kanner, 
1949), but there is only a slightly raised prevalence of autism in 
autistic children's siblings. Rutter (1968) found a 2% rate in sib 
instead of the 4.5 per 10,000 age specific rate found in the population 
in general. Folstein and Rutter (1977) did a study of 21 same sex 
twins where at least one of each set had autism. Of the 25 cases of 
autism 19 were boys, which gave a girl/boy ratio of 1/3.1, similar to 
that found in the general population. They found a 36% pairwise 
concordance for autism in the 11 pairs of monozygotic twins, compared 
to a 0% concordance in the 10 dyzgotic pairs. Further, in 12 of the 
17 pairs discordant for autism there was a tendency for the presence 
of autism in one twin to be associated with biological damage. Thus 
this study might provide some support for the idea of dividing 
autistic children into two groups: those who have few signs of brain 
damage and may have a genetically determined abnormality and those 
whose symptoms are due to a form of brain injury. However, this study 
awaits replication, and it remains possible that the problems of early 
diagnosis of autism may have led to spurious results in this twin study. 
There seems little doubt that brain damage of some form can lead 
to a disorder which is indistinguishable from autism (Wing, 1976). 
Indeed, noting the absence of support for psychogenic theories of 
aetiology, it is almost certain that brain dysfunction or tissue damage 
is in some way the causatory factor. Evidence pertaining to perinatal 
injury is conflicting (see Wing, 1976). Chess (1971) found a 
correlation between the presence of maternal rubella and autistic 
behaviour in the child. Workers have documented that a history of 
infantile spasms may precede the onset of autistic behaviour (Kolvin 
et al, 1971; Taft and Cohen, 1971; Wing, 1975). Wing (1975) also 
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found that conditions such as menengitis, tuberose sclerosis and 
phenylketonuria may be associated with patterns of behaviour which 
more-or-less resemble those found in autism. Rutter (1970) reported 
that by adolescence about a third of autistic children had at some 
point had epileptic fits. Lotter (1966,1967) also found that about 
a third of the autistic children in his epidemiological study had some 
recorded evidence suggestive of neurological abnormality. 
Several theories have been proposed as to where in the brain the 
lesion might be which causes autism. However, there appear to be 
three main areas which are favoured as possibilities: the recticular 
formation, subcortical areas such as the limbic system and temporal 
lobe, and the left hemisphere. Theories based upon the suggestion that 
abnormalities of arousal underly autistic behaviour have favoured the 
reticular formation as the site of a lesion (Rimland, 1964; Hutt 
et al, 1964,1965; Hutt and Hutt, 1970; DesLauriers and Carlson, 
1969). Rimland suggested that the function of the reticular formation 
is to sort out incoming information and to imbue it with meaning. 
This would imply that the basic deficit in autism would be one of 
coding, which is in good agreement with empirical research (see the 
next section on experimental studies of autism). However, Rimland's 
view of the functioning of the re ticular formation is one which few 
neurophysiologists hold. Hutt Hutt and colleagues have proposed that 
the autistic child is chronically over-aroused. However, their theory 
has been criticised by Hermelin and O'Connor (1971), who have also 
presented evidence which suggests that autistic children's arousal is 
no different from matched controls. DesLauriers and Carlson's theory 
posits a deficit in the interaction of the limbic system and the 
reticular formation (both of which affect arousal). The deficit 
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as they suggest it amounts to the autistic child being hypothesised to 
be in a state of (functional) sensory deprivation. However, their view 
of the function of these 2 systems has yet to be borne out in the 
physiological literature, and it is uncertain whether one could account 
for the wide variety of symptoms of all autistic children by an arousal 
theory alone. 
Work in the field of possible biochemical abnormalities in autism 
is probably best summed up by quoting Wing (1976): 
The work in the field of biochemistry is at present 
hard to interpret because of the poverty of clinical 
data concerning the children studied, lack of 
repetition of experiments by other workers and the 
difficulty of knowing how to relate biochemical 
abnormalities to the details of the clinical syndrome. 
(p. 87) 
Turning now to theories which do not necessarily base themselves 
on any particular suggestion of brain dysfunction, it is notable that 
the earliest theory of autism (that of Kanner) said that autistic 
children are born with a lack of ability to relate affectively to others. 
Undoubtably autistic children do have problems relating to others 
(cf. the four points above which describe the syndrome). However, a 
concept of a general deficiency of affect is too global. DeMyer et al. 
(1970) pointed out that autistic children are often cooperative so long 
as tasks are within their ability. Hermelin and O'Connor (1971) 
discussed the fact that their studies had shown autistic children to 
approach and orient towards adults as frequently as matched subnormal 
children. They concluded that it would be more fruitful to look at 
the social and interpersonal behaviour of autistic children in terms 
of an absence of basic skills which underlie normal social and linguistic 
behaviour. 
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Hermelin and O'Connor (1971) were led to the conclusion that a 
central cognitive deficit might underlie autism. This theory was later 
elaborated in collaboration with Frith to include the inability of 
autistic children to extract meaning and features (such as rules) from 
their perceptual input. Because their ideas came from a series of 
experimental studies, it will be dealt with again in the following 
section on experiments with autistics. 
Some investigators have suggested that autistic children have 
abnormalities of perception and attention (Koegal and Schreibmann, 1974; 
Lovaas and Koegal, 1973; Orintz and Ritvo, 1968). Lovaas and his 
colleagues have proposed that autistic children have problems attending 
to more than one aspect of their input. Thus this leads to an 
'overselectivity' in their responses. However, later work by Lovaas 
(Koegal and Lovaas, 1978) and Litrownik et al, (1978) has shown that this 
is more due to general subnormality than to autism in particular. 
Ornitz and Ritvo have posited that the autistic child has faulty 
modulation of sensory input, which is related to an underlying vestibular 
dysfunction. In essence, this means that the autistic child lacks stable 
percepts. However, this suggestion is not supported by the findings of 
others who provide evidence for stable perception by autistics (DeMyer, 
1971). 
Finally, some workers have suggested that the autistic child's 
problems with imitation may lie at the root of the syndrome (DeMyer, 
1971; Curico and Piserchia, 1978; for instance). DeMyer links this 
inability with an underlying inability to integrate visual information 
with motor acts. This, it is argued, could lead to a lack of 
communicative competence due to the fact that a lot of early social 
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behaviour is imitative in form. However, it may be the case that a 
poor ability to imitate is one manifestation of a deeper problem, which 
also affects cross-modal integration. This point will be returned to 
later in this thesis. 
1.2. Experimental Studies 
1.2.1. Memory 
Anecdotal and clinical evidence would tend to suggest that autistic 
children generally have good memory abilities (Wing, 1976a, for example). 
They are noted to have excellent rote memory, and the reported 'islets 
of intelligence' (Creak et al, 1961) are often memory-based (an ability 
to recall whole pages of telephone directories, to reproduce a piece of 
music on the piano having only seen it played once, and so forth). 
However, their abilities to recall items of information are often best 
when the topic of the items coincides with their obsessive interest. 
For instance, one might meet an autistic child who had an average (or 
even poor) memory for most things but who might be obsessed with knowing 
people's date of birth and be able to tell you what yours is years after 
you first told him. The clinical impression is also that autistic 
children's memory is 'echo-box' like (see Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970), 
that is, what goes in tends to come out in the same form, unchanged by 
processing. Indeed Rimland (1964) has suggested that an inability to 
process information with respect to stored knowledge is fundamental to 
the syndrome. He referred to a 'closed-loop' phenomenon whereby the 
autistic child tends to parrot what is said to him, even going so far 
as to repeat what he's heard in the same type of voice. Short-term 
memory, too, would appear to be good insofar as many autistic children 
are reported to exhibit echolalia. 
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Do the experimental studies confirm the above clinical impressions? 
In general, the answer would seem to be yes, but with some qualifications. 
Several workers have reported that the children's short-term memory (STM) 
is as good as that of normal and subnormal children matched for mental 
age (Tubbs, 1966; O'Connor and Hermelin, 1967a and b; Hermelin and 
O'Connor, 1970; O'Connor, 1971; Hermelin and O'Connor, 1975; Prior 
and Chen, 1976). However, there have been studies which suggest that 
autistic children have an STM deficit (O'Connor and Hermelin, 1965; 
Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970; Boucher, 1978). It is therefore worth 
looking at these studies to search for the source of the discrepancies. 
Tubbs (1966) administered the Illinois Test of Psycholinguistic 
Abilities (ITPA) to a group of autistic children. Two of the sub-tests 
of the ITPA measure the child's immediate recall of orally and visually 
presented words. On these subtests the autistic children were as able 
as normal children, who were matched on their ability at the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test. This finding was confirmed by Hermelin and 
O'Connor (1975) who also noted, though, that the autistic children were 
not as able as matched controls in the backward recall of digits. 
Hermelin and O'Connor's (1967a) study in which autistic children had 
to recall random words and sentences also supported the claim that 
their short-term memory (STM) is good. In fact, the overall ability 
of the autistic children was found to be better than that of subnormal 
children matched on the Peabody Vocabulary Test. However, the subnormal 
children recalled words that were presented in sentences better than 
they did words which were equally frequent in their lexicon and were 
presented in random order. This was not the case for the autistic 
children who recalled the sentences as well as they did the random 
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strings of words. This may well be related to the finding that 
autistic children excel in tests of STM only when immediate recall 
is required of stimuli which are not inherently meaningful (like 
sentences) and not to be recalled in any other way than that in which 
they were presented. 
Further support for this idea was found by Hermelin and O'Connor 
(1967b) when they tested the autistic child's ability to recall 
meaningfully and randomly arranged words and pictures. However, 
whilst the autistic children once again failed to benefit from the 
meaningful ordering of the words, both groups gained equally from the 
sequential ordering of the visual material. There was thus some 
evidence that in autistic children echolalia and the random ordering 
of input were more characteristic of auditory than visual material. 
Moreover, Hermelin and O'Connor's study found that the autistic children 
showed a strong tendency to recall what they had heard or seen recently 
better than what was presented before. Whilst this was also true for 
the subnormal children the effect was much more marked in the autistic 
children. The autistic children thus performed as if they had an 
'echo-box' memory (Waugh and Norman, 1965; Craik, 1966). 
This concept of an echo-box memory in autistic children was taken 
up by Boucher (1978). She emphasised that whilst semantic coding 
normally predominates in memorising earlier portions of lists for 
immediate recall, acoustic/phonetic coding plays an important role in 
the recency effect (Glanzer and Cunitz, 1966; Brown and McNeill, 1966; 
Baddeley, 1976). Comparing the ability of autistic children with 
normal children of similar age and digit span revealed that the autistic 
children were inferior in their recall of orally presented words, randomly 
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ordered. However, as Boucher pointed out, this result is of limited 
significance since the normal children had better language ability, 
thus-this does not provide evidence against the contention that autistic 
children's STM is as good as mental age (MA) matched controls. It 
does, however, give support for the idea that the autistic child does 
not possess supernormal abilities to use acoustic cues when remembering 
verbal stimuli. Boucher further reports that by use of Baddeley's 
(ibid) formula to calculate the capacity of the STM system, autistic 
and normal children have the same echoic memory capacity (about 
2.4 items on average). However, allowing for the variance in the two 
groups it does seem from Boucher's tables that the STh capacity of the 
normal children is greater than that of the autistic children, albeit 
fractionally (about 2.9 and 2.3 items capacity, respectively). Because 
she matched the normal and autistic groups on digit span, Boucher's 
study shows that autistic children's STM for digits is better than that 
for words. 
A final source of doubt about the STM ability of autistic children 
comes from O'Connor and Hermelin's (1965) study in which they 
investigated various visual analogues to verbal operations. In this 
study they asked verbal and non-verbal autistic, aphasic, normal and 
deaf children to perform a variety of visually presented tasks. One 
of these was the immediate recall by forced choice of the size of a 
previously seen square. Whilst the speaking autistics were as able to 
do this as the normal children, the non-speaking autistics were 
significantly poorer than all their controls. O'Connor and Hermelin 
draw on the work of Conrad (1964) to explain this. Conrad links good 
17 
ability to recall items with-the ability to verbally encode stimuli 
before storage. Thus, poor STM might exist in the relatively less able 
non-verbal autistic child - for visually presented material at 
least. 
From the above studies, it is clear that the relationship between 
memory and meaning is of particular interest in the study of autism. 
Remembering well may often depend upon one's ability to discern pattern 
in the items one is presented and to be able to cluster the items in a 
meaningful manner to aid recall. This topic has been explored 
in a 
series of studies by Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) and Frith 
(1968). 
Because this aspect is relevant to our knowledge of the processing 
abilities of autistic children, it will be dealt with in 
full later 
in a section on 'cognition'. 
There have been comparatively few studies of long-term memory 
(LTM) in autistic children. However, Boucher and Warrington (1976) 
claim to have shown impairments in autistic children's LTM, which 
in some ways resemble that the amnesic patients. In the first 
experiment they describe, autistic and subnormal children matched 
for non-verbal ability were tested for their ability to recall 10 
visual stimuli after a retention interval of 1 minute. They found the 
autistic children to be worse than the controls. However, they rightly 
pointed out that this might have been due to the subnormal children's 
higher verbal ability. It should be noted that the task involved the 
children having to verbally recall the drawings that they were shown. 
A further experiment was devised which was intended to take this factor 
of verbal ability into account. However, Boucher and Warrington claimed 
to match some subnormal children to their sample of autistic children 
on both language MA and non-verbal reasoning. This matching procedure 
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is rather puzzling because most autistic children can be expected to 
possess a higher non-verbal reasoning ability than language level. In 
contrast, subnormal children do not as a rule show such a biased 
profile of ability. It seems difficult to understand how they were 
able to match the groups for both measures. There is thus some doubt 
as to how well the groups were matched - did they both have about the 
same language ability? There was also quite a difference in what 
Boucher and Warrington required the groups to do in this task. This 
time each child was presented with 40 test items and was asked to name 
each one. In the recall session, which occurred after a filled interval 
of 30 seconds, he had to choose one of 40 pairs of items to indicate 
which he had seen before. Once again the autistic children were inferior 
in their ability to recall which items they had seen before. However, 
this test was in fact a recognition paradigm, and the presence of the 
pictures seen before did not 'cue' the autistic children's memories 
and allow them to perform as well as the controls. This is of relevance 
because in three of their studies Boucher and Warrington claim that 
cued recall in autistic children is unimpaired and significantly better 
than their free recall. In one experiment they cued the children 
acoustically, using the initial sound of the test word coupled with 
the neutral vowel (S ). In a second experiment they gave semantic 
clues to each word which were short descriptions of the objects the 
words referred to ('something to sit on', for example). In both 
experiments the words that the child had to recall were less frequent 
in their lexicon than at least one other word which had the same initial 
sound (in the first case) or which might be given the same description 
(in the second case). However, one must ask whether 'high frequency' 
words are indeed equally frequent in the lexicons of both autistic and 
subnormal children. Boucher and Warrington used the Mein (1961) word 
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list , which was prepared 
from an analysis of words used in conversation 
by severely subnormal patients. Wing (1976) and others have pointed out, 
though, that the speech of autistic children is often very idiosycratic. 
Thus their vocabularies might contain words that are uncommon for the 
average non-autistic subnormal child and fail to contain some words 
which are common for most subnormals. It might also be expected that 
the autistic children's vocabularies vary more from one child to the 
next than comparable subnormal children. This is a problem which all 
studies of the language of autistic children face, and it can only be 
overcome by an extensive examination of the language used by the 
particular children under study. 
Boucher and Warrington claim to show that cued recall (both 
acoustic and semantic) is as good in autistic children as in subnormal 
controls. In fact, their data implied that the autistic children were 
more able than the subnormals to use the semantic cues, however, the 
experiment attempting to show this was poorly designed. It was impossible 
for them to directly compare the two groups' abilities in semantically 
cued recall. The children were read a list of words, and after a 
filled interval of 30 seconds they were required to recall (freely) as 
many as they could. Once they had done this the children were given 
semantic cues to aid their recall of the remaining words. Thus the 
number of remaining words that could be recalled after semantic cuing 
varied from group-to-group and from child-to-child. Their conclusion 
that the subnormal children did not use semantic cues as well as the 
autistics is based upon logical, not statistical, inference. That is, 
the autistic children had poorer recall when they were uncued, yet 
their overall recall ability did not differ from that of the subnormals. 
However, whilst one might feel able to draw the logical conclusion that 
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the autistic children must have 'made up' the difference in recall 
scores by being better at the cued recall, this might be erroneous. 
The subnormal children might still possess as good cue recall as the 
autistic children, but the words that they would have recalled by 
semantic cuing had mainly already been remembered without such aid. 
It is a pity that Boucher and Warrington did not give both groups a 
separate test of cued and uncued recall on matched items. In sum 
then, it is difficult to agree with Boucher and Warrington's conclusion 
fromthis study that their results favour an 'impaired retrieval' 
hypothesis rather than one of a central cognitive deficit in autism. 
They argue that the latter would predict relatively poor ability to 
utilise semantic cues for recall, whereas the former predicts the 
opposite finding. It is certainly surprising given that the series of 
of experiments reported by Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) suggest that 
it is the semantic aspect of stimuli that gives autistic children the 
most problems. 
Boucher and Warrington also report a study of the ability of 
autistic and normal children to recall written words after a filled 
retention interval. In this experiment they did do two separate 
studies of the children's ability to recall the items freely and with 
cues. The cues were the first 3 letters of each of the test words, and 
were also the first 3 letters of a more frequent word in their lexicon. 
However, they used the Mein word list again, and thus the aforementioned 
matching problems applied here too. In this study they not only found 
that the groups were equal in their ability on the cued recall but 
also on the free recall. Thus they once again found evidence to support 
the idea that cued recall was better in autistics than subnormals 
(although no subnormal group was actually tested), and that this ability 
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to utilise cues was not modality bound. But the finding that the 
autistic children were as good at the free recall was not in line with 
their amnesia/autism parallel. The finding that the autistic children's 
long term memory under free recall of visual items might be better than 
that for verbal items may parallel the findings of O'Connor and 
Hermelin (1967a). In this study O'Connor and Hermelin found that the 
meaningful ordering of visual stimuli had an equal effect upon the 
immediate recall ability of normal and autistic children. Meaningful 
ordering of verbal items on the other hand helped the autistic children 
far less than it did the normal controls. There is thus a body of 
evidence to suggest that the basic deficit in autism affects the 
auditory/temporal mode more than the visual/spatial. This point will 
be returned to in the section on 'cognition'. 
In summary, the autistic child would seem to have an intact STM, 
and there is some possibility that his LTM is less good than that of matched 
subnormals. It seems likely that these findings are linked to the 
proposition that autistic children fail to process their perceptions 
meaningfully, which is a primary factor in recall from LTM storage. 
These findings need not conflict with the clinical reports of 
exceptional memory feats in autistic children. It may be that 
recalling specific stimuli to order is most affected. When the 
autistic child is remembering items obsessively (and thus on his own 
terms, and not in the structured situations noted above), he may 
perform exceptionally well. He will also tend to perform much better 
when the items can be recalled as they were perceived, unprocessed 
(such as dates, car numbers, etc. ). Finally, there is some evidence 
that the autistic child's memory problems are greater in the auditory/ 
temporal realm than in the visual/spatial. 
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1.2.2. Perception 
Abnormal responses to sensory stimuli are one of the central 
features of autistic behaviour. They have been noted to be hyper- 
reactive and hypo-reactive to stimuli, and both forms of response may 
be present in the same child. A lack of response to sensory stimulation 
has led some mothers to think that their child is blind or deaf; 
however, it is often the case that the same mother will also have reason 
to disbelieve this for the child may ignore loud sounds but seem aware 
that a sweet is being unwrapped in an adjoining room. Similarly, a 
child might often present as blind, but will be noted to have a 
fixation which includes collecting small pieces of cotton that drop 
onto the carpet (see Wing, 1976a). In fact some investigators have 
gone so far as to regard autism as the result of multiple sensory 
handicap. Wing (1967) carried out a comparative study of autistic, 
blind, deaf, aphasic, Down's syndrome, and normal children. Abnormal 
responses to visual and auditory stimuli was far more marked in the 
autistic than in the Down's syndrome or normal groups. This group 
difference was also noted for the autistics' preference for proximal 
senses. Overall, the group which the autistic children resembled 
most was the partially deaf-blind group. Keeler (1958) and Blank 
(1959) are amongst the many who have noted similarities between blind 
and autistic children (see Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970; Fraiberg, 
1977). Blind children have mannerisms, for instance, which closely 
resemble those produced by autistic children. The lack of social 
responsiveness in blind infants (reported by Urwin, 1978) is strongly 
reminiscent of reports of autistic infants' behaviour (Wing, 1976a 
for instance). This may well be linked with Walters and Parke's (1965) 
conclusion that social responsiveness in infancy is related to the 
role which the distal receptors (vision and hearing) play in normal 
development. 
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An abnormal hierarchical structuring of the senses has been 
proposed for autistic children (Goldfarb, 1961; Schopler, 1965,1966). 
Such workers state that autistic children tend to use proximal as much 
or more than distal senses for exploring their world. Wing (1966) 
and Rimland (1964) have both noted that autistic children tend to lick, 
bang, scratch, smell, touch and shake objects. And when they shake, 
bang or scratch them they seem to be doing so for the vibrations 
produced rather than for the sounds. But a simple view of preference 
for proximal senses is not in line with observations of the autistic 
child having hypo-responsiveness to pain, cold and heat. 
Investigating EEG responses to sound and light in autistic, normal 
and Down's syndrome children, Hermelin and O'Connor (1968) found no 
group differences in orienting responses to light, but there was a 
clear indication that continuous noise was more arousing for the 
autistic children than for the other groups. They also found that 
the autistic children showed a relative lack of sustained arousal to 
intermittent visual stimulation. This finding is in line with the 
results of behavioural measures which showed that autistic children 
have briefer visual inspection times than do normal or subnormal 
controls (O'Connor and Hermelin, 1967a). No such group differences 
were found for the continuous representation of visual stimuli. 
Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) concluded that the results do not indicate 
avoidance of visual stimuli due to high arousal levels, but rather'a 
faster decrease in an orientation response. 
In another study by Hermelin and O'Connor (1964) they examined 
autistic subnormal and normal children's responses to light, sound 
and touch when 2 stimuli were presented at once. The children were 
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rewarded regardless of which of the stimuli (one to their left and 
the other to their right) they chose to respond to. Hermelin and 
O'Connor found that all groups responded to light in preference to 
either touch or sound. However, when the bimodal presentation was 
of touch and sound alone, subnormal children tended to respond to 
the sound whereas the autistic children tended to do the opposite. 
It was also concluded that the autistic child's main problem was not 
the establishment of a new response (all children could learn to 
respond to sound rather than light), but the extinction of a dominant 
response. 
Elsewhere O'Connor and Hermelin (1965b) showed that autistic 
children of fairly low ability tended to respond equally to noise and 
to words when the two stimuli were in competition. However, this was 
also true for Down's syndrome children of similar verbal M. A., thus 
the effect may be entirely due to verbal ability. However, what did 
differentiate the autistic children was their tendency to respond 
more according to the position of the stimuli than to the stimuli's 
intensity. Hermelin and O'Connor (1965a) have also shown that 
discriminations are easier for autistic children when they can be 
made on the basis of - and with additional information from - motor 
movements. In this study the children had to find a reward under one 
of two boxes, with three possible cues being given as to which box 
concealed the sweet; in one case it was the box in the higher 
position, in another the box was larger, and in the third case the 
box had an arrow pointing in a certain direction drawn upon it. The 
autistic children only learnt the task of finding the reward when 
the response included motor movements (high versus low boxes). 
Although it may be noted that the autistic children who did worst on 
these tasks were those with lower levels of ability. Support for these 
findings was also found in Hermelin and O'Connor'sAstudy (1967a). 
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Thus the above studies do not support a simple theory of abnormal 
hierarchical organisation of the senses in autism. There is evidence 
that they prefer to explore objects with proximal senses rather than 
distal ones, but they respond more to light than sound or touch when 
the senses are put in competition. They seem to have an abnormal 
preference for touch over sound, although the factor of M. A. might 
be important here, it being true only for lower ability children. 
Certainly there is evidence for autistic children finding discrimination 
easier when there are motor cues available. Given this, though, what 
factors characterise autistics ability in visual discrimination? 
In their study of visual discrimination, O'Connor and Hermelin 
(1967a) were concerned with the question of whether autistics were 
able to perceive differences between various visual stimuli. To do 
this they employed the paradigm devised by Fantz (1965) in which one 
measures the child's fixation times whilst looking at two displays. 
By mounting the displays inside a box with a dark interior, it was 
possible to give the child a choice of looking at one or two stimuli 
or at nothing at all. Thus if a child looked significantly more at 
one of the stimuli than the other, it could be concluded that he 
could discriminate between them. Because this paradigm relies upon 
the existence of visual 'preference', it should be noted that an 
equal fixation time on each stimulus does not necessarily mean that 
the subject could not perceive any difference between them. Using 
this method O'Connor and Hermelin were able to investigate identity, 
size, colour, brightness, pattern, complexity and meaningfulness. 
The main finding was that the autistic children had generally lower 
fixation times on all the stimuli. Because the number of their 
fixations was similar to that of normal and subnormal matched controls, 
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this meant that they spent more time than the other groups in 'non- 
directed gazing' (at the black interior of the box). 
There were no group differences in preference for looking at the 
stimuli. This meant, for instance, that all groups tended to look 
more frequently at the photograph of a face than at a jumbled version 
of the same photograph. There was thus no indication that the autistic 
children tended to avoid looking at faces - this is a point that will 
be returned to later in a survey of the work on social perception in 
autism. 
It might be suggested from the above studies that autistic 
children see and hear but do not look and listen. The evidence 
reported so far, and that to be reported in later sections, supports 
the view that the autistic child has a central cognitive deficit, 
which can lead him to resemble other children whose perceptual 
apparatus is not intact (such as blind and deaf children). What the 
nature of this deficit is will be pursued in the section on 'cognition'. 
However, such a view is not without its opponents. 
Ornitz (1969,1970,1974) and Ritvo (1976) have proposed that 
the autistic child has faulty modulation of sensory input and an 
underlying central vestibular dysfunction. This is hypothesised to 
lead to 'perceptual inconstancy' and an unsmooth balance of internal 
neural excitation and inhibition. All this amounts to saying that 
the autistic child lacks stable percepts - which is contrary to the 
evidence provided above by the studies of Hermelin and O'Connor. 
DeMyer (1971) discussed the hypothesis of perceptual inconstancy 
and fcuhä little support for it. The autistic children that she 
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has studied have always shown good test/retest reliability. DeMyer 
also found that autistic children could copy actions performed when 
there was a constant visual reference (a doll for example), and thus 
showed no evidence for unstable percepts. Alpern (1967) has noted 
that autistic children are stable in their responses to IQ tests 
(which is supported by Rutter, 1974). Also a neurological study 
(Small et al, 1971a, b) found that latencies and amplitudes of visual 
cerebral evoked potentials were quite constant in autistic children. 
In fact, Small found some evidence for the autistic children's 
potentials being even more stable than those of normal comparison 
subjects. DeMyer concludes her discussion (ibid) by saying that 
Ornitz and Ritvo's theory finds little support in the literature, 
but a theory which proposes that autistic children fail to attach 
semantic cue value to sensory input is well supported. 
Finally, further evidence for the essentially normal perceptual 
abilities of autistic children of higher ability comes from Wurst 
(1976). He found that whilst they demonstrated many problems on 
tests involving social contact, they showed no problems on perceptual 
tests. Evidence for a lack of perceptual problems also comes from 
studies of less able autistic children, too. For instance, Nadia, 
described by Selfe (1977) had a remarkable ability to draw objects 
when she was only 5 or 6 years old. Nadia is a very 
low level child, and when she drew the pictures she was almost 
entirely mute. Now she has some language ability, and it is possible 
that the emergence of symbolic function has lessened her ability to 
draw so remarkably. Nonetheless, it seems clear that Nadia's problems 
were not in seeing but in the interpretation of what she saw. Thus 
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she represents one retarded autistic child in whom perceptual 
discrimination, memory, and motor skills are higher in some areas than 
might be expected from her general development. It seems that there 
Are &fe number of autistic children with good drawing ability 
too (Selfe, inter alia). Indeed, autistic children of all levels of 
ability often have obsessions which reflect the presence of intact 
perceptual abilities. 
1.2.3 Cognition 
The most extensive studies of autistic children's cognitive 
abilities have been undertaken by Hermelin, O'Connor and Frith (see: 
Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970; Hermelin and Frith, 1971; and Hermelin, 
1978). In the previous section it was noted that autistic children 
seem to have intact perceptual systems. That is, whilst they may 
occasionally behave as if they are blind or deaf, they can nonetheless 
see and hear quite normally. It appears that the autistic child's 
main problem is making sense of what he sees and hears - that is, in 
processing the incoming information. Evidence for an intact STM in 
these children also supports this idea. Several experiments have 
been carried out to determine where the autistic child's greatest 
areas of cognitive disfunction lie. 
From very early on in life - some say from birth - the child is 
able to integrate the information coming through his senses (Bower, 
1979). It also seems that the storage of information coming in through 
the senses is not modality specific. Some, for instance, have proposed 
that cross modal transfer is language mediated (Blank and Bridger, 1964). 
Others have suggested that an area of the brain is concerned with 
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modality independent storage of information (eg. Geschwind, 1965). 
In contrast Atteneave and Benson (1969) concluded that spatial 
information is primarily represented in visual terms regardless of 
which modality the relevant data entered through. On the other hand, 
it seems likely that temporal information is processed primarily in 
auditory terms, and hence verbal coding may play a strong role I'h AU, 's pmcessýo j 
(Hermelin, 1972). 
To begin with, can autistic children make normal use of visual 
cues to aid performance on motor task? Frith and Hermelin (1969) 
studied the role of visual and motor cues for autistic, subnormal 
and normal children. In each group there were two subgroups 
distinguished on the basis of perceptual age (PA, determined with 
the Frostig scales), chronological age (CA), and mental age (MA). 
They asked the children to construct jig-saw puzzles which were a 
series of cards that had to be put into a specific order. In one 
puzzle the order could only be determined by the shape of the edges 
of the cards. In another the cards had flat edges and the only clue 
as to the correct ordering was a line running through the cards - one 
thus had to match the lines up at the joining points, rather like 
making a road. In a third type of puzzle there was both the pictorial 
and edge shape information available to help the child. In the first 
type, then, the shape/tactile cues were maximised whereas in the 
second the visual cues were maximised. All the groups except the 
autistic children with low ability found the second type of puzzle 
to be harder than the first. The low PA autistic children demonstrated 
a trend to find the second easier than the first. Thus these autistic 
children alone showed that they could perform well when they had to 
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deal with trial and error motor-based strategies but performed 
poorly when visual information was available which might have improved 
their performance. The possibility of poor visual/motor integration 
led Hermelin and Frith to examine the same groups' abilities to follow 
a maze-like track with a metal stylus. The children were required to 
do this once without being able to see what they were doing, and again 
with visual feed-back. When the children were able to look the autistic 
children were as fast as normal children. However, when they were 
denied visual feedback, particularly when the track to be traced was 
complex in form, the normal children were significantly faster than 
the autistic children. Hermelin and Frith concluded that autistic 
children fail to compensate for a deficit in processing and integrating 
visual information by alternative strategies. The strategies which 
autistic children can use efficiently are those based upon immediate 
feedback from kinesthetic or motor cues. 
Hermelin (1972) reported studies of the autistic child's ability 
to code information. She asked each child to place his hands such 
that the middle and forefingers of one hand were spread open and 
immediately behind the equivalent fingers of the other hand. The 
child's 4 fingers were touched in turn and for each one a word was 
said. The child had to repeat the word that went with each finger. 
When the child had learnt the correspondance the experimenter changed 
the hands around so that the fingers of the left hand now occupied the 
places of the right hand and vice versa. Having done this the child 
had 2 choices. He could either decide that the labels went with the 
place or with the specific finger regardless of its position. It was 
found that both sighted normal and autistic subjects responded with 
the finger that was labelled, whereas blind children tended to report 
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the location. It is thus a pity that blindfolded autistic children 
could not have been used, for it would have been interesting to see 
if they resembled the blind children. In a second experiment also 
reported 6), Hermelin (1972) autistic normal and congenitally deaf 
children were presented with a display of numbers to be recalled. 
The numbers-appeared in windows which were side-by-side. It was 
thus possible to make the temporal order in which the numbers were 
presented differ from the spatial order (thus, the order might have 
been 397 left-to-right, but 973 first-to-last). Both autistic and 
deaf children reported the numbers in spatial terms whereas the normal 
children reported them according to the temporal order. 
{i s 
The above results concur withAtide"arlirc{' 
Ny 
emr 5ttd%! ý$ by Hermelin and 
O'Connor (1964) in which they found that autistic children have normal 
orientation to visual stimuli, and show no preference for proximal 
receptors. However, in both the above studies autistic children used 
the information about discrete location in space, and were less liable 
to locate events according to their temporal position. The main 
result is thus that like deaf children autistic children may not readily 
translate and rehearse events in space and time in a verbal form. 
Temporal processing deficits have been shown in other studies by 
Hermelin, O'Connor and Frith. Hermelin and Frith (1971) report the 
most important of these studies (see also, Hermelin and O'Connor 1970; 
Frith, 1968; Frith 1970a, b). Normal, subnormal and autistic children 
were required to repeat words spoken to them. One experiment tested 
the ability of the children to repeat words that formed an orderly 
sequence (a sentence) with their memory for words which were randomly 
arranged. It is well known that people can remember sentences better 
than random word strings (Miller and Selfridge, 1953). This phenomenon 
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can be explained by assuming that people make use of their knowledge 
about and familiarity with language and its inherent redundancies. 
Because of our knowledge about syntax we can guess what a sentence 
might be given only the key words, and thus considerably relieve the 
load on our memory. Both normal and subnormal children were able to 
recall the sentences better than the random words, and were thus able 
to make use of the redundancy. However, whilst the autistic children 
(of about MA 4 years) also found sentences easier to recall than random 
words, the effect was far less marked than with the other 2 groups. 
The autistic children were as able (or better on occasion) to recall 
the random words as were the normal children, but they were much worse 
at the sentences. There was also a strong tendency for the autistic 
children to recall mainly the last thing that they heard. It is possible 
that some of the autistic children were simply echoing what they had 
just heard. 
A second experiment attempted to see if the autistic children 
could overcome their tendency to recall the last thing that they heard. 
In this study the child was presented with word strings which were 
half made up of random words and half of meaningful strings (sentences). 
Thus the child might be asked to recall "wall long cake send where is 
the ship", or "read them your book way spoon here like". Because half 
the time the sentence began the string and the other half it followed 
the random words, it was possible to tell whether a child was merely 
repeating the last thing that he heard, or taking note of the redundancy 
present in the sentence half of the word string. Normal children were 
found to recall sentences better than the random words regardless of 
where they came in the word string. In contrast the autistic children 
tended to recall what was most recently said to them regardless of 
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whether this was the meaningful half or not. This supports the clinical 
observation that some autistic children echo what is said to them, with 
little understanding for meaning. Even the relatively able autistic 
child may use words without fully understanding the meaning and 
implications of them. 
Hermelin and O'Connor (1967b) also attempted to show whether or 
not the association processes shown by 'clustering' are impaired in 
autistic children. Subnormal and autistic children were matched for 
digit span and tested on their immediate recall of supra-span lists 
of words which contained words drawn from two meaningful sets of 
objects. For instance, they might have been presented with "blue three 
red five six white green eight". As can be seen, the ability to cluster 
these 8 words into 2 meaningful sets of 4 would greatly aid recall 
(ie. blue, red, white, green/three five, six, eight). Thus if any 
subject was to recall more items than he normally was able to from a 
list of random words, he would have to appreciate the value of 
clustering. The subnormal children showed this clustering in their 
recall whereas this was found to a much lesser extent in the autistic 
children. Thus Hermelin and O'Connor confirmed their hypothesis that 
autistic children do not actively reorganise material according to its 
meaning. 
Frith hypothesised (Frith, 1968) that autistic children are 
impaired in their ability to detect lawful patterns in their perceptual 
input; thus the above problems with realising that clustering 
meaningful items would aid recall might only be one example of a more 
fundamental deficit. The children were consequently presented with 
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series of words which were simply variations upon either repetition 
(eg. one-one-one) or alternation (eg. one-two-one-two). More complex 
patterns could thus be created by mixing repetitions and alternations 
together (eg. one-one-two-one). Subnormal, normal and autistic 
children were once again matched for their immediate memory ability 
and were required to recall lists of supra-span length. The results 
showed that the control groups could remember highly redundant strings 
of words (eg. mouse-mouse-mouse-bag-bag-bag) far better than the 
autistics. However, as might be expected from the matching procedure, 
both groups did equally well when recalling more random strings. Once 
again the autistic children failed to make use of the structure in 
the stimuli. It may be noted that these findings are similar to those 
reported above for recall of random words together with sentences. 
However, whereas the structure of the earlier tests items was syntactic, 
that of the later one was not. Thus, the deficit displayed by the 
autistic children in extracting rules is not restricted to grammar. 
Frith also noted the type of errors made by the groups. Just as 
the known rules about syntax might enable one to reconstruct a sentence 
from keys words, so it might be possible to reconstruct the 'binary' 
strings presented in Frith's study by noting the dominant rule of the 
sequence (repetition or alternation). For instance, brown-blue-brown- 
brown consists of mainly alternations. Thus the application of this 
rule to aid recall might produce: brown-blue-brown-blue.. The results 
revealed that subnormal and normal children's recalled sequences 
tended to reflect correctly the main rule present in the input sequence. 
If the input sequence tended to contain repetitions then the control 
groups recalls tended to contain even more repetitions. The autistic 
children performed quite differently. They tended to almost always apply 
the repetition rule, whether or not it was dominant in the input. 
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Thus Frith was drawn to the conclusion that whereas the control 
groups could correctly determine and use the rule present in the word 
strings, the autistic children tended to rigidly apply one rule 
regardless of the input. She noted that feature extraction and the 
imposition of rules might be relatively independent of each other. 
They may be likened, in fact, to Piaget's "accommodation" and 
"assimilation" (See Piaget and Inhelder, 1969). Frith suggests that 
the stereotyped rigid and ritualistic behaviours in autistic children 
might be regarded as an exaggerated form of pattern imposition. On 
the other hand, the often inappropriate and unpredictable behaviour 
of such children might be the result of the autistic's impaired ability 
to extract features from his environment. 
Frith (ibid) also undertook a study which aimed to investigate 
the pattern imposition tendencies of the autistic children. A pack of 
cards was used, each card being either black or red. The child was 
required to guess which colour card would be turned up next. Only 
subnormal, normal and autistic children who appeared to understand the 
game were included. Nearly every child tended to repeat or alternate 
his responses. - very rarely did children use mixtures of the two. All 
the children tended to impose their own simple patterns in this 
unstructured situation. Similar results were found when children had 
to spontaneously construct rows of coloured counters. 
These experiments led Hermelin and Frith (1971) to conclude that 
the deficit possessed by autistic children may extend beyond their 
language problems, and it may account for a wider range of cognitive 
dysfunctions. This basic deficit would appear from these studies to 
be an inability to extract features from organised input, coupled 
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with_a tendency to impose rigid patterns. Frith concluded that in 
certain circumstances this imposition of pattern might be appropriate, 
but in relatively complex and flexible situations (such as social 
interaction, symbolic play, etc. ) such a tendency would be a gross 
handicap. However, it is possible that the pattern imposition tendency 
of autistic children may itself be a secondary manifestation of a 
more fundamental deficit. This possibility will be considered later 
in this thesis. 
Whilst the autistic child's good short-term recall of items 
implies that he possesses the ability to form internal images, Hermelin 
and O'Connor decided to test this ability more directly (see Hermelin, 
1978). Hermelin (1978) noted that in Piagetian terms the ability 
to form images is a necessary precursor to symbol formation in the 
child. The first experiment she reported involved blindfolded 
normal, congenitally blind, and blindfolded autistic children. Each 
child had to feel two shapes and say whether the shapes could fit 
together to form a complete square. The shapes were fixed to a 
board a small distance apart, and thus one could not directly test 
their ability to fit together. The shapes were presented in two 
different ways: in one case the shapes were in the correct rotation 
to fit together if it was possible; in the second case the smaller 
shape was rotated around 180 degrees so that the child might have 
to "rotate it in his mind" to determine if it would fit. No differences 
were found between the groups on either mode of presentation. However, 
Hermelin pointed out that the task could have been solved by tactile 
exploration alone and may have required a minimum of visual imagery. 
O'Connor and Hermelin (1975) also required blind, blindfolded normal 
and blindfolded autistic children to say whether a plastic 'hand' 
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given to them to feel was a left one or a right one. The hands were 
identical in shape, one being a mirror image of the other. Thus, 
orientation features were the only distinguishing cues in this task. 
Blindfolded normal children were both faster and more often correct 
than were the blind or blindfolded autistic children. Hermelin 
(ibid) thus concluded that like the blind, autistic children may lack 
a spatial reference frame with visual dimensions to help them in making 
a decision. 
In the same study, Hermelin and O'Connor (1975) also asked blind 
and blindfolded subjects to reproduce different aspects of a limb 
movement. The question which concerned them was whether kinesthetic 
data were sufficient for the derivation and storage of movement 
components in the absence of kinesthetic invariants. The experiment 
involved each child moving a lever up a rod for a distance which was 
determined both by the starting point and by the presence of a 
'stopper'. After the practice trials the stopper was removed and the 
child was required to reproduce the same end position from a different 
starting position. Thus, if in the practice trials the child had been 
asked to move the lever from the base up to a height of 15cm, then in 
the test he may have been required to lift the lever once again to 
the 15cm position but this time to start already 5cm up the rod (thus 
the distance to be produced in the latter case would be 5cm shorter 
than in the former). In a second condition the child had to reproduce 
the same distance from a different starting position (thus he might 
have 
Ato 
lift the lever from 5cm to 20cm rather than from the base to 
15cm). They found no group differences on the first task -ie. when 
the same location had to be reproduced. Thus the position of the arm 
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could be recalled by all 3 groups(-blind, blindfolded normal and 
blindfolded autistic) on the basis of kinesthic information. However, 
in the second task the children needed to involve a degree of visual 
imagery, for there are no receptors in one's muscles or joints which 
x 
signal distance of limb travel. Large group differences were found, 
the blindfolded normal children being more correct than the blind or 
autistic children. Hermelin and O'Connor thus concluded that autistic 
children seem to be unable to evoke the necessary visual images to 
supplement information derived from movement. 
Hermelin (ibid) ended her discussion of the above results by saying 
that it is unwise to treat the autistic child's problems as if they lay 
entirely in the realm of language. She pointed out that it is not 
language which enables us to think, but rather the ability to think 
and form symbols which allows us to develop language. It is thus of 
relevance to the studies that Piaget considers the construction of 
internal images to be essential precursors to symbolic acts in the 
child. She concluded by saying, ".... (our experiments) seem to 
indicate to us that autistic children do not tend to integrate 
current experience with schemas and representations stored from 
previous sensory impressions". (p. 153; Hermelin 1978). However, 
she also notes that autism may well be present from birth, and thus 
from a period before the normal child can handle symbols and images, 
and that the behavioural pathology in autism must be due to "other 
psychological mechanisms and processes" than the ability to handle symbols 
and images. This is a topic that will be returned to later in this thesis. 
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DeMyer's (1971) claim that autistic children have problems in 
transferring information from the visual to the motoric systems thus 
gains some support from Hermelin and O'Connor's work. DeMyer's work 
in turn offers support for Hermelin and O'Connor's findings. DeMyer 
tested normal, subnormal and autistic children for their ability to 
imitate bodily movements. Some of the movements involved an object, 
such as a doll, and some left no visual trace at all, such as raising 
a hand. She found that autistic children could copy actions with a 
doll fairly well, but were significantly poorer at the other body 
movement imitations than the other two groups. Her explanation centres 
on the fact that when an action is done with a doll there is a visual 
referent available, whereas body movements leave no visual traces. The 
child thus has no cues in the latter case as to which of the possible 
body movements in his repertoire is required. However, it may be 
possible to see these findings as support for Boucher and Warrington's 
(1976) contention that autistic children have normal cued recall 
abilities but poor free recall competence. 
In conclusion, it would seem most likely that the essential deficit 
in autism can be described as 'cognitive' in nature. Autistic children 
have problems in extracting meaning from their perceptions. Their 
good immediate recall supports the idea that they can retain information, 
but the idiosyncrasy of their LTM implies that they tend not to encode 
sensory data meaningfully. Relatively low ability autistic children 
tend to have poor pattern detection abilities and also tend to impose 
their own patterns upon their perceptions regardless of the 
appropriateness of the imposition. Autistic children appear to be 
able to form internal images, but they seem poor at integrating these 
images with prior perceptions. They are also poor at using information 
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from the visual modality to aid their performance on motor tasks. In 
several respects, then, they resemble blind children. They resemble 
the deaf, too, insofar as they tend to code visual stimuli spatially 
rather than temporally, regardless of the nature of the stimuli. 
Finally, it is worthy of note that autism may be present from birth 
and thus begin at a stage in development which is precursory to the 
normal child's ability to handle symbols and images. 
1.2.4 Arousal 
Arousal is of relevance to several parts of this thesis, however, 
it will be covered briefly here due to the fact that relatively little 
is known of this complex variable. One may measure 'arousal' by several 
methods. One can, for instance, record a subjects heart-rate, or his 
EEG or observe his behaviour. However, it is possible that one level 
of arousal may be indicated by one of these measures and a quite 
different level be suggested by another measure - at the same time, 
in the same subject. Some workers have proposed that autistic children 
have arousal problems (Hutt et al, 1964; Rimland, 1964; Schopler, 1965; 
DesLauriers and Carlson, 1969). Although most of these workers have 
implicated a defect in the reeicular formation of autistic children, 
it is notable that they do not all posit the same deficit. Hutt et al 
suggests that the autistic child is over-aroused and cite EEG evidence 
to support their claim. They claim that autistic children's resting 
EEG records have a predominance of low-voltage, fast, desynchronised 
waves and that the decrease of stereotypic behaviours in such children 
accompanies a greater synchronisation of the waves. However, Hermelin 
and O'Connor (1968) found no abnormalities in the resting EEGs of 
autistic children. Hermelin and O'Connor (1971) also note that 
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Hutt et al's claim that chronic high arousal is linked to the autistic 
child's avoidance of 'social stimuli' was not supported by their studies. 
Autistic children were not found to avoid 'social' stimuli when their 
behaviour in a room containing objects and a person was noted, nor when 
they were required to look at faces with their eyes closed or faces 
with their eyes open (see O'Connor and Hermelin, 1967a). 
Rimland (1964) suggested that autistic children are under-aroused 
and suggested that a lot of their behaviour could he seen as self- 
stimulatory. However, his theory is based upon a view of the 
functioning of the rejicular formation which few physiologists hold 
and there is no supporting experimental evidence. DesLauriers and 
Carlson (1969) suggest that autistic children have problems of both 
under- and over-arousal. Though they hypothesis remains a possibility, 
no empirical evidence has been forthcoming to support it. It is also 
unclear as yet whether their view of the re ticular formation and the 
relationship of it with the limbic system is upheld by physiological 
research. 
Wing (1976) in reviewing the ideas about arousal and autism concludes 
by saying that whilst autistic children almost certainly have 
abnormalities of arousal, these are likely to be secondary to other 
abnormalities. "In any case it is difficult to explain the specific 
patterns of impairments and skills found in autism on the basis of 
anything as generalised as over- or under-arousal". (Wing, ibid; 
p. 86). 
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1.2.5 Language and Sociability 
Language and sociability will be dealt with in one section. This 
is partly because a major point to be made in this thesis is that the 
two aspects are closely related in the normal child, and party because 
few experimental studies have been done of these areas. This- latter 
point is perhaps rather surprising given that problemswith communication 
and social interaction are fundamental to autism. However, the reason 
is perhaps that such aspects of the child are easier to investigate by 
ethological, observational means rather than laboratory based 
experimental approaches. Language has nonetheless been studied - as 
the above sections have shown - and whilst language may not have 
always been the central variable being measured, it has often been a 
part of various experimental designs (children have frequently been 
required to voice their responses). One must also not overlook the 
fact that most experiments take place in a social setting. 
Abnormal responses to people are a fundamental aspect of clinicians' 
reports of the behaviour of autistic children. It is thus important 
to know whether the autistic child does indeed behave differently 
towards people than do other children of similar mental capacities. 
If this is the case, then one must further enquire if their abnormal 
response to people is peculiar to the social situation or whether it 
is just one manifestation of a more general deficit in the autistic 
child. 
A more specific aspect of the general topic of social interaction 
and autism is the claim that autistic children avoid eye contact. 
This will be discussed in more detail in a later section, however it 
will be noted here that it seems that autistic children have unusual 
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gaze behaviour which is more connected to their inability to use gaze 
correctly than,, their avoidance of others' eyes. It also appears that 
an autistic child may seem to avoid another's gaze when in fact he has 
an abnormally low fixation time on all objects, not just others' eyes 
(Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970). There is evidence of this kind, too, 
relating to the proximity which autistic children keep to people 
compared to that of control subjects. 
Hermelin and O'Connor (1963a) noted the amount of approach to, 
and orientation towards, various stimuli in autistic and control 
children. The various stimuli were placed in an otherwise empty room 
and the children were observed one at a time through a one-way mirror. 
Part of this study included a measure of the children's proximity and 
response to an adult. The adult spent 9 minutes in the room. For the 
first 3 minutes she sat still and silent. In the-next 3minutes she 
attempted to make physical contact with the child (cuddling, tickling, 
and engaging him in play). In the final 3 minutes the adult asked the 
child some questions and gave some simple verbal commands. The results 
showed no difference between the groups in the number of approaches 
and responses they made, as long as these were non-verbal. However, 
speaking or responding to speech divided the groups. Many of the 
autistic children failed to respond to speech, seeming not to understand 
or to be unattentive. However, they also found that when there were 
objects, pictures and a person in the room, all children oriented 
more often and for longer periods to the person than to the objects. 
Another study (O'Connor and Hermelin, 1963) confirmed that 
autistic children are like subnormal controls in their preferential 
orientation to people. In this study they were once again observed 
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whilst in a room. The physical distance of the children from a variety 
of objects placed at one end of the room was compared. The objects 
included both 'social' and non-social stimuli: a box, a rocking 
platform, a blanket, a life-size model of a woman, a person and a 
voice being played through a loudspeaker. It was found that subnormal 
children spent more time in the vicinity of the box, blanket and 
rocking platform than the autistic group, but there were no differences 
on the other (social) stimulus conditions. 
Two further studies by O'Connor and Hermelin (1967) pertain to 
the gaze avoidance controversy, which will be dealt with in full later. 
They measured the children's fixation times whilst looking at various 
stimuli in a box. This type of experiment was described in the above 
section on 'perception' and essentially involves the use of Fantz's 
stimulus preference method devised for use with infants. The child 
has two stimuli to look at in an otherwise dark interior of a box, and 
his visual fixations are noted. Two of the stimuli Hermelin and 
O'Connor used were a photograph of a face, and a jumbled version of the 
same photograph. Like subnormal and normal children, the autistic 
children looked more frequently and for longer at the unscrambled face 
than at the scrambled one. However, their gaze behaviour was 
characterised by extremely brief fixations whereas that of the other 
groups was not. Hermelin and O'Connor also modified the apparatus 
so that a person could look into the opposite end of the box from 
that which the child looked through. Thus the child could see a live 
face illuminated at the far end. Hermelin and O'Connor measured the 
children's eye movements when the face had its eyes open compared to 
when they were closed. Both autistic and control children looked as 
frequently atr both displays. However, once again the autistic children 
had abnormally brief fixation times. 
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In conclusion to their section on responsiveness to people, 
Hermelin and O'Connor remark, "Our results gave no support to the 
view that the behaviour of autistic children towards people or images 
of people is specifically impaired in comparison with their behaviour 
towards other objects. " (1970, p. 120). Nonetheless, abnormal social 
response is one of the most clear symptoms which presents itself to 
the clinician. It is also undoubtedly true that people as a class 
of objects differ from most objects in crucial ways, and thus present 
specific problems for any child who has a 'cognitive dysfunction'. 
This point will be returned to later. 
It should be noted, though, that some workers have put a more 
primary emphasis on the social problems of the autistic child (Kanner 
1943,1949,1954; Hutt and Ounsted, 1966; Richer, 1976). Hutt and 
Ounsted claimed to find that autistic children specifically avoided 
looking at social stimuli and related their findings to the theory 
(Hutt et al., 1965) that the autistic child is chronically over-aroused. 
However, they have been criticised (Hermelin and O'Connor, 1971, p. 17) 
for drawing conclusions which go beyond the experimental evidence they 
obtained. They also had very few subjects in their experiment. Their 
study has also not yet been replicated, although results presented in 
this thesis are of relevance. 
Richer and Coss (in Coss 1972) also did a study which claimed to 
show that autistic children specifically avoid looking at people's eyes. 
This experiment and criticisms of it will be given later; suffice to 
say at this juncture that the results they obtained are highly 
questionable. Finally, approaches to the study of autistic children 
such as that of Richer (1976) and Tinbergen and Tinbergen 
(1972) have 
been strongly criticised(Ricks and Wing, 1976, for example). 
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To summarize, then, there is a body of experimental evidence 
(albeit small and unreplicated) which suggests that the social handicap 
of the autistic child might be secondary to a more basic handicap. 
Whilst autistic children and subnormal children alike seem to respond 
more to people than to objects, the autistic child appears to have a 
less differentiated response to people. It is perhaps primarily the 
autistic child's failure to find meaning in his perceptions which leads 
him to be less sociable than other children. 
Experimental studies of autistic children's language have been 
scarce. There has, however, been a lot of space in the literature 
devoted to the description of the syndrome which has been given to 
the topic of the language. In several papers, Rutter (1968,1972, 
1974,1978) has emphasised his belief that language problems are at 
the heart of autism. Over the years Rutter has summarised the trends 
in thought about language and autism. Briefly, this has covered a 
period when Rutter referred to autistic children as having a "language 
delay" (and spoken language was mainly referred to), through a period 
when the deviance of their language was emphasised, and most recently 
to the emphasis on the language deficit being global insofar as it 
affects all modes of communication. Distinctive characteristics of 
their speech have been noted. For instance, they tend to begin their 
speech development with echolalia which is unlike that of normal 
children in that autistic children repeat what they hear as it is 
heard, unmodified by the level of their grammatical competence. In 
contrast, normal children's echolalia is modified by the level of their 
grammatical competence. Related to the echolalia is the tendency for 
autistic children to go through a much longer period than normal 
in 
which they reverse pronouns. They also frequently 
display abnormal 
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gore _cc,. ra'ekL) Iý 
use 't1ýe covýec L5 -'tt, e t plýcaýot ilýat tiýey veverse 
yv WOV_MS '6 Mi: -, ll, I It, 
47 
prosody (rhythm, pitch and contour of the speech), tending to speak all 
utterences in a monotone or with a particular idiosyncratic phrasing. 
As with the normal child in the early stages of language development, 
they show such features as naming difficulties, neologisms, 
abbreviations and telegrammatic speech. 
Hermelin and O'Connor's (1971) above mentioned studies of recall 
of meaningful and randomly organised word strings tend to suggest that 
the less able autistic child has problems with both the syntactical 
and semantic aspects of speech. However, this was not so for the 
more able autistic children, whose abilities in these areas of language 
may approach or equal those of subnormal children with similar M. A. s. 
Frith (1969), in collaboration with Hermelin and O'Connor, has also 
tested the effect of word stress upon recall by autistic and subnormal 
children. It was found that both groups tended to recall the stressed 
words better than the unstressed ones. 
Baltaxe and Simmons (1975,1977a, b) and Baltaxe (1977,1979, 
1980) have undertaken a series of studies of the language of autistic 
children. The major results of their work have been the delineation 
of pragmatic factors of speech as the core symptoms. This has also 
been noted by others (Langdell, 1977,1980; Frith, 1980). Such factors 
refer primarily to the use to which language is put. This is bound' up 
with an awareness of the social aspects of speech, the context in which 
utterences occur, the shared understandings between speaker and listener, 
and the use of prosody. Baltaxe has focused on the latter factor of 
prosody as a primary aspect, but to do so may obscure more relevant 
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'interpersonal' aspects of autistics' language. The pragmatic aspects 
of autistic children's language is important and will be dealt with 
fully later in this thesis. 
In conclusion, few studies of autistic children's language have 
been undertaken. It would appear that the lower ability autistic child 
has problems with all aspects of speech (indeed many of the least able 
autistic children are mute), whereas the more able autistic child may 
more realistically be described as having problems with the use to 
which language is put. It is noted, though, that the latter aspect 
of linguistic pragmatics is a new area in the study of autism, and as 
yet little is known about it beyond the level of description. Pragmatics 
and the relationship between verbal and non-verbal factors will be a 
focus of this thesis. 
1.3 Terminology, Diagnosis and the Selection of Subjects 
The aim of this section is to survey the issue of the terminology 
of the syndrome and to discuss the problems of diagnosing autistic 
children. After this the selection procedure of the subjects used in 
the thesis will be given as well as a brief summary of the case history 
of each autistic child. 
1.3.1 Terminology 
Since Kanner (1943) first called the syndrome "infantile autism" 
workers have used various other labels, such as Creak et al's(1961) 
"childhood schizophrenia" and Goldfarb's "childhood psychosis". All 
three labels are open to criticism for several reasons. In the first 
place Kanner's use of the term "infantile" might imply that the syndrome 
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is particularly related to infancy. However, Rutter (1974) has noted 
that symptoms which are indistinguishable from those 
which Kanner described-may be found in children who develop normally 
up to 2 or 3 years of age. The term "schizophrenia" is also very 
misleading in that it implies a connection with adult schizophrenia, 
which-does not appear to be true. For instance, adult schizophrenics 
are reported to have hallucinations whereas autistic children do not, 
and schizophrenics are more likely to come from unskilled or semi- 
skilled parents whereas autistic children are more likely to have 
middle class parents (although this last point has recently been 
questioned by Wing, (1980)). For a more complete discussion of the 
differences between autism and schizophrenia the reader is referred 
to Wing (1976), or Rutter (1974). 
The term "psychosis" is also potentially misleading for similar 
reasons. Wing (1976) states that "childhood psychosis" includes 
autism, but it may also be used to describe many other conditions of 
childhood whose symptoms differ greatly from those of autism. 
"Psychosis" may also cause confusion because of the implication of 
'thought disorder' which it carries (the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines psychosis in terms of a severe mental derangement involving 
the whole personality). Whilst the autistic child may display a 
rigidity of thought patterns it is perhaps less than accurate to refer 
to his thought as 'deranged'. Certainly autism is not a personality 
disorder in the usual sense of the term. 
What term should one use then? Wing (1976) suggests "early 
childhood autism". Her reasons for the choice of this is that it allows 
for the fact that autism is not always evident from birth but also has 
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the virtue of implying that the "autism" (i. e. the withdrawal) may be 
present only in the early years. Wing further suggests that the term 
might be changed when more is known about the underlying neurological 
impairment present in autistic children. However, it has yet to be shown 
that a single such impairment exists. 
There are 'though Itwo viable alternatives 
to the above term. First, 
one might return to calling the syndrome by its delineator (hence "Kanner's 
Syndrome") as it was once referred to. Although this might lead to 
argument, too, as others have laid claim to referring to similar children 
at about the same time as Kanner, or even sooner. Second, one might 
suggest that the term "autism" alone be adopted. The reason usually 
given as to why one does not do this is that the term on its own has 
unfortunate connotations. It was first used by Bleuler (1919) to refer 
to schizophrenic patients who have withdrawn into an inner world of 
fantasy. This is not the case for the autistic child, who is 
characterised by his lack of fantasy and inner language (Ricks and Wing, 
1976). However, it may be noted that throughout the literature even 
those writers who agree on the merits of one term or another, may still 
use the shorthand term of "autism" or "autistic". The reasons are perhaps 
obvious, and the present author has been guilty of doing this throughout 
this thesis. Words have a habit of coming to mean what their use implies 
that they mean. Thus by use a word like "awful" has come to mean the 
opposite of its etymological derivation. Already it might be suggested 
that many workers in the field of childhood mental disorders are not 
likely to confuse childhood autism with Bleuler's original term - and it 
could be argued that in many cases they are unaware of its other, original 
use. Thus whilst the present author is in agreement with Wing's reasons 
for choosing "early childhood autism" as the best available widespread 
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term to date, it is nonetheless noted that common usage will probably 
cause the singular tern "autism" to be widely and unconfusingly applied. 
The area of terminology is thus rather confused, and undoubtedly made 
too much of. 
1.3.2 -Diagnosis 
As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, Kanner first 
singled out 5 points which characterise the autistic child: 
1. A profound lack of contact with other people 
2. An anxiously obsessive desire for the preservation 
of sameness. 
3. A fascination for objects which are handled with skill 
in fine motor movements. 
4. Mutism or a type of language which does not seem intended 
to communicate. 
5. The retention of an intelligent physiognomy and evidence 
of good cognitive potential as shown by such abilities 
as an excellent rote memory or their skill on performance 
tests. 
It was also mentioned above that there are many problems with 
application of the above five points as diagnostic criteria. First, 
it is misleading to imply that any islets of ability in the autistic 
child are evidence for essentially good cognitive potential. Most 
autistic children remain in the subnormal range of functioning. 
There is also evidence that particular cognitive deficits (see Hermelin 
and O'Connor, 1971) may allow a child to have a few seemingly good 
abilities and yet still handicap him tremendously. Whilst it is 
undoubtablY true also that subnormal autistic children do not look 
subnormal (unlike many other subnormal children) it is again misleading 
to refer to their appearance as "intelligent". Such a set of 
descriptions might lead one to think that the child is essentially 
normal but temporarily withdrawn for psychosocial reasons only. 
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Wing also notes (1976, p. 17) that people who have tried to apply 
Kanner's criteria have been loath to include any child who shows any 
signs- of awareness of others. This thus excludes virtually every eligible 
child. The main problems seem to have arisen from the fact that 
clinicians have tended to refer to his five points and not considered 
what he meant by them in the light of the eleven case histories he 
presented in great detail (1943). 
Several other diagnostic schemes have been criticised on the 
grounds or being potentially misleading. Creak et al's "9 points" 
have been faulted for containing too much ambiguity of meaning. 
In addition, many workers have taken 4 out of the 9 points listed by 
Creak et al. as their criterion for autism. Whilst it is agreed that 
not all 9 points outlined by them are essential, by taking only 4 one 
might wrongly classify a child with no real social or language problems 
as autistic. A similar criticism can be made about Rendle-Short's 14 
diagnostic points (see Rendle-Short, 1971; Clancy et al, 1969). He 
suggested that only 7 of the 14 points need be present for the 
diagnosis of autism. However, once again this would allow one to give 
the label to a child who showed none of the accepted basic characteristics 
of autism. In fact, one of the 14 points was counter indicative of 
autism, for it was claimed that the autistic child uses gesture instead 
of language. This is quite contrary to the clinical observations which 
have revealed that autistic children have particular problems with the 
production and use of gesture (see Bartak et al., 1975). 
Rutter and his colleagues have been concerned to discover which 
characteristics are specificto autism (Rutter, 1966,1974; Rutter and 
Lockyer, 1967). Rutter (19-4) reported that only two behavioural 
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characteristics were common to all autistic children: a profound and 
general failure to develop social relationships, and language problems 
which include lack of comprehension, echolalia, and pronominal reversal. 
Ritualistic and stereotyped behaviours were reported in the majority of 
autistic children but were also frequent in other types of children, too. 
It should be noted here that autistic children's echolalia and their 
tendency to reverse pronouns are both aspects of their general inability 
to understand what language is used for. 
More recently Rutter (1978) has updated his criteria in response 
to the observations and empirical research of the past decade. It has 
been noted for some time that it is important to emphasise that the 
language problems of the autistic child do not constitute a delay, but 
are rather abnormalities (Newson, 1977). It is also imperative to note 
that the autistic child is impaired in all modes of communication, not 
just the verbal aspects (see Tubbs, 1966, for example). Thus the best 
diagnostic points at this time would appear to be: 
1. An impairment of language and all modes of communication, 
which has certain well-defined characteristics and is out 
of keeping with the child's general intellectual level. 
2. Impaired social development which is characterised by a 
number of special features such as a failure to develop 
empathy. This impairment of social relations is out of 
keeping with the child's general intellectual level. 
3. Evidence of rigidity and inflexibility of thought processes 
reflected in an insistance upon sameness, stereotypies, 
abnormal preoccupations, and a resistance to change. 
4. An onset of symptoms before 30 months of age. 
(Drawing on Rutter, 1978, and Newson, 1980). 
It is clear that a glossary is needed to be able to apply these 
diagnostic pointers, especially the first two. Although several workers 
have written in some detail about the specific characteristics of autism 
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(Rutter, 1978 for instance), this does not detract from the fact that 
the factors which lead to diagnosis are complex and may make the correct 
labelling of a child difficult. 
Wing (1976) indicates the complexity of diagnosis when she 
refers to the fact that a lengthy interview with parents is almost 
obligatory. The problem is that an accurate diagnosis is dependent 
upon full details of the child's history. There is every indication 
that no list of pointers can replace first-hand knowledge of a large 
number of children with autistic features. Newson (1977) has also 
emphasised that the problem with toting up any list of points is that 
it misses what she terms the whole nature of autism. That is, to tot 
up points allows the clinician to miss the fact that in autism every 
kind of impairment links up with every other kind of impairment. The 
impairments flow into each other, and it is the interaction between 
the different parts of the syndrome which is most characteristic of 
autism. As Creak et al. (1961) pointed out, every characteristic in 
autism can be found in the normal child at some stage in his development. 
The diagnosis of autism is thus rather complicated by various 
factors. Indeed there are some workers who feel that autism may not 
be a separate syndrome but may be part of a spectrum of language or 
social disorders in childhood (Wing, inter alia, for instance). The 
fundamental problem is that autistics, like schizophrenics, do not all 
share some easily definable characteristic (as do Down's children or 
those with PKU). Autistic children rather tend to form a family, where 
not all members look alike but all resemble some other members. Together 
with this is a common aspect of all autistic children which may be 
likened to the "look" of a family. 
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1.3.3. Selection of Subjects 
The first step in the choice of autistic children to be used in 
the present studies was to visit as many schools for autistic children 
as was practical. Seven schools were visited, five of these on a fairly 
regular basis, and two of them weekly during the first year of research. 
More recently schools in Holland, Germany and the United States have 
been visited to consolidate the subjective impressions of autism against 
various cultural and linguistic backgrounds. As the result of the 
visits to English schools a pool of 20 autistic children were chosen 
from just 2 schools (both of which belong to the National Society for 
Autistic Children). Thus these children were chosen not only with the 
academic concept of "syndrome typicality" in mind, but also with the 
experience gained from seeing some 250 children who had received the 
label of "autistic". This coupled with the reports of experienced 
psychiatrists and psychologists (where available) was seen to be the 
safest method of choosing a subject pool of autistic children for 
experimental purposes. 
Each child was screened, though, to make sure that he complied 
with the then most used system of classification (Rutter, 1971). 
This was essentially a list of 4 points which closely resemble those 
mentioned near the end of the last section. That is, a delay in language 
development, an impairment in the formation of relationships, ritualistic 
and compulsive behaviour, and an onset before 30 months. 
The subject pool was initially chosen for the first study to be 
reported in this thesis. This involved children having to identify 
faces, and it was necessary that the subjects have some verbal ability. 
This consequently narrowed the sample to relatively able children who 
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were at least 8-years-old. The details of the children are given 
in table 1.1. As can be seenAthe ratio of males to females was high, 
and thus in accord with the ratio found in the general population 
(Rutter, 1974). Again, because of the requirements of the first 
experiment, the children were split into two groups according to 
their chronological ages. Comparison groups were also chosen at two 
age levels. If one is trying to show abnormal performance or response 
in an autistic child, then one must also test a normal child of similar 
mental age. But if the autistic child is found to perform/respond 
differently to the normal child, it might still be because of the 
subnormal nature of his cognitive abilities. Thus the child must also 
be compared to a subnormal child of similar mental and chronological 
age who is not autistic. Finally, should the autistic child perform 
well on a task, one wishes to know how good his performance is compared 
to that of a normal child of similar chronological age. Thus three 
comparison groups were chosen, each at two levels of age, to match the 
autistic groups. Two groups were of normal children who were matched 
to the mental ages of the 2 groups of autistic children (on WISC scores). 
Another two groups were of normal children matched to the chronological 
ages of the children in the two autistic groups. Finally, there were 
two groups of subnormal children who were matched with the autistic 
children for both mental (WISC scores) and chronological ages. Only 
if the autistic children's performances differ from all the other groups 
can one conclude that the results are due to their 'autism'. The 
subnormal children were all free of autistic symptoms, and the normal 
children matched to the C. A. of the autistics were chosen as being 
'average' performers according to teachers' reports. 
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As will be seen, in most of the studies after the first one, it 
was decided that the subnormal children were the most pertinent 
comparison group. Because of their general abilities, the subnormal 
children will hereafter be referred to as 'ESN' children. 
There follows a brief summary of the information gathered on the 
autistic children. It will be noted that in most cases the files on 
the children were fairly uninformative, particularly with reference to 
the child's development prior to school entry. The children's parents 
were not available for the collection of any further information. 
However, any sparsity of critical information (such as age of onset 
of symptoms) was compensated for by consultation with the heads of the 
schools. 
Child 1: Paul B. D. O. B. 5/6/63. 
Paul is the second born of a family of five. His two siblings are 
female (one a year older, the other about two and a half years younger). 
The pregnancy was normal but birth was delayed. The first suspicion of 
abnormality was at around 15 months when Paul was noted to head-bang. 
He was a difficult child to manage at home, had no speech at 18 months, 
took no notice of others, had no bowel/bladder control and seemed not 
to be able to understand the simplest of commands. Diagnosis of 
autism was made at 24 months. There is no known history of mental 
illness in Paul's family. The change in Paul's condition has been 
very dramatic. At about 4 to 5 years old he was still in nappies day 
and night. He could not dress himself, and had virtually no speech. 
He would take people's hands if he wanted something and would happily 
spend his day fitting puzzle-type games and objects together. By the 
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time he was first seen by the present author Cat 12 years old) he had 
fluent speech and was certainly not socially withdrawn. As is typical 
of the more able autistic child (Wing, 1976) Paul's main problems are 
now in the realm of the 'do's' and 'do nots' of social interaction, 
and not in the presence or absence of it. He still retains his greater 
ability in spatial/non-verabl taks but he is only slightly delayed in 
his linguistic abilities. 
Child 2: Gary. D. O. B. 29/3/6S. 
Gary is an only child. His Mother claims that she knew there 
was something wrong with him from his very first cry. Both parents are 
qualified mental nurses. He began to walk at about 12 months, talk at 
3 years, and had bladder control at 4 years. There is no noted 
abnormality in the pregnancy, his birth or his early life. There are 
no neurological signs. Autism was first suspected in the last quarter 
of the first year. He did not play, was very resistant to any change, 
banged his head when frustrated, flapped hands and arms, looked out 
of the corner of his eye at things, and his sentences were stereotypic/ 
echolalic in nature. As with Paul, Gary's symptoms of withdrawal from 
social contact have given way now to problems with social interaction. 
He can still be aloof, but may paradoxically indulge in attention- 
seeking routines. Once again the WISC showed him to be more able to 
do non-verbal tasks than verbal ones. In common with many fairly able 
autistic children, communication with Gary is quite possible so long 
as it takes place on his terms. 
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Child 3: Clive D. O. B. - 15/4/65. 
Clive is the third born of his family and quite a lot younger 
than his two brothers. Because the brothers were born in 1953 and 
1958 one may assume that his mother was of mature years when she had 
Clive. However, the pregnancy and birth are recorded as normal and 
nothing out of the ordinary is noted in his earliest development. In 
fact, it seems that his mother did not notice anything wrong with him 
even at 3 years. At this age he went to a nursery and immediately a 
nurse there suspected that Clive might be autistic. Thus one must 
assume that the statement of Clive's normal development up to 3 years 
must be looked upon with suspicion. Clive walked at 14 months, but 
continence by 22 years, had some words at 1 year and spoke at 18 months. 
However, his mother said that his speech was never "conversational" 
and that he has always "tapped things". He is also aloof, even now 
to some extent. His mother has taken a very long time to concede that 
there might be anything wrong with Clive but admits that his present 
disinterest in others has always been there - certainly prior to 30 
months. Today Clive is not withdrawn, but he is "distant" in his 
manner. He will hardly ever initiate a conversation, and when he does 
his topics are likely to be sterotypic or bizarre. 
Child 4: Christopher, D. O. B. - 19/9/65 
Christopher is a firstborn. There were no pregnancy problems, but 
the second stage of labour was prolonged, with signs of foetal distress. 
There is no history of mental illness in his family. The first signs 
of abnormality came within the first 30 months of life. He was described 
as ahyperactive child, who was aloof and slow to develop language. 
Little else is known about his early development, but there would seem 
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to be no overt signs of brain damage. He is now still fairly aloof, 
and his linguistic abilities are certainly out of keeping with his 
intellectual level. His language is particularly poor when it comes 
to using it to communicate. 
Child 5: Michael, D. O. B. - 19/1/62. 
Michael is the second child of a family of four. Both parents are 
university graduates. The head of the school remembered that he was 
born prematurely, but there was no note of pregnancy or birth problems 
in his file. Abnormality was first suspected at 18 months because the 
words he had acquired by then were not being extended or put to 
conversational use. The label of autism, though, was not given to 
Michael until some 4 years of age. He had always been noted as a 
distant child, but he is now somewhat more sociable. He will readily 
engage in social conversation now, but does so mainly on stereotypic 
topics. He will greet one by name, but shows few totally normal social 
behaviours. 
Child 6: Martin K. D. O. B. - 24/11/66 
Martin is an only child. He first walked unaided at 16 months, 
was not fully continent until 5 years, possessed some words by 2--years- 
old and some phrases by 3 years. His parents have taken a long time 
to accept that there is anything abnormal about Martin. Thus reliable 
data about his early development is not available. He seems- to have 
had no major illnesses. There are no hard signs of neurological 
problems. There is nothing noted regarding pregnancy or birth problems. 
However, Martin seems always to have been abnormal in his social 
behaviour. In early life he was a "solitary person" and his words 
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and phrases were almost totally echolalic. In early childhood, he 
was diagnosed as having a personality disorder, but the information 
fits more exactly the diagnosis of autism which he has more recently 
been given. Today Martin is more sociable, but his speech is full of 
obsessive phrases and is delivered in a fairly high-pitched and 
monotonous manner. He is still a solitary child, and has many 
obsessions - most of which are verbal. 
Child 7: Robert, D. O. B. - 26/2/62 
The file on Robert is very brief and essentially tells one that 
he is of below average ability. However, the head is certain that his 
birth and the pregnancy were normal and that his earliest development 
did not lead to suspicions of abnormality. However, before 30 months 
of age, his aloofness and non-communicative use of language provided 
indications of autism. Certainly, when first seen Robert presented 
as a fairly typical autistic child of above average ability. He had 
a distant manner, and his attempts at social interaction were invariably 
abnormal. Whilst his speech is good, it is notable that he scores 
well below his age level on the verbal tasks of the WISC. His being 
particularly poor on the comprehension of language gave support to 
the description of him as autistic. 
Child 8: Rebecca, D. O. B. - 4/6/67 
Very little pertaining to Rebecca's early life is included in her 
file. At first her development was presumably seen as normal for she 
was sent to a normal village school. However, she was always out of 
place there. She failed to keep up with the others of her age and was 
frequently "picked on" by other children. Because of her "underachievemen 
she was sent to an ESN school where she was later diagnosed as autistic. 
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At first sight one might doubt Rebecca's diagnosis. However, she now 
presents as a bright autistic child. One also notes that it may be 
very hard to diagnosis "mild" autism early in life. The more intelligent 
autistic child may only appear as a difficult child when seen in the 
context of a normal school. Further questioning of the parents by the 
head of the autistics' school revealed that Rebecca was always a loner 
at school. She made no friends and played very little, if at all. 
The head also commented on Rebecca's tendency to wiggle her fingers in 
front of her eyes occasionally, and was told that Rebecca had done that 
since infancy - it was not seen as abnormal by the parents and thus 
was not mentioned. Thus there would seem little doubt that Rebecca 
is a fairly able autistic child whose symptoms of social aloofness 
and abnormalities of language stem from within the first 30 months of 
life. Her social behaviour is still out of keeping with her intellectual 
level, and her language is also abnormal in the ways described by 
Rutter (1978). 
Child 9: David B. D. O. B. - 13/12/62 
The notes on David are poor. He is the fifth child of the family. 
He was seen to be abnormal early in his development. A doctor who was 
a friend of the family suggested early on that David might be autistic. 
His symptoms began very early (before 30 months) and certainly included 
many typical autistic features (such as aloofness, slow speech development, 
and lack of communicative speech when it did develop). 
Child 10: Cathy, D. O. B. - 29/4/63 
The notes on Cathy are also scant. She is the second of two 
children in the family, and her sister is reported to have language 
problems. As far as is known she has had no illnesses which may have 
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given rise to her condition. There are no hard signs of brain damage. 
Pregnancy and birth were reputedly normal. Her gross language problems 
and social abnormalities have been evident since before 30 months of 
age. Today she presents as a distant child who is "more with it" than 
one first imagines. That is, she seems to be intellectually very slow 
and has little clear speech, but her comprehension of speech as 
revealed by her following commands is higher than her verbal performance 
would imply. 
Child 11: Mark, D. O. B. - 31/12/61 
Mark is an only child. His mother fell downstairs in the 6th month 
of pregnancy, but no immediate consequences were apparent. The birth 
was normal and as a baby he seemed to develop fairly normally. He 
loved to be cuddled and would laugh when tickled, but he seemed too 
placid and lacked normal reactions to outside stimuli. His father 
suspected something to be wrong when Mark was 2 years old because 
he was not developing speech. His mother was young at his birth (16) 
and he may have been an unwanted child as divorce followed relatively 
soon after his birth. However, there is nothing to connect Mark's 
condition with this early upheaval. Today Mark presents as an 
extraordinary child. Although autistic in his distance from others 
(especially peers) and his naievity when it comes to socialising, 
he has an exceptional musical ability. He has been shown to have 
perfect pitch, an excellent sense of key, and his memory for music 
is outstanding. 
Child 12: Paul Mc. D. O. B. - 1/5/66 
The notes on Paul are incomplete. However, it is known that his 
mother was unconcious during the first stage of labour for four hours. 
This has no effect on the baby as far as could be told at that time. 
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There are no signs of brain damage. Paul is an only child. His 
autism was suspected at about 19 months because of his extreme placidity. 
He was late to develop language, and he spoke mainly echolalically for 
some time. Today Paul presents as a fairly typical autistic child as 
per Rutter's (1978) classification. He is a fairly bright child, 
although a formal test delivers a mildly subnormal score. 
Child 13: Stewart, D. O. B. - 8/10/65 
StewaztIs file was almost bereft of information. He has one older 
sibling (F, 18/5/62). As far as is known his birth went without problems, 
as did the pregnancy. He showed typical autistic features in his early 
childhood. 
Child 14: Stephen Q, D. O. B. - 2/3/68 
He is an only child. Autism was first suspected at 18 months 
(language was not developing, and he presented as an aloof child). 
He attended his first school for autistic children at the age of 4 yrs 
11 months. 
Child 15: Chrissy, D. O. B. - 16/1/67 
He has one female sibling who is two years older. His notes tell 
that he was first suspected as autistic at about 18 months. Little 
information about his early life is available, and there is no evidence 
of prenatal, perinatal or postnatal problems. No evidence exists for 
neurological dysfunction or damage. 
Child 16: John, D. O. B. - 7/12/62 
He is a first born child, with one sibling (M, 3 years younger). 
At 9 months John was suspected of being deaf because of his lack of 
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response to auditory stimuli. However, hearing tests found nothing 
to support the suspicions. It was later realised that his aloofness 
and slow language development were in fact aspects of his autism. 
There is no evidence for neurological abnormality. Since very young 
he has assembled puzzles at 90 degrees from normal, and has been able 
to do them when no picture is present. At 7 yrs 9 mths, he was tested 
to have a performance IQ of 124. Although his ability here is now much 
more in the normal range, he is nonetheless very able at non-verbal tasks. 
Child 17: Steven, D. O. B. - 1/5/61 
Steven is an only child. Some abnormality was indicated as early 
as 18 months, but the diagnosis of autism itself was not made until 
he was 4 years. His onset of symptoms is said to have been concurrent 
with the break up of his parent's marriage. However, it seems unlikely 
that Steven's problems were in any sense "caused" by the separation. 
He was walking at 15 months, but did not start to talk until 4 years 
of age. The birth and pregnancy are reported to have been without 
complication. Steven is now a slow child for his age and undoubtably 
presents as an autistic. 
Child 18: David, C. D. O. B. - 21/7/60. 
David had a normal birth, and the pregnancy was not complicated. 
He was adopted at 7 weeks of age. Thus although he is reported to have 
one sibling who is 3 years his senior, this child would seem to be his 
half-brother. It is very likely that he is therefore a first born. 
His condition was first noticed at 24 months when he was slow to 
acquire communicative language and presented as a distant child. 
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TABLE 1.2 Summary of Pathological Data: Autistic Children 
(n = 20) 
Early Onset 20 
Males 18 
First Born 13 
Premature 1 
Pregnancy Complications I 
Birth Complications 3 
Low Intelligence in one or Both Parents p 
Mental Illness or Subnormality in sibs 1 
Seizures 0 
"Soft" Neurological Signs 0 
No speech 0 
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Child 19: Martyr, D. O. B. - 1/7/62 
Martyn was a firstborn thus although his mother claims to have 
felt there was something wrong from the time of labour, one cannot be 
sure this was so. There is certainly no medical evidence to support 
prenatal problems. His head was stuck in and forceps were used. It 
is not known whether this has any causative connection with his present 
condition. However, there are no signs of neurological impairment. 
Abnormality was first suspected by the parents at 6 months, but they 
did not feel sure until 2 years. Martyn was diagnosed as autistic 
at 4% years of age. 
Child 20: Neil, D. O. B. - 13/4/59 
Little information on Neil's early development was available. 
However, it seems certain that his development in infancy was fairly 
normal. But speech was late to emerge and developed in a non- 
communicative manner. He has always been a loner, and even now 
presents as someone in a world of his own at times. Suspicion of 
autism occurred early in his life and the onset of symptoms was 
within the first 30 months. Today Neil is a very bright autistic 
child. He possesses a remarkable ability to add up long strings of 
numbers in his head and is able to mentally multiply 6 finger numbers. 
It is also claimed that he can readily state on which day of the week 
a person was born on given only their birth date. 
1.3.4 Themes in the pathological data 
In table 1.2 it can be seen that there is a high preponderance 
of first-borns amongst the sample of autistic children (13 out of 20). 
To date it is unclear whether there is any relationship between birth 
order and autism. Several authors have noted a tendency for autistic 
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children to be first born (Rimland, 1964; Kanner, 1954; Creak and 
Ini, 1960; Pitfield and Oppenheim, 1964; Rutter, 1967). However, 
Wing (1967) states that whereas the firstborn of two sibs has a higher 
risk than in other sibship sizes, there is no significant association 
between birth rank and abnormalities when it is classified into first- 
born, intermediate and last-born. Nonetheless, Hermelin and O'Connor 
(1970) found that of their sample of 27 autistic children, 20 were 
first-born. Should there indeed be a preponderance of first-borns 
amongst the autistic population, then this would tend to implicate birth 
injury as a possible cause of the syndrome. 
Complications in pregnancy and birth are sometimes reported to 
be quite high in autism (Knoblock and Pasamack, 1962; Gardner, 1976). 
Although they do not discuss the topic, it may be noted that Hermelin 
and O'Connor (1970) found a fairly high incidence of pregnancy and birth 
complications in their "small" sample. The sample of this thesis, in 
contrast, have very few incidents of such problems. This may be in 
part due to the general level of ability of the children in the present 
studies compared to that of the children studied by the above cited 
workers. Certainly the children studied by Hermelin and O'Connor and 
by Gardner were mostly of relatively low intelligence. It may well be 
the case that pregnancy and birth complications are more frequently 
associated with the autistic child of lower ability. 
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Chapter 2 
FACE PERCEPTION AND MUTUAL GAZE 
2: 1 The Ontogeny of Face Perception 
Instead of searching for drives to 'explain' social development 
it is more profitable to conceive of sociability as originating 
in the infant's perceptual encounters with other people. 
(Schaffer, 1971, p. 57). 
One of the first and most consistent of the perceptual encounters 
to which Schaffer refers is the human face. It is thus hardly surprising 
that the perception of people's faces figures prominently in discussions 
of the unfolding of the child's sociability. An abundance of studies on 
the topic reflects an immense interest in the ontogeny of face perception 
(Ellis, 1975), but sadly leaves us with a somewhat confused picture of 
the subject (Gibson, 1969). Perhaps a substantial part of this confusion 
is due to the fact that our knowledge about the infant's perception of 
faces is drawn from a wide variety of studies dealing with a wide range 
of topics, and not necessarily with the ontogeny of face perception per 
se. For example, studies of smiling have aimed to establish which aspects 
of the infant's perceptual environment lead to a smiling response (Ambrose, 
1961; Wolff, 1963; Spitz, 1946): not surprisingly the human face, or 
parts of it, has been found to be a prominent releaser of smiles in the 
newborn. Other workers have been more interested in the general perceptual 
abilities of the child (Gibson, 1969; Thomas, 1965), or in the formation 
of specific perceptual schemata (Kagan et al, 1966), or in the perception 
of object orientation (Watson, 1966) - with the result that they have 
provided useful information about the development of face perception in a 
somewhat serendipitous manner. Nevertheless, many studies have addressed 
themselves directly to the topic and have generally fallen into two basic 
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Human voice 
Dot patterns 
Human face, nodding, 
or eye contact (not 
preferred over non- 
human displays) 
Face with only the 
eye area and brows 
Full face, expression- 
less(hairline not 
necessary) 
Smiling face (full 
complement of facial 
details) 
012345678 
Age (months) 
Figure 2.1 The stimuli which elicit smiles from normal babies - note that with increasing age they become more 
specific to human faces (details from Ahrens, 1954, 
and Bower, 1977) 
[*Note that the full 'social' smile emerges at 6 weeks] 
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No preference for 
fixating schematic 
face over scrambled 
version of the same 
Fixate checkerboard 
more than drawing 
of face 
Tend to fixate peri- 
phery and not inside 
Fixate upon eyes 
Tend scan eyes, espec- 
ially when talked to 
Prefer fixate solid 
face over cutout one 
Prefer fixate regular 
face over scrambled 
Motion of mouth increa- 
ses attention to it 
Uniqueness of individual 
faces appreciated. 
Age (months) 
-continues as 
tendency 
no data beyond 
11 weeks 
Figure 2.2 Fixation 'preferences' with increasing age 
(details from Gibson, 1969; Ahrens, 1954; 
Haith et al., 1977) 
73 
types: those interested in the possible innateness of face perception 
(see Schaffer, 1971) and those concerned with the delineation of the 
stages in the development of social perception (e. g. Ahrens, 1954; 
Fantz, 1965). 
With the foregoing in mind, a summary will be presented of the 
present state of our knowledge about the ontogeny of face perception. 
As will be seen, this is at times somewhat contradictory, and far from 
complete. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show which stimuli elicit smiles, and 
which are preferentially fixated in the first 8 months of life. Reference 
to these figures may prove helpful to the understanding of the following 
sections. 
2.1.1: THE FIRST YEAR OF LIFE 
(a) Birth to four weeks of age 
A question of major pertinence to this section is: "Is face 
perception an innate property of the human infant? " If by this we mean 
that the infant is born with the ability to recognize the basic pattern 
of a face qua face from birth, then the answer is simply "No". However, 
it does seem quite possible that certain biases exist within the newborn's 
perceptual organization that do favour the human face as an attractor 
of infant attention par excellence. 
A number of studies have come to the conclusion that the newborn 
exhibits no 'preferential' fixation of real faces over other complex 
stimuli, including stimuli whose elements are those of a face but are 
in scrambled form (Hershenson et al, 1967; Herschenson, 1966; Fantz, 
1965,1966; Thomas, 1965; Koopman & Ames, 1968)" Early reports that 
the human face might be a unique stimulus for the newborn were confused 
by the uncontrolled variable of complexity (e. g. Fantz, 1963). However, 
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they gave clear indications that a schematic 
face is 'preferred' to: 
coloured discs (Fantz, 
1963,1965); bull's eyes (Fantz, 1963); dice 
(Stechler, 1964); newsprint (Fantz, 1963,1965); red squares 
(Fantz, 
1967); or a lighted orange bulb (Fantz, 1967). Indeed, 
Fantz himself 
found (1965) that for infants in the first week of life, visual preferences, 
as measured by lengths of fixation, were solely 
dependent upon the 
complexity of the stimuli presented; there is in 
fact a body of evidence 
to support the view that infants prefer a certain level of complexity 
(Hershenson, 1964; Brennan, 1965). Typically, these studies have 
succeeded in showing that newborns tend to fixate a checkerboard with 
a particular number of squares in 'preference' to those with either less 
or more squares. Thus it would seem quite possible that 'visual preference 
studies' have done little more than to demonstrate this finding - that 
complicated patterns (such as newsprint) and simplistic ones (such as 
red squares and dice) lie either side of an optimum level of complexity 
that is more closely approximated by a schematic face. The helpfulness 
of these findings is thus rather unclear, and even less so when one 
considers that real (live) faces possess a quite different level of 
complexity than the drawings that have been used in most of the studies. 
It may also be noted that the word 'preference' is being used in a very 
loose sense and refers to the activity on the part of the infant of 
looking at one visual stimulus longer than at another. Obviously, 
there could be many reasons why the newborn might do this, and hence 
the unqualified usage of this term is to be criticized. 
It has been reported that infants in the first month or so of life 
have a tendency to only scan the perimeters of objects presented to 
them (see Maurer & Maurer, 1976; Haaf, 1974; Kessen et al, 1972); 
Nelson $ Kessen, 1966,1973). The face would seem to be no exception 
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to this, as Haith et al (1977) have found; their study of 
the 
scanning behaviour of infants from birth to 
11 weeks showed that in 
the first few weeks of life the child will hardly look at a 
face 
presented to it at all. When its gaze does fall on the 
face it is 
almost exclusively restricted to the periphery (hair, outline, and 
chin). As the weeks pass, the infant will, with increasing regularity, 
allow his gaze to wander into the interior of an object (Maurer & 
Salapatek, 1976). Again, this was borne out by Haith et al. 's study 
(ibid); a glance at their data reveals that whenever the infant of 
less than 3 weeks looked inside the perimeter of the face then his 
gaze almost inevitably rested upon the eyes in preference to other 
features. 
Other writers have stressed the importance of such basic stimulus 
factors as brightness, contrast and mobility as those which have a 
major part to play in the determination of the infant's gaze behaviour 
(Gibson, 1969; Salzen, 1964). In fact, these factors may hold such 
a monopoly upon the infant's fixations (Kessen et al., 1970) that the 
finding that the eyes receive a disproportionate amount of attention 
may simply be due to their possessing these qualities. 
In a sense, so far so good. There seems to be nothing innate 
whatsoever about face perception as such, but rather that the human face 
possesses those properties which the newborn child 'prefers' to fixate. 
Given this and the fact that the face is one of the most frequently 
viewed stimuli in the infant's environment, one cannot be suprised to 
find that 'faces' as a class of visual stimuli often appear to be unique 
(Ellis, 1975). However, we are still left with the puzzle - if puzzle 
it be - that when the infant starts to look inside things it is necessarily 
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the eyes that come to have no intramodal rival in attracting 
his 
attention. Why, for instance, should the eyes dominate 
his looking 
behaviour when other aspects of the face also possess the properties 
of contrast and movement (in particular the talking mouth)? Indeed, 
Haith et al (1977) designed their experiment in such a way as to throw 
light upon this subject. They found that the additional variable of 
talking did not have any statistically significant effect upon the 
3-week-old's scanning. This may have been due to a baseline effect of 
those subjects showing so few face fixations anyway. Nonetheless, 
even the 5- and 7-week-old infants did not increase the number of mouth 
fixations when the face was talking. On the contrary, there was a 
clear trend for the addition of this variable to increase the five- and 
seven-week-old's percentage of fixations to the eyes. This point will 
be returned to in the next section. 
Is there any evidence that perception of faces or parts of them 
is an innate ability? Several workers have suggested that the eyes 
may form an elementary gestalt (see Ahrens, 1954; Spitz, 1951; Argyle 
4 Cook, 1976). However, although one would expect that any discussion 
of innateness would naturally fall into this first section, in fact most 
of the work which tries to support such an ethological stand-point has 
taken as its response measure the social smile, which does not manifest 
itself until some 6 weeks of age. Such studies have claimed to show 
that the eyes enjoy a unique position as releasers of smiling in the 
young infant (Ahrens, 1954; Ambrose, 1961); and it has been argued 
that the two-eye configuration may act as an innate releasing mechanism 
* However, Bower (1974) has rightly pointed out that babies deprived 
of visual contact with others' faces also produce full smiles. Thus 
the question of the uniqueness of the eye-pattern is in question. 
The topic will be dealt with more fully in the second half of this 
thesis, devoted to the development and recognition of expression. 
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in a similar way that 'eye spots' appear to 
do within the animal 
kingdom (Spitz, 1965; Coss, 1972). Support for this is drawn from 
studies that have found that two eyes are necessary to provoke smiling 
(see Gibson, 1969, for a summary) and, more pertinently, that more than 
two dots may prove to be a more effective releaser of smiles than just 
the two dot 'eye pattern' alone (Ahrens, 1954; Coss, 1972). Thus, 
one may see this as a supra-optimal stimulus functioning more effectively 
than nature herself (Tinbergen, 1951). As Schaffer (1971) concludes, 
this may be taken as evidence for a natural endowment of evolutionary 
advantage: 
And the human infant, too, is structured in such a fashion 
that certain biologically important stimulus-response sequences 
- such as smiling to eye-like patterns - are part of his innate 
endowment, bringing him into contact with other human beings 
and thereby increasing his chances of care, protection and 
survival. 
(Schaffer, 1971, p. 69) 
Argyle and Cook (ibid) claim that such an innate tendency might not 
show itself in the first few weeks of life due to the "immaturity" of 
the newborn's perceptual system. Is this a valid point? Certainly the 
newborn's visual system is immature when set alongside that of an adult, 
but is nonetheless surprisingly well developed from the first few days 
(Kessen et al., 1970). The infant has good acuity in the first weeks 
(certainly fine enough to perceive eyes) and it has been shown that 
babies exhibit "following behaviour" to mobile objects within the first 
few hours of life (Kessen et al., ibid). It is thus not immediately 
clear precisely which aspects of the newborn's "immaturity" Argyle and 
Cook might be referring to. Perhaps one of the most restricting 
limitations of the early visual system in humans is that the child has 
a fixed focus of approximately 20 cm (roughly 8 inches) (Jlaynes et al., 
1964). This rigidity of accommodation may well be advantageous to the 
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young child in his early perception of depth, etc. (see Maurer 
Maurer, 1976). It also means that the infant's clear vision is 
limited to a distance which corresponds closely to that of the 
caretaker's face from the child during feeding. This restriction 
would seem to be one that would favour the discrimination of the 
eyes, not hinder it. 
The picture so far is thus rather a confused one, in which the 
infant would seem to be geared to favour the eyes by virtue of the 
facts that: (a) he tends to fixate objects of high contrast and mobility, 
and (b) that his focussing is at first fixed at a distance that favours 
eye perception under primarily social situations. And yet he is found 
to scan the periphery of the face, virtually ignoring the eyes until 
the fourth week. Thus, if we are to consider some kind of an innate 
mechanism, then it must be in some way delayed until the start of the 
second month. 
However, another explanation for why the eyes are so favoured by 
the young infant can be drawn the ideas presented by Bower (1974) 
and Newson (1974). Bower discusses what he refers to as 'the strange 
case of the smile'. He is drawn to the conclusion that babies may 
smile because they perceive contingency between two or more of their 
perceptions. Thus the infant's tendency to smile at upright faces 
more than upside-down ones (Watson, 1966) might be due to the fact 
that the face is seen in an upright orientation when contingency 
games such as peek-a-boo are being played. Whilst this may not be 
so (see the later chapter on facial expressions), it nonetheless 
introduces the possibility that babies' smiling is at least partly 
due to their detection of contingency. Newson (ibid) notes that 
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infant attention is best gained by object's which are mobile, self- 
deforming, brightly coloured, and noise-emitting. These features, 
he notes, are quintessentially those of the human 
face. He also notes 
that human beings have another feature which means that they can 
monopolize an infant's attention; the adult is able to react 
selectively depending upon the immediately preceding activities of 
the baby himself. Thus a mother has the unique feature of 'contingent 
reactivity' which makes her an object of compelling interest to 
her 
baby. 
But in early infancy one is not talking of the whole mother being 
an attractive visual stimulus to her baby. As noted above, it is her 
head, and particularly the eyes, which attract the baby's attention. 
By extending Bower and Newson's suggestions it might be possible to 
explain this in terms of 'contingent reactivity'. That is, the 
caretaker's eyes are moving, the eye-lids blinking and screwing up, 
etc. in time with the baby's own behaviour. Thus the eyes in 
particular present a visual stimulus whose movement is contingent 
upon that of the baby. Furthermore, the adult possesses the ability 
to predict what the baby will do, and thus the eyes may be moving not 
only in response to what the baby just did, but also in response to 
what he is doing in the present moment. In terms, then, of 'contingent 
reactivity' the eyes may have no rival in the perceptual world of the 
infant (save possibly the human voice). 
Whether or not the above idea is sufficient to explain the fact 
that babies are so attracted to people's eyes will be returned to 
later in this thesis. For the moment it should be noted that if babies 
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are born with an innate attraction for eyes (the 'dot 
detector' idea) 
then it is very unusual that they do not look inside faces until about 
the fourth week. Also, if the eye configuration is learnt, then one 
must question why the young infant does not seem to use the earliest 
opportunities available to him to look at the eyes. This is particularly 
pertinent in the light of the finding that babies have their gaze 
fixation set at such an appropriate distance at this early age and yet 
do not at this time fixate the eyes. Finally, there is some support for 
the contention that the eyes are particularly attractive to infants 
partly because of innate tendencies to look at bright, mobile self- 
deforming objects, and partly because the caretaker's eye movements 
are contingent upon the behaviour of the infant. This necessarily 
implies that infants are born with a tendency to search out and attend 
to contingency between perceptual events and inner states. The full 
ramifications of this will be discussed at the end of this thesis. 
(b) Six-to-Sixteen-Weeks 
At about six weeks of age, the infant begins to smile in a 
social context for the first time. It is at this time that Wolff 
(1963) and Greenman (1963) report that mothers first experience real 
eye contact with their baby. The infant is seen to scan the face 
until the eyes are found, and their discovery elicits a great deal 
of excitement and smiling. Ahrens (1954) too found that one of the 
earliest and most efficient releasers of the smile response was simply 
a pair of dots drawn in the fashion of eyes upon a white oval disc. 
Spitz and Wolff (1946) also found data harmonious with this in that 
by the end of the second month all that is needed to elicit smiles 
is a facelike stimulus which must have two correctly placed "eyes", 
and some movement. In finding this they were effectively replicating 
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Kaila's (1932) findings that in order for a baby to smile at a 
face 
it must be presented en face, with movement, and preferably 
itself 
possessing a smile. Both eyes were found to be necessary 
in that no 
smiles ensued if the face was seen in profile or with one eye covered 
up by a hand (see also Spitz & Wolff, ibid). However, 
Kaila stated 
that although a smiling face was smiled at more than a non-smiling one, 
this could not be due to imitation: when imitation begins, it starts 
with facial movements that are much more simple than those involved 
in 
smiling. In addition, the infant will still smile at a face that 
has 
the mouth covered. Presumably Kaila's findings might be attributable 
to the fact that a smiling face possesses more movement than an 
unsmiling one. 
The predominance of the eyes is also borne out by studies of 
visual fixation. As noted above, Haith et al (1977) showed that 
infants between five and eleven weeks of age spent the majority of 
the. time looking at their Mother's eyes. Moreover, it would appear 
that if their mother starts to speak, rather than increasing his 
fixations to her mouth region the infant fixates her eyes with greater 
intensity and tightness of scanning. Because they also found that 
the mother's movement had the effect of increasing the child's response, 
it may well be that the increase in looking at her eyes in their study 
was brought about simply by the additional movement inherent in a 
talking face. In fact, this constitutes the major flaw of [faith et al's 
work: their "talk" condition was the same as their "movement" condition, 
in which the mother swayed from side to side, with the sole addition 
that she talked to the child as she moved. In consequence, we are not 
given any direct uncontaminated comparison between the still 
face and 
one that talks. The variable of movement itself has been shown in many 
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studies to increase the infant's reponse and thus 
increase his tendency 
to look at the eyes. It may therefore follow that movement enhances 
the attractiveness of the eyes and thus provides excessively strong 
competition for the mouth when it moves. A comparison 
between a 
'still' face and a 'talking' one might possibly reveal a greater number 
of fixations of the mouth. 
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned ideas about contingency detection 
by infants, it might be that Haith et al. 's results can be explained in 
these terms. That is, without being spoken to the infant may be 
attracted to the eyes because they move in time with his behaviour. 
When the mother starts to talk as well her lip movements too will 
usually be contingent upon the baby's inner state as reflected by his 
movements. Her speech will therefore be correlated with her eye 
movements; thus contingency will exist not only between the baby's 
inner state and the movement of the mother's eyes but also between the 
sound he perceives and the eye movements. This might cause the baby to 
attend with renewed vigor to the eyes, as Haith et al. found. 
Caron et al. (1973) also provide support for the view that the 
eyes are of major importance up to about four months of age. By 
presenting schematic faces repetitively to infants, they were able to 
test which of a number of 'distortions' of the schematic faces caused 
a release from proactive inhibition. In this manner they found that 
the eyes were by far the most salient feature at four months, and that 
they had to be symmetrically placed in the upper half of the face-like 
stimuli. 
It seems that the discrimination of the eyes in the upper half of 
the face is the real developmental step that occurs in this period. 
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Watson (1966) found that the infant of some three months of age will 
smile more at an upright face than at an inverted one. 
In fact, 
Watson's study is rather more interesting than other writers have implied. 
His work does not really show what he claims as such - that the 
infant 
of less than six months can respond to changes in orientation - 
but 
rather shows the unpredicted finding that differential response to 
human 
faces in different orientations only occurs for infants of about 14 weeks 
of age. This effect was very dramatic, was restricted to the change 
of orientation from upright (0°) to inverted (180°), and did not occur 
at all to the half turn (900). 
The results of Caron et al (ibid. ) have bearing on this in that 
they found that at four months an infant will respond to inversions 
of facial outlines but remains insensitive to inversions of the inner 
face itself. By five months, the child will have become primarily 
sensitive to changes in the orientation of the inner face and 
unresponsive to changes in the outline. This can be viewed in terms 
of the emergence of the importance of the outline with respect to the 
eye position as a factor, as mentioned above. At four months the infant 
probably has no schema for the face itself (the eyes/nose/mouth gestalt), 
and in consequence-the positioning of the eyes in relation to the hair 
will be of prime importance. By five months, however, it would appear 
that the face itself is perceived as a unity. Thus the infant starts 
to view the features of the face with respect to each other, and not 
with respect to an outline. Hence it seems quite natural that the 
infant's sensitivity should change its focus. 
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However, that the infant should become insensitive to the 
orientation of the outline does not ring true. Perhaps this was an 
artifact due to the simplistic nature of the schematic stimuli used 
in their experiment (the "inverted outline" leaving the face upright 
does in fact look like an acceptable representation of a bearded man). 
One would expect that the importance of the inner facial configuration 
should be established with respect to the position of the hair, ears, 
and so forth. The emergence of a relationship between facial features 
and the facial outline is evidencedin Watson's work (ibid. ): the unique 
sensitivity of the infant at about 14-weeks-old may well be due to his 
making the 'hypothesis' that the eyes must be in the top of the head, 
but his failing to hypothesise as to the position of the face with 
regard to its outline. When this 'hypothesis' emerges, at five months 
or so, then an inverted head which still satisfies this rule is not 
seen as incongruous, and this is precisely what Watson's results imply. 
Whilst up to about six weeks a pair of dots suffices to elicit 
a smiling response, regardless of the contour, by about three months it 
is found that the more realistic the representation of the eyes, the 
greater the response (Ahrens, 1954). With increasing age isolated 
features begin to lose their effectiveness in eliciting smiles, and 
Ahrens reports an increasing integration of the features which is 
reflected in the more organized scanning of the face by the infant 
(see Figure 2. l). The emergence of the importance of realism at two 
months plus is supported by such studies as that of Fantz (1965) 
where he found that a contoured model of a head was preferred to a 
flat cutout. He also found evidence to corroborate Caron et al. 's 
findings regarding the establishment of the eyes/outline relationship 
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by four months of age: Fantz discovered that at three months or so 
the child will only fixate an eye-spot pattern if it is symmetrically 
positioned within a facelike outline. 
Ahrens found that by four months of age whereas both a schematic 
and realistic portrayal of a face would produce smiling, a real face 
was better. Polak et al. (1964) also found that by three months the 
infant will smile sooner, longer, and more strongly to a real face 
than a life-size colour photograph of a real face. Prior to this 
time the photograph had been equally effective. It is hard to agree, 
however, with their main conclusion that this is evidence for the 
emergence of depth perception at this age. As Gibson (1969) points 
out, there is no evidence to suggest that the infant's perception of 
depth is like that in a 2-D photograph prior to this stage in his 
development. 
Bearing the above in mind, it is hardly surprising that workers 
should have found that about two to three months of age the infant will 
tend to look at a 'regular' face (be it schematic or photographic) 
more than a 'scrambled' version (Fantz, 1965; Kagan et al. 1966; 
Lewis, 1965). 
By way of conclusion to this section, one may say that "the eyes 
have it" when it comes to attracting the two- to four-month-old's 
attention or eliciting his smiles. In addition, it seems clear that 
as he becomes older he requires the stimulus presented to him to be 
increasingly realistic before he will smile. 
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(c) Five months to one year 
As noted above, the main characteristic of the fifth month 
is the emergence of the importance of the mouth as a feature (Caron et 
al. 1973). By this stage Ahrens (ibid) notes that for the 
first time 
the mouth must be present before smiles will ensue. A widely drawn 
mouth has greatest salience, and mouth widening as such rather than 
smiling is important (see also Spitz and Wolff, 1946). The face 
itself as a perceptual gestalt of eyes/nose/mouth seems to be 
appreciated and, as was mentioned in the last section, an inverted 
head is no longer seen as incongruous (Watson, 1966). Once again, 
there is strong evidence that the more lifelike the stimulus, then 
the more the infant will look at it or smile at it (Ahrens, ibid; 
Lewis, 1969; Kagen, 1971). 
Gibson summarizes the achievements of the fifth month by saying 
that the child has differentiated the plastic, solid surfaces of faces, 
has discriminated not only the eyes but also the mouth as necessary 
features, and has determined that faces tend to have an oval outline. 
However, there is as yet no appreciation of individual faces, nor of 
emotions. Although Caron et al. (ibid. )suggests that the mouth has 
become as salient as the eyes by this age, this is questionable. They 
fail to note the child's increasing requirement of realism as a prime 
factor, with the consequence that their five-month-old subject actually 
tended to be less disturbed by the eye 'distortions' than did the 
four-month-olds. This may well be due to the excessive simplicity 
of their schematic stimuli. Indeed, even in adulthood the eyes still 
remain the most discriminable part of faces (Ellis, 1975). In addition, 
even though the face as a unit emerges at about five months, it would 
seem that changes to the upper half may be still more readily perceived 
than those to the lower half (Meili, 1957; Benjamin, 1963). 
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At about the sixth month of life, the child begins to be able 
to tell what the sex of the face is (Gibson, 1969). Some variation 
is noted, though, in this finding: whilst Cornell (1974) has found 
evidence for sex discrimination as early as five and a half months, 
Fagan (1976) feels that this is not achieved until about seven months. 
Fagan's (ibid. ) other findings for seven-month-olds are also of 
interest: they were able to appreciate that a face still belonged to 
the same person even when quite different views of it were presented. 
The infant even seems to have grasped the idea of a 'pose' in that he 
can respond to a face as 'familiar' when it follows a different but 
similarly posed face. 
The emergence of the child's first negative reactions to human 
faces also occurs at about five-to six-months of age (Ahrens, 1954). 
An angry face will produce avoidance by the infant, as will artificial 
stylized eyes. However, negative responses have not been noted by some 
to become firmly established until about eight months (Gibson, 1969). 
At about this age there is a greater refinement in the infant's 
differentiation of faces and the first real evidence for negative 
responses to strangers is found. This latter topic has perhaps been 
insufficiently investigated (Schaffer, 1971; Gibson, ibid. ), and there 
are those workers who have failed to find unequivocal evidence for it 
prior to some twelve months of age (e. g. Morgan & Riccuiti, 1965). 
Concomitant, though, with the emergence of negative responses is the 
finding that smiling does not occur unless in response to a facial 
display to which smiling is a socially acceptable response (Gibson, 
ibid. ). Thus, there is a sense in which the eighth month brings with 
it an important step in the development of the child as a primarily 
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social being. It is now that the appreciation of basic emotions 
displayed by faces comes into existence: indeed, the development of 
such appreciation of emotions goes on for the rest of the child's life 
(see Charlesworth $ Kreutzer, 1973; Ekman et al., 1972). 
The study of children from six to twelve months would appear to 
have received far less attention than that of the first six months. 
However, it would seem to be the case that the infant grows into early 
childhood by developing his appreciation of individual features and 
of individual person's faces, by preferring more and more realistic 
portrayals, and by becoming more and more interested in violations of 
the basic face 'schema' (Gibson, 1969; Kagan et al., 1966; Lewis, 
1969). 
As a final note to this section, it must be mentioned that the 
above findings have been found using normal, home-reared infants as 
subjects. Evidence exists to show that other rearing practices and 
different early environments (such as institutions) may well retard 
both the emergence of social smiling and its related appreciation of 
faces and also the strength of such responses when they do emerge 
(Schaffer, 1971, summarizes this point). 
(d) Summary and conclusions to the first year 
Our present knowledge of the ontogeny of face perception 
within the first year of life is a patchwork of fact and speculation 
that is somewhat difficult to pull together into a unified whole. 
Precisely what propensities the infant is born with is unclear, let 
alone whether or not it is possible to infer some sort of innate 
mechanism which directs his attention specifically towards others' 
faces. 
89 
There is a distinct feeling that some important pieces of the 
puzzle have yet to be turned up: we find the newborn 'prefers' stimuli 
that have the qualities that eyes possess, and that he has a fixed 
focal distance which corresponds to the distance away of the caretaker's 
eyes during feeding, and yet for the first three to four weeks he fails 
to make eye contact. Has this preliminary period served as a time in 
which the child has learnt the social value of the eyes? It would 
appear that this obvious 'learning theory' answer fails to fit the 
data, since during this first month the infant does not seem to be 
utilizing his opportunity to learn about the eyes. 
A discrepency exists in the literature and was purposely avoided 
in the first section: the infant is found to prefer certain levels of 
complexity from the first days of life and yet several workers have 
found that he tends not to look inside shapes at this stage. If this 
is true, then it is rather difficult to understand how Fantz (1965) 
and others have obtained preference differences for varieties of 
facelike stimuli that differ from each other only in level of complexity 
and not in outline shape. To 'explain' this one may be drawn to propose 
that the newborn is not necessarily using his foveal vision to scan 
things, but rather using his peripheral or 'perifoveal' vision. Whilst 
there is no evidence for such a thesis (Kessen et al., 1970), and it 
would be rather hard to produce any, nonetheless it may be noted that 
Lewis et al. (1978) have shown that newborns can see both fovally and 
peripherally and that the periphery is often associated with 'movement 
detectors'. Therefore, although one is now in the realms of pure 
speculation, it is possible that the infant's attention is initiated 
by certain factors such as brightness and contrast (see Gibson, 1969) 
but is maintained by other factors such as movement - which are at 
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first scanned peripherally and not foveally. The advantage of this 
conjecture is that it offers a concrete 'explanation' for the data 
to date which no other theory seems able to do. 
The question of innateness is one that must be approached with 
caution. In what sense could face perception, or the propensity to 
fixate eyes (to be more precise) be innate? It would seem extremely 
naive to expect an inborn mechanism to exist that causes the infant 
to look specifically at another person from the first hours of life. 
Rather, it is most likely, as Schaffer (1971 quoted above) infers, 
that the context in which contact with other human beings can occur 
and social perception be initiated, should be created by the infant's 
innate endowment. 
Hershenson (1967) notes that a variety of studies report a 
qualitative difference in 'looking' of younger and older infants: the 
younger infant seems to be "captivated by stimuli" (Ames $ Silfen, 1965), 
to show "obligatory attention" (Stechler $ Latz, 1966); the older 
infant in contrast appears to be "capturing stimuli with his visual 
behaviour" (Ames & Silfen, ibid. ). Thus, whilst the newborn may be 
responding in an, -obligatory manner to the visual world he is born into 
in accord with his innate propensities, the older infant may be in the 
process of forming schemata. Whereas at first attention may well be 
initiated by one basic factor (such as brightness or contrast). and 
maintained by another (such as movement), it may be the case that the 
older infant orients towards stimuli that possess such qualities, but 
that the length of his fixation is determined more by the "closeness-of 
-fit" to his emergent schemat&(Kagen et al., 1966). In fact, 
Lewis (1969) 
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goes so far as to suggest that fixation and smiling are the responses 
to two quite different things: that length of fixation is indeed 
determined by schemafdevelopment, but that smiling is determined solely 
by releasing mechanisms and/or social learning. However, such a view 
seems to offer no explanation for the findings noted above - that those 
elements which are necessary to produce smiling are also those which 
tend to be fixated. The two processes appear to be linked, not 
differentiated. 
The contention that infants seek contingency in their perceptions 
(both between two or more present perceptions and between past and 
present ones) may offer the strongest alternative to the above ideas. 
To be accurate, though, it is not totally different from the previous 
ideas because it is a synthesis of Lewis and Wilson's (1972) and Bower's 
(1974) views. There is also some evidence that certain types of 
contingency may engage the infant's attention but other types may 
sustain it. Infants are known to give a lot of attention to mobiles 
WkIC 
that they can move, andtherefore 140e contingent upon the, r 
behaviour. Such mobiles receive most attention, however, if 
there is a delay between the baby's action and the mobile's movement, 
and if the movements are different from moment to moment. The infant 
thus tends to orient towards something which is both contingent and 
novel. But his interest in a stimulus may be sustained by its ability 
to continue to satisfy his curiosity. Thus it may be that contingency 
of a stimulus to the baby's ongoing behaviour causes him to orient 
towards it, but contingency to past experience (his scheml} affects 
A 
the sustenance of his interest. More research will be necessary before 
this contention can be fully assessed. 
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2.1.2 CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 
It is noted throughout the literature that most cognitive abilities 
show improvement with age increase - particularly in the period from 
birth to early adulthood. However, the results pertaining to facial 
recognition do not appear to be so clearly defined. For instance, 
Cross et al (1971) were not able to find a significant improvement 
in correct recognition scores for adolescent faces by subjects in age 
groups: seven years, twelve years, seventeen years (mean chronological 
ages), and adults. However, they did find that the younger subjects 
made more false identifications than the other age groups. Thus they 
combined the recognition scores with the false identifications to form 
a 'statistical decision theory discrimination parameter' (d'), which 
then showed a clear developmental trend (7 years - d' = 0.61; 12 years 
- d' = 0.93; 17 years - d' = 0.99 and adults - d' = 1.95). One should 
note, though, that this is hardly a surprising result, as young children 
are well known for doing their very best to help/comply with experimenters 
in just such tasks as these. The younger child, unlike the older one, 
when asked a question for which he has not learnt an answer is very 
likely to 'make one up' (Piaget, 1929). Thus, one must question whether 
Cross et al. are really telling us anything about the facial recognition 
ability of younger children. Moreover, as their study was of American 
children, one should note that such children are brought up, in general, 
to always try their hardest to answer any question put to them, whereas 
British children tend to be taught to be silent unless they know the 
answer (for a further discussion of this, see Hudson, 1966). 
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A replication of Cross et al. 's work by Ellis et al (1973), using 
12-year-old and 17-year-old subjects, found the latter were significantly 
superior to facial recognition of young adult faces on the basis of both 
correct identification and d' scores (thus, contrary to implications 
drawn from Hudson's work, Cross's results do seem applicable to some 
British children). In criticism, it may be suggested that the adolescent 
subjects would be more familiar with the stimulus material. The factor 
of age of face in photographic stimulus with respect to age of subject 
was taken into account in Goldstein and Chance's 1964 study; they 
concluded that the age of stimulus did not give advantage to any one 
group of subjects. However, one should note that their conclusion 
was based on two experiments, only one of which gave no relation between 
age of stimulus face and recognition ability for 'subjects of differing 
ages. The other experiment reported in the 1964 paper does, in fact, 
find the younger children's faces easier to recognize in general, and 
especially for the younger children. As this was contrary to their 
expectation (viz that the older children's faces would show greater 
differences, and that ability to recognize faces increases with age 
due to cognitive maturation) they went on to do the second (aforementioned) 
experiment. After obtaining different results with different stimulus 
pictures, they concluded that the paradox could be resolved by noting 
that there are very great differences between faces of the same age and 
went on to suggest these differences may be as great as those between 
ages! To some extent this is bound to be true for faces of children a 
few years apart in age, however, with an age difference of several years 
to a decade or more, there are surely very great inter-age differences 
(especially from infancy up to early adulthood, the age span in question 
in Goldstein and Chance's paper). 
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Working with disoriented (inverted) photographs of faces, Brooks 
and Goldstein (1963) found a clear developmental trend for children 
between three and fourteen years of age - the older children being 
less affected by the change in stimulus orientation. However, Goldstein 
did a similar experiment in 1965, which found that adults were more 
affected by disorientation of stimuli than were children. To resolve 
"the 'apparent paradox' thus provided by the 1963 and 1965 papers" 
(Goldstein, 1975) Goldstein did a further replication (1975) using 
subjects from five to twenty years of age. This time he obtained a 
general decline in performance with age (although a slight rise in 
mean % correct scores between the five/six years group to the nine/ten 
years group was noted, no intervening age group being tested). However, 
for some strange reason Goldstein argues that, because his experimental 
methods were very similar in the 1963 and 1975 studies, he is within 
his rights to combine the scores of the two papers. He thus obtained a 
curvilinear variation with age (the three/four years old being as poor 
at recognition as the twenty-year-olds, and the twelve/thirteen year olds 
providing the peak in ability). He then goes on to suggest that cognitive 
maturation can explain the increase in ability from three to thirteen years, 
and that the subsequent reduction in level of performance can be attributed 
to "rigidity of the perceptual mechanisms as a function of over-learning of 
a mono-orientated configuration". Many criticisms of this paper come to 
mind; not the least of which is that of his combining the results of two 
independent studies. The studies obtained quite different scores for the 
age groups from five years to thirteen/fourteen years (especially the 
latter), and yet he still felt the two studies could be integrated for 
analysis simply on the basis of a similarity in methods. He himself 
suggests that there may have been quite substantial differences in his 
subject populations. In addition there was a major difference in the 
two methods employed; in the 1963 study the subjects saw the stimulus 
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faces upright prior to identification in the inverted mode. In the 
1975 study the pictures were firstly viewed inverted and then upright 
later. Possibly, viewing the faces upright initially may have allowed 
easier recognition by the older children of the inverted faces (as is 
borne out by their results). The drop in ability to recognize the 
inverted stimuli by the older subjects in his latest study (1975) 
may be due to his method of subject selection and his rationale behind 
it. Up to thirteen/fourteen years he used school children (predictably) 
and the faces used as stimuli were those of classmates of the subjects. 
However, for the seventeen/twenty year age group he used 'sororities' 
and 'fraternities' in college as a direct parallel to classes in school. 
Sororities and fraternities are not comparable, though, in all but a 
vague sense. First, there is likely to be many more 'peers' in one's 
sorority or fraternity than in one's class at high school. Second, 
there is a larger possibility that college students may recognize a 
sorority/fraternity member's face less well because unlike classmates, 
sorority and fraternity members do not meet regularly as a group on 
a daily basis. 
Finally, Goldstein and Mackenberg (1966) found a clear developmental 
trend in children from three years to eleven years in recognition of 
faces from isolated facial features. The older children were more 
able to give a correct identification on the basis of a smaller area 
of the face being shown (e. g. just the nose, just the eyes, etc. ). 
As Goldstein and Mackenberg point out, one might argue that the older 
children may simply have known each other longer than the younger 
children, especially in stable school populations. However, they 
feel this interpretation is weak because the kindergarten children 
had been together for at least seven months prior to testing. 
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Additionally, Chance, Goldstein and Schicht (1966) found that when 
they replicated this experiment, taking length of association into 
account, the ability to identify a face on the basis of viewing a part 
did increase with age, but would not a function of increased acquaintance. 
The other major finding of this latter paper was that the younger 
children, of their sample of six-year-old to twelve-year-old children, 
tended to identify a face of a 'friend' more often than a face of a 
child who was not a friend. In fact, the increase in ability for the 
older children only seems to apply to recognition of non-friends in 
Chance et al. 's 1967 study. 
Table 2.1: correct responses in Chance et al. 's 1967 paper: - 
FRIENDS AS NON-FRIENDS OVERALL 
GROUP STIMULI AS STIMULI SCORE 
Kinder' 57 41 44 
ist Grade 73 56 56 
2nd Grade 67 58 58 
6th Grade 66 64 66 
Two possible interpretations of these results come to mind('). On 
the one hand, one might tentatively suggest that the 'increased ability' 
of the older child is not purely cognitive but rather is largely due to 
his increased socialization. That is, the younger child may be more 
egocentric in every sense, and thus only take close notice of the 
appearance of his friends and his relatives to the exclusion of others. 
With age he comes to more readily take the other's position into account 
(viz, the emergence of sympathy and empathy), and with increased 
(1) 
One cannot ignore, though, a third interpretation: as the friends 
formed a much smaller sample size, if a developmental effect was 
present it may have required many more subjects to obtain a 
statistically significant trend. 
Besides, who has the most friends? 
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socialization, he may notice more closely the appearance of all others 
he meets, both acquaintances and friends. On the other hand, one can 
still propose an explanation in terms of 'cognitive maturity', as the 
young child may simply need longer and more continuous visual contact 
with another in order to recognize his face (this he would presumably 
obtain with close relatives and friends). However, Cross et al. found 
that length of acquaintance was not a factor in recognition and that 
the disparity between the younger children's ability to recognize 
friends and non-friends was large, it seems to imply that a social 
rather than just a cognitive explanation may apply here. 
Goldstein and Mackenberg (ibid. ) also found that all of the 
children they studied found the upper facial features easier to 
recognise than the lower ones. This better recognition of the upper 
halves was related to the presence of the eyes: when they were visible 
the children could identify the faces easier than when they were not. 
Thus the importance of the eye area in early childhood persists 
throughout childhood into adolescence (and apparently into adulthood 
too, see Argyle and Cook, 1976). This topic will be returned to in 
the following section on the function of gaze contact in normal people. 
Summary and conclusions 
The results of the studies relating to age as a factor in the 
recognition of faces are very mixed. There is certainly a need for 
many of the experiments to be replicated. It seems that there are no 
age trends in children's abilities to recognise faces, when one looks 
at percentage correct scores. But if false identifications are noted, 
then younger children are found to make more of these than older 
children. However, not all studies have found this. Another study, 
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for example, found that older children do recognise faces better, 
both in terms of percentage correct scores and false identification 
scores. A third study obtained different results again. In this 
study the children had to recognise upside-down faces, and it was 
found that the older children were worse at this than the younger 
ones. All these studies were criticised, though, and none have 
results which can be unquestionably taken as fact. It was also 
suggested that faces themselves may be more or less difficult to 
recognise depending on the person's age. Two studies by the same 
investigator revealed conflicting results. In one study there was 
no difference between the ease of recognising young faces and old; 
in the other the younger faces were found to be easier to recognise 
than the older ones. 
A less flawed, paper on the ability of children to recognise 
peers from isolated areas of photographs of their faces showed that 
older children could identify correctly from relatively smaller areas 
than could younger children. Thus the ability to recognise a whole 
from a small part seems to improve with age. 
Finally, the eyes, which became important to the child in the 
sixth week of life, seem to retain their position of prime salience 
into late adolescence. The tendency to fixate others'eyes is true 
regardless of the age of child and seems to radically affect the 
manner in which children recognise faces. 
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2.2: The role of gaze and mutual gaze in normal children 
Of the five senses sight alone possesses a range of 
possibilities in which the input may be enhanced or attenuated. For 
example, the eyelids may be opened or closed; gaze may be averted to 
bring a stimulus into peripheral vision, or it may be fixated directly; 
the pupils may be constricted or dilated; the skin surrounding the 
eyes may be screwed up so as to peer through a mere slit or stretched 
out to allow maximum light to enter. All this adds up to a system 
which is far more flexible than that of audition, which may only be 
significantly affected by an action like putting one's hands over 
one's ears. 
The visual system matures very quickly too. The newborn baby 
soon gains almost adult visual capabilities (Rheingold, 1961; Kessen 
et al., 1970; Klaus et al., 1971). Vision is not only mature from 
early in life, but visual fixation and following are the only 
neonatal reflexes that do not drop off with time (Greenman, 1963; 
Robson, 1967). It is hardly surprising, then, that vision should 
play a critical role in the development of social relations (Walters 
and Parke, 1965; Schaffer, 1971,1977). 
I f445 gaze at Abou ^! 
0da4s 
is fairly passive and often out of the 
corner of their eyes; they will follow movements of the mother's 
face, but only so long as she is facing her child. At about four weeks, 
eye contact occurs between mother and child for the first time. Wolff 
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(1963) reports how an infant of this age will scan an adult's face 
until the eyes are found. Mothers begin to spend much more time 
interacting with their babies at about the fourth week. They report 
(Wolff, ibid. ) that they feel the baby can see them for the first time. 
Robson (ibid. ) notes that many mothers may not be conscious that eye 
contact has been established, but they may rather report that 
interaction with the baby is suddenly much easier. 
Once gaze contact is established, there is evidence that the gaze 
of mother and child takes on a 'conversation-like' quality (Jaffe et al, 
1973; Peery and Stern, 1974). Pawlby (1977) has also noted that baby 
and mother will take turns in their looking behaviour. It seems that 
the behaviour may be innate, for it is similarly and precisely timed 
in both mother and infant (Jaffe et al, ibid.; Trevarthan, 1974a, b). 
Thus in a sense mother and infant share something from very early on 
in their relationship. A phasing of their behaviours exists such 
that very few clashes occur (Newson, 1974) and such phasing can take 
place because the patterns of behaviour (including gaze) are common 
to mother and child, making the child predictable to interact with. 
The mother can thus gain a real sense of 'contact' with her child 
from very early on. And the contact is two-way, for Schaffer and 
Emerson (1964) found that interruption of visual contact produced more 
protests in six-month-olds than did interruption of physical contact. 
Richards (1971) studied mothers' interaction with two-month-olds. 
He noted that when the infants sat on the mothers' laps there were 
repeated cycles in which the mother would smile and move her head 
rhythmically to-and-fro from the baby's face. The infant responded 
with rapt attention, a widening of his eyes, and a stilling of body 
movements. He would become more and more excited and gradually begin 
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to move and vocalise, at which point he would turn from the mother and 
the cycle would begin again. 
The making and breaking of mutual gaze seems to be one of the 
earliest interactions between mother and infant. Bruner and his 
colleagues (see Ratner and Bruner, 1977) describe the patterns of rule- 
governed behaviour which develop between mother and child. Games such 
as peek-a-boo are common and basically consist of the breaking and 
re-making mutual gaze contact. 
It is worth emphasising that gaze contact is just that - contact. 
That is, it allows the other to know that you are attending to him and 
aside from vocalising it is the only effective way of establishing 
contact between people at a distance. Above it was noted that mothers 
may suddenly feel contact with their children for the first time when 
mutual gaze is established. Certainly where such contact is not 
possible (in blind children, for example) children may suffer great 
problems in the development of sociability and language. 
Language development may have a great deal to do with early inter- 
changes such as those noted above. Collis and Schaffer (1975) showed 
that babies follow their caretaker's line of regard, and the caretaker 
follows theirs. Being able to look at the same thing is a first step 
towards sharedunderstandings. If the child looks at something, then 
the mother will frequently try to determine what the child is looking 
at and comment upon it or 'mark' the experience. Bruner (1975a, b) has 
gone so far as to claim that language develops to regulate such shared 
understandings, and thus they are essential to the ontogenesis of speech. 
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Consequently, gaze serves to tell someone what you are attending 
to, and this role will continue into adult life as an important aspect 
of communicating with others (Bates, 1976; Urwin, 1978; Trevarthan 
and Hubley, 1978). There are many unconscious activities which adults 
carry out with mutual gaze or by the direction of their gaze. For 
instance, when another is speaking and one wishes to indicate that one 
has something to say, then one will attempt to establish eye contact. 
However, if the other person wishes to continue to talk, then he will 
avoid mutual gaze. Mutual gaze also gives cues as to whose turn it is 
to speak, and it can be used to convey paralinguistic aspects of 
communications such as boredom, assertion, aggression, disagreement, etc. 
Although this section has been kept brief, several pertinent 
conclusions may be drawn about gaze and mutual gaze. In early life 
mutual gaze helps to establish contact between mother and child. It 
also serves to enable adult and infant to establish joint reference 
that underlies shared understandings. The establishment of joint 
reference has been suggested to be essential for the development of 
language (see Bruner 1975a, b) and is undoubtably involved in the normal 
development of social relations (Schaffer, 1977). Later, gaze serves 
its earlier role of establishing joint reference but it is also used 
to regulate conversations and give paralinguistic cues to the meaning 
of utterances and responses. 
2.3: Person Perception and Gaze Contact in Autism 
When one considers that the presence of gaze avoidance has been an 
often mentioned (see Wolff $ Chess, 1964), and by implication fundamental, 
aspect of the syndrome of early childhood autism, then it is perhaps 
rather surprising that there have been so few studies of the topic (see 
Rutter, 1974). This is partially due to its being a difficult area of 
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study within an experimental context, which means that the behavioural 
observation methods of ethological workers (e. g. Hutt, et al., 1965) 
are more readily applicable. 
Kanner himself emphasized gaze avoidance as a common aspect of the 
autistic child's "disturbance of affective contact" (1943). Even in the 
most recent papers on the subject, this aspect of autism is almost 
inevitably mentioned even if it is no longer given the importance it once 
had (Rutter, 1978). 
Perhaps one of the most often quoted studies of gaze avoidance in 
childhood autism is that of Hutt and Ounsted (1965). In this they put 
forward the idea that gaze avoidance in such children is a reaction to 
over-arousal. They make an analogy with findings from work with animals 
in which avoidance of mutual eye gaze is frequently associated with 
timidity and the avoidance of threatening situations. The autistic 
child is seen to be in an already high state of arousal, and eye contact 
is avoided in order to prevent the level of arousal from rising any higher. 
The evidence they were able to offer to support this claim was very 
meagre and consisted of a discussion of a limited amount of video recording 
taken of autistic children during 'interaction' with adults and other 
children and of the results to a fairly simple experiment. The video 
recordings, they claimed, showed typical situations in which the autistic 
child is found to monitor others with his peripheral vision and avert his 
gaze at the critical moment when someone is about to look at him or in 
any way demand his attention. The essentially 'anecdotal' nature of this 
part of their paper makes it difficult for one to accept the findings 
unquestioningly. The experiment that they reported entailed autistic 
children being put into a room in which there were four different schematic 
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representations of faces, both animal and human. Their major finding 
was that the autistic children spent more time looking at the fixtures 
in the room than did subnormal controls. When the autistic children 
did look at the drawings they tended to avoid the more obviously social 
ones looking least at a smiling 'human' face. However, Hutt and 
Ounsted draw conclusions which are far beyond the findings that they 
present. A major failing was that they failed to control for such 
factors as realism and complexity of the stimuli. Given that 
differential behaviour was found for both types of children, it is 
difficult to say which factor (or factors) affected the results. 
Richer and Coss (1972) also did an experiment designed to 
investigate gaze aversion in autistic children. An experimenter sat in 
a room into which the child entered. The adult adopted one of several 
poses which were aimed to present the autistic child with varying 
levels of 'threat' (in terms of the presence and absence of eyes 
especially). The adult sat in the middle of the room and either talked 
in a normal manner to the child or talked with his mouth or mouth and 
one eye or his entire face covered by his hands. They claimed to find 
that the children showed less "aversion" to the covered face than to 
the partly covered-one and less to the partly covered face than to the 
talking person with his face uncovered. However, when one considers 
the conditions, it is notable that they differ in degree from what a 
child might expect an adult to be doing. In consequence, their results 
may simply show that the autistic children were more interested in what 
an adult might be doing with his hands over his face whilst talking, 
than in a normal talking adult - as would be. the case surely ftr any 
normal child. At least this factor should have been accounted for and 
discussed. 
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Such experiments really tell us very little about what they claim 
to be studying: there are far too many other factors involved to know 
which of the variables is instrumental in producing the results. 
Experiments undertaken within a laboratory type of setting may well be 
described as less natural, but at least they allow one to be rather 
more specific about the variables one is looking at. In this regard, 
Hermelin and O'Connor (1967) undertook a study of the gaze behaviour 
of autistic children. In one of their experiments they required that 
the child look into one end of a 'black box' in which he could only 
see an illuminated face at the other side. There were two conditions: 
the face either had its eyes open or closed. If the autistic child 
avoids eye contact then one would expect them to look longer at a face 
with its eyes closed than at one with its eyes open. This was not found 
to be the case, and they looked at each condition equally long. Similarly, 
they found that the autistic children looked longer at a photograph 
of an adult male than they did at a scrambled version of the same face. 
However, they did find that the autistic children looked significantly 
less long at all the stimuli that they presented to them than did matched 
subnormal controls. This led them to hypothesize that the gaze avoidance 
noted in the literature as a strong clinical impression may simply be a 
result of their exceptionally brief fixation times on all stimuli, not 
just human faces. It is also worth noting that if they specifically 
asked any of their autistic children to look at them then no gaze 
avoidance was noted. 
A more recent study by Churchill and Bryson (1972) also failed to 
find support for the contention that autistic children actively avoid 
looking at people. Theirs was an observational study and involved a 
subject being in a room in which there was an adult seated in a cubicled 
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area. 'The floor of the room was mapped out according to whether or 
not the child could see and be seen by the adult. The adult adopted 
one of two dispositions: either he remained quiet and inattentive 
to the child, or, still without talking, he- paid a lot of (visual) 
attention to what the child was doing. If the autistic child is 
hypothesized to avoid looking at people and to be more aversive to 
attentive adults than non-attentive ones, then clear behavioural 
differences should have been observed between the autistic children 
and matched normal control subjects. However, their findings did not 
bear this out at all; all the children spent most of their time in a 
position within the room where they could see and be seen by the adult. 
In addition, all the children tended to look more frequently at the 
attentive adult than at one who was being less attentive. In fact, 
the most prominent inter-group differences were in such areas as type 
of toy play activity and level of communication attempted with the 
adult: the autistic children were found to play with their toys in a 
very ritualistic manner and failed to use them in a communicative way; 
equally, their speech, when it occurred, was of a non-communicative 
nature. This contrasted strongly with the 'chatter' of the normal 
children, who were clearly puzzled as to why the adult was so 
unresponsive, etc. - 
Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of their study was 
the reported impressions of the observers who felt that there was a 
qualitative difference in the looking of the two types of children. 
The normal children seemed to be attentive in their looking and 
accompanied it with cessation of unrelated motor activity, turning 
the entire torso toward the adult, etc; the autistic children did not 
do so. This links up with Rutter's (1978) description of the gaze 
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behaviour of autistic children. He points out that it is not so much 
the amount of gaze contact which differentiates autistic children from 
normal children, but rather the way in which the eye contact is used. 
The normal child will use eye contact in a highly discriminating fashion, 
looking at people when he wants something from them. The autistic child 
on the other hand does not engage in such use of mutual gaze. More 
important, he does not exhibit the patterns of gaze behaviour that one 
associates with shy or very anxious children whose eye avoidance is 
often specific to social interaction of a highly arousing nature. 
Whilst an impression of gaze aversion is nonetheless found in the 
literature of the syndrome, this is almost entirely attributed to children 
of less than about five years old. Wing points out that the older autistic 
child is far less likely to be withdrawn (Wing, 1976), and many adolescent 
autistics engage in over-extended gaze contact. Such information is very 
difficult to marry with the concept that autistic children are avoiding 
eye-to-eye contact in order to keep their level of arousal as low as 
possible. Nor can we see this latter theory as being applicable to the 
younger autistic child, if not to the older one: many young autistic 
children too are reported to "look through" people in a non-aversive 
manner (Norman, 1955; Wolff & Chess, 1964). 
Differences have been outlined between relatively intelligent 
autistic children and those of low IQ (Bartak & Rutter, 1976; Wing, 
1978). However, precisely what effect cognitive level has upon such 
aspects of gaze contact is slightly unclear. Whilst Wing found that the 
difficulty of obtaining eye contact in her sample was positively 
correlated with cognitive level (especially as measured by language 
comprehension), Bartak and Rutter found no significant difference 
108 
between autistic subjects under IQ 70 and those with an IQ over 70, 
either on level of eye contact at the time of study or on presence of 
gaze avoidance in the child's history (they had all shown it at some 
time). However, they would appear to agree on the general statement that 
the autistic child with lower intelligence is much more likely to have 
general social deficits and to show much more socially deviant behaviour. 
The more intelligent subjects were reported to have a lesser likelihood 
of having shown impaired physical responsiveness in infancy, especially 
in social situations. 
It is now possible to distil some major factors from this section: 
the clinical impression, although poorly supported as yet by experimental 
evidence, is one of abnormal gaze behaviour in the autistic child, but 
this may not involve "avoidance" as such. This may be particularly so 
for the more intelligent autistic child, in whom it might be argued 
that the syndrome is less confounded with concommitant subnormality 
(Bartak & Rutter, ibid. ). Certainly, beyond about five years of age 
it would seem impossible to attribute a simple theory such as avoidance 
of arousing stimuli to the behaviour of the autistic child. The picture 
is more one of a failure to use gaze in a normal fashion - an indifference 
to gaze contact and not an aversion to it. 
Bearing this in mind, perhaps it would be useful to consider the ways 
in which normal gaze behaviour influences the manner in which normal 
children view other people, and then to go on to investigate the presence 
or absence of such factors in the perceptual abilities of autistic children. 
To this end the first section of the following chapter is devoted to 
such a consideration, and to a comparative investigation of the autistic 
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child's ability to recognize faces from isolated features. The remaining 
sections of the next chapter discuss the various findings that this initial 
investigation revealed. 
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Chapter 3 
RECOGNITION OF FACES AND RELATED ISSUES 
3.1: Recognition of peers' faces from isolated features 
In the last chapter it was noted that the normal child between 
about 4 and 10 years of age tends to find it rather easier to 
identify faces from the upper regions than from the lower areas. 
This was particularly so when recognition of different parts of a 
face involved the presence or absence of the eyes - when the eyes 
were present the children found it much easier to identify the person 
in the photograph. From this and other studies (see Ellis, 1975, for 
a summary), the conclusion may be drawn that it is most probably the 
ýNýlWQýKI (i 
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normal child's proclivity for gaze contact and his use ofAthe eyes 
to discern how others are feeling that leads to the particular 
salience which the eye area possesses. 
This being the case, it would seem reasonable to assume that 
the converse may also be so: that visual avoidance of the eye area 
may lead to a lesser knowledge of that part of the face, and consequently 
lead a gaze-avoiding child to possess an abnormal pattern of knowledge 
of facial features. Thus an experimental paradigm which sets out to 
test autistic children's knowledge of the various parts of a face 
may well prove fruitful in providing an indication as to which parts 
of the face they know best, and presumably look most frequently at. 
However, in the last chapter it was noted that whilst some workers 
have claimed that the autistic child avoids eye contact, others have 
proposed that the autistic child is simply indifferent, giving no 
more attention to a person's eyes than to other stimuli which he 
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experiences. As Beate Hermelin once put it "If you were a table, 
you too would complain that the autistic child was not looking at 
you". How may an experiment which aims to test a child's ability 
to identify known faces from isolated features provide data to indicate 
which of the foregoing statements about the autistic child's gaze 
behaviour is the more likely? 
On the one hand there is the idea that the autistic child may 
actively avoid looking into people's eyes. If this is true then it 
might well be the case that his knowledge of the eye area, and that 
alone, would be poor in comparison to that of other non-autistic 
children. On the other hand an indifference to looking into the 
eyes of others might be expected to lead to quite different results. 
The child's knowledge of the various parts of a face may well then 
be decided by basic attractive properties, which in consequence 
would lead to a much more homogeneous knowledge of the face - more so, 
in fact, than that of the normal child who is biased towards gaze 
contact. More to the point, one would especially not expect such 
a child to possess a relatively poor knowledge of the eye area. 
However, these are not the only predictions that one can make: 
the literature on face perception contains many studies which attest 
to the fact that our habitual manner of perceiving faces causes them 
to be abnormally difficult to recognize when viewed upside-down 
(Ellis, 1975). Precisely what it is which causes this is not yet 
known (Ellis, ibid. ); but it would, at least, not seem to be simply 
a question of faces being unlike other 'objects' in so far as they 
are usually only seen in one orientation. Other so-called "mono- 
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Figure 3.1. Normal eye movements when viewing a face 
(Yarbus, 1967). 
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oriented" stimuli have been consitently found to be relatively easier 
to recognize when inverted (Yin, 1969). Nor would it appear to be a 
matter of complexity, for other equally complex stimuli have also been 
reported to be easier to identify when upside-down (Ellis, ibid). 
However, there would seem to be a consensus of opinion 'amongst the workers 
in this field that it is primarily the social aspects of face perception 
that give rise to this finding. Moreover, it seems likely that in order 
to gain social information from a face one needs to be able to integrate 
the various features into a whole or 'gestalt'. Thus, normal subjects 
great problems with identifying inverted faces may be related to the 
difficulty in telling the expression of an inverted face (Yin, 1970), 
and hence to the problem of integrating the various facial features 
when they are viewed in an unusual orientation. Others have stressed 
such aspects as the manner in which one scans faces in order to gather 
social information (e. g. Rock, 1974; Noton & Stark, 1971; see 
figure 3.1). Such workers claim that these scanning strategies become 
inadequate when one is attempting to identify an upside-down face. 
However, it may equally be because certain scanning patterns are 
appropriate to viewing a known gestalt configuration, whereas others 
are more appropriate when viewing a complex stimulus which would 
normally be seen as a whole but which is presented in an unfamiliar 
orientation. 
It is of interest to note here that if a child were able to 
identify inverted faces with greater ease than is normal, then it may 
either be because he is indifferent to the expression on other's faces 
or because he is unable to discern such expression. In addition it may 
mean that such a child is unable, or poorly able, to integrate his 
perceptions into meaningful gestalten. 
It was also noted in the last chapter that the factor of age 
has an effect upon the child's ability to recognize photographs of 
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faces (Ellis, ibid. ; Goldstein FT Mackenberg, ibid. ). In addition 
workers have reported a clear developmental trend in the autistic 
child's responsiveness to people; the older autistic child tends to 
be more responsive and to show less behaviour that gives the clinical 
impression of gaze aversion. Consequently, one might expect such 
aspects to manifest themselves in the autistic child's pattern of 
ability to recognize faces. There is, for instance, the finding that 
older normal children can recognize peers' faces from a small portion 
than can younger subjects (Goldstein E Mackenberg, ibid. ). Do autistic 
children also show this developmental trend from a basic knowledge of 
the whole to a knowledge of constituent parts? And is the increase in 
sociability in the autistic child with age reflected in a trend towards 
a more normal pattern of recognition ability? 
To investigate all the above, an experiment was carried out which, 
in essence, utilized the same procedure which Goldstein and Mackenberg 
had used with normal American children. In this experiment, each child 
was presented with a photograph of a classmate's face which was 
partially covered so as to allow only one feature or a selected few 
of them, to be visible. However, this previous study's methodology 
was not followed precisely: using a large number of subjects, Goldstein 
and Mackenberg showed each child only one example of each part of the 
face under test. Thus each child saw only one face with the eyes alone 
being visible, only one where the face from the nose downwards was 
visible, and so forth. But this procedure led them to produce a few 
nonsensical results, which in turn throw doubt on their general findings. 
For instance, the method gave rise to their Sth grade subjects seeming 
to do better with only the immediate eye area (45% correct) than with 
the condition which allowed them to see an entire band of the face 
from ear-to-ear (15% correct; see Figure 3.2). 
its 
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(a) 45% correct (b) 15% correct 
Figure 3.2: Two of the conditions used by Goldstein and Mackenberg 
(1966) with the respective percentage correct obtained 
by Sth grade subjects underlayed. 
In order to avoid such puzzling results, the following experiment 
required that all the subjects would see all the photographs under all 
the possible masking conditions. 
To investigate possible age effects, two groups of autistic children 
were selected and will be nominally referred to as the 'older' and 
'younger' autistic children. However, it should be made clear that 
there was an unavoidable lower limit set upon the age level of the sample 
as a whole. Each child was required to have sufficient language ability 
to be able to comprehend, and respond to, the requirements of the various 
tasks. No autistic child below about eight years of age was found to be 
able to do this. 
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The Children Tested 
In total, eighty children took part in this study. Of these 
twenty were autistic children who were attending one of two special 
schools and had been diagnosed by experienced psychiatrists. These 
children are the 'pool' of autistic children for this thesis and 
they have been described in detail in the first chapter. The autistic 
sample was divided equally into an "older" and a "younger" group 
according to their chronological age. Table 3.1 gives details of all 
the subjects used in this study. 
Two groups of ten normal children acted as controls according to 
the chronological ages of the autistic children. A further two groups 
of ten normal children were chosen to control for the mental ages of 
the autistic sample. In addition, two groups of ten subnormal children 
were selected to match both the chronological and-mental ages of the two 
autistic groups. All the subnormal children attended a school for the 
educationally subnormal, and were free of autistic symptoms. 
In choosing the children for this investigation, care was taken 
not to include any child who had unduly obvious distinguishing features 
(such as scars, glasses, etc. ) or who had any known defect of vision. 
The Materials Used 
The stimuli for each group were black and white photographs of 
the faces of the members of that group, each measuring 14cm by 10cm. 
All signs of clothing were excluded, together with any distinguishing 
features in the background that might have aided or confused recognition. 
An attempt was made to have all the children in a natural pose, which 
in almost all cases was fairly expressionless with mouth closed. The 
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Figure 3.3. Two of the faces to he recognised; the 
lower one has the Low3 mask in place. 
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same lighting conditions, photographic equipment, and processing procedures 
were used for each photograph to ensure a good match of tone, definition 
and contrast. It was decided that black and white photographs should be 
used, as recognition of them is reported to be in no way inferior to 
that of colour photographs (Laughery, et al., 1971), and colour photographs 
were thought to involve insurmountable difficulties in the matching of 
skin tones, and so forth. Each photograph was large enough for isolated 
features to be readily distinguishable without loss of clarity and detail. 
Samples of the photographs are shown in Figure 3.3. In order to present 
isolated features and areas of the faces, cardboard masks were prepared 
that could be placed over the photograph during presentation to allow 
only specific facial areas to be viewed. A stop-watch was used to record 
the response times of each subject. 
The Testing Procedure 
Each child was taken individually to a quiet room to be tested. All 
ten photographs of the members of his group (i. e. of the nine peers and 
of himself) with all masking conditions were shown to each subject. 
There were seven "masks" in all and one condition in which the face was 
shown upside-down. - 
A consistent order of presentation was used, to ensure 
that no child gained any advantage to be had from differences in 
presentation order, and that as little learning as possible could occur 
of the particular photographs that might have aided recognition. 
The eight conditions were as follows, and they were presented to 
the child in the order in which they will be described. First, all the 
pictures were shown upside-down, as it has been found that prior 
experience of a face in a different mode can greatly affect its recognition 
when inverted (Goldstein, 1975): 
1 20 
D 
ýýo 
1. The 'inverted' condition (Inv. *) 
When all of the faces had been seen in such a manner then the 
child was shown just the noses of all the faces: 
ý\ 
2, The 'nose-only' condition (Nose) 
Then the child saw just the eyes of each face: 
0 
3. The 'eyes-only' condition (Eyes) 
After this the child saw just the mouth and chin of each face: 
M 
0 
4. 'Mouth and chin' condition (Lowly 
* Abbreviations are included for the conditions in order to facilitate 
the drawing up of the tables and graphs. 
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When he had made his guess the card was moved a little to reveal 
the nose area of the face as well: 
5. 'Nose, mouth and chin' condition (Low2) 
Following his next guess, or reaffirmation of the first one, 
the eyes were revealed by a further move of the card: 
6. 'Eyes, nose and mouth' condition (Low3) 
The 'lower half' of the face of the next photograph was then 
shown in a similar way, and so on until all ten photographs had been 
seen in all of these last three conditions. 
1* 
The 'upper half' of each face was revealed next in two stages; 
firstly the child was allowed to see only the hairline and forehead: 
FvcEnoE. e: Tl, e pkafas were r'uiA(ÄOwised 
kf e. )NCcedt WA 
tie vieKt step. 
\ 
7. The 'forehead only' condition (Up, ) 
Then, following the child's guess, the card was moved down to 
reveal the eyes as well: 
8. 'Forehead and eyes' condition (Up2) 
This procedure was repeated for each of the ten photographs in 
turn. It was impressed upon the child each time the card was moved 
that he did not-have to change his mind - it did not necessarily mean 
that his guess had been incorrect. No feedback whatsoever was given 
as to the subject's number of errors. 
Finally, the child was shown all the faces in the normal upright 
uncovered manner, to ensure that he knew the identity of each face. 
If the child failed to recognize any face in this final condition 
then his previous errors on that face were discounted. 
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Each child was told that he was to see "some pictures of the 
other children in your class/school" and that the task was "a sort of 
game" in which he was told "let's see if you can tell me whose 
picture I'm going to show you". Additionally, each subject was told 
that he should have no hesitation in saying if he didn't know, as 
the experimenter quite understood that some might be a little difficult. 
Nonetheless, the child was encouraged to "have a guess" whenever 
possible. Subjects were kept fully informed as to how much of the 
face they could expect to see at any one time to avoid the possibility 
of their delaying a response until more was revealed. 
After the child had seen a condition (or series of conditions when 
the "halves" of the face were revealed) with all of the ten photographs, 
the pictures were thoroughly randomized before proceeding with the 
next stage of the presentation. 
Although no time limit was set for the presentation of each 
stimulus, a record was kept of the response times of each child, who 
was told to guess as soon as he felt fairly certain whose face was 
being presented. 
The Results of the Study 
a) The basic analysis 
An analysis of variance was performed on the percentage error 
scores of the various groups (the means are shown in Table 3.2) to 
compare the performance by the different types of children (autistic, 
normal and subnormal) in the different conditions, across the two 
age groups. Significant main effects of age, conditions, and type of 
child were obtained, together with significant interactions of 
conditions x type and of conditions x type x age. 
Because the sources 
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of the conditions x type interaction are of particular interest to 
us in this study, and noting that the 'age' factor was significant, 
two further analyses of variance were computed: one to compare the 
older autistic group with their controls; and a second to compare 
the performance of the younger autistic children with that of their 
controls. Significant effects of type and conditions were obtained 
in both cases, along with a significant interaction of type x condition 
in each case. The results of these analyses are given in Table 3.3. 
b) An overview of the findings 
The main results of the study can be summarized as follows (note 
that the terms 'upper half' and 'lower half' are used in the way 
they were in the description of the presentation). 
(i) On nearly all the masking conditions, there were no 
significant differences between the mean percentage errors 
of the normal and subnormal groups. The trend for all these 
children was concordant with the results of previous experiments 
(e. g. Goldstein 4 Mackenberg, ibid. ), and indicated that they 
found the features of the upper half of the face generally 
easier to recognize than those of the lower half. 
(ii) In contrast to their normal and subnormal controls, the 
younger autistic children were significantly better at identifying 
the lower half of the face than the upper half. 
(iii) The older autistic children's mean percentage of errors 
were not significantly different from those of the younger autistic 
children when recognizing the lower half of the face. Unlike the 
younger autistic children, however, they did not differ significantly 
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from their normal control group matched for chronological age 
on their ability to recognize the uppermost area of the face 
(the 'forehead only'). In fact, their pooled mean percentage 
error for the upper two areas of the face (the 'forehead only' 
and the 'forehead and eyes') did not differ from that of the 
lower 'half' (the three conditions which gradually revealed 
the lower features from 'mouth only' up to 'eyes, nose and 
mouth'). 
(iv) The remaining major finding was that while the younger 
autistic children did not differ from their controls in their 
ability to recognize upside-down faces, the older autistic 
children were much better at this than a other group (including 
their younger counterparts). 
c) Further analysis: some basic comparisons 
Selected comparisons were made, using Scheffe s procedure (Winer, 
1971) to investigate the sources of the two significant interaction 
terms of the first analysis of variance above. 
The analysis of variance revealed that the pattern of performance 
over the various conditions differed according to the type of child. 
The first interaction indicated that the autistic children as a whole 
had quite different error rates on the upper and the lower halves of 
the face than did the other types of children (the difference between 
Low,, Low2, Low3 and Upl, Up2 differed between the types of child, 
F77,2 = 89.87 (p < 0.01). The differences between the groups' error 
rates are shown in figures 3.4 and 3.5. As can be seen, the major 
source of this was due to the autistic children being so good at the 
'Low' mask conditions, i. e., the lower areas of the face. 
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The other significant interaction was a second order one of 
conditions-by-type of child-by-age. This essentially indicated that 
there were age level differences, along with the between group variations, 
for the two halves of the face. The Scheffe comparison showed that 
whilst the older normal and subnormal children resembled their younger 
counterparts in their pattern of ability, the older autistic children 
were significantly better than the younger ones on the two upper areas 
('forehead only' and 'eyes and forehead'; F77 77,2 = 22.65, p<0.05). 
Figure 3.6 shows the differences between the autistic groups. 
By a combination of Schaffe's procedure with the Duncan's Range 
statistic (Winer, 1971; McGuigan, 1968), the sources of the groups- 
by-conditions interaction were further investigated separately at each 
age level. First, the results of these comparisons for the younger 
children will be described. 
d) The results of the younger subjects 
A comparison of the upper most and lower most parts of the face 
(Up, and Low, ), where the eyes were not present, for the four groups 
of younger children revealed that the groups' performances were 
different (F36 3= 67.50, p<0.01). i. e.: 
Up, 
Normal (M. A. ) 34.98% 
Normal (C. A. ) 37.41% 
Subnormal 36.90% 
Autistic 60.69% 
Low1 
85.00% 
71.04% 
74.00% 
35.19% 
(average errors) 
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The difference was clearly due to the subnormal and normal 
children finding the uppermost area easier, but the autistic children 
finding the lowermost area easier (df = 62, p<0.05 in each case; 
Duncan's Range). The normal and subnormal children thus performed 
almost indistinguishably on these two conditions, and the contrast 
with the younger autistic children's performance could hardly have 
been more marked. 
It is also of interest to look at the difference which the 
contribution of the presence of the eyes made to the identification 
of the lower 'half' of the face. i. e.: 
Low2 versus 
Normal (C. A. ) 56.59% 
Normal (M. A. ) 78.04% 
Subnormal 64.30% 
Autistic 21.97% 
(average errors) 
U 
Low3 
25.69% 
35.82% 
21.30% 
7.64% 
It is immediately obvious that the autistic children did better 
in both conditions than all the control children (p <0.05 in all cases). 
It is also obvious that the presence of the eyes made the faces easier 
to recognize for all four groups. However, the interaction was just 
significant at the p=0.05 level (F36 36,3 = 9.11). Within group 
comparisons showed that this was because whilst the normal and subnormal 
groups' errors were significantly reduced when the eyes were present 
(df = 62, p <0.01 in each case), the difference for the autistic 
children just failed at the p=0.05 level. But it should be noted 
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that the autistic children had very few errors without the eyes being 
present, and thus the effect of the presence of the eyes may have been 
obscured by a ceiling effect. Thus the lack of significant reduction 
of errors by the autistic children when the eyes were allowed to be seen, 
should not be taken as evidence that they knew them less well than the 
control subjects. Indeed, the younger autistic children were quite as 
able to identify the faces in the 'eyes-only' and 'forehead and eyes' 
(Up2) conditions as the other children matched for mental age, i. e.: 
eyes-only Up2 
Normal (M. A. ) 86.12% 23.32% 
Subnormal 83.60% 10.90% 
Autistic 89.34% 24.42% 
(average errors) 
The comparison designed to look at the contribution which the 
eyes made to the-recognition of the upper area of the face also showed 
that the autistic children knew the eye area well, i. e.: 
\\\NNN Up, Up2 
Normal (C. A. ) 37.41% 15.52% 
Normal (M. A. ) 34.98% 23.32% 
Subnormal 36.90% 10.60% 
Autistic 60.69% 29.42% 
(average errors) 
I 
All four groups found identification much easier when the eyes 
were present, though the effect was much greater for the autistic 
children, primarily because they were so poor on the 'forehead only' 
condition (all within group comparisons were significant at p<0.01 
on the Duncan's Range). The autistic children were significantly 
worse on the 'forehead only' condition than all the control children 
(p (0.01 in all cases). 
It is noteworthy that the younger autistic children still found 
the lower part of the face from the eyes downwards (Low3) easier to 
identify than the part from the eyes upwards (Up2). i. e.: 
0u0 
q=X 
Low3 Up2 
Autistic 7.64% 29.42% 
(average errors) 
This was not the case for any of the other younger groups, who 
tended to find the reverse was true (see figure 3.4), although the 
difference did not quite reach significance for these groups. 
Finally, no significant differences were found between the groups 
on either the 'nose-only' or the 'inverted' conditions. 
e) The results of the older subjects 
As was mentioned in the initial summary of the results, the 
older control subjects performed almost identically to their younger 
counterparts. Once again, the presence of the eyes significantly 
reduced the number of errors they made in recognising upper and lower 
halves of the face. i. e.: 
Upl Up2 
Normal (C. A. ) 24.40% 7.20% 
Normal (M. A. ) 38.40% 21.00% 
Subnormal 47.70% 15.20% 
Autistic 15.61% 8.28% 
(average errors) 
Normal (C. A. ) 
Normal (M. A. ) 
Subnormal 
Autistic 
Low2 Low3 
43.70% 20.30% 
71.90% 35.50 
46.90% 14.60% 
11.06% 4.31% 
(average errors) 
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As can be seen, nearly all the control groups had fewer errors 
when they could see the eyes, in both cases (the normal children in 
the first above instance were the exceptions; the other children had 
significantly different errors at p <0.01). Unlike the younger autistic 
children, the older ones did not produce fewer errors when the eyes 
were made visible in either case. However, as with the younger 
autistics' ability on the lower two areas, this may have been due to 
a ceiling effect, because they were already making very few errors on 
the lower areas where the eyes were absent. A ceiling effect might also 
have prevented the normal children doing any better on the 'forehead and 
eye, ' than on the 'forehead only'. Lastly, it is noted that the older 
autistic children made fewer erros than all the other groups on all 
the conditions except the 'forehead and eyes' one (Up2), where they 
were no better than their normal controls matched for chronological 
age (p 
<0.05 in all the other instances). 
The comparison of the older subjects' abilities to recognize the 
'forehead only' and the 'mouth only' conditions revealed a similar 
pattern to that described above for the younger children, i. e.: 
Up1 
Normal (C. A. ) 
Normal (M. A. ) 
Subnormal 
Autistic 
24.40% 
38.40% 
47.70% 
15.61% 
W\ý 
o 
Low1 
68.90% 
77.70% 
64.00% 
26.52% 
(average errors) 
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As before, the normal and subnormal children found the uppermost 
part easier to identify than the lowermost one (p <0.05 in all cases). 
However, unlike the younger autistic children, the older ones found 
the two conditions almost equally easy (the difference was not 
significant). The autistic children were very much better on the 
'mouth only' condition than their controls (p ( 0.01 in all cases). 
What is particularly interesting about the older autistic groups' 
results is the homogeneity of their knowledge across the parts of the 
face (the 'nose only' and 'eyes only' excepted). In fact, the only 
comparison which reached significance was between the 'mouth only' and 
'eyes, nose and mouth' conditions (Lowl and Low3; p<0.05), where 
the information available was quite different, i. e.: 
Lowl. Low3 
Autistic 26.52% 4.31% 
(average errors) 
This uniform knowledge of the face also extended to the inverted 
mode, for errors here were only found to differ significantly from 
the 'eyes, nose and mouth' condition, in which recognition was nearly 
perfect (p < 0.01, Duncan's Range). 
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The mention of the inverted mode leads to the final major result 
of this section, namely that the older autistic children found it far 
easier to recognize upside-down faces than did any of the other 
groups (and this includes the younger autistics too). 
The 'nose only' condition produced no group differences whatsoever. 
f) Age differences in performance 
In the above section many of the similarities and dissimilarities 
between the older and younger children were highlighted. It was noted 
that the increase in age had very little effect upon the scores of 
the normal and subnormal groups. In fact, reference to the previous 
graphic representation (Figures 3.4 and 3.5) reveals only a general 
trend for an increase in recognition ability of about 5% to 10%. 
However, the autistic children differed substantially with age on the 
upper portions of the face: the older children were substantially 
better on the 'forehead only' (p ( 0.01, Duncan's Range) and somewhat 
better on the 'forehead and eyes' condition. The older autistic 
children were also significantly better on the 'eyes only' condition 
than were the younger autistics (p < 0.01). There was also a trend 
for the normal-groups to show better ability with age on the 'eyes 
only' condition, and thus the difference may be attributable to no more 
than an increase in skills with age. Nonetheless, it is of interest 
that whilst the younger autistic children performed only at their 
mental age level on this condition, the older autistic children were 
well up to a normal chronological age ability. 
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g) IQ differences in performance 
The WISC scores for the autistic children were used to test the 
possibility of a correlation between IQ and performance on the tasks. 
A Pearson-Bravais product moment coefficient (see McGuigan, 1968) was 
computed for both groups' mean percentage error scores versus both full 
and performance IQ. No significant correlation was found. 
h) Some additional points 
The mean response times attained by each group were not significantly 
different. Thus it can be concluded that there was no tendency to give 
any group any advantage that might be had from viewing the stimuli for 
a longer period. 
Finally, in all the conditions where the autistic childrn's results 
differed significantly from those of their normal-control subjects, 
the subnormal children were found not to differ in their ability from 
at least one of the normal control groups. In consequence, it can be 
inferred with some confidence that the deviant results of the autistic 
children which have been described above are not likely to be simply 
due to their 'subnormality' but rather to their 'autism'. 
i) Summary of the main findings 
In such a complex analysis it is worth briefly summarizing the 
most outstanding points again before discussing the results as a whole. 
i) The autistic children's pattern of ability was clear'y 
different in many respects from that of the control groups - 
most of the differences being in the direction of the autistic 
children performing better than the normal or subnormal children. 
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ii) It was notable that whereas all the control groups found the 
upper parts of the face easier to recognize than the lower parts, 
the younger autistic children found the reverse to be true. The 
older autistic children differed again in that they seemed to find 
all areas of the face almost equally easy to identify. 
iii) Neither autistic group showed any evidence of knowing the eye 
area poorly in comparison to their controls. 
(iv) The largest 'age' effects for the autistic children occurred 
in their abilities to recognize the uppermost facial regions, and 
to identify the inverted faces. The older autistics were much 
better than the younger ones in both cases. 
Discussion of the findings 
Three main questions have arisen from this study. First, why are 
young autistic children better able to recognize photographs of their 
peers when shown the lower rather than the upper facial features? 
Second, why, in contrast to normal and subnormal children, should older 
autistic children possess a more homogeneous knowledge of the entire 
face, such that they can use the upper as well as the lower features 
effectively for recognition? Third, why are the older autistic children 
better able than any others in this study to recognize upside-down faces? 
In searching for explanatory hypotheses for these results, it 
Wpe-Ct 
should be borne in mind that they may not reflect a single, \but rather 
a compound of aspects of autism. Thus, the results can be viewed both 
in the light of the autistic child's perceptual abilities, and also 
his failure, or deviant attempts, to discern the social signals conveyed 
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by the face. However, as was noted above these aspects may well be 
interrelated; indeed they may represent two sides of the same coin. 
First, in terms of social factors of face perceptions, it is noted 
that the results of the experiment do not seem to support the gaze 
avoidance theory proposed by Hutt et al. (e. g. Hutt and Ounsted, 1966). 
It will be remembered that in the introductory section of this study, 
it was suggested that the reason for the eye area's usual salience in 
face perception might be the fact that one tends to engage in mutual 
gaze contact and use eye contact for communicative purposes (Argyle 
and Cook, 1976). By reverse argument, a child who avoids gaze contact 
might be expected to have an abnormally poor knowledge of the eye 
area. Clearly this was not so for either of the groups of autistic 
children. 
There are two remaining ways in which the results may be interpeted: 
either the autistic child has something akin to the normal and subnormal 
child's tendency to view upper halves of faces and has an additional 
reason for looking at, and hence knowing well, the lower facial 
features; or the autistic child lacks the normal tendency to focus 
upon the eye area, and instead has an abnormally even knowledge of all 
the facial features due to an absence of social awareness causing him 
to fixate any one area in particular. 
The younger autistic children found the uppermost facial regions 
harder to identify than did their matched controls, whereas these 
autistic children found the lowermost areas easier to recognise than 
did the controls. Whatever the reason for the younger autistic children's 
good knowledge of lower areas, they do not share all the characteristics 
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of the normal and subnormal children's socially biased knowledge of the 
upper regions. What might lead to a better-than-average knowledge 
of lower facial features? In view of the younger autistic child's 
poor social competence it is hardly surprising to find evidence which 
suggests that he may have failed to learn either that the eye area 
is an important source of information about another's inner state, or 
that a social convention exists concerning mutual gaze contact. 
Thus a lack of knowledge, to some degree, of upper facial features 
can be understood without reference to gaze avoidance, but why should 
a bias towards the mouth stem from this? A possible relevant observation 
reported by Dodd (1977) is that normal subjects, when presented with a 
spoken communication against a noisy background, tend to rely upon 
visual cues (i. e. lip reading) regarding the content of the communication. 
Thus it might be inferred that the younger autistic child attends to the 
mouth area because he is trying to compensate for an inability to 
extract the full meaning from the auditory component of speech. This 
inability, in turn, might arise from a cognitive deficit affecting the 
processing of all auditory stimuli (see Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970). 
This hypothesis leads to the postulation that the autistic child 
should either possess better-than-normal lip-reading powers, or at 
least a greater-than-normal reliance upon the cues given by the lips 
in spoken communications. Yet a contrasting hypothesis may account 
for the results equally well. If the child is aware that the lip 
movements are related to what he hears but is unable to integrate the 
two sources of information, his attention may well be drawn toward 
the mouth of the speaker as a source of conflict. In spite of this 
focussing of attention, his lip reading powers may nevertheless be 
somewhat poorer than normal. 
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On the other hand, the autistic child may be envisaged as being 
able to utilize information from visual and auditory modalities and 
be able to combine such information to compensate maximally for a 
central linguistic deficit. On the other hand, the child may 
be unable 
to integrate the two sources yet being aware of their connexion may 
concentrate his attention on another's mouth. Clearly, a study of the 
lip-reading abilities of these children would help to decide whether 
either of these views might in fact be justified. Naturally, 
conclusive evidence cannot be sought by such a study - it may well be 
that the autistic child's lip-reading powers are quite unrelated to 
his knowledge of facial features. 
The above argument leads to what one may call a 'focussing 
hypothesis'. That is, whereas the normal and subnormal children tend 
to focus upon the eye area and hence know this area best, the younger 
autistic child may tend to focus on the mouth area and know this best. 
The hypothesis is illustrated in figure 3.7, and gives some idea of 
how a tendency to focus on the eye area may mean that the mouth is 
not attended to, and in contrast a tendency to focus on the mouth area 
means that the uppermost facial regions tend to be out of the sphere 
of attention, whereas the eyes are not. 
Could such hypotheses account for the older autistic children's 
performance? These children possessed a better-than-normal 
knowledge 
of lower facial features, too. The autistic syndrome has 
been regarded 
in a sense, as a language disorder (Rutter, 1978), for the autistic 
child's problems with language stay with him for life even though 
his 
'social' behaviour may improve remarkably (Rutter, 1974). Thus, if it 
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is argued that the linguistic deficit in the younger autistic child 
leads to a better knowledge of the mouth area then one can expect the 
older autistic child to also possess this knowledge. But as was noted 
above, the growing autistic child may also become more socially 
competent (though rarely, if ever, normal in this respect). Thus he 
may be expected to acquire at least the rudiments of social communication 
- including the use of the eye area as a source of 
information, even if 
his ability to read complex meaning into this area is deficient. To 
exemplify this, one older and more able autistic boy said, "I know 
people talk with their eyes but I don't know what they are saying". 
Sufficient knowledge that the eye area conveys meaning relevant to 
interpersonal communication, but an inability to decipher this meaning, 
could lead to the over-extended gaze contact noted by Wing (1976b) and 
hence to a knowledge of the upper half of the fact which can equal that 
of normal subjects. In short, the reasons for 6cT4 of the autistic 
group's good knowledge of the mouth area might be the same, and the 
difference between their abilities on the upper regions might be 
explicable in terms of the growth of social awareness. 
The major alternative to the above interpretation of the results 
is to view them in_terms of the autistic child's lack of social competence 
leading him to view the face as a pattern devoid of socially meaningful 
information. His knowledge of the various facial features might thus 
be determined by the inherent attraction and discriminability of the 
features. Implicit in this, though, is the assumption that the autistic 
child is viewing the face as a collection of separate parts rather than 
as a unified meaningful whole or 'gestalt'. Given that the eye and 
mouth areas might be considered to be the most easily discriminable 
regions one might expect the child's ability to identify faces to 
be 
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best when both of these areas are present, less good when only one 
area is visible, and worst when neither are present. This, in fact, 
accurately describes the younger autistic children's results (see 
figure 3.4). Once again the difference between the two autistic 
groups may be viewed as due to maturation, but this time maturation 
of the ability to discriminate parts of wholes rather than maturation 
of social competence. Evidence that older children are better than 
younger ones at discerning isolated features was one of the findings 
reported by Goldstein and Mackenberg (1966) and is well supported by 
the literature on gestalt perception in children (Ghent, 1956). 
This hypothesis thus emphasises the social factors in the normal 
child's perception of faces in contrast to the possibility that autistic 
children view faces as collections of disparate features rather than as 
meaningful, expressionful wholes. If this is true then the social 
factors which make inverted faces so hard to recognise (Yin, 1970) 
ought to be absent in the autistic; in addition the autistic child 
ought to be poor at recognising facial expression because this requires 
the integration of facial features, and indeed poor at perceptual tasks 
in general which require perceptual integration. The present experiment 
allows one to look at one of these points, namely the identification 
of inverted faces. 
The older autistic children's mean percentage error for recognising 
inverted faces was much lower than that of all the other groups, whereas 
that of the younger autistic children was not significantly different 
from that of their controls. Nonetheless, there was a slight trend 
towards the younger autistic children being particularly good on the 
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inverted faces. These results do not offer clear support for either 
of the above theories. The older autistic children's exceptional 
ability to recognise upside down faces does seem to agree with the 
contention that they view faces as collections of parts rather than as 
'gestalten'. Thus whereas the normal and subnormal children had to 
try to rotate mentally not only the facial features but also the 
relationships between them, the older autistic children merely had to 
identify a feature which they recognised as unique to a peer's face. 
It is possible that the younger autistic children also view faces as 
collectionsof parts but are poor at identifying inverted faces simply 
because they are not as good at identifying single inverted features 
as their older counterparts are. 
These results with inverted faces may also be interpreted in terms 
of the above mentioned 'focussing hypothesis'. One may argue that 
both normal and younger autistic children possess a centre of attention 
(the eyes for the former and the mouth for the latter) the position of 
which changes when a face is inverted. If, as has been suggested, 
(Noton and Stark, 1971) people teAa to have specific scanning strategies 
when viewing faces, then these strategies may be organised about a 
subject's 'focal centre'. Inversion of the face thus disrupts the 
child's scanning strategy. This disruption may account for the 
relatively poor performance of both the normal and younger autistic 
children. The older autistic children, by contrast, seem to have no 
particular focal centre and thus their scanning strategy might be more 
flexible. If this is so then their strategy might be less affected 
by inversion of the stimulus. The difficulty with this interpretation 
* Footnote: See Figure 3.1 for an example of a normal person's scanning 
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though, is that no matter how flexible the older autistic child's 
scanning strategy is hypothesised to be, one would expect it to still 
be organised around the upright arrangement of the facial features. 
In addition, it does seem unlikely that the autistic child possesses 
such a sophisticated perceptual ability in this realm given his well 
reported problems with perceptual tasks (Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970). 
However, there may be a simpler reason why the older autistic 
child is so good at recognising inverted faces: it may simply be due 
to the fact that he possesses a more detailed knowledge of the mouth 
and that this feature is easier to rotate mentally. His superior 
performance over the younger autistic child may in turn be due to the 
development of his cognitive/perceptual skills to put such knowledge 
to use. This idea can simply be tested by presenting the child with 
inverted halves of faces to recognise. It would thus be expected that 
the older autistic child's ability to recognise inverted lower halves 
would be superior to his ability to recognise inverted upper halves. 
This point will be followed up in a section devoted to the 'inverted 
mode' further on in this chapter. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This study has brought to light a number of interesting findings 
which now need to be investigated further. Those hypotheses proposed 
in the above discussion which lend themselves to experimental study 
will be dealt with in the remaining sections of this chapter in the 
order in which they are summarised below. 
i) It was suggested that autistic children might have a tendency 
to scan the lower halves of all objects presented to them. 
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(ii) Two possible hypotheses were proposed to account for the 
autistic child's tendency to know the lower halves of faces which 
allow clear (if opposing) predictions about the lip-reading abilities 
of such children. 
(iii) Having noted that the older autistic children possessed a 
better-than-average ability to identify inverted faces, three possible 
explanations presented themselves: it may be a result of the scanning 
patterns employed by the children; it may be due to their possessing 
a detailed knowledge of a part of the fact which is easy to recognise 
upside down; finally and related to this last idea, they may regard 
faces as collections of disparate features rather than as 'gestalten' 
and hence have an advantage over non-autistic children who habitually 
view faces as integrated meaningful wholes and who are thus presented 
with difficulties when viewing faces presented in an unfamiliar 
orientation. The first of these possibilities will be dealt with to 
some degree in Chapter Six, and the last possibility will be returned 
to in Chapter Five when autistic children's knowledge of facial 
expression is investigated. 
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3.2 Sorting schematic houses 
In the last section it was seen that both groups of autistic 
children were far more able to recognize faces from features of the 
lower facial areas than were normal or subnormal children. Is it 
possible that this could be the result of the autistic children possessing 
a tendency to scan the lower halves of all things? Whilst there is 
nothing in the literature on autism to suggest this, it is nonetheless 
a potentially parsimonious explanation of the autistic children's 
results, and as such must be investigated. 
Possibly the most direct method of investigation would be to 
study the eye movements of autistic children whilst they are looking 
at various objects. However, there are many methodological problems 
inherent in such studies, not the least of which is the fundamental 
requirement that subjects must remain fairly motionless. The results 
of a study of this nature will in fact be reported later in this 
thesis, but are not presented at this point due to the rather 
inconclusive findings they revealed. 
Another approach to the problem is to give the children a simple 
task in which a set of cards must be sorted into two piles. By 
designing the stimuli in such a manner that there can be no 'wrong' 
way of sorting them, it is possible to leave it to the child concerned 
to choose the criterion on which they are sorted. Thus if a child 
has a proclivity to attend to the lower half of things he may be 
expected to choose one or more feature of the lower-half of the 
stimuli to sort by. 
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Figure 3.8 The two 'basic houses ('a' and 'b') to be sorted by 
and an example of a variation. 
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Materials 
A set of drawings of schematic houses was prepared. In the 
first instance two 'basic' house designs were chosen, and they are 
shown in Figure 3.8 as'type A' and 'type B'. As can be seen, the 
details of 'type A' are fairly square and angular in style, whereas 
those of 'type B' are rather more rounded. The houses on the set 
of cards to be sorted into two piles were each variations upon these 
basic houses and contained elements from each of them. Thus (as 
can be seen in Figure 3.8) one variation, for instance showed the 
roof and two upper windows of 'type &' together with the door and two 
lower windows of 'type A'. The child could thus elect to sort 
according to any of four main features, i. e. type of roof, shape of 
upper windows, shape of lower windows, or door. This would allow 
the examiner to test whether the lower placed features, i. e. doors 
and lower windows, would be predominantly selected as crucial to 
the autistic children. Care was taken to draw the houses in 
complementary pairs (as in Figure 3. ). That is, if one variation 
was modelled upon 'type A' with a few elements from 'type B', then a 
complementary drawing based upon 'type B' with the same elements 
changed to those of 'type A' was also included. A 'square' house 
having two rounded windows would always be complemented by a 'round' 
house with two square windows. In this way it was ensured that any 
consistent strategy of sorting would give rise to an equal number of 
houses being placed in each pile. 
All the houses (Basic and variations) were drawn in black ink 
upon white card 10 cm x8 cm in size. Figure 3.8 shows full scale 
examples of the drawings. In total, twenty variations were prepared 
modelled upon the two basic houses. 
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TABLE 3.4 Subjects in house sorting study 
Group N Mean C. A. (s. d. ) Mean full IQ (s. d. ) 
Autistic 9 11.66 yrs (2.21) 62.89 (15.24) 
ESN 9 11.82 yrs (2.10) 60.91 (8.12) 
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For reasons that will be made clear in the procedure section, 
additional sets of variations were prepared, each based upon two new 
basic houses. For example, twenty variations were drawn modelled upon 
two roofless basic houses and another set based upon 
two doorless basic houses 
Subjects 
In all, eighteen children took part in this experiment. Nine of 
these were autistic children, who were randomly chosen from the twenty 
who took part in the previous study. No age factor was included, because 
the good ability of the autistic children to recognize lower facial 
features was found across both age levels. The remaining nine subjects 
were those subnormal children from the last study who were matched with 
these nine autistic children according to mental and chronological age. 
Details of the subjects are given in Table 3.4. 
The Testing Procedure 
All children were tested individually in a quiet room. The 
experimenter placed the two drawings of the basic houses (type A and 
type B) on a table in front of the child. The child was then given 
the set of twenty variations upon these two basic houses and was told 
that they were drawings of houses which looked like the two already 
displayed. The child was then instructed to "put those houses which 
look like this one (pointing to type A) here (pointing to a place 
adjacent to type A) and those which look like this one (pointing to 
type B) here (pointing to as adjacent spot)". No indication was 
given to the child as to how he was to sort. To avoid the confusion 
which might have arisen from too many houses being visible at one time, 
the houses already sorted and those yet to be sorted were kept face 
downwards (leaving only the two basic houses continuously visible). 
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When the child had completed his sorting of the cards the 
experimenter examined the two piles to ascertain the most likely feature 
(or possibly features) by which the child had sorted. This was invariably 
quite easy to do as, for example, all the houses with 'type A' roofs 
would be in the pile by 'type A', and similarly for 'type P. Following 
this, the feature used by the child as his sorting criterion was omitted 
from the drawings of the next two 'basic' houses. Thus, in the above 
example, the old cards would be removed from sight and two new basic 
houses displayed; these were identical to types A and B but without 
roofs. 
As was mentioned in the materials section, variations upon these 
new basic houses were also drawn, and these were now given to the 
child. once again, identical instructions were given which directed 
the child to sort according to similarity. - 
The rationale behind the removal of the crucial sorting feature was 
that the subsequent results would give an idea as to the hierarchy of 
importance of the features for the two groups of children. Thus, for 
example, if the autistic children tend to look at the lower halves of 
things, then we would expect them to sort according to a lower feature 
regardless of the stimuli. If they were indeed found to sort by a 
lower feature in the first run then this might arguably be due to 
an imbalance in the design of the houses. Buf if, when the lower 
feature in question is removed the autistic child goes on to sort 
according to another lower feature, then perceptual bias in these 
children may be inferred (although, of course, such an interpretation 
is dependent upon the performance of the ESN subjects). 
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TABLE 3.5 Number of children in each group who sorted by each 
of the characteristics 
Basic houses 
When no upper 
When no roof windows 
Type of By By roof Child By roof windowsr 
By door 
windows 
Autistic 81801 
Subnormal 90810 
(N = 9) 
3; 7 
Results 
The results are shown in Table 3.5. They were very clear-cut and 
did not support the hypothesis that autistic children tended to look 
at the lower half of objects. Both groups of children chose to sort 
by the roofs in the first run, with the sole exception of one autistic 
child who sorted according to the shape of the upper windows. Of 
those children who sorted by the roofs, all except one went on to 
sort the 'roofless' houses by their door type. The exception was an 
ESN child who went on to sort by the upper windows. Finally, the 
autistic child who sorted by upper windows in the first run was found 
to sort by the roofs when no upper windows were present. No support 
can be gathered from these results to infer that the autistic child 
is in any way abnormal in his scanning of objects. 
Discussion 
Clearly, the autistic children performed almost identically to 
the ESN subjects in their sorting of schematic houses. Both groups 
chose to sort according to an upper feature - the roof - even though 
it may be noted that the number of upper and lower elements were the 
same (although this is not to imply that the drawings were in some 
sense 'perfectly balanced' in their upper and lower features). 
With this upper feature absent, both types of children tended 
to switch to sorting by a lower feature (the door), as one might 
expect from looking at the somewhat door-dominated appearance of the 
roofless houses. 
It could, of course, be argued that these particular stimuli 
were not closely comparable to the faces used in the previous study. 
However, in schematic form there is a fair similarity between faces 
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and the type of house picture used in this study. In fact, it might 
be argued that real faces contain more salient information in their 
upper halves than do such schematic houses. Thus, if a bias towards 
lower halves of faces was found for the autistic children, then an even 
larger bias might have been expected for them with the houses. 
Caution must be exercised in drawing a causal connection between 
sorting strategies and scanning behaviour (after all, we may tend to 
visually fixate people's eyes and yet still choose to sort a selection 
of faces according to such criteria as sex, age, presence or absence of 
facial hair, etc. ). However, taking our knowledge of autism as a whole, 
this study would seem to give further evidence that no such simple 
phenomenon can explain the results obtained in the face-identification 
study. It would seem, therefore, somewhat unlikely that autistic 
children's good knowledge of lower facial features is the result of 
their possessing a proclivity to scan the lower area of all things. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The hypothesis that the autistic child's abnormally good knowledge 
of lower facial features is due to their looking at the lower halves 
of all objects was tested. They were given a task in which they had 
to sort a selection of schematic houses into two piles. The manner in 
which they sorted these indicated that they did not tend to scan the 
lower half of the houses. Their strategy for sorting was found to be 
almost identical to that of ESN children who were matched for age and 
general IQ. Thus the contention that autistic children tend to look 
at the lower half of things was rejected. 
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3.3 Lip-Reading 
In the face perception experiment, it was found that the autistic 
children were remarkably good at recognizing the lower halves of faces. 
Two possibilities were proposed to explain this, and it was noted that 
these implied opposite expectations about the lip-reading ability of 
autistic children. On the one hand it was suggested that an inability 
to fully extract information from the auditory component of speech 
might lead the autistic child to have an abnormally great reliance 
upon the visual cues given by the mouth. Thus a tendency to lip-read 
more frequently than a normal child could lead to a better-than-normal 
knowledge of the lower facial features. In consequence, it would be 
expected that the autistic child's lip-reading ability would be 
somewhat better than that of mental age matched controls, and their 
reliance upon such cues to be somewhat greater. 
on the other hand, the autistic children may possess a fairly 
normal, or even poor, ability to lip-read and yet be unable to 
integrate the two types of information from the speech-sounds and 
the visual movement of the lips. Such a lack of ability to bring the 
two types of information together into a coherent unity, might lead 
to increased attention to these sources of confusion. If the child's 
attention were to be drawn to the mouth, he may get to know the lower 
facial area well. However he would not be expected to possess a 
particularly good lip-reading ability, nor would one expect to find 
indications of an abnormally enhanced attention to the visual aspects 
of speech in contrast to the auditory components. 
To investigate these possibilities, two routes may be taken: 
a direct one and an indirect one. The indirect route 
involves a study 
of the face perception abilities of hard-of-hearing subjects who are 
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known to lip-read. If the supposition that such activity leads 
to an enhanced knowledge of the mouth area should turn out to be 
untrue, this would invalidate the first of the above hypotheses. 
The more direct way is to investigate the autistic child's lip- 
reading ability in comparison to that of subnormal children matched 
for mental and chronological age. In particular, it would be 
interesting to discover whether the contribution of lip-reading to 
speech perception is similar in both autistic and subnormal children. 
First, a study of face perception in deaf and hard-of-hearing 
subjects will be reported, followed by an investigation of the lip- 
reading abilities of autistic children. 
3.3.1 Recognijon of peer's faces by hard-of-hearing subjects 
Hermelin (1978) has made the point that there are two basic and 
contrasting approaches to the experimental study of autism. The more 
usual of these is to match autistic with other children of like 
cognitive ability who do not show any autistic symptoms. Any group 
differences thus obtained, assuming that the criteria for matching 
were valid, may be ascribed to the autistic children's "autism" 
rather than to general cognitive deficits. However, the alternative 
approach can often lead to equally enlightening findings. In this, 
autistic children and children with another well-defined impairment 
but different cognitive ability (the deaf or blind for example) are 
presented with an experimental task, and the results are scrutinized 
for communalities in spite of IQ differences between the two groups. 
Hermelin and O'Connor were able to show that autistic childen at 
times performed as if they were deaf, and at other times as if they 
were blind. 
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TABLE 3.6 Hard-of-hearing subjects' details 
Mean Full Mean chronological 
IQ Age 
70.80 27.60 
(sd = 4.76) (sd = 8.56) 
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In the study of face perception in autistic children, it has 
been shown that there are differences between their performance and 
that of matched controls, which may be ascribed to their autism. 
However, the second approach may now be useful in deciding which of 
the several hypotheses raised to explain the results might be true. 
One of these was that the autistic child may have a proclivity to 
lip-read. Consequently, it may be useful to investigate the face 
perception abilities of subjects who are known to lip-read in every- 
day life. To this end a number of the tasks given to the children 
in the previous face perception experiment were also given to a small 
sample of hard-of-hearing subjects. 
The subjects who took part 
The object of this study was not to match a set of subjects to 
the autistic sample on the basis of such factors as mental or 
chronological age. Instead, five hard-of-hearing adults were used 
who were all inpatients of one hospital. Details of these are given 
in Table 3.6. Although no attempt at matching was made, the subjects 
each had to meet two criteria: first they should be proficient at 
lip-reading and known to be using this ability in their daily life; 
second, they were chosen to be of below average intelligence such 
that their mental level was not greatly at variance with that of 
the autistic children used in the previous face perception study. 
None of these subjects had any specific deficit other than hearing 
loss and, in particular, none showed any autistic symptoms. 
Materials 
As with the previous face identification experiment, black and 
white photographs were prepared with the same attention to details 
as was outlined in the 'materials' section of the previous study; 
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the pictures were of the same size with natural poses, no 
distinguishing features, etc. The same cardboard masks were utilized 
once again to present isolated areas of the faces. The faces used in 
this study were those of members of staff at the hospital unit where 
the subjects lived. It was decided not to use photographs of the 
subjects themselves as this would limit the number of faces they had 
to choose from. The staff members were well known to all the subjects; 
and there were ten such photographs in all. 
The experimental procedure 
This study was essentially a rerun of the previous experiment but 
using the hard-of-hearing subjects, and fewer masking conditions. It 
was decided that the subjects' performance on the upper and lower 
upright halves was of prime importance; thus only two conditions 
showing upper features, and two showing lower features, were used: 
ii' 
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Once again, the subject was asked to guess whose face was being 
shown to him. He was told that they were photographs of people in the 
hospital. First, each subject saw just the 'mouth and chin' of one 
of the faces: 
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When he had made his guess, the mask was removed to reveal the 
area up to and including the eyes: 
\ 
S, 
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Having either reaffirmed the face's identify or given his new 
guess, the next of the ten faces was presented in an identical manner. 
When all twenty faces had been seen in these two conditions, the 
photographs were thoroughly randomized before showing just the forehead 
of one of them: 
1(c 
The subject made his guess as to whose face it was, and then the 
mask was lowered to just below the eyes - at which point the subject 
was asked if he still thought it was the same person, orý^ehe týcý r 
it was someone else: 
When a response was given, the next face was presented under the 
same two conditions. This was repeated until the subject had seen all 
ten photographs under all conditions. 
Finally, the subject was shown all the faces in a normal uncovered 
upright mode and asked to identify the people. If he made a mistake on 
a face in this run through, his previous errors on that face were 
discounted for the purpose of analysis. 
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TABLE 3.7 Average percent errors by each group on each 
condition (see section 3.1) 
Group Condition 
Mouth and Chin Eyes downwards Forehead Eyes upwards 
(Low1) (Low3) (Up1) (UP2) 
Deaf 
Older autistic 
Younger autistic 
Older normal 
(C. A. ) 
Older normal 
(M. A. ) 
48.02 24.46 48.44 27.80 
26.52 4.31 15.61 8.28 
35.19 7.64 60.69 29.42 
68.90 20.30 24.40 7.20 
77.70 35.50 38.40 21.00 
167 
Results 
The percentage of correct scores for the four conditions, along 
with those of the normal subnormal and autistic children from the 
previous experiment, are given in Table 3.7. Due to the small number 
of subjects who took part in this experiment, no attempt was made to 
compare these results statistically. Indeed, the basic aim of this 
study was not to undertake such a strict inter-group comparison of 
each condition, but rather to determine whether or not it was readily 
apparent that differences existed between the groups in their pattern 
of performance. This having been said, however, the performance of the 
normal and subnormal children on these four conditions was very 
homogeneous, both between groups and over the entire age range. Thus 
on the basis of such factors as chronological and mental age, there 
are few grounds for expecting the hard-of-hearing subjects' average 
percentage correct scores to be particularly different from those 
of the previous study's control children. 
Clearly, though, this is not totally the case for the hard-of- 
hearing subjects performed rather better than did those other subjects 
on the condition in which only the mouth and chin were present. Thus 
the common-sense prediction that lip-reading may lead to an enhanced 
knowledge of the mouth area would seem to have gained some support. 
It is worthy of note that this is the only condition in which the 
hard-of-hearing subjects' performance was substantially different 
from that of the normal or subnormal children. ' 
On the other hand, the results obtained from the autistic 
children are quite different from those of all the other subjects 
on all the conditions, except that in which the face is visible from 
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the eyes upwards (Up2). Both groups of autistic children are still 
substantially better than all the others on the lower facial features 
(Low1 and Low3). The hard-of-hearing subjects are certainly better 
than the 'control' groups on the 'mouth and chin only' condition, but 
their performance here does not seem as exceptional as that of the 
autistic children. 
Of course, too much emphasis should not be placed upon these scores 
for there are many uncontrolled factors involved. However, on the whole, 
it may be seen that the normal and subnormal children tend to be better 
on the upper features than the lower and they are certainly better when 
the eyes are available compared to when they are not. In contrast, the 
hard-of-hearing subjects seem to possess a more 'balanced' knowledge 
of the face - 'balanced' in as much as their knowledge of the uppermost 
and lowermost areas is almost the same: 
Up1 
48.44% 
Low1 
48.02% 
The same is true of the areas from the eyes downwards and the eyes 
upwards: 
Low3 Up2 
24.46% 27.80% 
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The younger autistic children thus had a better knowledge of 
the lower facial features than the upper ones. The subnormal and 
normal children by contrast had a better knowledge of the upper 
features than the lower ones. Both the hard-of-hearing subjects 
and the older autistic children had a more homogeneous knowledge of 
the face. However, the two autistic groups both showed a much better 
knowledge of the lower areas than the hard-of-hearing subjects. 
What conclusions can be drawn? 
The fact that the hard-of-hearing subjects found it easier to 
recognize the faces from just the mouth and chin area than the normal 
and subnormal children tends to support the thesis that habitual 
lip-reading enhances the knowledge of this area. Equally, the pattern 
of scores bears this out in as far as it shows that relative to their 
own scores on the other conditions, the hard-of-hearing subjects' 
knowledge of the mouth area is better. However, their percentage 
correct scores on this condition are not as impressive as those of 
the autistic children, and thus it would seem that a lip-reading 
propensity cannot be the full explanation for the autistic children's 
performance. Certainly, as far as the recognition of faces from the 
eyes downwards is concerned, the autistic children are still far and 
away the best performers. Thus it could still be argued that autistic 
children's attention to the mouth area of a face does not imply that 
they attempt to lip-read. Their excellence at recognizing the lower 
portions may merely reflect a greater capability to identify spatial 
patterns than that of the hard-of-hearing subjects. The next logical 
step would seem to be to examine the autistic children's lip-reading 
abilities. 
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TABLE 3.8 
Group 
Subjects in study of contribution of lip-reading to 
speech perception 
N Mean C. A. (sd) Mean full IQ (sd) 
Autistic 6 14.42 yrs (1.52) 65.33 (14.09) 
ESN 6 14.20 yrs (1.12) 62.67 (9.12) 
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3.3.2. Lip-Reading by Autistic Children 
It will be recalled that there was no statistically significant 
difference between the two groups of autistic children's abilities to 
recognize the faces from the mouth and chin only. Thus in an 
investigation of the lip-reading abilities of these children, the 
factor of age is not of particular concern. With this in mind, it 
was decided to select a sample of six autistic children from those 
who took part in the original face perception experiment and to give 
these children a simple test of their ability to lip-read. Details 
of the children selected are given in Table 3.8. in order to have 
some 'norm' against which to compare the results of the autistic 
children, a group of six control subjects were also tested. Bearing 
in mind that the subnormal and normal children's performances on the 
'mouth only' condition were almost identical, a selection of subnormal 
children were chosen as a comparison group. These ESN children were 
six of those who took part in the original experiment and were chosen 
to match the autistic children for general IQ and chronological age. 
The details of these children may also be found in Table 3.8. 
Procedure and method 
In this experiment the child was required to lip-read the names 
of some of his peers. To have presented the names by silently 
'mouthing' them could have led to too many errors of apparent 
articulation, placement of vowels etc. Thus in order to avoid such 
complications the children were fitted with noise-reducing headphones. 
With these in place the child was quite unable to hear a whispered 
word at about a metre away from the speaker. 
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Each child was tested separately in a quiet room free from 
distraction. He was told that he was going to have some headphones 
on, which would not allow him to hear what was being said to him. 
The experimenter made it clear to the child that he would see him 
say the names of some of his classmates/schoolmates. At this point 
five photographs of the faces of peers of the subject were placed in 
a row on a table in front of him. The child was asked to point to 
the face of the person whose name he thought the experimenter had 
said. The noise-reducing headphones were then put in position and the 
experimenter whispered the name of each of the represented peers in 
random order, naming each twice in all. No feedback was given to 
the child as to whether his guesses were right or wrong. 
Results 
The autistic and subnormal groups were equally good at this task: 
the ESN children obtained a mean percentage correct score of 79.17% 
(s. d. = 20.60), and the autistic children an average of 73.33% 
(s. d. = 22.51). There was no significant difference between these 
means (t=0.47; d. f. = 10). 
Discussion 
No attempt was made to match the stimuli used in this study, 
with the consequence that one group may have had an objectively 
easier task than the other (the peers' names for the two groups were 
of course not identical). Thus, the results really only reveal that 
the autistic children could lip-read, although this in itself is 
perhaps an interesting and salient finding. 
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Having established that autistic children can lip-read and that 
they may be able to do so as well as matched ESN controls, it seemed 
worthwhile to investigate their lip-reading abilities further. In 
order to do this the lip-reading task utilized by Dodd (1977) was 
employed in an adapted form. The reason for choosing this procedure 
was that it not only provides a more thorough test of lip-reading 
ability by use of matched stimuli, but it also allows the quantification 
of the extent to which lip-reading contributes towards speech perception 
in the child. Dodd found that in normal speech-perception by children, 
the contributions of what was seen and what was heard were statistically 
equal. However, if the two sensory sources were made to compete by 
giving the child disparate auditory and visual information, vision was 
found to dominate over hearing in the determination of what the child 
reported that he perceived. 
For several reasons, Dodd's experiment could not be repeated in 
its original form with the children used in the present experiments. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty was the time which it would have taken 
to establish the lip-reading ability of autistic children and match 
this with an 'auditory-only' presentation (Dodd's subjects took up to 
100 trials to reach her criteria). Consequently it was decided to 
assume the results that Dodd found for normal children with respect to 
there being an equal contribution of sight and hearing to speech 
perception under normal circumstances and to see if the autistic 
children also showed the reported dominance of vision when the two 
modalities were put in opposition. 
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Figure 3.9. Four pictures to choose from in the lip-reading study ("house" 
was seen, "book" was heard and "boy" was the related distractor). 
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3.3.3 The Contribution of Lip-Reading to Speech Perception 
Materials 
Given that it is meaningful to describe autistic children as 
having a language deficit (Rutter, 1974,1978), it was decided to 
keep the language content of this necessarily highly 'language loaded' 
study to a minimum. To ensure this, the children were not required 
to make a verbal response to the experimenter's questions but were 
requested to point to pictures of objects instead. 
The first step was to give the child a test of his lip-reading 
abilities using a standardized list of words. It was felt that one 
of the most important factors determining the choice of these words 
was that they be equally familiar to each of the children. The choice 
of words was also restrained by the decision that they should be 
monosyllabic and lend themselves easily to visual representation. 
When dealing primarily with subnormal children rather than abnormal 
ones, it might have been possible to use Mein's Word List (Mein & 
O'Connor, 1960, Mein, 1961). This would have allowed a selection of 
words of high frequency for subnormal children. However, such studies 
have not been undertaken on the vocabularies of autistic children. 
Autistic children, being known for their verbal idiosyncrasies, may 
have vocabularies which differ considerably from that of their 
subnormal peers with similar overall mental ability. To circumvent 
this difficulty, the classroom materials in both the autistic and 
subnormal schools were inspected and material was found in the form 
of packs of cards which were in general use as aids to language 
learning. These cards each showed a simple picture depicting common 
objects with monosyllabic names (Appendix I gives a full list of 
those used). Examples of the pictures may be found in Figure 3.9 
Each child's teacher was asked to confirm that the child knew the 
names of all the chosen schematized objects. 
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In addition to these materials, some electronic equipment was 
also used in the auditory presentation of the words: this included 
a tape recorder, microphone and headphones. The names of the objects 
depicted on the above-mentioned cards were read onto a tape to provide 
a standard source of auditory information. A constant volume amplifier 
was also employed in order to maintain constant loudness of the 
presentation of these words. A white noise generator coupled with an 
attenuator (graduated in decibels) was used to vary the difficulty of 
perceiving the words presented from the tape. Finally, noise-reducing 
headphones were once again used in the test of lip-reading. 
The procedure 
Step one: The child was first shown all the pictures which he would 
see in the course of the experiment and was asked to name each of them. 
If the child's spontaneous label for an item differed from that 
which had been used in the list of words (such as calling a 'ship' a 
'yacht') then he was corrected and told: "No, we'll call this a ship". 
This procedure ensured that the children knew the names of the stimuli 
and that they were all equally well informed as to the specific names 
given to the pictures within this study's context. 
Five of the pictures were thaiset out in a row in front of the 
child, and as in the last experiment, he was told that he would wear 
headphones which would not allow him to hear what the experimenter was 
saying. Again, it was made clear to the child that he would see the 
names of the objects mouthed and should point to which of them he 
thought had been named. The noise-reducing headphones were then placed 
over his ears, and the name of one of the objects was whispered. The 
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child was quite unable to pick up any auditory cues. This process 
was repeated twenty times, and each time the child had five randomly 
chosen pictures to choose from. The percentage correct thus obtained 
by the child was noted down to be used in the next step. 
Step two: For this stage of the experiment, the child was fitted 
with ordinary headphones into which white noise could be fed at a 
controllable level. These headphones were also connected to a tape 
recorder on which had been recorded the names of all the pictures used 
during the first step. The intention of this stage of the proceedings 
was to ascertain what level of noise would need to be mixed with the 
constant-volume presentation of the words in order for the child to 
get the same average percentage correct as he had obtained with vision 
alone in step one. The criterion for ascertaining the level of noise 
was that the child should obtain the same number of items correct out 
of the twenty presented at a particular noise level as he had done in 
the lip-reading task alone. 
To do this, a "method of limits" was employed in which the 
experimenter first estimated the level of noise which would produce the 
required percentage correct score. The child then had ten of the 
pictures placed before him and heard each of their names against the 
white noise background in a random order. His task was to point to the 
picture of the object which he had heard named - no spoken response was 
required. There was also no feedback given as to how well he was 
performing. 
Inevitably, the estimated noise level would prove to be too high 
or too low, thus another estimate was made on the other side of the 
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required level; for example, if the child had achieved a percentage 
correct score of eighty in the visual-only (lip-reading) condition, 
and if the first estimate of the necessary noise level returned an 
approximate average of 60%, then the noise level which would return 
a performance of between 90% and 100% was estimated. It was then a 
relatively simple matter to deduce by mathematical means the noise 
level which would be required to meet the criterion. If Xmin is the 
first percentage correct score, Xmax is the one which is higher than 
the criterion, and Xcri is that of the criterion; and if Ymin is the 
attenuation in decibels of the noise corresponding to Xmin, and Ymax 
is that corresponding to Xmax, then Ycri, which is the level that we 
seek, is: 
Xcri - Xmin x (Ymax - Ymin) + Ymin = Ycri 
Xmax - Xmin 
Thus, in the example above, if a 25 dB attenuation was associated 
with 60% correct, and a 35 dB attenuation of noise produced 90% 
correct, and the goal was to find that level which is needed to return 
80%, then the formula could be used to deduce that a 2/3 increase in 
percentage correct corresponds to a 2/3 decrease in noise, which is 
approximately 32 dB. 
The noise level was then set at the calculated value and twenty 
trials were given to establish its accuracy. In each of the trials 
the subject had a different set of five pictures from which he had 
to pick the one which he had heard named. In practice, the level of 
noise deduced in this manner was found to be within 1 dB or 2 dB of 
the required value. 
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By using this method, the matching of the child's ability on 
the visual-only and on the auditory-only conditions could be 
engineered in a minimum of time. This was important for several 
reasons. For instance, the autistic children were found to become 
distressed if they were required to listen to the white noise for 
too long; in addition, this method meant that each child took very 
nearly the same number of trials to reach the criterion, with the 
consequence that they all had almost precisely the same exposure to 
the experimental materials and situation. 
With the percentage correct scores on the visual and auditory 
only conditions being set as equal it was now possible to create 
a 'dubbed' condition in which the child heard one word and saw 
another one mouthed. To do this the level of white noise was kept 
constant for each child and a pre-recorded list of words was played. 
However, this was done in such a way that the child could not be 
certain whether he was hearing the words directly from the tape or via 
a microphone which the experimenter was holding. Due to the employment 
of a constant volume amplifier there was no detectable difference 
between words spoken by the experimenter which had been recorded on 
the tape and those presented live via the microphone. 
It should be noted that many of the instructions had been given 
to the child whilst the headphones were in place, by the use of the 
microphone. Thus each child had become accustomed both to listening 
to a tape recording and to the experimenter speaking via the 
amplification system. The instructions now given were to look at 
the experimenter and point to the picture of the object that he said. 
By phrasing the instruction in the form: "What did I say? " the 
implication of whether 'seen' or 'heard' was meant was avoided. 
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The sound of a brief 'knock' was recorded onto the tape two 
seconds prior to each of the words. This sound was recorded at such 
a low level that the child was unaware of its presence. However it 
allowed the experimenter to synchronize the seen and heard words. 
The process was practiced many times prior to running the experiment 
with the children in order that the synchrony could be as near perfect 
as possible. 
once again the pictures of objects were used. In each trial the 
child would have four of these placed on the table in front of him 
one of the pictures was of the word he was to hear and one of the word 
he was to see the experimenter mouth. A third was what may be termed 
a 'related distractor' because it was of a word which had either its 
beginning or its end in common with either the heard or the seen word. 
The final picture was of an object whose name bore no resemblance at 
all to either the seen or the heard word. Thus for one trial the 
four cards may have been: 
HEARD SEEN RELATED UNRELATED 
Tree House Train Boy 
The 'unrelated distractor' was included to control for guessing. 
A series of five trials like this were run at the level of noise 
determined previously for that child in the auditory-only condition. 
It was mentioned in the introduction to this section that Dodd (1.977) 
has found that when the two inputs are set in competition as above (by 
creating an equal percentage correct in each modality separately), then 
subjects tend to report more of the seen words than those heard. The 
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above five trials averaged across the subjects in each group thus allows 
the determination of whether such a visual dominance exists for the 
autistic and subnormal children. 
If this is so, then it would be of interest to know to what degree 
the children rely upon the visual rather than the auditory information. 
To investigate this, the noise level was reduced in four steps of two 
decibels each, with five trials being run at each of these steps (with 
the exception of the final step where only four trials were runc due to 
a shortage of appropriate materials). 
As was mentioned above, autistic children may have an abnormal 
tendency to rely upon visual input rather than auditory. Thus, even 
if the noise level is decreased, the autistic children might still 
report what they saw rather than what they heard. -In contrast, the 
subnormal children might exhibit a more normal reliance upon auditory 
cues as the noise is reduced. It is possible that visual dominance may 
only be present when the two modalities are in direct competition. If 
the child's reliance upon one modality is greater than the other, then 
it would be expected that words presented in that dominant modality 
would always be more readily reported. Thus, by setting the noise level 
such that auditory and visual presentations alone result in equal scores, 
modality dominance becomes apparent when the two stimulus sources are 
in direct conflict. Additionally, as the noise is reduced, one could 
expect the subnormals to quickly switch to reporting what they heard. 
There is also the possibility that the autistic child's attention 
is drawn to the mouth because he sees it as a source of confusion over 
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TABLE 3.9 Mean percentage correct by each group when lip-reading 
words, and the mean level of noise required by each 
group so that the auditory-only scores were equivalent 
to the visual-only ones. (Note that the higher the dB 
value, the lower the noise level) 
Group Visual only Level of noise to obtain 
(lip reading) same score on auditory-only 
(dB) 
Autistic 82.5% 28.3 
(sd = 10.84) (sd = 0.98) 
ESN 83.3% - 33.5 
(sd = 22.51) (sd = 5.01) 
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what he hears. If, as suggested earlier, this is the reason for the 
autistic child's knowledge of the mouth region, then he should not tend 
to report the visually presented words more than the heard ones when 
the two modalities are in conflict. In addition, the effect of reducing 
the noise should only be that the autistic child reports the heard 
words with increasing accuracy. 
Hence, two opposing sets of propositions may be derived from the 
hypotheses outlined at the beginning of this section. 
Results 
First, it can be said that the autistic children were as able as 
the ESN subjects at the basic test of lip-reading (the visual-only task; 
t=0.08 ; df = 10) - but not more so. However, a suprising result 
emerged from the auditory-only task, in which an attempt was made to 
match the percentage correct with that on the previous lip-reading task. 
Surprisingly, the autistic children were found to require a higher 
average level of white noise to match an equal level of percentage 
correct as the ESN children (t =2.24; df = 10 p <0.01). That is, the 
autistic children's ability to report the words which they heard was 
significantly less affected by the masking white noise than was the 
ability of the subnormal children (see Table 3.9). 
i) The Subnormal children and the 'balanced'condition: 
Contrary to expectation, the ESN children did not perform in the 
manner which Dodd (1977) reported for normal children on the 'dubbed' 
condition. When the level of noise was set such that each child had an 
equal ability to identify the words when they could only hear them or 
see them, then with the two modalities in conflict the ESN children 
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reported the heard and seen words with equal frequency (t = 0.41 ; df =10, 
p>0.1). Interestingly, this reflected a 50% efficiency in each 
modality (thus, with an 80% correct average with each modality alone, 
the percentage correct in each modality fell to about 40% each in the 
dubbed condition). As the noise level was reduced in two decibel steps, 
the first step had no apparent effect at all, but the next step brought 
a sudden and substantial swing towards dominance of the auditory input 
over the visual one (see Figure 3.11). (t=3.86; df=10, p<0.01). 
Further reduction of the noise increased this tendency to report 
what was heard and not what was seen. By the final reduction of noise 
the ESN children were reporting what they heard with almost total 
accuracy, totally ignoring (or at least not reporting) the visual input 
(t=25.4; df=10, pc( 0.001). 
(ii) The autistic children and the 'balanced' condition: 
The picture presented by the results of the autistic children was 
rather different. In the first place they did not exhibit an 
equipartition of response at the initial stage in which the two 
modalities were in direct conflict. Instead, they showed a significantly 
greater tendency to report what they heard rather than what they saw 
(t = 1.85; df = 10, p<0.05 - see Figure 3.10). As was the case with 
the subnormal children, their tendency to report the heard items 
increased as the noise level was lowered. However, the decrease in 
noise level had a somewhat weaker effect upon the autistic children's 
responses. In fact, using an 'absolute' method of scoring (where 
responses given to the related distractor were scored as incorrect) 
there was no significant difference in the autistic children's average 
percentage correct responses to the heard words with various levels of 
noise (the minimum was 63.3%, the maximum was 83.3%. t=1.51 - see 
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Figure 3.11). Even when the responses to the related-distractors 
were counted as correct (as in the previously mentioned Figure 3.11), 
only the minimum and maximum average percentage correct scores 
differed (minimum = 70%, maximum = 91.7%, t=2.16, p<0.05). In 
a similar manner, their percentage correct responses to the seen 
words also underwent less change as the noise was decreased (the 
maximum and minimum average percentage correct scores did not differ 
by either scoring method). It is possible, however, that the low 
average percentage correct score at the first stage (prior to noise 
reduction) was such that a significant lowering of performance in 
this modality could hardly occur. Nonetheless, we may note that 
neither did their ability to report the seen words fall to zero by 
the last step of noise reduction, nor did their ability to report the 
heard words rise to the almost errorless performance of the ESN 
subjects. 
Discussion 
First in this study, the autistic children were as able as the 
subnormal subjects at lip-reading. In itself, this may be seen as one 
point against the suggestion that autistic children make greater use 
of lip-read cues than others. This idea is further contradicted when 
it is considered that the autistic children were also not found to 
possess an abnormally great reliance upon lip-read cues in the 'dubbed' 
condition. In fact, the opposite appeared to be the case, and the 
autistic subjects had a greater tendency to report what they heard 
than what they saw. However, the effect of reducing the noise level 
was far less dramatic for the autistics than for the subnormals. If 
it is suggested that the tendency to report the heard words before 
the noise was reduced was due to them selectively attending to the 
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auditory input, then the problem immediately arises of explaining why 
the noise reduction had little effect. one would have expected that 
if the child possessed a tendency to attend to the auditory modality 
rather than the visual, any changes which made perception of the heard 
words easier would have been expected to facilitate the reporting of 
these words. 
Clearly, there are too many uncontrolled variables in this study 
to allow any firm conclusions. However, some suggestions may be 
offered which might provide a basis for some further research. In 
attempting to account for the above findings, it would be well to 
consider the other unexpected result that came out of this study: the 
autistic children tended, on average, to put up with more noise to 
achieve an average percentage correct score in the auditory-only 
condition than ESN children. This may be connected with Hermelin & 
O'Connor's (1968) finding that autistic children are more aroused by 
continuous white noise than are matched subnormal controls. If it is 
proposed that a higher level of arousal might heighten attentiveness, 
then for the autistic children in the present study, it may be suggested 
that the increase in noise level served two antagonistic functions: 
(1) to mask the signal and thus make it less easy to discriminate; 
(2) to increase attention to the auditory modality and thus enhance 
perception of the items which were heard. 
This explanation is tentative and obviously not the only one which 
might be put forward; however, looking at the autistic children's 
percentage correct scores on the heard words it can be seen that as the 
noise was reduced their performance hardly changed at all. in the light 
of the above it may be suggested that as the noise level became lower, the 
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autistic children simultaneously became less attentive to the auditory 
stimuli and yet more able to perceive them; thus, the relatively gradual 
increase in the average percentage correct scores may be seen as the 
result of these two antoagonistic factors. Nonetheless, we should not 
consider the auditory component in isolation, either within the context 
of this study or in 'real life' situations. Consequently, the question 
remains why the presence of the noise did not also enhance the autistic 
children's ability to report the words they saw too. That is, what 
reason could there be for an auditory predominance when the two modalities 
are set in direct conflict? 
It might be conjectured, for instance, that the autistic children 
were not tending to integrate the disparate pieces of information into 
a unified perception. Clearly, some competition for response selection 
was present or else they would have reported the seen-words and heard- 
words equally frequently. But with some failure to integrate the inputs 
of various modalities, one may speculate that arousing stimulation to 
one modality (here, white noise to the auditory) increases sensitivity 
specifically to items presented to that modality. The suggestion that 
the autistic children may have had a lesser propensity to integrate the 
inputs was bolstered by the finding that two of the autistic children 
responded to some of the trials by reporting correctly that they had 
seen one word and heard another - which was never reported by any of 
the subnormal children. In fact, being aware of the possibility that 
the ESN children could equally well have been able to report both heard 
and seen words but failed to do so because they felt a single response 
was required, additional trials were run at a later date, and it was 
specifically pointed out that what was heard and what was seen were 
different. The subnormal children were requested to report both of the 
ar mat a, luYz to ;wc Jýý c. iýc, ý w tts s ý. wett, wlýc. r was kecirJ rfc4kced 
190 
words and were found to be unable to do so. Instead they pointed 
to just one of the choice of four pictures as they had done in the 
experimental proceedings. 
Evidence exists that human infants integrate what they see and 
hear from birth (Wertheimer, 1961), and that by at least ten weeks 
of age an infant is capable of detecting when lip-movements are out 
of synchrony with the speech he is hearing (Dodd, inter alia), and 
this is even the case when a non-native language is being presented 
to the baby. In the light of such findings, it could be the case 
that an apparent deficit in inter-modal integration in autistic 
children has important implications for their ontogeny and can be 
seen as an aspect which parallels that of an incompetence in cross- 
modal transfer. Evidence for this has been reported in recent 
literature (Hermelin, 1978). Such a proposition that autistic 
children have problems with the integration of experiences is not 
new, and references to it may be found scattered throughout the 
writings on childhood autism (e. g. Rimland, 1964; Anthony, 1958). 
The results pertaining to noise level and the perception of 
auraLLj presented information needs to be more thoroughly investigated. 
One way in which this might be approached would be to replicate the 
"auditory only" part of the above experiment but with overall magnitude 
of the input being the only variable. Thus having set a low level of 
information input, which is overlaid with a similarly low level of noise 
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to produce an average correct reporting of the stimuli of, say 50 to 
60%, the overall volume of the combined input could then be increased 
in equal decibel steps. For the ESN subjects it would be expected that 
the overall increase in volume would have little or no effect on their 
ability to report the words. However, for the autistic children it 
might be hypothesized that as the overall noise level was increased, 
so would their average percentage correct scores. 
Concerning the sensory integration aspect, the autistic and 
subnormal children could be presented with a noise over-laid auditory 
input which was out of synchrony with the lip-movements of the 
presenter of the items. The performance in this condition would then 
be compared with that on an "auditory only" condition which utilized 
the same level of white noise. For the normal, and presumably the 
ESN children, the conflicting information provided by the out-of- 
synchrony visual input would cause a lower average percentage correct 
score than when such a conflicting input is absent (Dodd, 1977). On 
the other hand, if the autistic subjects were tending not to integrate 
the two inputs, then it would be expected that their performance on the 
two conditions would be almost identical. Although this experiment is 
not included in this thesis, the proposition that autistic children 
have problems with the integration of sensory data will be returned 
to later. 
In conclusion, this study has mainly brought to light several 
interesting findings that are outside the scope of the present thesis 
to follow up. Nonetheless, there would seem to be no support for the 
contention that the autistic children possess an abnormal tendency to 
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rely upon the visual modality when perceiving speech. In fact, when 
the two modalities were in conflict the autistic children tended to 
report what they heard rather than what they saw. 
The most parsimonious explanation for the results would seem to 
be in terms of the children's abilities to integrate their perceptions. 
Whilst the subnormal children seemed to show evidence of such 
integration, the autistic children tended not to. 
Summary of the lip-reading studies 
It was suggested that autistic children might possess a better- 
than-average knowledge of the mouth area of faces because they have a 
tendency to lip-read. Thus it was decided to approach the study of 
this possibility by examining the face perception ability of subjects 
known to lip-read in every-day life. Hard-of-hearing subjects were 
indeed found to know the lower facial regions generally better than 
did normal and other subnormal subjects. However, their ability to 
recognize the mouth area of peers' faces was not outstandingly good 
and was thus felt not to be truly comparable with that of the autistic 
children in the previous study. 
The basic contention was also investigated by studying the lip- 
reading ability of autistic children in comparison to that of matched 
ESN children. It was noted that a tendency to look at the mouth area 
might occur for either of two quite different reasons: it may well 
be the case that autistic children lip-read, but it may also be that 
they are poor at integrating the seen and heard aspects of speech 
perception. The latter deficit might lead to confusion in the 
autistic child and thus to an enhanced attention to the sources of 
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this confusion. It was thus decided that the first of these two 
possibilities would imply better-than-average lip-reading powers by 
autistic subjects and a greater-than-normal reliance upon such visual 
speech cues. The second possibility, in contrast, would not imply that 
autistic children would be any better than ESN children at lip-reading, 
indeed they may be worse. It was also not expected that an inability 
to integrate the two types of information would lead to an abnormal 
reliance upon the visual modality. 
These possibilities were investigated using a method developed by 
Dodd (1977) in which the child heard one word and saw another being 
mouthed. This allowed testing for abnormal modality reliance. The 
results did not lend themselves to clear interpretation. However, it 
would seem unlikely that a dependency upon visual speech cues could 
explain the autistic children's knowledge of lower facial features. 
Instead, it appeared that a poor ability to integrate the two sources 
of information about spoken messages was implicated. 
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3.4 Further Studies of the Inverted Mode 
3.4.1 Recognition of inverted halves of faces 
In the initial study of face perception (section 3.1), it was 
found that the older autistic children were exceptionally good at 
recognising inverted faces. In contrast, the younger autistic children 
were no better at this than the normal and ESN children tested for 
comparison. It was therefore concluded that the findings could not 
be explained purely by reference to the social aspects of face 
perception. For instance, Yin (1970) has suggested that it is ones 
ability to discern the expression of an inverted face which makes it 
particularly difficult to recognise. The less sociable child would 
thus be expected to have least difficulty recognising inverted faces. 
However, the younger and less sociable autistic children (see Wing, 
1976b) did worse than the older ones at recognising the inverted faces. 
It was suggested that a child's scanning strategy might be 
partially determined by the existence of a 'focal centre', that is, 
a point or area of the face around which scanning is primarily centred*. 
It was further argued that normal and ESN children might have such a 
'focal centre' as the eyes, and the evidence which emerged from the 
study suggested-that the younger autistic children might have the mouth 
as a centre of scanning. The inversion of the face changes the position 
of the focal centre with respect to the other facial features, thus 
for the above three groups inversion of the stimulus might disrupt 
their scanning strategies. 
* There is evidence supporting the idea that normal adults have 
'focal centres' around which their scanning of a face revolves 
(Walker-Smith et al., 1977). 
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In contrast, the older autistic children's fairly homogeneous 
knowledge of faces might indicate that they possess no such 'focal 
centre', and thus have no well-defined scanning strategy which could 
be disrupted by inversion of the stimulus. This suggestion might best 
be investigated by studying the children's eye movements while looking 
at inverted faces compared to their eye movements when viewing upright 
ones. A pilot study of their scanning when viewing upright faces will 
be presented near the end of this thesis; but it was not possible to 
carry out the full eye movement study with the older autistic children 
used in section 3.1. 
However, a simpler explanation might also account for the older 
autistic children's results. It may be that they possess a better than 
normal knowledge of the mouths of faces and that the mouth area is much 
easier to recognise upside down than areas that other children know best. 
This suggestion has common sense validity insofar as the eye area has 
more elements comprising it than the mouth area. In other words, to 
recognise the eyes upside down one would have to be able to 'mentally 
rotate' more elements than when recognising inverted mouths. The fact 
that older autistic children were better able to recognise inverted 
faces than younger ones might be due to a maturational factor (it is 
known that older normal children are more able to identify faces from 
small areas than younger normal children; Goldstein and Mackenberg, 1966). 
If the above is true, then one can predict that older autistic 
children would find inverted lower halves of faces to be considerably 
easier to recognise than inverted upper halves. To test this, older 
autistic children were required to identify inverted halves of peers' 
faces from black and white photographs. Their performance on this task 
was compared with that of a group of ESN children matched for age and 
general ability. 
1 96 
TABLE 3.10 Subjects in the study of ability to recognise 
inverted halves of faces 
Mean C. A. Mean Full IQ 
Group N (sd) (sd) 
Autistic 10 14.17 yrs 66.70 
(1.42 yrs) (13.24) 
ESN 10 13.92 yrs 62.80 
(1.31 yrs) (8.41) 
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Subjects 
The selection of subjects for this study was hampered by two 
factors. First, of the original ten 'older' autistic children, five were 
no longer available for testing. Second, because there had been a gap 
of some 18 months between this experiment and the one presented in 
section 3.1, the children involved were naturally older. Consequently 
any differences between the performance of the children in this study 
and the earlier one might be due to the nature of the task, or to the 
different photographs, or to the maturation of the subjects over the 
18-month period. In an attempt to reduce these problems a new 'older' 
group of autistic children were chosen on a one-to-one basis to match 
the age and intelligence of the earlier group. Similar problems of 
course arose with the choice of ESN children to act as a comparison 
group. These problems were ameliorated in the same way by choosing a 
new 'older' ESN group which was matched one-to-one with the former group 
for age and intelligence. Table 3.10 gives details of the subjects. 
The materials used 
As for the experiment in section 3.1, the stimuli for each group 
were black and white photographs of the faces of the members of that 
group, each measuring 14 cm by 10cm. A fresh set of photographs was 
made, of course, because not all members were present in the previous 
experiment, and this also avoided any advantage being given to a child 
who could remember the previous photographs. Precautions were once 
again taken to ensure that no clothing was visible in the pictures, and 
that they were all of evently good quality. Cardboard masks were again 
made so that the part of the face the child was not to see could 
be 
covered up. 
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TABLE 3.11 Mean percent correct for each group when recognising 
inverted upper and lower halves of faces 
Group Inverted lower half Inverted upper half 
Autistic 70.00% 72.00% 
ESN 47.40% 51.24% 
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Methodology and Procedure 
Each child was taken individually to a quiet room to be tested. 
The child was told that he would see 'upside-down pictures of the faces 
of children you know in the school'. The inverted pictures of upper 
and lower parts of the faces were presented one at a time in random 
order, and the child was asked to say whom he thought the photograph 
depicted. The upper inverted halves were equivalent to an inversion 
of the 'Up2' condition from the last experiment. The lower inverted 
halves were equivalent to the invert of the 'Low2' condition. Although 
the order of presentation was essentially random, certain contraints 
were imposed in that the two halves of the same face were not shown 
consecutively. This method was used in preference to one in which one 
half of all faces was presented before the child saw the other half, in 
order to reduce learning effects. Finally, each child was shown the 
whole of all the faces upright and uncovered, and. if he was unable to 
identify any face in this run then his previous errors on that face 
were discounted. 
Results 
The results are tabularised in table 3.11. 
1. The ESN children 
As can be seen from the table, the ESN children were approximately 
as good at recognising each of the inverted halves (the difference was 
not significant in a related t-test; t=0.60, p> 0.1, df = 8). 
Surprisingly, this group performed a little better on these inverted 
halves than the previous 'older' ESN group did on the full inverted face. 
However, the difference only reached significance for the comparison 
between the inverted whole face and the inverted upper half (a related 
t-test revealed t=2.39, df = 8, p <0.05). It is not clear why this 
should be so. 
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Comparing the present 'older' ESN group with the previous one 
on inverted and upright halves revealed significant differences. 
There was no difference between the previous ESN group's ability to 
recognise upright lower halves and the present ESN group's ability 
to recognise inverted lower halves (related t=0.46, df = 8). However 
the performance on the inverted upper halves was significantly worse 
than on the upright upper halves (related t=2.89, df = 8, p<0.025). 
Thus inversion of the faces had little effect on the ESN children's 
ability to recognise lower halves, but it significantly impaired their 
ability to recognise upper halves. This finding thus supports the 
initial proposal that recognition of upper half is more affected by 
inversion of the stimulus than is recognition of the lower half. It 
may well be then that the mouth area is easier to rotate mentally than 
is the eye area. 
The autistic children 
The autistic children displayed equal ability to recognise faces 
from upper and lower inverted halves (related t=0.31, df = 8, p> 0.1). 
The autistic children in this study were as good at recognising 
at' 
inverted halves as the group in the previous study had been, \recognising 
whole inverted faces: full invert versus inverted Up2 gave a related 
t=0.27, full invert versus inverted Low2 gave t=0.05, and neither were 
significant at p=0.1. Comparing their abilities at the inverted 
and upright halves revealed significant differences. They were better 
on upright lower halves than inverted ones (related t=3.72, df = 8, 
p <'0.01), and better on the upright upper halves than the inverted ones 
(related t=3: J Ej, df = 8, p<0.01). 
Between group differences 
The autistic children were considerably better at recognising 
faces from inverted lower halves than the ESN children (t = 2.14, 
df = 17, p <0.025). The comparison of the groups' abilities to identify 
inverted upper halves showed a non-significant, but nonetheless clear, 
trend for the autistic children to be once again better (t = 1.62, 
df = 17, pK0.08). 
Summary of results 
1. The ESN children got about half of the faces correct when viewing 
either upper, or lower inverted halves. The ability of the autistic 
children was about equal when requiring to tell identify from either 
inverted half and was generally better than that of the ESN children 
Percentage correct scores 
00 
XMN'l NI 
-"" 
0 
Inv Up2 Inv Low2 Inv Up2 Inv Low2 
51.24% 47.40% 72.00% 70.00% 
ESN AUTISTIC 
2. Comparison of the ESN children's ability to recognise inverted 
o. % tl. e cAe t%aad, 
halves of faces in this study with their recognition of upright faces 
Qt cCt e+ kot'd, 
in the previous study,,, showed that their ability to recognise upper 
halves was more affected by inversion than was 
reac, 
ýtii10^A lower halves, 
This supports the contention that the lower half of the faces contains 
more easily mentally rotated features. 
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Percentage correct scores: 
o MON 
Up2 Inv Up2 Low2 Inv Low2 
84.80% 51.24% 53.10% 47.41% 
(ESN children) 
3. Inversion of the faces equally impaired the autistic children's 
H+ket(er 
ability to recognise them regardless ofAupper or lower halves or the 
whole face were seen. 
Percentage correct scores 
0 
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ýmn 
Upright Inverted Inv Up2 
100% 71.70% 72.00% 
(Autistic children) 
Inv Low2 
70.00% 
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Discussion 
The results from the autistic children imply that they have a 
homogeneous knowledge of inverted faces as well as of upright faces. 
In the introduction it was suggested that the older autistic child's 
relatively good ability to recognise upside down faces might be due to 
his knowledge of the mouth area and the ease with which this area can 
be 'rotated mentally'. The results of the ESN children's performance 
support the contention that the mouth area is more easily mentally 
rotated 
(in that recognition of it is less affected by inversion) 
than the eye area is. However, the autistic children did not find the 
lower inverted halves to be easier to identify than the upper ones. 
Thus, it is unlikely that the ease of mentally rotating the mouth 
area alone can explain the autistic children's above average ability 
to recognise inverted faces. If knowledge of the mouth area led the 
autistic children to have a superior ability to recognise inverted 
faces, then why was their ability to recognise upper inverted halves 
so good? 
A number of workers have pointed out the possibility that 
inversion of faces may more radically affect recognition of them than 
it does any . other stimulus that is normally only seen in one orientation 
Vochberg and Galper, 1967; Yin, 1969; Rock, 1974; and Ellis, 1975). 
gives a summary). Rock (ibid. ) noted that when a face is inverted 
a complex of familiar spatial relationships is altered. Because one's 
scanning strategies may rely upon these relationships, inversion of 
the face might disrupt one's habitual face-scanning strategies. 
Noton and Stark (1971) found support for the idea that faces are 
scanned in a particular manner, and Smith and Nielson (1970) bolster 
this with their finding that people tend to scan faces from top to 
bottom. 
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One problem inherent in such work is the lack of a precise 
definition of what is meant by a stimulus which is usually only seen 
in one orientation (so called 'mono-oriented stimuli'). Written text 
for example is most often seen in the upright mode, and Rock (1974) 
draws attention to the fact that upside down hand writing can be very 
hard to read. On the other hand, although it is no indication that 
children are indifferent to orientation, they are nonetheless frequently 
observed to look at books and pictures which are held upside down. 
(Ghent, 1961; Phillips, 1977). If an explantion of why faces are 
peculiarly difficult to recognise upside down relies on defining them as 
mono-oriented, then this term must be defined more clearly. Additionally, 
if inverting faces disrupts one's natural scanning pattern for them, then 
it remains to be shown that one's scanning pattern for faces is unique 
to faces alone. 
Yin (1970) notes that the face serves two functions. It provides 
information about the identity of the person, and it also reveals 
something about the person's inner state. It is the latter, more social, 
aspect which Yin feels is involved in the abnormal difficulty in 
recognising inverted faces. It is, as many others have said (see Phillips, 
1977), very difficult to tell the expression of an upside down face. 
However, there is a possibility which Yin does not discuss, namely that 
recognition of expression in the eye area is more radically affected 
by inversion than that in the mouth area. There is no data in the 
literature which is directly relevant to this point, but it is of 
potential relevance to the present study. It seems that the normal 
persons recognition of a face is strongly bound up with his ability 
to identify expression in that face: he tends not only to identify faces 
according to specific facial features but also according to typical 
expression. 
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In a sense, recognition of features and recogniton of typical 
expressions are two sides of the same coin. For the manner in which 
a particular expression manifests itself on a person's face is a 
function of the physical characteristics of his face. His expression 
is a pattern of his facial features and the spatial relationships 
between them. Thus to talk of the disruption of one's ability to 
recognise features is ipso facto to be talking of the disruption of 
one's ability to identify expression, too. 
The important point to be made here is that emotional expression 
might be difficult to discern in inverted faces because the discernment 
involves the integration of several features and their inter-relationships 
into a whole or 'gestalt'. Consequently, the eye area is possibly 
harder to recognise upside down not only because it contains more 
elements than the mouth area, but also because the relationships between 
the components must be 'mentally rotated' and not just the individual 
features themselves. If this is true, then the normal and ESN child's 
natural propensity to integrate the parts of his perceptions into a 
meaningful whole might on the one hand allow him to understand facial 
expression but on the other hand hamper his ability to recognise both 
identity and expression in upside down faces. By reverse logic the 
autistic child's abnormally good ability to identify inverted faces 
might be due to him lacking the normal propensity to integrate his 
perceptions. If this is true then one can make two predictions: the 
older autistic child's good ability to recognise inverted stimuli 
should not be restricted to faces and his ability to identify facial 
expressions should be deficient (especially where correct identification 
involves the integration of several components and the relationships 
between them). 
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It would thus be of interest to test the ESN and autistic 
children's abilities to identify other stimuli which are usually seen 
one way up and which usually involve the integration of their parts into 
a whole. One example of such stimuli is the written word, which as 
soon as a child can read will be viewed as a whole rather than as a 
series of letters and their sounds. 
Summary and conclusions 
It was hypothesised that the older autistic child's superior 
ability to recognise inverted faces is due to his possessing a more 
detailed knowledge of the mouth area, which, it was suggested, might be 
easier to 'rotate mentally'. To test this hypothesis the children were 
shown inverted halves of peers' faces in photographic form, and their 
performance was compared with that of matched ESN children. If the mouth 
is a more easily mentally rotated feature, then it. -would be expected 
that recognition of lower halves of faces is less affected by inversion 
than that of upper halves. This was found to be true for the ESN children 
but not for the autistic children. The autistic children found both of 
the inverted halves equally easy to identify. The results were discussed 
in the light of other workers' suggestions as to why inverted faces are 
so hard to recognise. It was concluded that one's ability to identify 
emotional expression in another's face may be important in recognising 
his identity, and that such recogniton might be drastically affected by 
inversion. It was finally suggested that the normal and ESN child's 
difficulties with recognising inverted faces might be due to their 
natural propensity to integrate their within-modality perceptions into 
wholes or 'gestalten'; thus, the autistic children may not integrate 
their perceptions so readily, and consequently they might possess knowledge 
of individual components which are easier to recognise when inverted. 
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Figure 3.12 Words in the test of inverted and 
upright word perception (after the 
'Burt Word Reading Test', Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1976) . 
to is up he at 
for my sun one of 
big some his or an 
went boys that girl water 
just day wet pot things 
no told love now sad 
nurse carry -. quickly village scrambled 
journey terror return twisted shelves 
beware explorer known projecting tongue 
serious domineer obtain belief luncheon 
emergency events steadiness nourishment fringe 
formulate scarcely universal commenced overwhelmed 
circumstances destiny urge labourers exhausted 
trudging refrigerator melodrama encyclopaedia apprehend 
motionless ultimate atmosphere reputation binolcular 
economy theory humanity philosopher contemptuous 
autobiography excessively champagne terminology perambulating 
efficiency unique perpetual mercenary glycerine 
influential atrociots fatigue exorbitant. --physician 
microscopical contagion renown hypocritical fallacious 
phlegmatic melancholy palpable eccentricity constitutionally 
alienate phthisis poignancy ingratiating subtlety 
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It was proposed that the next step should be to find out whether the 
autistic children's abnormally good ability to identify inverted stimuli 
is specific to faces. Hence a study was made of their ability to read 
inverted words, and the results of this study are presented in the 
following section. 
3.4.2 Recognition of Inverted Words 
The purpose of this investigation is to determine whether or not the 
older autistic children's superior ability to recognise inverted stimuli 
is specific to faces. To this end the children were required to read 
words which were presented upside-down and then to read them the right way 
up. If the older autistic children's ability is not specific to faces, 
then one would expect that, like the ESN children, their ability to read 
upright words would be better than their ability to read inverted ones 
but that inversion would affect them less than it would affect the ESN 
children. 
Materials 
The intention of this experiment was to administer the Burt Word 
Test to the children with the words first being presented upside-down and 
then the right way-up. However, in its original form the word test has 
the test material printed in various print sizes. It was felt that this 
was potentially a confusing factor, and thus the words were re-typed 
using an IBM typewriter with "pica" typeface (see figure 3.12). 
Methodology and Procedure 
Each child was shown the words on the test sheet, one at a time and 
upside-down. The procedure of the Burt WoNd Test was followed with the 
child seeing progressively more difficult words until he failed two complete 
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rows of words. Having administered the test in this inverted mode, 
the child was immediately given the test again in the normal upright 
manner. In the first presentation of the words the child was given 
no feedback as it was felt that learning of the test material might 
occur before the retest. 
Results 
An analysis of variance on the data revealed a main effect of 
conditions (F = 3.01, p<0.05) and an interaction of groups-by- 
conditions (F = 3.82, p<0.01). This reflected the fact that in 
accord with prediction both groups found the words easier to read 
when they were seen upright (t = 4.78, p<0.01 for the autistic 
children; t=5.19, p 
<0.001 for the ESN children). The difference 
between the number of correct upright and the number of correct 
inverted words for each child was calculated for the two groups and 
these were compared using an unrelated t-test; the source of the 
above interaction was thus discovered to be that inversion of the 
words affected the ESN children's scores much more than it did the 
autistic children's (t = 3.93, p<0.005). The lack of a 'groups' 
effect was due to the lack of difference in their ability to read 
the words when they were presented in the normal upright mode 
(t = 0.29, p, 0.1), and one may therefore conclude that the reading 
ability of the groups was statistically equal. 
A note was made of the types of error that the members of each 
group made, and there were significant group differences. Errors of 
reversal of letters (eg. b for d) were more frequent 
in the ESN group 
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than in the autistic group (12 in the ESN group compared to only 3 
in the autistic group). Similarly, the ESN children were found to 
make more errors of inversion of letters (eg. t for f) than did the 
autistic children (again, 12 errors by the ESNs but only 1 by the 
autistics). However, errors of displacement of letters (reading 
"on" for "no" for eg. ) did not differentiate the groups (the ESN 
children made 6 such errors and the autistic children only made 5). 
211 
Discussion 
Whilst both the autistic and the ESN children found inverted 
words harder to identify than upright ones, the autistic children's 
ability was less affected by inversion of the stimuli. Because the two 
groups had statistically equal reading ages in the upright mode, one 
may conclude that the difference in abilities on the inverted mode was 
not due to a mismatch of their reading abilities. Thus the older 
autistic children's superior ability to identify inverted stimuli is 
not specific to faces and extends at least to the identification of 
written words. 
It was notable that the autistic children made fewer errors, -)of 
inversion and reversal of the letters. The presence of reversal errors 
in young children's reading is common (see Gibson and Levine, 1976), 
and these alongside ihVe(-sinn errors tend to imply that the ESN children 
were trying to read the words as 'gestalten'. That is, they were tending 
to read in terms of the relationship between the various individual 
components of the printed words. Thus reversal and particularly inversion 
errors are a natural consequence of attempting to 'mentally rotate' each 
word in its entirety. If by contrast a child were to read in a more 
piecemeal fashion, noting how each component looks iconically, then he 
may also approach the reading of inverted words in a similar manner. 
Hence he would invert each letter individually rather than attempting 
to invert the word as a whole. This would give rise to fewer errors of 
inversion and reversal, and describes very well the performance of the 
autistic children. Whilst this is not firm evidence (other factors 
might explain the results), it may be that the autistic children tended 
not to integrate the letters into whole words when they read as much 
as the ESN children. Support for this comes from the responses of one 
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autistic child who frequently half-spelt and half-pronounced each 
word (eg. 'g-l-ycerine' for 'glycerine'). The contention is also in 
line with the findings of the previous experiment, in which it was 
also suggested that the autistic children tended not to integrate their 
perceptions into meanginful wholes as readily as the ESN children. 
3.4.3 General discussion of the inverted mode studies 
In the original experiment on face perception, it was found that 
the older autistic children were exceptionally good at recognising 
upside-down faces. The older autistic children were also found to be 
equally good at recognising both upper and lower inverted halves of a 
face. This finding thus eliminated the possibility that it was solely 
their knowledge of the mouth which led to their abnormally good ability 
to identify upside-down faces. 
It was noted that the literature favours a link between one's 
ability to identify emotional expression in a face and one's problems 
with identification of faces seen upside-down. It was also noted that 
the identification of expression is inextricably bound up with the 
ability to process one's perception of a face in terms of both its 
featural components and the relationships between them. Integration 
of one's perceptions is thus vital to accurate perception of facial 
expressions. By reverse logic it was suggested that the autistic 
children had less of a tendency to process their perception of faces 
in such an integrative manner. The advantage to expect of a less 
holistic knowledge of a stimulus is that one can recognise it more 
readily when it is upside-down. The price paid, though, was hypothesised 
to be a lesser ability to discern facial expression. The latter point 
will be investigated later in this thesis, but the former point would 
seem to fit the previous results of the autistic children. 
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If the autistic children's good ability to recognise inverted 
faces is based on a lesser tendency (or ability) to integrate parts 
of their perception into wholes or 'gestalten', then there 
is no reason 
to suppose that it is specific to faces. This was found to be true, 
and they displayed a better ability to identify inverted words than 
matched ESN children. Further, the lack of errors of reversal or 
inversion of the letters by the autistic group was noted to be possible 
evidence for their not reading words in as holistic a manner as the 
ESN children. 
To integrate the 'parts' which make up one's perceptual world into 
'wholes' is a necessary aspect of normal human cognition. But if this 
integration simply takes the form of 'chunking' or 'clustering' then 
the processes of categorisation and symbol formation will be greatly 
impeded. one must be able to go beyond that which is immediately 
given or temporally adjacent and be able to bring together disparate 
elements to form a single thematic unity. Clearly, although it may be 
going beyond the data of the above experiments, one may nonetheless hold 
in mind that the older autistic children's superior ability to recognise 
inverted stimuli may reflect a deficiency in their ability to perceive 
gestalten through the integration of component parts into meaningful 
wholes. 
This theoretical proposition will be returned to later, though 
for the moment one may note that the fact that the face serves several 
functions may be an important aspect of the present enquiry. Up to this 
point the studies have dealt with the autistic child's ability to 
recognise faces and have investigated the hypotheses that arose in 
consequence. However, as was mentioned above, recognition of a face's 
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identity may be linked to one's ability to discern the expression on 
that face. It remains a possibility therefore that ESN children find 
it difficult to recognise inverted faces because they find the expressions 
on them hard to discern. 
But if feature- and expression-identification are probably linked 
for the ESN child, it is not clear from the above study that this is 
also true for the older autistic child; and one is in no position to 
propose that it is true for the younger autistic child either. In fact, 
clinical observation suggests that both younger and older autistic 
children are poor at understanding other people's non-verbal behaviour 
of which facial expression forms a part (Wing, 1976a). Consequently, 
one may hypothesise that in a study of their ability to identify 
expression, autistic children would be shown to be less able than ESN 
children. Further, while the ESN children's ability to identify 
expressions would be greatly affected by inversion, it is possible that 
the autistic children's ability to identify facial expression would be 
generally much poorer, but what ability they have would be less affected 
by inverting the faces. 
For the above reasons, the following two chapters will be concerned 
with the identification of expression by ESN, normal and autistic 
children. The first of these chapters deals with an overview of the 
literature on normal children's ability to identify facial expressions 
and the ontogeny of their ability. The second chapter deals with an 
experimental study of the autistic and ESN children's skills in this 
area. 
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Before moving on to these topics, though, it is worth noting 
that the literature on the identification of facial expression also 
concerns itself with the production of expressions. The ability to 
understand another's expression is intertwined with one's ability to 
experience that expression. Similarly, the ability to correctly label 
a facial expression is bound up with one's ability to produce it 
(although it will be noted that for acquired expressions comprehension 
seems to precede performance). Hence, the following chapter will 
discuss details of those expressions which may be innate and those 
which are more probably acquired. Suffice to say at this juncture 
that in early life spontaneous production of expressions precedes 
recognition of them; and this in turn precedes the ability to produce 
them to order. Thus it would be of interest to study the autistic 
children's abilities to produce facial expressions, both spontaneously 
and to order. Therefore, Chapter 5 will deal with this topic too. 
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3.5 Summary of and Conclusions to the Studies so far 
In the first study the autistic children's ability to recognise 
peers' faces from isolated facial features and from inverted portrayals 
was compared with that of matched comparison groups of normal and ESN 
children. The results of the normal and ESN children were similar 
across age levels and showed them to be more able to recognise faces 
from upper features than from lower ones. In contrast, both younger 
and older autistic children were more able than their comparison groups 
to recognize lower facial features. 
However, whereas the younger autistic children found the lower 
features easier to recognize than the upper ones, the older autistic 
children found the faces to be almost equally easy to recognise from 
any facial area. Neither autistic group were found to be less able than 
the comparison children to recognize the faces from the eye area. 
Whilst the comparison groups and younger autistic children found 
inverted faces harder to recognize than upright ones, the older autistic 
children were found to have an ability to recognize inverted faces 
superior to that of all the other groups. This ability was nearly as 
good as their ability to recognize upright faces. 
As a result of these findings, it was suggested that the autistic 
children might have a tendency to scan the lower halves of all objects. 
To test this they were required to sort schematic houses into two piles 
according to their similarity to two basic house designs. The houses 
to be sorted were made up of elements of the basic houses. By noting 
onto which pile the child placed any, one could infer whether the child 
was tending to sort according to upper or lower features. The autistic 
children's performance on this test was compared with that of matched 
217 
ESN children. There was no evidence to indicate that the autistic 
children tended to scan lower areas since they showed no evidence for 
abnormal sorting by lower features. 
A second possibility was that the autistic children's better than 
normal knowledge of lower facial features might be due to them tending 
to lip-read. The validity of such an assertion was first tested by 
investigating the ability of hard-of-hearing subjects to recognise 
peers' faces from upper and lower halves. It was found that, in 
accord with prediction, they were more able to recognise faces from the 
lower area than were subjects with normal hearing. However, it was 
noted that they were still somewhat less able in this regard than the 
autistic children. 
Some of the autistic children were compared with matched ESN 
children for their ability to lip-read peers' names. The two groups 
were equally able to do this task. A more elaborate task was devised 
in order to investigate whether the two groups differed in their reliance 
upon the mouth area for cues about the content of spoken communications. 
The autistic children were once again found to be as able as the ESN 
children at lip-reading. However, the other findings were more confusing. 
First, the autistic children were less affected by the presence of white 
noise when they had to report words heard via headphones. Second, the 
ESN children did not perform in the expected manner when they were 
presented with conflicting auditory and visual information and were 
asked to repeat the word they had perceived. Normal children have 
been shown (Dodd, 1977) to rely more on visual input than auditory input 
when either modality presented alone would dictate that the children would 
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give the same percent correct. In contrast, the ESN children reported 
heard words and seen ones with equal frequency. When the noise level 
was reduced they quickly switched to reporting the words that they heard. 
The autistic children's performance differed from this in that at the 
balance position they tended to report what they heard, and as the noise 
level was reduced they changed more slowly than the ESN children to 
reporting the heard words with greater frequency. The meaning of these 
findings was not clear, but the autistic children did not seem to exhibit 
an abnormal reliance upon lip-read information. Instead, it seemed that 
a poor ability to integrate the seen and heard sources of information from 
spoken messages was implicated. 
The older autistic children's superior ability to recognise inverted 
faces was further investigated. It was suggested that they might possess 
a superior knowledge of the mouth area which is easier to identify when 
upside down. However, whilst the ESN children's ability to recognise 
lower halves of faces was less affected by inversion than their ability 
to recognise upper halves the older autistic children's ability was equally, 
and only slightly, affected by inversion. Thus, a superior knowledge of 
the mouth area could not explain the autistics' results. The ability 
of the children to identify inverted words was also investigated to find 
out if the older autistic children's superior ability to recognise inverted 
stimuli was restricted to faces. This was not found to be so, for 
their ability to identify upside-down words was also better than that 
of matched ESN children. Furthermore, the autistic children made fewer 
errors of inversion of letters (mistaking 't's for 'f's and so on) and 
fewer reversal errors, too (such as saying 'on' when they'd read 'no' 
upside down). It was concluded that the older autistic child's superior 
ability to recognise inverted stimuli is not restricted to faces but 
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probably remains constant for all so called 'mono-oriented' stimuli. 
The most probable interpretation of the results was that the autistic 
children were not tending to view words or faces as 'gestalten' and 
thus retained a more fragmented knowledge of the stimuli. Such a 
fragmented knowledge might have enabled the autistics to identify 
inverted stimuli, since recognition of individual inverted features 
is easier than that of a whole which must be mentally rotated in its 
entirety before identification can take place. 
The general conclusion is thus that the autistic children have 
showed several instances where their abnormal performance might be 
accounted for by a failure to integrate their perceptions and form 
meaningful gestalten. The failure to do this could explain why they 
were so good at identification of inverted stimuli and would also account 
for their abnormally homogeneous knowledge of the-face. However, it is 
the ability of other children to form such meaningful gestalten that 
allows them to have a full concept of 'facial expression'. That is, 
only by integrating the information gathered from the various parts of 
the face over a course of time can one to determine how another 
feels. It was thus decided that it would prove fruitful to know more 
about the autistic child's ability to discern facial expressions. It 
was further noted that the ability to identify expressions has been 
discussed along with the ability to produce expressions in the literature 
on normal children, and thus it was decided to investigate this topic, too. 
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Chester 4 
THE IDENTIFICATION AND PRODUCTION OF FACIAL EXPRESSIONS: THE NORMAL CHILD 
"The human face is a masterpiece.. The eyes reveal the soul, the 
mouth the flesh, the chin stands for purpose, the nose means 
will; but over and behind all is that fleeting something we 
call 'expression'. 
(Elbert Hubbard, 1895 - 1915) 
4.1 Introduction 
In the context of this thesis there are several questions regarding the 
face's role in revealing the inner state of a person. To what extent are 
facial expressions innate? To what extent are they learnt? Does recognition 
of an expression go 
hand-in-hand with the ability to produce it, or does 
recognition only follow much later? Finally, to what extent do the production 
and recognition of expressions play a part in a child's communication with 
others? 
It is difficult to answer any of these above questions with total 
confidence. However, 
it is possible to go some way toward answering them: 
while there is strong evidence 
for an innate element in early expressional 
behaviour, many specific expressions seem to be learnt from within the 
context of social 
interaction. 
Facial expression is an important aspect of the newly-born's pre- 
linguistic non-verbal communication. As was previously noted, autism is 
mainly described 
in terms of an impaired ability to communicate and a lack 
of affective contact. 
It is thus of particular interest tocompare the 
development of expression in autism with that in normal children; especially 
bearing in mind that by definition autism has its onset in the early (pre- 
linguistic stage of life} Thus the beginnings of what may be called a 
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"communication deficit" must be present in the stages of life which 
are precursory to speech production. 
The questions raised above will be examined through reviewing 
our present knowledge of the development of expressional behaviour 
in normal children and then comparing this knowledge with that of the 
expressional behaviour of autistic children. The review of normal 
development in this chapter will draw heavily on the excellent summary 
by Charlesworth and Kreutzer (1973). 
4.2 Emotional expression in the normal infant and young child 
Darwin wrote one of the earliest accounts of emotional 
expression of the human infant (1877). In this he charted the 
development of his own son's expressions during his first year of 
life. He felt strongly about the innateness of-many facial expressions 
and their place in the phylogenesis of the species. He saw the vast 
majority of expressions as having evolved from more primitive inborn 
forms, and he noted that almost all of the complex expressions which 
an adult can display are to be seen in infancy in a simpler form. 
This, he felt, was particularly true of such basic emotions as 
pleasure, displeasure, anger, joy, sorrow and disgust. On the subject 
of much more complex emotions, he was willing to concede that they 
were largely affected by learning and cross-cultural variation. 
However, as Charlesworth and Kreutzer (1973) rightly pointed out, 
many psychologists today are unwilling to come to such absolute 
conclusions regarding the innateness of expressions. 
It is worth noting, however, that some of Darwin's (1872) 
observations do at 
least have a common sense validity. For instance, 
he noted that some emotional expressions seem to have a specific 
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function other than communication with others. For instance, when 
surprised, our eye-brows rise and our eyes open. It is a state of 
hyper-alertness in which the senses are 'cleared' in readiness for 
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action. In contrast one screws up one's eyes momentarily,,, The 
behaviour protects the eyes from the unexpected, but may also serve 
to reduce visual input. Laughter and crying, on the other hand, may 
be examples of the release of internal tensions. This leads to an 
important point: there is quite a difference between the somewhat 
'reflex' expressions which may communicate feelings to others but 
are not primarily intended to do so, and those whose primary aim is 
to inform others of personal feelings. Perhaps the former reflex 
expressions are largely innately determined and consistent cross- 
culturally, whereas the latter are learnt and are as culturally 
specific as any verbal language. 
Blatz and Millichamp (1935) found that emotional episodes in 
infancy are very frequent, but they are often not easy to trace to 
specific environmental stimuli. Again, Herzka (1965), in his 
study of the range of facial expressions displayed by infants, 
confirmed that the range was very large - from an "angelic smile" 
to complicated-and adult-like displays of disgust, anger, and even 
what looked like "wisdom". However, the specific onset of most 
emotional eypressions is not easy to define with precision. 
Probably the first expression that a Western baby displays 
is crying/distress, for this has been frequently induced at birth 
by obstetricians (see Le Boyer, 1975 ). But the best documented 
and most studied expression is the smile. Data from the study of 
it provides some of the strongest evidence available for the 
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innateness of emotional expression. It would seem that the onset 
of the full social smile comes quite consistently at around 46 weeks 
after conception (Bower, 1977). This is true of any child, apparently, 
regardless of when he is actually born. Thus premature babies, 
although they may be argued to have had longer to learn the expression, 
do not smile any earlier ("conceptually") than do full-term neonates. 
Further support for the innateness of the smiling response 
comes from the work of Dennis (1938). Dennis studied a pair of twin 
girls who were reared from one month of age with very little social 
contact. They were never given the opportunity to see a human face, 
and they were cared for in such a way that they could not come to 
associate any pleasurable release with the human face or voice. 
Nonetheless, they too each began to smile on schedule at 46 weeks 
after conception. Although it will be discussed more fully later 
in this chapter, the study of blind babies is also relevant. They, 
too, begin to smile at the same time after conception7 however, at 
first their smiles are not generally found to be as intense or 
sustained as those of a normal sighted baby (Charlesowrth & Kreutzer, 
1973). 
Having presented a fairly strong case for the innateness of 
the smiling response, can anything be said about the factors that 
elicit it? The human voice and face have both been described as 
powerful elicitors of smiles especially when the face is seen en face 
(e. g. Spitz t Wolff, 1946). However, Bower (1977) discusses the 
reasons why some believe that the face per se is not a prime stimulus 
for bringing forth the neonates' first smiles. For instance, the 
evidence presented above by Dennis and also that from studies of the 
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blind seems to indicate that it is not necessary for the infant to see 
a face in order for him to smile. In the early chapter of this thesis 
it was mentioned that it is not necessarily the 'human' aspects of a 
face that cause an infant to smile vigorously -a pair of black dots 
on a white card will suffice (Ahrens, 1954). Somewhat more enigmatic 
is the consistent findings that more than one pair of dots will produce 
more smiling than will a single pair. (Ahrens, 1954). 
It should be made clear at this point what is meant by the 'social 
smile'. This label is generally given to the full smiling response 
that occurs around six weeks of age and is most readily elicited by 
a human face. It follows a period in which full smiles have just 
emerged in the infant's repertoire (at about three weeks) but only in 
response to the human voice; the response being far greater to the 
female voice than to sounds such as bells ringing. The response is not 
enhanced by the presence of any visual stimulus, the human face 
included (Bower, 1977). Thus, the label 'social smile' may say more 
about the adult's interpretation of the infant's behaviour than about 
the infant's view of the world. It is rather ironic that research 
should indicate that, for the baby, smiling at a face at this stage 
of life is not 'social' at all in the sense of being directed specifically 
to a human being. 
Bower (1977) introduced the idea of the infant's perception of 
contingency between two events in his experience. Bower notes that 
there is a substantial body of evidence to support the connexion between 
the infant's appreciation of contingency and the onset and vigour of 
his smiling (e. g. Watson, 1973). This result was also obtained by 
Papousek (1969) who clearly demonstrated that the goal of the action 
(such as the illumination of a light) was not the cause of the infant's 
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smiling. Rather it was specific to his discovery of a connexion 
between an action on his part and an event in his environment. 
Bower (1977) cites a retarded infant who, whilst she had had 
ample exposure to human faces, had not smiled by eight months of age. 
Her first full smiles came only after she had been exposed to a situation 
in which she could discover contingency. Similarly, a blind baby who 
could not be argued to have his smiles elicited by visual stimulation, 
first smiled in response to a situation in which he had contingent 
control over an auditory mobile (see Bower, p. 45). Bower further notes 
that the vast majority of games which adults play with infants can be 
seen to be "contingency games" (such as 'peek-a-boo'). In fact, Watson 
(1973) goes so far as to say: 
.... the contingency 
detection game is not important 
to the infant because people play it; rather people 
become important to the infant because they play the 
game. 
Bower goes on to point out that this view may offer an explanation 
for previous findings by Watson (1966) in which he found that infants 
smile most at faces which are in the same orientation as their own. This 
is so in spite of the fact that during feeding, washing and changing a 
baby, an adult's face is most frequently not en face, but rather rotated 
at some angle. Bower makes the connexion that it is only in the context 
of contingency games that the baby sees an adult's face full on and 
upright. In consequence, this orientation may come to 
be associated 
with a smile producing situation, and thus itself evoke smiling. 
However, it is clear that this cannot be the entire answer. Why, 
for instance, should a pair of black dots on white card be such an 
effective early evoker of smiles in most infants? Moreover, why should 
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a similar card with three pairs of dots on it elicit an even stronger 
smiling response? Bower has made the point that the two dots are, of 
course, associated with the eyes, and yet whilst they are present in 
all facial orientations the infant smiles most at upright faces. How 
can this be so if the child is smiling in response to dots? From the 
review in chapter 2 of the ontogenesis of face perception, it is clear 
that the response to this question is that at this stage the infant 
is no longer smiling at dot pairs. Watson's (1966) study involved 
fourteen-week-old infants, and the data which relates dot pairs to the 
smiling response is referring to six-week-olds. As was noted in the 
early section of this thesis, Caron et al (1973) found that at about 
fourteen- to sixteen-weeks-old the infant becomes sensitive to the 
position of the eyes vis a vis the facial outline. That is, he has 
located them in the upper region of the face and has come to expect 
them to be side by side and symmetrical in their placement. It is 
more likely that the confirmation of this discovery causes the fourteen- 
week-old infant to smile particularly strongly at upright faces. 
Nonetheless, it would be of interest to know whether such an orientation 
specific response still occurs in babies who are brought up by adults 
who purposely avoid playing contingency games in the normal orientation. 
It is of interest to note that in the above paragraph the idea 
that contingency discovery is an important releaser of smiles has not 
been disgarded; rather it may have indicated how our conception of 
this might be enriched and expanded. For instance, it might be possible 
to talk of "discovery" alone, rather than "contingency discovery" and 
thus of the more basic idea of an "'ah-ha! " response (see Koestler, 1971). 
That is, whenever the child makes a discovery, or has a previous discovery 
or hypothesis confirmed, he reflects this by smiling. Consequently, an 
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infant may be expected to smile not only when he perceives a correspondence 
between two events or between an action on this part and an external 
event, but also when a perception confirms (or conforms to) a newly 
formulated schema. 
To conclude this discussion of the smiling response, it can be said 
that whilst it appears that the discovery of contingency can elicit 
smiling from an infant, it remains to be shown either that this is the 
earliest releaser of smiles (predating the response to dot-pairs, for 
instance) or that it is the major factor involved. It may well be found 
that the readiness to smile under certain conditions is 'gentically 
programmed' but that a wide variety of factors may be able to contribute 
towards these necessary conditions. It seems certain, though, that whilst 
there may be uncertainty as to what these factors are and why they 
produce smiling, the specificity of the onset of smiling does suggest 
the innateness of this emotional expression. 
In comparison to the amount of work that has been devoted to smiling 
in babies, there is a lamentable lack of information regarding other 
expressions of emotion in early life. Laughter,, for instance, seems to 
be a difficult expression to define. Its onset has been set at anywhere 
between four and sixteen weeks of age (Washburn, 1929; Stroufe, 1971). 
This disparity would seem to be totally due to the different workers' 
definition of the label (see Dennis and Dennis, 1937; Charlesworth 
E Kreutzer, 1973). 
J. B. Watson (1919) considered anger to be one of the triumvirate 
of emotions which appear at birth (along with smiling/laughter and crying). 
However, it would seem that an unequivocal facial expression of anger is 
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absent until several months after birth. The earliest signs of 
"affection" seem to come at about four months (Banham, 1950). However, 
the scoring of such an emotion is extremely subjective. How, for 
instance, can one be certain that the child's expression is not simply 
one of pleasure? 
Charlesworth and Kreutzer report that the first appearance of "fear" 
totally depends (again) upon the criteria used. Stirnimann (1940), for 
example, would claim that the expression of it is present from birth, 
but at the other extreme Peiper (1963) is adamant that "no expressive 
movement of fear or horror exists during infancy". However, such a 
statement has its origins in the concept that by definition fear requires 
a fairly high level of cognitive ability; a level which a child does 
not reach within the first six months of life. There may well be two 
types of fear in fact. On the one hand a 'reflexive' or 'primitive' 
response to intense or aversive stimuli; and on the other hand a more 
advanced form which results from incongruity between the expected 
properties of a stimulus and those which are actually experienced 
(Jones, 1930; Schaffer, 1969); the former making its appearance 
substantially before the latter. 
The element of expectancy is an important one in the discussion 
of emotional expression for it also differentiates two confusable 
expressions - surprise and startle. These have been referred to as 
'epistemic' in that they involve a person's expectations regarding an 
event in contrast to what is actually experienced. The difference 
between the two expressions is subtle, yet very real: surprise is 
the result of a misexpected event, whereas a startle reaction follows 
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an unexpected happening. Charlesworth (1966) tells us that a "surprise 
face" is rare within the first seven months, but the basic expression 
would appear to be established within the first half of the second year. 
The basic startle reflex, however, seems to be present from very soon 
after birth (cf. Bower, 1977). 
It is rather difficult to distinguish "shyness" from "fear" in the 
neonate, but shyness would seem to be unquestionably present from around 
the end of the first eighteen months. Shame and embarrassment make their 
debut in the child's repertoire at a relatively late stage, being dependent 
upon fairly advanced cognitive abilities and an awareness of one's own 
appearance. 
In general, then, it can be seen that a very great number of emotional 
expressions appear within the first years of life. Also, it would seem 
to be safe to postulate the innateness of at least a few of these expressions 
(e. g. the 'laugh' and cry/fret behaviour). It would appear that younger 
children generally express themselves in more extreme form than older 
children - flailing their limbs and rolling on the floor in rage (Darwin, 
1872; Bridges, 1931). However, undoubtedly social factors play a large 
part here (consider such a commonplace phrase as "big boys don't cry", 
for example. ) Infants not only show greater extremes of emotion, but are 
frequently noted to shift suddenly from one expression to another. 
Gradually the changes become more subtle (Charlesworth 4 Kreutzer, 1973) 
as the infant matures. 
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4.3 The recognition of emotion 
Are infants and children equally able to recognize expressions 
as they are to produce them? It seems clear that by about six months 
infants can discriminate at least the two basic expressions of smiling 
(positive) and anger (negative) (Buhler and Hetzer, 1928). Spitz and 
Wolff (1946) noted that prior to about six months of age the infant 
will smile at any widely drawn mouth - even at a rictus which would 
produce a response of fear in an older child. One point of interest 
is that infants of around six months will also respond to the presentation 
of a 'poiitivýe affect' or 'negative affect' face by producing a similar 
expression (Charlesworth and Kreutzer, 1973). According to them, an 
element of internalization has occurred that allows the child to copy 
expressions. 
One of the earliest developmental studies of the child's ability 
to recognize emotional expression was that of Gates (1923). He assessed 
458 children in an age range from three to fourteen years on their 
ability to identify the expression of a so-called "Ruckmick" photograph. 
It is of interest that Gates not only required the subjects to label 
expression but also to adequately communicate them to him as well. 
Adults had also been tested on such a task and found to be extremely 
accurate (84% to 100% correct) on the identification of six basic 
expressions: laughter, anger, surprise, fear, scorn and pain. 
A developmental trend was in evidence for the children. The subjects 
of three years of age or less could recognize laughter with greater than 
50% accuracy, but it was not until around five or six years of age that 
more than 50% of the subjects could recognize pain. Anger was not 
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recognized until seven years, and fear was identified correctly 
after nine years. Surprise became generally recognizable by around 
ten and a half years, but the ability to recognize scorn was still 
not established in more than half of the fourteen-year-olds. However, 
this study is open to criticism (Jenness, 1932) because only one 
photograph was used to represent each of the six emotions. In 
consequence it may well have been the case that a poor photographic 
representation of an expression could only be correctly labelled by 
the older and more intellectually agile children. 
Ekman and Friesen (1971) explored the ability of 130 children 
from the Fore of New Guinea to recognize expressions. Each child was 
asked to choose one of six emotions that fitted each of several stories. 
The stories contained a description of a character who clearly felt one 
of the following: happy, angry, sad, surprised, fearful or disgusted 
(two examples). The children ranged from around six- to fifteen-years. 
When the six- to seven-year-olds were compared. with the fourteen- to 
fifteen-year-olds there was no statistically significant difference 
in their abilities to recognize the above emotions. Their findings 
were thus at variance with Gates on the ability of the younger children 
to identify "fear" and "surprise", for Ekman and Friesen found them 
to be fairly good at these expressions. 
Honkavaara's (1961) study produced the interesting finding that 
young children tend to be misled by irrelevant cues as to a person's 
emotional state. For instance, he found that more than half of the 
three- to -four-year-olds that he studied mistakenly identified a 
sad girl in a red dress as happy. However, this may be partly due 
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to the younger child not quite clearly understanding what is being 
asked of him. Certainly, if the child has latched on to an erroneous 
correspondence between "redness" and "happy" then this must have some 
basis in the child's development. Possibly, for instance, the label 
"pretty" has been given to pictures of children dressed in brightly 
coloured clothing and, almost inevitably, shown to be smiling. Thus a 
confusion of the categories might be expected at an early stage before the 
child has clearly defined to himself the meaning of the adult's utterance. 
Honkavaara also noted that the correct labelling of actions precedes 
that of passive displays. Thus laughing and crying are seemingly 
recognized earlier than happiness and sadness. Charlesworth and Kreutzer 
(1973) draw attention to the fact that this finding is consonant with our 
knowledge of early verb acquisition: the young child will often describe 
an object by what it does rather than what it is. 
However, 8 reservation Aabove 
is added that the young child's 
ability is "seemingly" biased towards recognition of action at first. Once 
again the situation arises in which the child must learn to delineate what 
an adult means by a word such as "sad" or "miserable". The attachment of 
a label such as "crying" to another who is exhibiting a well defined 
pattern of behaviour is relatively easy when compared to the cognitive 
and empathic/sympathetic processes involved in the correct use of more 
abstract labels. Hence the child's awareness of the fact that another is 
"miserable" may well precede by some considerable time his ability to 
utilize this label correctly in his everyday speech. 
The main point here is that a child's competence may be greater than 
his performance implies it to be, which is essentially the point Odom and 
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Lemond revealed in their 1972 study. They required 32 kindergarten and 
32 fifth grade children to identify eight facial expressions and then to 
produce the same expressions. The older children were not only more accurate 
in their ability to recognize the expressions but also produced them more 
accurately. Both groups, however, showed a significant lag in their ability 
to produce the expression compared to their ability to identify it. 
Charlesworth and Kreutzer (1973) suggest that this finding may contradict 
observations that spontaneous expression precedes identification. However, 
it is perhaps unnecessary to suggest, as they do, that such a contradiction 
may be resolved by consideration of the scoring difficulties and specific 
photographs employed. In fact it is not at all clear that a contradiction 
even exists. Why should a lag between requested production and recognition 
be argued to be antagonistic to findings regarding spontaneous production? 
Intuitively one might expect (as is found) that spontaneous production 
precedes the recognition of production in others, which in turn precedes 
the ability to imitate that production. Nonetheless, an uncontrolled 
factor in Odom and Lemond's study was that of the age of the people who 
posed for the photographs. The photographs used were of adults (Izard, 
1971) and the expressions were "idealized" in form. Because of the 
idealization of the expression they may well have been easier to recognise 
than produce, the latter involving relatively unnatural facial movements 
for the young child who is unaccustomed to acting. 
Thus far it has been noted that the infant and the young child both 
have a quite wide repertoire of facial expressions and an almost equivalent, 
if lagging, ability to identify these expressions. However, to what extent 
does learning play a part in the expression of emotion? 
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4.4 Lack of opportunity to learn expressions 
Davis (1940,1947) described a child who was kept confined to 
her room for the first six years of life. During this period the 
mother engaged in an absolute minimum of social interaction with her. 
When discovered, the girl produced virtually no facial expressions at 
all, but after only a day or so in a more "normal" environment she 
would smile when coaxed to do so. Later still she smiled more willingly, 
and in about six weeks even actively sought to be tickled. The mother 
was severely retarded and thus this factor may have had other effects 
upon the child apart from simply "social deprivation". It is important 
also to be wary of interpreting the absence of expression in a child 
found after several years of deprivation in terms of a lack of 
innateness of the production of expressions. Clearly we cannot be 
certain whether such a child once showed any expression and only later 
failed to show it due to the lack of positive reinforcement for its 
presence. 
So called "feral" children also fit into this category of children 
who have been deprived of normal social stimulation in early childhood. 
Zingh (1940) in his review of such children, since about 1957, concluded 
that they generally did not laugh or cry when first discovered. However, 
many such children have been described as "wild" in their behaviour 
and somewhat aggressive in their manner. Itard's (1932) "Wild Boy of 
Aveyron" (Victor) is a prime example of such a child. Itard described 
how Victor showed no signs of affection at first. His facial expression 
would suddenly shift for no apparent reason from seeming melancholy to 
peals of laughter. In fact, this form of behaviour has been noted in 
autistic children, too, and along with the presence of such characteristics 
as "want for sameness" has led some workers to propose that Victor may 
well have been autistic (this is reviewed by John Wing in Wing, 1976). 
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It is possible that such cases provide some information about 
emotional expression in children deprived of the opportunity to 
learn about it from others. However, a problem still exists in that 
although it may be possible to conclude that such children often have 
a scant expressional repertoire when discovered, it is not possible to 
say whether they never learnt them or whether they possessed them as 
part of an innate endowment but lost them due to the absence of social 
reward for their presence. Certainly, at least the propensity to 
rapidly acquire expressional behaviour is present in many of these 
children (see Davis' study above). 
Charlesworth and Kreutzer (1973) indicate that the behaviour of 
'feral' children is not harmonious with Darwin's (1872) hypothesis that 
laughing and crying exist to reduce tensions. In fact, no such definitive 
statement can be made in this regard from the above evidence. For 
instance, one might propose that such a releasing effect might only be 
subserved by expressional behaviour early on in life. Thus, by the 
time that most of the deprived children were discovered the function 
(or functions) which any particular expressive behaviour might serve 
may have changed. In the normal child such changes might take the 
form of a more 'primitive' reflexive expression later becoming transformed 
into a considerabl9 more complex social behaviour which is embued with 
communicative intent (see Bruner, 1975a, b). 
There are, of course, other forms of childhood deprivation, the 
study of which can give us some insight into the nature of expressional 
behaviour: notable amongst these is congenital blindness. The study 
of such children (e. g. Freedman, 1964,1965) has led workers to the 
conclusion that the smile response is innate. However, strictly speaking, 
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this statement should be limited to the conclusion that the visual 
modality is not the only one via which stimulation may arrive to 
precipitate a smile. However, it is of interest to note that the 
early social smile which blind babies produce is much more fleeting 
than that of a normal infant. It is rather like the 'smile' which a 
normal infant produces with his eyes closed within the first month of 
life. Nonetheless, the blind child's social smile does start at the 
same time of life as the normal infant, and by around six months the 
blind baby will be smiling for a more normal duration within a social 
situation. 
An earlier study by Thompson (1941) gives us a more thorough 
picture of the development of facial expression in blind infants. 
She studied a wide range of blind children from seven weeks to 131 years 
old, half of whom had been blind since birth and half had become blind 
in the period up to about three years of age. These children, along 
with a comparison group of sighted children, were filmed in both 
natural and contrived situations which were likely to elicit emotional 
responses. 
Crying, smiling and laughter were found in all the children, with 
no detectable differences in the manner of production between the blind 
and the sighted. She also noted that displays of anger, annoyance 
and sulkiness were very similar in the two groups, and appeared only 
in appropriate situations. 
Thompson also noted that the congenitally blind children smiled 
less as they became older. Strangely, she attributed this decrease 
in facial activity to maturation in the blind child, which is masked 
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in the normal child by the effects of social mimicry. However, it 
does seem more likely, as Charlesworth and Kreutzer (ibid) point out, 
that the blind child's facial activity becomes less due to the lack 
of feedback from the facial expressions of others. 
She also noted that there was far less variation in the expressions 
displayed by the sighted children than by the blind children. This, 
she argued, was due to the conformatory effects of social mimicry, 
which serve to stylize expressions. 
Goodenough (1932), Charlesworth (1970) and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1970) 
have each noted that expressions of emotion seem to be fairly normal 
in older blind children. Goodenough reported that a congenitally 
blind and deaf girl had fairly normal expression of such emotions as 
laughing, resentment, anger, and astonishment. In fact, with the 
exception of a few abnormal expressions, her 'normal' facial behaviour 
seems to provide good evidence for the contention that such expressions 
do not require visual learning. 
Charlesworth (1970) produced further parallels between the 
expressional behaviour of sighted and blind individuals. He studied 
the responses of fourteen congenitally blind and eleven normal children 
in situations where their expectancies were not fulfilled. No 
significant group differences were found. However, quite contrary 
to expectation the children did not produce a stereo-typed surprise 
reaction or startle response. 
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A clinical study of eight blind infants was undertaken by 
Fraiberg (1968). She found that the rage reactions of these children 
were abnormal in so far as they mainly consisted solely of yelling 
and were not accompanied by such behaviours as kicking, banging the 
floor, or facial expressions. This is not in line with the fairly 
normal facial behaviours of blind children mentioned above. 
Charlesworth and Kreutzer (1973) note that this may in part be due 
to the fact that Fraiberg's subjects tended to be younger than 
those in other studies. However, if this is accepted then it must 
stand as evidence for later onset of expressional behaviour in 
blind infants, for it is clear that visual learning cannot account 
for the later presence of such behaviour. It may also be noted 
that her infants were not younger than those of Thompson (1941) 
who reported a great similarity between the facial expressions of 
blind and sighted infants. 
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4.5 Acting expressions 
Dumas (1932) asked 33 congenitally blind persons (most were twelve- 
to twenty- years old) to act afraid, sad, angry and happy. The blind 
subjects were normal in their spontaneous expressional behaviour, but 
were totally unable to act out these expressions. Charlesworth (1970) 
also asked blind and sighted children to produce expressions and again 
found that the blind children were either unable or far worse than 
normal at doing so. 
Fulcher (1942) compared the abilities of 50 blind and 118 sighted 
children to produce facial expressions upon request. In brief, his 
findings were that the blind children produced less facial activity 
than the sighted subjects, although there was a great similarity 
between expressive behaviours that the two groups exhibited. He also 
claimed that his data showed evidence of an increase in facial activity 
with age in the sighted subjects, but a decrease of such activity in 
the blind children. However, Fulcher did not subject his data to 
statistical analysis. Charlesworth and Kreutzer (1973) feel that the 
intergroup differences may not in fact be significant - neither for the 
amounts of facial activity or the differential amounts of it as a 
function of age. 
However, these findings simply show that a lack of opportunity to 
learn the visual/motor correspondances of facial expression tend to 
lead to a deficiency in the production of expression to order. They 
cannot tell us anything directly about the innateness of such expressions. 
The results of such studies would seem to support Darwin's basic 
hypothesis that visual learning is not a necessary requirement for the 
possession of a seemingly normal repertoire of 
facial expressions. 
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Nonetheless, it cannot be concluded from this that facial expression 
is innate - it can only be said that the visual modality is unnecessary 
for its acquisition. 
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4.6 The presence of opportunity 
Most infants have the opportunity to learn facial expressions; 
from within a few hours of life they have visual contact with other 
people's faces. It has also been found that neonates can imitate 
tongue protrusion (Zazzo, 1957; Gardner and Gardner, 1970) as well 
as other simple actions such as the opening and closing of the mouth. 
Guernsey (1928)studied imitation in 200 infants from two-to twenty-one- 
months of age. She found that at two months the infant engages in 
reflexlike or passive imitation; at around four months imitation 
becomes more conscious and active; at eight months delayed or memory- 
based imitation begins. Buhler and Hetzer (1928) also reported that 
infants in their fifth to sixth month imitate facial expressions. 
However, Spitz (1946) in his monograph on the smiling response 
argues quite conclusively that the early imitations that an infant 
engages in require far more simple facial movements than are involved 
in smiling. Thus he argues that the response is innate and not due 
to any form of imitative learning. It was also noted in an earlier 
chapter of this thesis (which had a section devoted to the ontogenesis 
of face perception) that the neonate has a limited perceptual ability: 
evidence exists that suggests that he does not perceive the face as 
a whole until fairly late in the first year of life - an ability which 
is surely necessary for him to successfully imitate a fully smiling 
face, even given that his imitiative abilities are greater than his 
mimicry of simple motor movements would imply. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE IDENTIFICATION AND PRODUCTION OF FACIAL EXPRESSIONS: 
THE AUTISTIC CHILD 
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5.1 The Identification of Expressions 
5.1.1 The abilities of autistic children 
There is no literature which deals directly with the ability of autistic 
children to identify facial expressions. There is, however, frequent mention 
of them being poor at non-verbal communication (e. g. Tubbs, 1966; Rutter, 
1974; Ricks 4 Wing, 1976). The poor ability both to use and identify 
others' gestures would seem to be connected to their relative inability to 
display a normal range of facial expressions or understand those of 
others (Wing, 1976). Thus while the available anecdotal evidence would 
seem to indicate that autistic children are poor at identifying others' 
expressions, there is as yet no experinevkC evidence to support these 
observations. 
In Chapter Three it was shown that the autistic children knew the 
lower facial areas better than did normal or ESN children who were matched 
for age and intelligence. The autistic children's knowledge of the lower 
halves of faces was also not accompanied by a weaker performance in 
recognition of the upper halves of faces. One was drawn to the conclusion 
that the older autistic child's relatively homogenous knowledge of upright 
faces was extant in the inverted mode of presentation. The possibility was 
suggested that the normal and ESN child's ability to recognise a face may 
be related to their ability to identify that face's expression, and that 
it is this factor in particular which makes inverted faces so hard for 
them to identify. Because the autistic child's knowledge of the face would 
appear to be more homogeneous than that of the normal or ESN child, it was 
suggested that he may not view faces as socially meaningful. This factor 
may also account for the older autistic child's superior ability to 
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recognize inverted faces, although his ability does not seem to he 
restricted to faces. 
The intention of the following experiment was thus to investigate 
the autistic children's ability to identify facial expressions. It was 
decided that it would be profitable to investigate their ability not 
only in the upright mode but also in the inverted one, too. If the 
suggestions made above are correct, then one would expect that the 
normal and ESN children would be less able to identify expression in 
an upright face than in an inverted one. However, one would expect 
that the autistic children's ability to identify expression would be 
relatively poor, but their ability in the inverted mode would depend 
to a great extent upon the strategy which they adopt to label expressions. 
If, as seemed to be the case with their ability to recognize faces, they 
are able to identify some expressions by seeing only a small area, then 
it may be that they are able to identify the expression of an inverted 
face almost as well as when the face is upright. If, on the other hand, 
their appreciation of a person's feelings is arrived at after viewing 
his face in a more holistic manner (as may be the case for the normal 
child), then one would also expect that inversion of a face would 
greatly affect their ability to identify its expression. 
The literature contains very few examples of attempts to test the 
abnormal child's ability to understand facial expressions. Odom et al 
(1973) examined the deaf child's ability to identify facial expressions 
by testing how well he could correctly match an expression to an emotion- 
arousing situation. Deaf children, like autistic children, have been 
noted to have a lack of empathy (Altschuler, 1963,1964,1967; Baroff, 
1963; Levine, 1956,1960). Odom et al therefore decided to test their 
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Figure 5.1. Contextual clues given 'for a facial expression test 
by Odom et al (1973). 
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ability to choose which expression would be appropriate for several 
situations and compare it with that of hearing children. They chose 
nine affect categories after those used by Izard (1971). These were: 
interest, joy, surprise, distress, disgust, anger, shame, fear and 
contempt. They found the deaf children to be generally less able to 
match the correct expressions to each of thirty-six situations (four 
of each affect; see figure 5.1, for examples of their pictorial situations). 
However, they found that this was not due to the deaf children being less 
able than the hearing children to sort the photographs of the expressions 
into piles according to similar affect. They thus concluded that the 
deaf child's lack of empathy is connected to his inability to relate a 
particular expression to a situation and not to his inability to identify 
expressions in general. However, one may note that Odom et al. required 
their subjects to put photographs of faces with similar expressions into 
separate piles and rightly concluded that the deaf children did not seem 
to have a perceptual problem in identifying which expressions went 
together. Nonetheless, it is possible that the deaf children may be 
less able to label the expressions or describe how a person with a 
certain expression is feeling. Thus one may take issue with their 
final conclusion that the deaf child has difficulty in analyzing and 
interpreting emotion-producing situations: he may well do, but he may 
also have problems with the understanding and labelling of facial 
expressions, too. 
This experimenter's initial intention was to repeat Odom et al's 
task with the autistic children; however, it was found that none of the 
children tested so far in this thesis could understand the requirements 
of the task. In fact, after discussion with the children's teachers 
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TABLE 5.1 Subjects in the study of identification of facial 
expression 
Group N Mean C. A. Mean Full IQ 
(sd) (sd) 
Younger autistic 9 10.66 yrs 
(1.37) 
Older autistic 9 14.93 yrs 
(0.98) 
ESN 10 12.27 yrs 
(2.21) 
64.67 
(12.10) 
60.11 
(14.02) 
61.20 
(8.17) 
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and the care-staff it seemed unlikely that the autistic children would 
be able to identify any more complex expressions than happiness or 
sadness. A pilot study tended to support this. Then autistic children 
were shown pictures of facial expressions and asked to identify them 
(these were the same as Odom et al had used, together with a 'sad' 
face, also from Izard, 1971). It was found that on the basis of verbal 
labelling they were unable to identify all but the happy and sad faces 
(and some of the children tested in this pilot could not do this even). 
However, a further pilot study revealed that all of the children to be 
tested in the following experiment (see later for details) were able to 
correctly identify simplistic schematic representations as: 
and 
(ýO^ 
. It was thus decided to test these children's ability to 
sort photographs of happy and sad faces into two piles, and in accordance 
with the discussion at the beginning of this section, to test their 
ability in both upright and inverted modes. The ability of the autistic 
children was compared with that of ESN children. 
5.1.2 The identification of expression in upright and inverted faces 
Subjects 
Initially two groups of ten autistic and ten ESN children were chosen 
and matched for age and general intelligence. However, after testing 
these children in the following experiment, it was found that there were 
some distinct age trends among the autistic children, but none among the 
ESN children. A further eight autistic children were tested, increasing 
the group to eighteen and nine of them were designated the "older" group 
and the other nine designated the "younger" group. There being no age 
effect in the ESN group, it was decided to retain just the original'ten 
subjects and to compare the performance of the two autistic groups with 
this single ESN group. Details of the subjects are given in table 5.1. 
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Figure 5.2. Actor making sad and happy faces (top); the parted and 
complete composites are shown below. 
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Materials 
The stimuli for this experiment were photographs of actors' faces. 
The actors were asked to produce happy and sad faces in such a way that 
it was clear from both the upper and lower areas of their face what the 
expression was (i. e. they were required to "smile with their eyes" as 
well as their mouth, and to couple a sad mouth with a frown). The 
upper and lower halves of twenty faces thus produced (ten of each type) 
were shown to twenty undergraduate students, each of whom correctly 
identified the intended expression. The photographs were black-and-white 
and measured approximately 14cm by 10 cm. Figure 5.2 gives examples 
of the photographs. 
Method and Procedure 
The subjects were initially required to sort the inverted upper 
and lower halves of the faces into two piles according to whether they 
thought the face was happy or sad. Each child was first shown the 
upper halves of the faces upside-down. The instruction given in each 
case was put the "happy" faces on one side of a line and the "sad" 
faces on the other side. If the child had any trouble in understanding 
what was required of him, then he was shown the schematic representations 
of happy and sad faces to exemplify the sorting. 
Having sorted the upper inverted halves, the child was asked to 
sort a pile of lower inverted halves into the same two piles. This 
completed, the child was required to sort the whole, uncovered upside- 
down faces into the two piles. Once the child had sorted all the faces 
in the inverted mode, then he was asked to repeat the procedure with the 
halves and whole faces now seen in the upright mode. Again he was first 
asked to sort the upper halves, followed by the lower halves, and 
and finally the uncovered faces. 
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TABLE 5.2 Mean percent correct for each group when sorting 
upright and inverted full and half expressional 
faces. (Note 50% is a chance sorting) 
Upright Inverted 
Group Full Low Up Full Low Up 
Younger 76.40 77.10 50.70 77.80 76.60 50.00 
autistic 
Older 93.10 92.60 63.70 90.56 88.20 53.70 
autistic 
ESN 98.80 98.20 72.20 96.00 98.30 48.20 
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Results 
(i) Between groups comparisons. 
(a) The Upright Faces 
The results are shown in table 5.2. A multivariate analysis 
of variance was computed for the present study. The two conditions described 
in the next experiment were also included in this analysis, because the 
same children and stimuli were involved. A significant result was obtained 
when the equality of all mean vectors was tested (F16,36-2.488; p <0.012); 
and a test for individual effects of groups and conditions was also 
significant (F8,18=5.004; p(0.002). The younger autistic children were 
found to be significantly inferior to the ESN children in their ability to 
correctly sort either the half or whole upright faces (whole: t=2.96; 
df=17, p<0.01; lower half: t=2.58, df=17, p <0.002; upper half: t=5.06, 
df=17, p <0.001). They were also less able than the older autistic children 
to sort the lower halves of the upright faces (t=1.87, df=16, p< 0.05) 
or the whole upright faces (t=1.95, df=16, p<0.05). ' A trend existed 
for them to be less able at the upper halves, too (t=1.66, df=16, p< 0.07). 
The reason for the non-significance of this last difference was that all 
the younger autistic children were performing at chance on the upper halves, 
whereas some of the older autistic children were able to do the task above 
a chance level. 
The older autistic children were slightly less able to sort according 
to the whole faces and the upper halves than were the ESN children (whole: 
t=1.89, df=17, p (0.05; upper halves: t=1.75, df=17, p<0.05). However, 
one should note that both groups were performing at around 100% correct. 
The older autistic children were as able as the ESN children to sort 
according to the lower halves (t=1.62, df=17, p <0.01). It is thus 
possible that it was the older autistic children's poorer ability to 
ascertain expression in the upper halves of the faces which led them 
to be slightly less able to recognize the uncovered faces. 
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(b) The Inverted faces 
The ESN children were as able to sort inverted lower halves 
and whole faces as they were to sort upright ones. This was also true 
for the younger autistic children, and thus they were once again less 
able on these two conditions than the ESN children. However, in the 
inverted mode the ESN children's ability to sort according to the upper 
halves dropped to chance, and they therefore became no more able to sort 
these than were the younger autistic children. 
The older autistic children were as able as the ESN children to 
sort by the whole inverted faces and by the inverted upper halves 
(both groups performing at chance on the latter). However, the ESN 
children were slightly more able to sort according to the inverted 
lower halves than were the older autistic children (t = 1.80, df = 17, 
p(0.05). 
(ii) Within group comparisons 
For the upright faces the ESN children were as able to sort 
according to the lower halves as by the whole faces. However, they 
were significantly less able to sort by the upper halves (upper versus 
lower halves: t-= 7.57, df = 9, p <0.005). The picture was similar in 
the inverted mode: but their ability to sort by upper halves dropped to 
chance, whereas they were no less able to sort by the lower halves or 
whole faces (lower versus upper inverted halves: t= 22.51, df = 9, 
p <0.001). The picture for the older autistic children was almost 
identical to that for the ESN children (lower versus upper upright 
halves: t=4.37, df = 8, p< 0.01; lower versus upper inverted halves: 
t=5.17, df = 8, p <0.005). Whilst the younger autistic children were 
also as good at lower halves as at whole faces, and also better on these 
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than on the upper halves (upper versus lower halves: t=2.83, df = 8, 
p <0.025), their ability was not altered by inversion of the 
faces. 
Thus the older autistic and ESN children showed a better than chance 
average ability to sort according to upper halves in the upright mode, 
and this fell to chance in the inverted mode. In contrast, the younger 
autistic children's performance was not significantly above chance in 
either mode. 
Summary of results 
1. The ESN and the older autistic children showed fairly similar 
performances in this experiment. Both groups were very able to sort 
the faces according to the lower halves and the whole faces, but were 
somewhat less able to sort by the upper halves. However, the older 
autistic children were not quite as good as the ESN children at sorting 
by the whole faces or by the upper halves. 
2. The younger autistic children were less able than either of the 
other groups to sort by either the upright halves of the face or the 
upright whole faces. Their ability on the upper halves of the upright 
faces was no better than chance. 
3. The abilities of the older autistic and the ESN children to sort 
by the lower halves and whole faces were not affected by inversion. 
However, when the faces were seen upside-down their abilities to sort 
according to the upper halves dropped to a chance level. 
4. The younger autistic children's abilities to sort by the lower halves 
and whole faces was also not affected by inversion. 
Because they had 
performed at chance on the upright upper halves, there was no change 
in 
their ability to sort by these halves after the faces had been 
inverted. 
The results may thus be seen to offer some support to the contention 
that one's ability to identify a person's facial expression 
from the lower 
half of their face is less affected by inversion than is one's ability to 
judge expression from the upper halves. 
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The pilot study mentioned in the introduction to the above 
experiment found that all the autistic children were able to label 
schematic representations of happy and sad faces correctly. It is thus 
not surprising that they all showed themselves to be able to sort the 
real photographs of happy and sad faces into two piles at above chance 
level. However, while it was found that the older autistic children were 
only a little less proficient at sorting the expressions than were the 
ESN children, the younger autistic children were considerably less able. 
The differences were particularly noteworthy in their ability to sort the 
upper halves of the faces. 
The pattern of performance by the ESN children indicated that they 
found it easier to tell if someone was happy or sad when they saw the 
person's mouth than when they saw the person's eye"-area. Clearly, a 
happy mouth is characterised by up-turned edges and a sad one by down- 
turned edges. The identification of happiness or sadness in the mouth 
area is thus not complicated by the need to obtain an overall view of 
the disposition of several features. However, in order to tell the 
expression displayed in the eye area it is necessary to take into 
account the relationship between various aspects (such as positions of 
the eye-brows, how wide the eyes are open, presence of wrinkles as when 
one smiles, etc. ). Thus the task of telling someone's feelings from 
the eye area alone is relatively difficult when it is seen out of the 
context of the rest of the face. 
The fact that the ESN children's ability to identify expression 
in the upper halves of the faces dropped to a chance level when the 
faces were seen upside-down supports this reading of the data. It was 
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proposed in the final section of Chapter Three that a difficulty 
that one has in recognising inverted faces is that one may have to rotate 
several aspects of the faces at once mentally. That is, because a face 
is usually viewed as a gestalt, one has not only to imagine what the 
individual features look like upside-down, but also what the disposition 
of them one-to-another would be like. Given that the identification of 
expression in the mouth area involves very little integration of 
component features, one's ability to recognise expression in this half 
will be relatively unaffected by inversion. However, identification of 
expression in the eye area might be greatly affected. 
Turning to the results of the autistic children, one notes that the 
older autistic children were almost as good at identifying the expressions 
as the ESN children. The younger autistic children, in contrast, were 
significantly worse than either of the other groups at this task. They 
were particularly poor at sorting the expressions according to the upright 
upper halves, where they performed at a chance level. It would seem to 
be harder to tell expression in the eye area than in the mouth area 
because the former requires that one be able to integrate the various 
components and arrive at an overall view which implies "happiness" or 
"sadness". One may therefore suggest that the younger autistic children's 
performance reflects their relatively poor ability to integrate aspects 
of their perception in order to obtain meaningful wholes. Because the 
older autistic children were able to sort the expressions by the upper 
halves at a level which was on average about 10% above chance, one may 
presume that they possess at least the rudimentary ability to perceive 
the relationships between features which is necessary in order to arrive 
at the conclusion that the person is happy or sad. 
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In the recognition of identity (see Chapter Three) the ESN 
children were far more able to recognise upper halves of the face than 
the lower halves. However, it has been found above that they were more 
able to sort expressions according to the lower halves than the upper 
ones. Thus it would appear that the ESN child tends to use the upper 
half of the face to determine someone's identity, but the lower half 
to determine how the person is feeling (although it is uncertain how 
far the above findings would be generalisable to other facial expressions). 
The younger autistic children, in contrast, were found to have an abnormally 
good ability to recognise faces from the lower halves, and were unable to 
sort the expressions according to the upper halves. The older autistic 
children differed again, in that they had a fairly homogeneously good 
knowledge of the face as far as identity was concerned and had a similar 
pattern of ability to determine expression as that of the ESN children 
(if a little lower in their ability). The fact that the older autistic 
children were relatively good at recognising people from upper halves 
of inverted faces and yet poor at identifying expression in the inverted 
upper halves may be seen as support for the idea that identification of 
expression is not connected to the recognition of features in a simple 
way. 
It was predicted in the introduction that the autistic children 
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might show evidence of viewing faces less socially meaningful stimuli 
than do the ESN children. What may now be said in this regard? The 
results of the younger autistic children support this in so far as they 
were generally less able to sort the expressions, and were particularly 
poor at sorting the upper halves of the faces. However, this effect 
was not so clear for the older autistic children, and yet it was they who 
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took part in the study of recognition of faces from inverted halves which 
gave rise to the predic tion. Nonetheless, the older autistic children 
were not as able as the ESN children to sort the expressions and, like 
the younger autistic children, the difference was most marked for the 
sorting of upper halves. Indeed, whilst the means do not reflect it, 
five of the nine older autistic children were unable to sort the upright 
upper halves at a level above chance. 
Thus there would seem to be some support for the hypothesis that 
autistic children tend to view faces less as social meaningful stimuli 
than do ESN children of similar age and intelligence. This is certainly 
backed by the pilot studies undertaken before the above experiment and by 
anecdotal reports. The above-mentioned pilot studies found that the 
autistic children were able only to name happy and sad faces, whereas a 
small sample of the ESN children had relatively little difficulty in 
doing so. Teachers' and caretakers' reports bear out the autistics' 
poor knowledge of expression. 
It was mentioned above that identifying the expression displayed 
in the mouth area involves less ability to integrate features than does 
the appreciation of expression in the eye area. It may thus be more 
accurate not to talk of the autistic children as being less social in 
their looking at faces (although this may well be so) but to refer to 
the fact that identifying someone's facial expression requires the ability 
to integrate facial features into a meaningful whole. And integration 
is far less necessary for the identification of happiness and sadness 
(where one can rely upon the appearance of the mouth) than for other more 
complex expressions. 
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It is thus of interest to compare the ESN and autistic children's 
abilities to sort faces into two piles according to whether they appear 
as happy or sad when they contain elements of both expressions. If the 
upper half of a face were to contain one emotion and the lower half the 
other emotion, then one could infer by the way that the children sort 
the faces which half of the face their perception is dominated by. It 
may also be possible to obtain an idea of the extent to which the child 
is integrating the features into a unity - that is, whether he perceives 
a single complex emotion or is aware that the face contains two conflicting 
ones. The following experiment was designed to investigate this. 
5.1.3: The identification of expression in faces containing two conflicting 
expressions 
The aim of this study was to investigate the autistic and ESN 
children's abilities to determine expressions in faces which display more 
than one emotion. It has been discussed above that one tends to view a 
face as a whole, a gestalt, and not as a collection of unrelated components. 
Thus, it would seem that one perceives a face's expression by gaining a 
holistic impression of its entirety, and one does not usually judge 
whether someone is surprised, frightened, etc., on the basis of looking at 
a single feature. If there is conflict between the expression that a 
person tries to communicate and what she/he really feels (eg. "putting 
on a brave face"), then one usually knows this is so. But one does not 
perceive two distinct expressions in the face of such a person; instead 
one sees a single complex expression which reflects the emotions that are 
pretended and felt. It is usually said to be the eyes which reveal the 
"true" emotion which a person is feeling (Ekman, 1973). Thus if one views 
a face with the upper and lower halves displaying contrasting emotions, 
then one's perception of the face's expression will be biased towards the 
emotion conveyed by the eye area. 
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If a child is tending to view facial expressions in this manner, 
then one would expect him to tend to sort a face with a smiling mouth 
and a frowning eye area as a "sad" face. And one would expect this trend 
to exist despite the fact that he is more able to sort expressions 
according to the lower halves than according to the upper halves. In 
addition, one would rarely expect a child who is perceiving faces as 
"wholes" to comment that there are two distinct expressions present in a 
face. On the other hand, one might expect him to say something like "That 
person looks happy, but he's really sad" when there is a smiling mouth 
and sad eyes. 
In contrast, a child who does not tend to view faces in a holistic 
manner may not find the emotion which the eyes convey to have such a 
compelling influence on his perception of facial expression. Thus, if 
such a child is presented with a face in which the upper half is sad and 
the lower half is happy, then he may label such a face as "sad" as 
frequently as he does "happy". Or, to be more precise, he may sort by 
the mouth's expression more frequently simply because he finds it easier 
to discern emotion in the lower half. Equally, one would not expect 
such a child to make such a searching comment (about "apparent" and "real" 
emotions) as was cited above. But one might expect him to mention that 
"the mouth is happy, but the eyes are sad". 
If one is correct about the normal tendency to view faces as wholes, 
and consequently see only a single expression, then it may be possible 
to break-up the holism of a face by presenting it in photographic form 
with the lower half separated by a gap from the upper half. If this does 
have the effect of breaking up a holism, then one would expect it to 
change the way that the normal child would sort composite happy/sad faces 
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but to have no effect upon the sorting of a child who did not perceive 
it as a whole to begin with. 
It may be proposed that the autistic children will perform as if 
they do not perceive wholes. The ESN children, on the other hand, might 
be expected to perform as if they perceive faces in a holistic manner. 
Subjects 
The same children who took part in the previous experiment also 
acted as subjects for the present one. 
Materials 
The same photographs of faces used in the last experiment were used 
to prepare the composite photographs for this study. Each actor who 
posed for a happy face also posed for a sad one. It was thus possible to 
make composite pictures using the lower half of one of the expressions 
posed by an actor and the upper half of the other expression. This was 
done by cutting carefully prepared photographs in half and sticking them 
onto pieces of card. Care was taken to make the head size of each of the 
photographs the same, and to print the faces such that there was a minimum 
of difference between the tonal qualities. The two halves, one sad and one 
happy, were stuck next to each other and the resulting montage was 
reproduced on a high quality photocopying machine. With this done it 
was difficult to tell that the two halves of the resulting face were a 
montage of two different photographs (see figure 5.2). The composite 
faces to be used in the second half of the study where there is an attempt 
to break-up the holism were prepared in a similar manner, except that 
the two halves were glued onto the card with about one inch separation. 
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TABLE 5.3 Mean percent correct by each group, scored by the 
mouth's expression, for the parted and complete 
composite expressional faces 
Group Split composite Combined composite 
Younger 76.40 74.00 
Autistic 
Older 82.00 
autistic 
80.80 
ESN 81.70 90.30 
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The two types will be referred to as 'combined-half' and 'split-half' 
Their sizes were about the same as those in the last experiment (14 cm 
by 10 cm). 
Method and Procedure 
This experiment was either run on the same day as the previous one 
or as soon afterwards as possible; in all cases this was within a week. 
once again, the children were told to sort the photographs of faces into 
two groups depending upon whether they thought the person looked happy or 
sad. The children were not introduced to these faces as being in any 
way special compared to the foregoing ones, as it was felt that this 
might draw attention to the composite nature of the stimuli. Each child 
was shown all possible composites, in both the combined-half and split- 
half conditions, in a random order. He was encouraged to decide one 
way or the other, although hesitations and reasons given for hesitations 
were noted down. Once a face had been sorted it was turned over to 
avoid the child comparing it with faces he might sort onto the same pile 
later. 
Results 
The results are shown in table 5.3. 
(a) The ESN children 
Scoring the performance of the ESN children in terms of percent 
correct for the mouth's expression, revealed that they were tending to 
sort by this and not, by the expression conveyed in the eyes. Still, 
this does not go against the predictions mentioned above. one must test 
the difference between their ability to sort the combined halves with that 
they showed for the upright lower halves in the previous experiment. If 
there is no significant difference between the scores, then one can infer 
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that the ESN children sorted the combined halves purely according to the 
mouths. If there is a significant difference, though, then one may infer 
that the contrasting emotion conveyed by the eyes affected their choice. 
In fact, the latter was found to be true: treated in terms of sorting 
by the mouth's expression, they were significantly better at the upright 
lower halves than at the combined halves (t = 4.56, df = 9, p <0.001. 
One is also interested in whether the splitting of the face had an effect 
upon their sorting choices. In fact, it was found that it did 
(t = 2.43, df = 9, p <0.05). That is, in terms of sorting the faces 
correctly according to the mouth's expression, showed them to be more 
often correct in the combined-half condition than in the split-half one. 
The ESN children were also found to report that there were two separate 
expressions (or two faces) more frequently when the faces were parted by 
an inch gap (an average of 6.1 occurrences for the split-half condition 
compared to an average of only 1.2 for the combined-half). All the above 
results are concordant with the hypothesis that ESN children perceive 
facial expressions holistically: this is supported by the fact that four 
of the ESN children mentioned that a person in the combined-half condition 
"looked happy but is really sad", whereas none made such remarks in the 
split-half condition. 
(b) The Autistic Children 
The younger autistic children performed these tasks as if they were 
sorting according to the expression revealed by the mouths. Comparing 
their performance on the combined-halves with that on the upright lower 
halves from before revealed no significant difference (t = 1.24, df = 8, 
pý 0.1). And there was no significant difference between their performance 
on the combined-halves and the split-halves (t = 1.05, df = 8, p) 0.1). 
This of course was only as expected since it was discovered previously 
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that their ability to sort according to expression in the eye area was 
no better than chance. Thus, as expected, they showed no evidence of 
perceiving faces as gestalten. 
The older autistic children were found to be better when sorting 
the upright lower halves than when sorting the combined-halves in terms 
of percent correct by the mouth (t = 3.17, df = 8, p <0.01). They were, 
however, no better on the combined-halves than on the split-halves by 
this criterion (t = 0.23, df = 8, p'>0.1). Thus, like the ESN children 
the older autistic children showed evidence that they took some account 
of the contrasting expression of the eyes in the combined-half condition. 
But unlike the ESN children, the parting of the faces made no difference 
to their performance. The older autistic children reported about as many 
times in both composite conditions that there were two expressions 
(average of 3.3 in the split-half, and 2.7 in the combined-half; no 
significant difference). The last two points taken together would seem 
to imply that the older autistic children, like the younger ones, were 
not tending to perceive facial expression holistically. Finally, none 
of the autistic children ever remarked that any person "looked happy/sad) 
but is really sad/happy"). 
Discussion 
The initial predictions were confirmed. By performing differently 
when sorting incongruous combined-half and split-half faces than when 
sorting upright lower halves, the ESN children revealed that their 
perception of combined halves was affected by the conflicting expressions 
which the eyes conveyed. Support for the interpretation that this was 
due to their perceiving facial expression holistically came from three 
sources. First, their performance was different when they sorted the 
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split-halves than when they sorted the combined-halves; and it was 
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conjectured Xcould only be true if the gap in the face had broken the 
holism. Second, they tended to report that there were two expressions 
in the combined-half condition much less frequently than in the split- 
half condition. Third, whilst a few ESN children remarked that a face 
in the combined-half condition looked happy but that the person was 
really sad, none of them made such a comment about a split-half face. 
In contrast, the autistic children did not show this evidence for 
viewing facial expression holistically. The lack of ability for the 
younger autistic children to sort by the upper halves of faces was once 
again evident. They sorted both types of composite face as if they were 
simply sorting by the mouth's expression. The older autistic children 
however, were more like the ESN children in that they also did not sort 
the combined-half faces by the mouth's expression alone. Thus the older 
autistic children also seemed able to take account of the expression 
conveyed by the eye area. Nonetheless, it seems wrong to attribute 
the same type of performance to the ESN and autistic children. The 
older autistic children, unlike the ESN ones, performed no differently 
on the two composite face conditions. That is, the gap present in the 
split-half condition's faces did not seem to break the holism for the older 
autistic children. At least, one can infer that a lack of difference 
between their performance on the two conditions indicates that the unity 
of the face is less crucial to the autistics' perception of faces than 
to the ESNs'. 
The older autistic children did NG 64 to report that there were 
two expressions in the face more frequently in the split-half condition 
than in the combined-half one. As was noted above, if a child tends to 
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perceive faces as gestalten, then he would most probably note that there 
-bre two expressions in a face which has been split in*two than one 
which is whole and complete. Lastly, the conclusion that the autistic 
children tended not to view the faces holistically was supported by the fact 
that none of the autistic children made a comment like, "He looks happy, 
but he's really sad". Such a comment implies that a child is perceiving 
a face in its entirity and is able not only to report his global 
impression of the facial expression but also to perceive that a conflict 
can exist between the global expression conveyed by a face and what the 
person is really feeling. 
Once again, then, the ESN children's perception of expression was 
dominated by that which the mouth displayed (cf. section 5.1.2). They 
were able to take into account the emotion revealed by the eyes, but this 
seemed to mainly affect their appreciation of what. a person was 'really' 
feeling and did not dominate their overall view of the face's expression. 
Furthermore, they showed evidence of having an overview of the face's 
expression. In terms of happy and sad faces, then, it seems that ESN 
children's perception of facial expression is dominated by the lower half 
of the face, whereas their perception of faces for identity is dominated 
by the upper facial features. Perception for identity did not indicate 
that the autistic children (younger or older) tended to view any one 
facial area, but when perceiving expressions they were dominated by 
what was conveyed in the mouth area. The reason for the abnormal 
performances of the autistic children can be explained in terms of their 
not tending to integrate their perceptions into meaningful gestalten. 
These points will be discussed later in this thesis in Chapter Seven. 
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5.1.4 Discussion of studies on identification of expressions 
Section 4.3 of the previous chapter outlined the normal child's 
ability to recognise emotion in people's faces. It would seem that by 
around six months of age the normal child will respond differently to a 
"negative affect" face than to a "postive affect" one (Buhler and Hetzer, 
1928; Charlesworth and Kreutzer, 1973). Gates' study (1923) showed that 
normal children can correctly label happy faces before three years of age, 
and this would seem to be confirmed by Ekman and Friesen's (1971) study 
of the Fore of New Guinea. Ekman and Friesen's study also seems to 
have shown that by about six years old a child can recognise facial 
displays of sadness, surprise, fear, anger and disgust. One can thus 
surmise that the child's ability to recognise happy and sad faces 
develops very early in life. One should certainly be surprised not to 
find it in a child of about eight years, even if his mental faculties 
were mildly retarded. 
The ESN children performed up to expectation in the above experiments. 
The suggestion from the pilot studies that they were able to correctly 
identify such expressions as joy, surprise, distress, anger, fear etc. 
also conforms to one's expectations of children with mild mental retardation 
in the eight to eleven year age range. The autistic children, in contrast, 
clearly have a much poorer ability to identify expression than one would 
expect from their general mental abilities. Indeed, the fact that the 
younger autistic children were so poor at identifying happiness and sadness 
implies that they have less ability in this regard than the normal child 
has attained by the third year of life. This ability is obviously below 
that expected at their average mental age level of about five and a half 
years. 
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One can thus conclude with confidence that the autistic children's 
abilities to identify facial expressions are out of keeping with their 
mental ages. Wing and others (see Wing, 1976) have mentioned that the 
autistic child fails to understand other's feelings, and such arguments 
infer that any inability these children have in identifying facial 
expressions stems from a basic absence of empathy. However, the present 
studies have drawn attention to the fact that the autistic child may 
lack the ability to integrate aspects of his perceptual world into 
meaningful wholes. It has been argued that this inability causes him 
to be particularly poor at the identification of expression, except where 
identification can take place in the absence of such integration - e. g. 
when identifying happiness and sadness from a single feature, such as 
the mouth. 
Whilst the process by which normal children come to be able to 
identify facial expressions remains unknown, it would seem safe to 
hypothesise that certain factors must be involved. The child must be able 
to recognise that a person (or several different people) disply a certain 
facial configuration in certain situations or following events of a 
particular nature. For example, they must be at least able to recognise 
the fact that a face with a widely drawn mouth with up-turned eges, raised 
eyebrows, etc. (i. e. the attributes of a happy face) tends to go with 
or follow soon after a "happy" event. There must, presumably, be an 
element of empathy in that the child is aware that the other may feel 
"happiness" in certain circumstances, just as he would. Thus, to obtain 
a full understanding and ability to recognise when another is pulling a 
happy face the child must be able to combine his past and present 
knowledge about his feelings in certain situations, the facial display 
of others that goes with those situations, and be able to put these 
items of information together. 
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Of course, to be able to simply put a "correct" label to a facial 
display or sort it consistantly may not involve such a degree of empathy 
as has been implied above. But the child must at least be able to extract 
those aspects from faces to which he consistently applies the label. 
Given the complexity of facial expressions and the fact that one must be 
able to see what is common about a display of emotion, regardless of 
the particular physical attributes of the face which is displaying it, 
then it seems highly likely that an inability on the part of the autistic 
child to integrate his perceptions into meaningful wholes would necessarily 
mean that he would be poor at identifying people's facial expressions. 
These points will be returned to later in the thesis, but suffice 
it to note at this juncture that those aspects of recognising expression 
at which the autistic child is fairly able, are those which are not 
greatly affected by temporal changes. That is to say, the physical 
characteristics of happy and sad mouths are reasonably consistent regardless 
of who exhibited them and when. In contrast, emotion displayed in the 
eye area, being more complex, is more variable between faces and, to a 
lesser extent, within each individual face over time. Additionally, it 
would seem reasonable to suggest that the recognition of a gestalt from 
a complex of components must involve the integration of several characteristics 
and relationships in a finite period of time. This process is qualitatively 
different from the identification of a single characteristic feature such 
as a smiling mouth, which has little need for temporal processing. 
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5.2 The Production of Facial Expressions 
5.2.1: The autistic children's abilities 
It was hypothesised above that one aspect of a child's ability to 
identify facial expressions might be his degree of empathic understanding. 
Given, too, that a correspondance was noted between a normal child's 
abilities to identify expressions and to produce them, it would be 
pertinent to investigate the autistic child's ability to produce 
expressions. 
Ricks and Wing (1976) seem to be in little doubt about the fact that 
autistic children are usually able to smile, laugh, weep and show signs 
of fear and anger. But they tend only to show extremes of such emotions. 
However, virtually no non-verbal communication (as defined by Argyle and 
Cook, 1972, for example) appears to be universally present in the 
autistic child's repertoire. Insofar as facial expressions are part of 
one's non-verbal communicative abilities, it may be suggested that the 
autistic child's expressional behaviour reflects their innate "reflex" 
emotional response to their environment rather than an intent to 
communicate their feelings. 
It was decided that the most valuable first step was to undertake 
a survey of the expressional ability of the autistic children studied. 
Two approaches were taken. First, the teachers and houseparents were 
given a list of basic expressions and asked to comment upon the 
children's ability to execute them. To supplement this the author 
visited the schools for an average of two days per week for two months 
in an attempt to observe the range of expressions which the children 
displayed, and to make a photographic record where possible. 
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Because of the informal nature of this survey, the results will 
be presented informally. The findings of Ricks and Wing were broadly 
confirmed in that most of the children were said to be capable of 
smiling, laughing, weeping, and showing signs of fear and anger. 
However, the teachers pointed out that expression of even these emotions 
were not common, and most of the children were characterised by an 
apparent flatness of affect. When emotion was displayed by facial 
expression it tended to be fairly extreme, with shades of emotion 
being almost totally absent. It was also of interest to note that 
most people who worked with the children felt that many expressed 
emotions which were not seemingly contingent upon what had happened 
or was happening to them. Other workers have also noted the existence 
of inappropriate affect in the autistic child (Wing, 1965). Many of 
the adults who knew the children felt that the children had at sometime 
shown a reflex startle reaction; but none of them had ever displayed 
an obvious expression of overt surprise. That is, whilst the children 
had been known to react to an event as "unexpected", they had not shown 
that they had "misexpected" an event (see Charlesworth, 1972, for a 
discussion of the distinction between these two expressions). 
All these points were supported by the author's own observations 
of the children. The only expression which was noted that was not 
brought to light by the houseparents or the teachers was that described 
as "puzzlement". Kanner (1943) drew attention to the fact that most 
autistic children do not look subnormal, whereas many other children 
who score well below average on IQ tests do. Kanner went so far as 
to claim that autistic children have intelligent physiognomies. 
The present survey could only attribute this observation to the general 
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TABLE 5.4 Details of the subjects in the study of elicited 
expressions 
Group N 
Autistic 10 
ESN 9 
Mean C. A. Mean Full IQ 
(sd) (sd) 
13.78 yrs 61.20 
(1.32) (14.17) 
13.91 yrs 60.09 
(1.02) (7.82) 
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lack of expression the children displayed coupled with the afore- 
mentioned puzzled look, which might be said to give a child the 
appearance of someone who is rapt in thought or intelligently reflecting 
upon some matter. 
Such factors as these may well have led some autistic children to 
be thought of as enigmatic, or to be wrongly diagnosed as a normally 
intelligent child who is going through a phase of withdrawal. Indeed, 
such factors as their apparently normal and intelligent appearance 
have been the primary motivation of many psychogenetic theories who 
would have the "blame" for the child's condition fall on the parents 
and their methods of child rearing. 
This initial survey has thus set the scene in which one may view 
the autistic child as being relatively affectless and generally 
incapable of using facial expressions intentionally to communicate 
their feelings to others. But if their ability to 
produce facial expressions spontaneously is poor, are they equally 
unable to produce expressions to order? A study was devised to 
investigate the autistic children's ability to pull happy and sad 
faces, compared with that of a group of ESN children. 
5.2.2: Elicited Expressions 
Subjects 
Ten autistic children were chosen from those who had taken part 
in the previous studies of this thesis. These children's ages spanned 
those of the children who had previously taken part. Nine ESN children 
matched to the autistic children for chronological age and general 
mental ability were also chosen. Details of these children can 
be 
found in table 5.4. 
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Method and Procedure 
Each child was taken on his own to a well-illuminated quiet room. 
He was told that he would be asked to make a couple of faces, and some 
pictures would be taken of him as he did so. The child was first asked 
to make a happy face, and a photograph was taken when the experimenter 
and an independent observer agreed that the child was doing his best. 
This necessarily introduced an element of subjective evaluation, and 
hence potential error, yet it was nonetheless felt to be a justified 
and reliably realistic measure of the children's abilities. Once this 
was done, the child was asked to make a sad face, and again the child's 
best effort was photographed. It should be noted that the child's 
teacher was also present to enable all possible methods of communicating 
requirements to the child to be made. Thus if the child seemed not to 
understand either the phrase "pull a face" or "make a face", then such 
phrases as "try to look happy/sad" would be used. - 
For five of the ESN children, pictures of their "happy" faces were 
not taken. Instead three independent observers from the children's 
school were asked to be present and to judge each child's performance 
on a seven point scale from "good" to "poor". For the poor expressions 
of these children and for both expressions of the rest of the ESN children 
and of the autistic children, the photographs were given to ten independent 
raters who were naive as to which of the two expressions had been demanded 
of the children, or which type of child any particular photograph was of. 
These raters were asked first to classify each photograph as happy or 
sad, and then to judge how good an example of that expression each was 
on a seven point scale from "good" to "poor". 
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TABLE 5.5 Mean scores given by raters to each groups' attempts 
to pull happy and sad faces. The raters scored on a 
seven-point scale, with the correct expression giving 
a positive rating, and an incorrect expression giving 
a negative rating (hence the high sd of the autistic 
children on happy faces). Note a high score represents 
a good example of the expression. 
Group Happy Sad 
(sd) (sd) 
Autistic 2.88 3.06 
(3.38) (1.36) 
ESN 6.02 3.50 
(0.17) (0.78) 
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Results 
The results are shown in table S. S. A 2-by-2 ANOVA was computed 
and revealed a main effect of groups (F1,36 = 9.45; p <0.01), and a group- 
by-conditions interaction (F1 1,36 = 5.91; pi( 0.025). The results were 
indicative of the fact that the subnormal children were generally more 
able to pull accurate facial expressions than were the autistic children. 
The subnormal children were more able than them to pull happy faces 
(t = 2.87, df = 18; p <0.02), but each was equally able at the sad 
faces (t = 0.36, df = 18, p> 0.1). And whilst the autistic children 
were equally good at both types of expression (t = 0.36, df = 9, p) 0.1), 
the ESN children were better at the happy ones than the sad (t = 8.47, 
df = 9, p< 0.001). 
Thus whilst both groups were fairly poor at pulling sad faces, the 
ESN children alone were good at pulling happy faces. The similarity, 
though, between the two groupstresponses when trying to pull sad faces 
belies the fact that the autistic children responded quite differently 
to the ESNs. Whereas the autistic children seemed genuinely unable 
(or barely able) to pull either face very well, the ESN children made 
much more thoughtful attempts to pull the sad faces. Their low scores 
may reflect the fact that they tended to report feeling self-conscious 
about pulling a sad face, and consequently tended to smile a little as 
the photographs were taken. There was also a tendency for them to report 
that "sadness" was something which one kept inside - and thus they simply 
rendered it by a passive "sad face" staring at the ground. This pose, 
however, was not one which the raters tended to score very highly, 
despite its possible realism. 
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Figure S. 3a. Autistic girl's attempts at sad (top) and happy 
faces. 
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Figure 5.3b. A more able autistic 
boy's attempts (note expression 
almost totally in the mouth). 
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Figure 5.3c. Another autistic girl's attempts. 
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Figure 5.3d. ESN girl's sad face which was typical of a type 
not scored highly yet arguably "realistic". 
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A revealing finding was that two of the autistic children 
obtained an overall negative score for their attempt to pull a happy 
face. That is, one of them was judged on average to be pulling a 
poor sad face, and the other was generally judged to be pulling a good 
sad face! In all, six of the autistic children were given a negative 
score by at least one rater, whereas none of the ESN children were. 
It should finally be noted that the five ESN children who were 
rated at the time of testing were all thought by the raters present to 
be pulling unequivocably good happy faces. Support for having done 
this is gained from the fact that the other ESN children also obtained 
a similar average ability for their attempts at the happy face. 
In this experiment each child needed to understand what was 
required of him when he was asked to "pull a happy/sad face", for there 
were no models for him to copy. Thus it is possible that the superior 
performance by the ESN children noted above might have been partly due 
to their superior linguistic abilities. For this reason it was decided 
to undertake a study of the children's abilities to copy a facial 
expression which is demonstrated by a model. The following study 
reports the findings of such an investigation. 
5.2.3: Copying Facial Expression 
Subjects and Procedure 
In this study autistic and ESN children matched to the autistic 
children for general ability were compared for their ability to copy 
a facial. expression displayed by a model. It was also decided to add 
to the design of the experiment the factor of whether or not the child 
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TABLE 5.6 Details of the subjects in the study of copied 
expressions 
Group N Mean C. A. Mean Full IQ 
(sd) (sd) 
Autistic 8 13.51 yrs 60.90 
(1.24) (13.92) 
ESN 8 13.44 yrs 61.24 
(0.98) (7.72) 
I 
f 
ý. 
ý 
G. 
Figure 5.4. Autistic boy's attempts to copy an expression 
without feedback (top) and with feedback. 
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Figure 5.4b. ESN girl's attempts at copying with and without 
feedback. 
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had feedback of how well he was doing. Eight of the children from each 
of the groups who took part in the above experiment acted as subjects 
in this study (see Table 5.6 for details). Each child was taken alone 
to a quiet well lit room in which was positioned a large mirror against 
one wall. At first the child was asked to stand with his back to the 
mirror and to look at the face of a female model who was pulling "a 
funny face" (figure 5.4 shows an example of it). The child was asked 
to "do as the lady is doing - pull a funny face like hers". All 
children seeemed to understand the requirements of the task and 
immediately looked at her face and attempted to copy it. A photograph 
was taken of their best effort, and this was done such that it included 
the model's face, too, reflected in the mirror behind the child's back. 
The child was then asked to turn around and face the mirror so that he 
or she could see both his or her own face and that of the model. With 
the visual feedback which this allowed each was asked to have a second 
attempt at copying the model's facial expression. Once again a 
photograph was taken of the child's best attempt. The photographs 
were later given to each of a panel of ten raters who were asked to 
score each photograph on a seven point scale for the accuracy of the 
child's attempt to imitate the model (the scale ran from "very 
inaccurate" to "very accurate"). The raters were not told what the 
purpose of the experiment was, and they were given the photographs 
in random order so that it was not possible to tell from which group 
each child came. All the photographs were in black and white, and each 
was given the same attention to quality of the print. Examples are 
given in figure 5.4. 
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TABLE 5.7 Mean scores given by the raters on a seven point scale 
when the children were trying to copy a model's 
expression once without visual feedback, and again with 
feedback. (Note a high score represents a judgement 
of good imitation). 
Copy without feedback Copy with feedback 
Group (sd) (sd) 
Autistic 3.46 3.06 
(1.45) (0.92) 
ESN 3.17 4.35 
(1.18) (1.03) 
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Results 
The results are shown in table 5.7. A two-by-two analysis of 
variance was computed on the results and revealed only a significant 
interaction of groups-by-condition (F1,36 =6.02; p <0.025). This 
interaction reflected the fact that both groups tended to do equally 
well at copying the model (t = 1.83, df = 30, p <0.05). Although 
there was, in fact, a trend for the ESN children to do a little better 
than the autistic children. However, the source of the interation 
resided in the fact that only the ESN children improved their performance 
when they were allowed access to visual feedback (t = 2.48, df = 7, 
p <0.01, for the ESN children; and t=0.88, df = 7, pý0.1 for the 
autistic children). This finding is in concord with findings reported 
by Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) when (in conjunction with Frith) they 
gave autistic and subnormal children the task of following a 'maze' 
like track with a metal stylus. The children were required to do 
this with and without visual feedback of their efforts, and only the 
autistic children failed to gain from the availability of the visual 
information. 
Given, then, that the autistic children showed a fairly good 
ability to copy facial expression, it may be noted that it is unlikely 
that their limited repertoire of expression is the result of their 
being unable to imitate the expressions of others. 
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Discussion 
The ESN children were generally able to pull happy and sad faces. 
To the extent that they failed to pull sad faces convincingly it seemed 
to either be due to their embarrassment or to their understanding of 
the feeling which led them to pose in a fairly expressionless manner. 
The autistic children, on the other hand, were less able to pull happy 
and sad faces. Several of the autistic children pulled expressions 
which were seen by some raters as being of the opposite kind of that 
requested. Indeed, two autistic children attained overall averages 
which implied that their happy faces were judged to be sad. This was 
not true for any of the ESN children. 
In Chapter Four a distinction was made between 'reflex' and 'non- 
reflex' expressions of emotion. The former are spontaneous and may 
communicate one's inner state to another but are not consciously 
intended to do so. The primary intention behind the non-reflex 
expressions is, by contrast, to communicate to another how one feels. 
These expressions are thus part of the nonverbal complement to verbal 
language. As with verbal language, these intended expressions must 
be learnt by the child. 
Babies are noted to show a very wide range of facial expressions, 
and many of these are said to be surprisingly adult in their form 
(Herka, 1965). However, there is evidence to suggest that the infant's 
expressions do not always relate to the inner states they would be 
expected to correspond to if they were an adult's. Bower (1974) notes 
that there are several quite distinct facial displays which babies 
show that are said to be a 'smile'. Moreover, all these different 
displays tend to happen in quite different circumstances. It is thus 
2R0 
rather misleading to refer to all of the expressions by the same label. 
An infant's earliest smiles may not only reflect happiness, but may 
also indicate other internal states such as having wind. Similarly, 
one cannot attribute an adult meaning to an infant's expression simply 
because it looks like an adult's expression. 
It may be that while certain facial displays are reflex expressions 
of such inner states as 'happiness', 'anger', 'fear', or 'discomfort', 
others may be relatively unrelated to any particular inner state. The 
latter may be in some ways similar to infantile babble. Babble is a 
necessary precursor to speech proper, and might be part of the child's 
discovery that he can emit sounds. Although the theory is speculative, 
it may be that early utterances which at first carry no specific 
meaning (none which is socially defined anyway) come to acquire meaning 
through the child's interaction with an adult. The adult marks the 
child's utterances and shapes them towards more socially acceptable 
usage. At first these utterances may be idiosyncratic to the infant, 
but it is important that the adult impute meaning to the child's 
behaviour and thus meet his needs. Through the adult's meeting of the 
infant's needs, and thus showing the baby that there is a correspondence 
between his utterances and things being done to him, the baby may come 
to imbue his utterances with intent. In this way the baby can progress 
from a stage of pure demanding to being able to request. There is 
growing evidence that this is true (see Bruner, 1975a, b) and that 
such early utterances develop into spoken language proper in order 
to fulfil the need to regulate joint attention between mother and 
child. 
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In a similar sense, early facial displays may be a necessary 
precursor of later more socially acceptable communication of feeling. 
Adults may serve a similar purpose to that in the child's development 
of speech by shaping the child's displays by marking them in a 
consistent manner. Thus, mothers may say such phrases as "Who's a 
happy boy then? " in situations when the infant is thought to be 
displaying happiness. Consequently, if the infant starts life by 
producing a 'smile' in several diverse situations, then this shaping 
by his caretaker will lead him to emit it mainly in one type of 
situation and not others; therefore in this case he will learn to 
smile when he is happy and not when he is not. 
The strength of this theory is that it avoids having to explain 
how a child is able to imitate the facial display he would need in 
order to produce any given expression. However, this is not to say 
that imitation does not play a part in the child's acquisition of 
facial expressions. It does. But the importance of imitation in 
the first months of life may not only be in terms of the child's 
acquiring the ability to produce facial displays; in a similar way, 
imitation does not simply lead to the child's acquisition of his 
first words. Rather, it may be that the adult imitates the infant's 
expressions, and through this the infant comes to associate certain 
expressions in other's faces with certain types of feeling or 
experience of his own. Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence 
that this is the case (eg. Pawlby, 1977). 
The consequence of the infant coming to associate a certain 
feeling in himself with the expression on another's face, is that 
the perception of the expression may come to evoke the corresponding 
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feeling in him. That is, seeing a smiling face may-evoke the feeling 
of pleasure that he felt whenever he previously viewed the display 
and the adult was imitating him. Thus viewing a smiling face may cause 
a baby to smile not because he is copying the facial expression, but 
because it evoked a feeling within him that he associates with seeing 
that expression. It then seems a natural step for the baby to 
associate expression in others with feeling in himself and later to 
understand that he too makes such expressions. This is surely a basis 
for the acquisition of empathy. But one may note here that a baby 
will only be able to follow this course of development if he is able 
to put together the differing aspects of his perceptions - an empathy 
with what he sees, and the contingency of other's behaviour upon his own. 
Obviously there are other factors involved in the acquisition of 
a full range of facial expressions. Many require-complex social 
learning, and it is thus not surprising that they develop much later 
in life (see Gates, 1923). Imitation of others' expressions may play 
an increasingly important role in the acquisition of facial expressions 
with age. Insofar as this is the case, it would seem that the autistic 
child is able to imitate others' expressions - thus his major problems 
pºý (I C, 
with faciaTn expression must lie elsewhere. 
His major problems may lie in his behaviour in the first year of 
life, and the consequences of his innate cognitive deficit. To 
summarise what the normal infant might require in order to gain a 
basic ability to produce and identify expressions: 
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1. The infant must produce a sufficient range of facial 
expressions for the mother to respond to. That is, if 
the mother's copying and marking of the child's behaviour 
is important, then clearly the infant must produce 
sufficient behaviour. 
2. The mother must copy those examples of the baby's facial 
displays which she feels reflect the socially acceptable 
emotion or feeling for that display (e. g. reinforcing 
smiling when the child's inner state is pleasure and 
not at other times). 
3. The infant must produce his displays with sufficient 
consistency such that the mother can gauge which facial 
displays go with which inner states (i. e. insofar as 
there may be several different types of smile, for instance, 
the baby must be consistent as to which type he produces 
when he's happy). 
4. The baby must be able to detect and encode the fact that 
a facial display on the mother's part tends to go with 
a certain type of feeling in himself. 
5. It may be that as time passes the baby should have the 
feeling evoked in him whenever he sees the expression 
if empathy is to develop and he is to appear to copy his 
mother. This may be rewarding for her. 
It is not claimed that this list is complete, but nonetheless 
let us consider that these factors may be essential to the development 
of facial expression and an understanding of its use and meaning. 
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In the above experiments it was found that the ESN children's 
abilities to recognise and produce expressions were equally good, and 
they had no history of being poor at expressing emotion early in life. 
On the other hand, the autistic children were both less able to 
recognise and to produce facial expressions. Although the data was 
not available for the present children, autistic babies are frequently 
reported to have been generally affectless during their development. 
Many autistic babies are said to be exceptionally passive or to fret 
and cry and be very difficult to comfort. Thus it seems that whilst 
some autistic babies may produce insufficient facial displays for the 
mother to mark and copy, others may produce them for reasons which 
are hard to discern. In addition, autistic infants have been described 
as showing little willingness to interact with their caretakers (Wing, 
1976a; Newson, 1980). And there is also evidence to show that autistic 
babies fail to exhibit normal pre-verbal conversation patterns of turn 
taking and so forth (Newson, op. cit. ). 
Bearing in mind the above mentioned five points it seems that the 
autistic child may be ill-equipped on all fronts. He may produce too 
few expressions or may produce them with insufficient consistency. 
The studies so far reported also support the contention that the 
autistic child may have difficulties in integrating his perceptions 
both over time and over different aspects of ongoing experience. 
Consequently he may be unable to perceive the links between his inner 
states and the expressions displayed by the mother. A failure to 
perceive such links may mean that the baby fails to smile back at his 
mother and is thus considerably less responsive than a normal baby. 
This inability to link inner states with other's facial expressions 
may lead to a lack of understanding as to what facial expression of 
emotion is about, what its purpose is. 
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The literature also suggests that autistic children may have had 
abnormal or deficient babble (Wing, 1976; Bartak et al, 1975) and 
idiosyncratic pre-verbal utterances (Ricks, 1972,1975). Thus it 
seems that the autistic child has abnormalities in both the verbal and 
non-verbal precursors of communicative ability. Consequently, a 
failure to integrate perceptions into wholes or thematic classes may 
be coupled with a lack of production of necessary precursury behaviours 
in the autistic child, and it may lead to his poor and abnormal 
communicative abilities. This point will be returned to in Chapter 
Seven. 
In summary, the autistic child seems to have a fairly normal range 
of spontaneous or reflex expressions, which are not primarily intended 
to communicate something to others, but he may fail to grasp what 
conscious expression of emotion is for due to an inability to integrate 
the various aspects of his perception. However, he may show fairly good 
ability where he need not interpret the meaning of his perception, 
for example, when he is required to reproduce a facial expression 
exactly as seen. He is thus at least able to act as if he comprehends 
the connexion between facial expression by others and his own facial 
displays. Hence any theory which contends that he has a defect in 
sensory processing that affects the integration of perceptions must 
take this possible comprehension into account. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EYE MOVEMENTS WHEN PERCEIVING FACES 
6.1: Introduction 
This chapter will deal with a computerised study of the eye movements 
of autistic and ESN children whilst looking at faces. Because the study 
was undertaken after the main body of work on this thesis was complete, 
different children were used (Dutch ones, in fact). The study also made 
use of a piece of apparatus which the author had on loan for a short 
while. Hence the experiment stands only as a pilot project in this area 
of study. 
To date very little is known about the details of autistic children's 
gaze behaviour. On an anecdotal level, they have been reported to look 
out of the corners of their eyes and to use peripheral vision to inspect 
objects. But this has so far been a clinical impression - without 
specialised equipment it is not possible to say for certain that a child 
tends to use peripheral vision when inspecting his environment. On a 
less anecdotal level, Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) have reported that 
autistic children are characterised by relatively brief fixation times. 
They also noted that the autistic children made fewer comparative gaze 
movements between objects. That is, they were unlike the subnormal 
children tested insofar as they tended not to compare and contrast the 
pairs of stimuli they were presented with. Rather they would tend to 
shift their gaze from figure to ground and back to figure again. 
Apart from the above, our knowledge about their gaze behaviour 
must be drawn from inference. For instance, it 
is said that autistic 
children actively avoid eye contact (Hutt et al., 
1965), although others 
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Figure 6.1. Eye movements when viewing a face (Yarbus 1967) 
Compare this to Figure 3.1 and note the greater 
scanning of the mouth of the smiling face. 
ýý-J 
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have disputed this (Hermelin and O'Connor, 1978; see Chapter Two). If 
this is so, then one can conclude that their gaze behaviour shows a 
certain amount of selectivity and is by no means random. However, as 
to the precise nature of their gaze when looking at faces, for example, 
one is unaware whether they have well defined scanning strategies 
relatively longer fixations on some parts more than others, and so forth. 
Turning for a moment to the literature on normal peoples eye 
movements when looking at faces, one notes that there is a host of evidence 
to suggest that scanning patterns are unique and selective (see Argyle 
and Cook, 1976). Yarbus (1967) found that subjects fixate areas of 
maximum interest for periods of about one third of a second. These 
fixations on such points of interest are linked by saccades and are 
repeated in cycles. In the case of faces people look mainly at the eyes 
and the mouth (see figure 6.1). Walker-Smith and her colleagues (1977) 
also studied eye movements of adults when looking at faces. In one 
task subjects were required to match a test face with a previously 
presented target face, and in a second task they had to compare two 
simultaneously presented faces. Walker-Smith et al. found that each 
subject tended to have a preferred feature which they would fixate when 
trying to tell whether they had seen a face before or whether two faces 
were the same. Moreover, the preferred features were mainly the eyes 
and the mouth, with some subjects choosing the nose as well. 
Studies of the eye movements of abnormal subjects seem almost 
entirely restricted to an interest in schizophrenic patients. There 
have been many studies on this (Holzman et al, 1973,1974,1975; 
Shagass et al, 1974; Lindsey et al, 1978) and they have generally claimed 
that schizophrenics have impaired smooth-pursuit eye movements (SPEMs). 
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Apparently between 65% and 80% of schizophrenic patients and about 45% 
of the first degree relatives have shown disordered SPEMs, in contrast 
to about a 6% prevalence in the normal population. The reasons for this 
remain obscure, and as yet the measurement of eye movements seems more 
concerned with a method of diagnosing schizoprenia. 
It is noted that none of the above studies of the eye movements of 
normal or abnormal subjects have involved children. Thus in many ways a 
study of the eye movements of autistic children will be breaking new 
ground. For this reason few predictions can be offered. In the following 
section various aspects of the gaze behaviour of autistics will be discussed, 
and expectations regarding their gaze behaviour whilst viewing faces 
will be outlined. 
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6.2 Computer Based Study of Autstic Children's Eye Movements 
After the body of work which makes up this thesis was complete, the 
author was given the use of aG&W Applied Science Laboratories "Eye View 
Monitor System" (sold under the trade name of Wittiker, model 1998). 
This apparatus is one of the more advanced of its kind and has particular 
advantages over other systems when working with abnormal children. It 
requires the subject to sit in a fairly relaxed manner, but has a computerised 
system which tracks head movements and thus can allow the child to move 
a little during measurements. It relies upon a corneal reflection 
measurement of the position of the eye. Information about where the subject 
is looking is obtained by means of an infra-red light which is bounced 
off the subject's eye and back into an infra-read camera. Hence there 
is no need for the subject to have anything on or near his person, and 
he will be unaware that his eye movements are being measured. 
It has been noted several times in this thesis that it would be of 
great interest to have details of autistic children's eye movements when 
they look at other's faces. Although it was not possible to use the 
computerised eye-movement recorder with the children who acted as subjects 
in the previous experiments, it was nonetheless felt to be of value to 
investigate the eye movements of another sample of autistic children. 
One aspect of autism which the study of face perception in section 
3.1 tried to deal with was whether or not the autistic child avoids eye- 
contact. Whilst the study of face perception indicated that it was unlikely 
that he does, it is noted that the indication was based upon the assumption 
that if normal people know the eye area of faces well because they look 
at eyes, then autistic children should not know the eye area well since 
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they avoid eye-contact. This point could be investigated directly by 
the use of an eye-movement recorder which allows one to quantify the 
autistic child's eye movements when he's looking at faces. 
Gaze Avoidance in Autism 
In section 2.3, a survey was presented on the various views of an 
empirical evidence relating to the topic of gaze-avoidance in autism. 
It was noted that very few studies of the topic have been undertaken. 
One of the most often quoted studies is that of Hutt and Ounsted (1966), 
in which they proposed that the autistic child is over-aroused and that 
he avoids mutual gaze to prevent his level of arousal becoming any higher. 
Whilst there have been a few studies which have provided support for such 
a claim (eg. Richer and Coss, 1972), these have been highly criticised. 
The work of Hermelin and O'Connor (1967) on this subject has received less 
criticism, although its experimental approach has been termed "unnatural" 
(see, Mittler, 1971). Their studies led them to posit that the autistic 
child's "gaze avoidance" might only be apparent and due to their having 
a very low fixation time on all things. As Beate Hememlin has put it: 
,, if you were a table, you too would complain that the autistic child 
avoids your gaze". 
Section 2.3 concluded that while the expe. LO4p41t work left an unresolved 
picture, it nonetheless seemed from the clinical evidence that the autistic 
child may not avoid gaze contact, but may rather be indifferent to it or 
use it abnormally. 
Because the measurement of a person's eye movements in a totally 
natural setting is beyond the technology available at the present time, 
it was felt that a laboratory based approach that attempted to be as 
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natural as possible was justified. It was thus decided to adapt and 
extend Hermelin and O'Connor's (1967) study of gaze aversion by the 
utilization of the computerised eye movement recorder. In their study 
Hermelin and O'Connor asked the child to look into a box which had a 
black interior. At the far end of its interior the child could see 
an illuminated live face. This face was seen by each subject once with 
its eyes open and once with them closed. Through another apperture in 
the box a second researcher was able to note the length of time each 
child spent looking at each of the faces. They used this experimental 
set-up to compare the gaze behaviour of autistic children with that of 
a matched group of normal controls. They found that the autistic 
children looked less long at each face than did the normal children. 
However, both groups looked at the face with its eyes open and the 
one with them closed for equal lengths of time. Thus Hermelin and 
O'Connor concluded that the autistic children did not evidence gaze 
aversion to the face with its eyes open. 
In the same paper (1967), Hermelin and O'Connor also studied the 
eye movements of autistic, ESN and normal children when looking at 
other stimuli. They found that the tendency for the autistic children 
to have very brief visual fixations was general to all the stimuli 
they required then to look at, but that they did spend longer looking 
at the human faces than at other stimuli. Because the interior of 
the box in which the stimuli were seen was blackened, it may be noted 
that the autistic children can be said to have engaged in more non- 
directed gaze than the other children. They also spent far less time 
looking from one stimulus to the other (when a pair were presented) 
and instead tended to look from stimulus to background and back to 
stimulus again. 
3OL 
The present study thus had four main goals: 
1. To investigate the gaze behaviour of autistic children whilst 
looking at faces in a situation allowing them to exhibit a 
natural pattern of gaze activity. 
2. To compare the gaze behaviour of autistic children with that 
of ESN children matched for mental and chronological age. 
3. To extend the study by investigating the autistic child's 
gaze when viewing other types of face (smiling, talking, etc. ) 
and other stimuli. 
4. To repeat Hermelin and O'Connor's study of the autistic child's 
eye movements when looking at faces with open and closed eyes. 
Methodology and Predictions 
It was stated above that present technology does not allow one to 
measure a child's eye movements whilst he is going about his normal daily 
activities. Thus one must necessarily put the child into an 'unnatural' 
situation in the sense that he will not be used to it. Because eye 
movement recorders which do not require the subject to wear a piece of 
apparatus generally need fairly low light levels (to obtain a large pupil 
diameter), and a reasonably motionless subject, there are certain 
constraints which one must immediately put upon the testing situation. 
A full description of the testing procedure and the conditions of testing 
will be given later, - however, it will be noted that given the requirements 
of the eye movement recorder the present study was made as natural as 
possible. 
It was decided that not only should the subjects see faces with open 
and closed eyes, but they should also see smiling faces, sad faces, talking 
faces, and ones that look away. These additional stimuli were chosen to 
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test the aforementioned hypotheses of gaze avoidance and also provide 
further information about the gaze activity of autistic children whilst 
viewing faces displaying emotional expression. Several predictions may 
be made regarding the gaze of autistic children whilst viewing these 
faces: 
1. Hutt et al. have proposed that autistic children avoid eye contact, 
or indeed looking at faces in general because they find them too arousing. 
However, arousal is a complex topic, and it is somewhat reductionist to 
talk simply in terms of faces arousing autistic children above an already 
abnormally high baseline. Nonetheless, Hutt et al. 's predictions may be 
tested in the present study. It is possible that some faces are more 
'arousing' than others. Certainly one would expect them to look less at 
a face which was looking at them than at one with its eyes closed or 
which is looking away. But there is also the implication in Hutt et al's 
work that emotional expression and social contact is arousing to the 
autistic child, and thus one would expect them to avoid this, too. That 
is, one might tentatively predict that Hutt et al. 's theory suggests that 
an autistic child would look less at a smiling face than at a passive one, 
and perhaps he would also look less at a person who was trying to talk 
to him than at either of the other two faces. Similarly, if the autistic 
child understands what a 'sad' face is then perhaps he will also look 
less at this than at a passive face. In the present study the sad face 
was also averting gaze. Thus, because the elements which make up the 
passive face with averted gaze and the sad face are the same, if the 
child shows different gaze behaviour to the two kinds of face this implies 
that he viewed them as different, and possibly he has understood that 
one was expressing emotion and the other was not. Likewise, if the smiling 
face looking at the child is inspected in a different manner than the 
passive staring face, then once again one can conclude that he saw the 
two faces as different. 
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2. As indicated above, if the autistic child appreciates facial 
expressions then he should respond differently to the sad averted face 
than to the passive averted one. He should also respond differently 
to the smiling face than to the one which is passively staring at him. 
3. It was suggested in section 3.1 that the autistic children's above 
average knowledge of the mouth area of faces might be due to their 
tending to use lip-read cues. If this is true, then one would expect it 
to be evidenced in their gaze behaviour by their tending to look at the 
lower half of the face. Whilst this might not be so for all faces, it 
should certainly be true in response to the talking face. 
4. Support for the findings of Hermelin and O'Connor would be found 
if the autistic child looks less long at faces than does the ESN child. 
Further support would be gained if both types of children tended to look 
as often at the face with its eyes open as the one with its eyes closed. 
One would also expect from their work that the autisitcs' fixations 
would be briefer than those of the ESN children, and that they would 
engage in fewer comparative shifts of gaze from one part of the face 
to another. 
Finally, if the autistic child views faces as qualitatively 
different from other visual stimuli, then his eye movements should 
reflect this. Thus if the autistic child is presented with a schematic 
house to look at, then he should exhibit gaze activity different from 
that he exhibited when looking at faces. Moreover, by showing the 
children such pictures of houses one would be able to test the results 
of the sorting experiment in section 3.2, which found no evidence that 
autistic children tend to look at the lower half of all things. Naturally, 
30.1; 
TABLE 6.1 Details of the three subjects tested in the computerized 
study of eye movements while looking at faces. 
(M. A. calculated using "De Snijders-Oomen Niet-Verball 
Intelligentieschaal", by S nijders, J. T. H. and Snijders- 
Oomen, N. (1975); Groningen). 
Child Onset of symptoms C. A. M. A. 
Autistic boy ( 30 months 11.42 yrs 4.90 yrs 
Autistic girl 30 months 10.58 yrs 5.08 yrs 
ESN girl (from birth? ) 10.67 yrs 5.21 yrs 
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all the results obtained with the autistic children could also he 
compared with those of an ESN child so that any abnormalities in the 
autistic children's gaze behaviour may be more certainly attributed 
to their 'autism'. 
It will be noted that this study has pertinence to nearly all of 
the foregoing experiments reported in this thesis, and thus may give rise 
to some potentially unifying conclusions. 
Subjects 
This study took place in Holland, and thus the subjects who had 
taken part in the other studies reported in this thesis were not 
available. There was also a time limit on the availability of the eye 
movement recorder. Consequently it was decided to run only a small 
selection of children. The main criterion for selection of the autistic 
children (beyond the assessment of their condition, which had to be in 
line with Rutter's 1978 description) was that they had to be able to sit 
reasonably still during the time of testing and not be distressed by 
the testing situation. Two autistic children met these requirements, one 
boy and one girl both of whom were particularly "classic" in their 
autistic symptoms. Both children had an air of aloofness and showed 
very little contact with people. The boy had no spoken language and 
had never been seen to use gesture to indicate his needs. The girl 
had a few words, no gesture, and was a little more sociable than the 
boy (in that she seemed more aware of the presence of other people). 
Details of these subjects are given in table 6.1. As can be seen from 
the table, both autistic children had an onset of symptoms within the 
first thirty months of life. To compare the performance of these two 
autistic children, an ESN girl of similar general ability but exhibiting 
no signs of autism, was chosen. 
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Equipment and Materials 
The main piece of equipment used in this study was the G? W model 
1998 "computer based head tracking eye view monitor system". A schematic 
representation of the components of the system is shown in figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.3 shows a photograph of a subject's eye-movements being measured 
with the equipment whilst looking at an idealised display. It will be 
noted that this picture omits the camera which would be positions behind 
the subject's head in order to have a record of what they are seeing 
(although the output from such a camera is shown in the upper left 
monitor of the control panel). 
(i) Principles of operation 
The subject's eye rotation (as opposed to translation resulting from 
head motion) and his point of fixation are determined by the measurement 
of the centre of the pupil with respect to the centre of the corneal 
reflection. The two features of the eye move together with head motion 
but move differentially with eye rotation, hence the difference in their 
positions is indicative of the eye's point of fixation. In this way the 
eye position is independent of head position as long as the pupil image 
is contained within the field ov view of the camera. This allows the 
system to tolerate a degree of head motion, talking, etc. 
(ii) Components of the system 
The heart of the system was an all-purpose computer which was linked 
to three television cameras. In front of the child, and below the display 
he was to watch, were placed two cameras (see figure 6.3) and an infra-red 
projector. One of the cameras was used to record the infra-red beam after 
it had been bounced off the subject's eye, and thus provided the computer 
with the above mentioned information regarding pupil and corneal 
reflection positions. The second camera had a wide-angle lens on it for 
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Figure 6.4. Early version of this study's set-up. 
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Figure 6.5 Calibration grid shown approximately half 
full size. The cirles were drawn on a red trans- 
parent sheet of plastic and a light shone from 
behind for the child track visually. 
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monitoring the general position of the child's head. This was necessary 
in order to line up the infra-red beam on the child's eye and to keep it 
there. A simulated output from these two cameras is shown in the upper 
right and lower left monitors of the control panel in figure 6.3. The 
position and focus of the two cameras in front of the child could be 
altered from the control panel. The apparatus in front of the child also 
contained an automatic head-movement monitoring system. This kept the 
child's pupil in the camera's view by using a second infra-red beam system 
to give feedback to a mirror, the position of which was altered in 
accordance with the head position. A third camera was placed behind the 
child in order to obtain a record of what he was seeing. The output of 
this camera was also displayed on the main control panel (see figure 6.3). 
The child sat in a highbacked chair of the kind which dentists use. 
This allowed one to adjust the position of each child such that his face 
could be set at one metre away from the stimulus. Such a chair also 
minimized forward and backward movements for which the recorder cannot 
compensate. In front of the child was a table around which was draped 
a black cloth which hid the rear of the table from the child's view. 
on top of the table a screen was placed which was painted matt black, 
and measured approximately one metre by one metre (see figure 6.4, for 
a photograph of this in an early pilot of this study - the black cloth 
is absent and the measuring cameras are placed higher). In the centre 
of the screen was a rectangular window a little bigger than a person's 
head. There were two doors attached to the back of this window so that 
either could be shut across it. One of these was a black wooden door 
which prevented the subject from seeing what was happening behind the 
screen. The other "door" was used for calibration purposes. This was 
made from a wooden frame across which was stretched some transparent red 
plastic. On this plastic were drawn nine black circles of about 4mm 
diameter. These circles mapped out a rectangular grid of about 17 cm by 
25 cm (see figure 6.5). 
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The subject was to see a face appear at the screen's window, 
and thus a spot light which threw a sharp circle of light onto the 
window was set up behind the child's chair. With this light shining 
upon the presenter's face it was impossible for her to see the child, 
thus a dim(15 watt) light was set up above the child so that the presenter 
of the faces could see him, which was important if the situation was to 
be as natural as possible. 
The child's fixation point was displayed by cross-wires which were 
superimposed upon the output of the camera filming what the child was 
seeing. A Phillips video-recorder was used to make a video record of 
the resulting picture. 
(iii)Calibration procedure 
Once the infra-red beam had been set-up in the correct position 
on one of the child's eyes, then calibration could begin. Essentially 
the child was required to look at each of the nine circles in turn that 
were drawn on the red plastic covering the window in the screen (the 
circles were numbered 1 to 3 on the top row, 4 to 6 on the middle row, 
and 7 to 9 on the bottom row). However, it was not possible to use 
speech to ask the-autistic children to do this. Hence it was decided 
to use a4 mm spot of light held up to the back of the red plastic 
at the point where the circles were. This spot of light could be made 
to "dance around" in order to attract the child's attention but once 
attracted the spot was held still for the calibration of that point. 
With the computer in the "DAT" mode one simply had to get a child to 
look at circle number 1 and then press button 1 on the computer facia. 
One then would press button 2 when the child looked at circle number 2 
and so forth. In this fashion the calibration procedure could be 
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completed very quickly, and such a procedure considerably increased 
the likelihood that the child could be calibrated before he tired of 
the situation (as might have been the case with the autistic children). 
The computer instantly calculated the position of the eye with respect 
to each of the 9 points in space, and thus a second run through the 
circles found that the cross-wires would cross exactly over the circle 
being fixated. Because all that the child would see was to be within 
the area defined by the 9 point grid one could be certain of the 
child's fixations on the stimuli to within 1 degree of visual angle 
(according to the maker's claims this corresponds to an area of about 
1 cm diameter at the screen). Considerable movement could be tolerated 
by the child before recalibration would be needed, and this was not 
found to be necessary for any of the children tested. 
Method and Procedure 
Each child was tested individually. The eye-movement recorder 
demanded a fairly low level of lighting. But in order to allow him to 
acclimate himself to the room the child was introduced to it with 
the lights fully on. Only when the child had had ample opportunity 
to see the room and become accustomed to it were the lights lowered. 
The child satin a high-backed chair which supported his head at a 
position of about one metre from the screen. The calibration procedure 
was carried out first in the manner described above. The child then 
saw a person's face appear at the screen's window. This face was that 
of a female undergraduate. She displayed the following in random 
order: a happy face which looked at the child's eyes, a sad face 
which looked away from the child, a talking face which spoke to the 
child in a social manner (saying "Hello N", and such like, in a 
conversational way), an expressionless face which looked at the child 
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and tried to gain eye contact, an expressionless face which looked 
away from the child to a point behind and to one side of him and finally 
an expressionless face turned in the direction of the child but with 
eyes closed. 
The child saw each of these conditions twice and for about fifteen 
seconds each time. During the presentation of a condition the spotlight 
was switched on, and between them it was switched off so that the child 
could only see the unilluminated homogeneously black screen. The period 
between presentations lasted about five seconds. In practice it was found 
that this speed and duration of presentation of the conditions provided 
a rapid pace and ample eye movement data while minimising distraction on 
the part of the child. However, the presentation was not thought to be 
so fast as to 'overload' the child with too much information in too 
little time. The only restriction placed on the order of presentation 
was that two of the same condition should not follow consecutively. 
When the different displays of faces had been seen, the child was 
shown two more stimuli; these were both schematic representations of 
houses and were both shown for about fifteen seconds with a gap of about 
five seconds intervening (see figure 6.6). 
When all these conditions had been shown to the child, the calibration 
screen was put back in place and the child's attention was drawn to a 
few of the circles by the use of the spot of light. It was thus possible 
to ascertain whether the child's eye movements had remained calibrated 
throughout the session. 
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The child's eye movements were recorded onto video and were super- 
imposed on the picture of what he was seeing at the time. A digital 
timing record was superimposed on the recording of what the child was 
seeing and allowed one to study the timing of the children's eye movements 
to within one hundreth of a second. Examples of these recordings are 
shown in figure 6.7. It should be noted that if the child did not look 
at the face (or house) when the spotlight was on, then he could only look 
at the surrounding black board of the screen - no other objects were 
visible. 
Results and discussion 
All three children's eye movements were found to have remained calibrated 
during the testing periods. 
The data was analysed in three main ways: first, in terms of the time 
spent looking at each stimulus; second, in terms of the children's average 
fixation times when looking at the stimuli, and third, in terms of the 
number of fixations on each stimulus. All three measures were also 
analysed separately for the upper and lower halves of the stimuli. 
Graphs displaying the first and third measures are shown in figures 6.8 
and 6.9. Table 6.2-shows the results of the calculation of the average 
fixations times. For the purpose of this analysis a 'fixation' was 
taken to be an arrest of gaze motion on an area for a period exceeding 
one tenth of a second. As can be seen from table 6.2 the fixations were 
typically somewhat longer than this, though. 
Because there were only three subjects in this experiment and they 
only saw each condition twice, the results could not be subjected to 
statistical analysis. However, the data will be inspected and the results 
discussed with reference to the predictions made in the introduction. 
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Figure 6.10 The ESN girlt results. 
(Note that here and on the ensuing figures the percentage time 
looking at a face and the average fixation time are given. The 
number and size of the dots and positions relate to fixation time 
and area of fixation) 
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Figure 6.11 Autistic girl's results. 
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Figure 6.12 The autistic boy's results. 
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1. Overall fixation times 
One prediction mentioned in the introduction related to the findings 
of Hermelin and O'Connor (1967). They found that the autistic children they 
tested tended to have very brief fixation times, and it was posited that 
this might lead to an appearance of gaze avoidance. Looking at the overall 
average fixation times, regardless of condition, in the present study, 
reveals that the two autistic children did indeed show a tendency to have 
a very brief fixation times compared to those of the ESN child (t = 4.00, 
p <0.01; t=2.67, p <0.05; df = 5). However, the difference between the 
two autistic children's average fixation times also approached significance 
(t = 2.55, which just fails at p=0.05; df = 5). An inspection of the 
data (see table 6.2) shows that the fixation times varied considerably 
across the conditions. Whereas the autistic children generally had shorter 
fixations, there were conditions where their fixations were not shorter 
than those of the ESN child. This point will be returned to in the 
individual evaluations of the various conditions. 
2. Passive staring face and the one with closed eyes 
Figures 6.10,6.11 and 6.12 show the results for these two conditions. 
A comparison between the results when the children saw the face with its 
eyes closed or open is of direct pertinence to Hermelin and O'Connor's study. 
When the face was one which was trying to establish eye contact, the autistic 
children's gaze was characterised by relatively little looking at the face 
(only 30% of the time), and short fixations when they did look at it. 
There was a slight tendency for them both to look more frequently and 
longer at the lower half of the face. For the autistic girl this effect 
was minimal, athough she did spend a further 25% of the time looking at 
the area of board around the lower half of the face. For the autistic boy 
the effect was stronger, but still only slight. 
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The ESN girl, on the other hand, looked at the face most of the time. 
Her observation of it was characterised by long fixations on or near the 
eye area, and an equal number of shorter fixations near the mouth. Because 
all three children had about as many fixations on the face and about 
as many in each half of the face, one may note that it was primarily 
the fact that the autistic children displayed relatively brief fixations 
times which differentiated their performance from that of the ESN girl. 
Whilst the autistic children's fixations were only a little more than 
half as long as the ESN child's in the lower half of the face, they were 
between four and five times shorter in the upper half. Thus, whereas the 
ESN child showed a very strong tendency to prefer the upper half of the 
face, the autistic children showed a slight tendency to prefer the lower 
half. The difference between the types of child was thus mostly in terms 
of the length of their fixations upon the upper half of the face. 
When the face's eyes were closed the autistic girl spent virtually 
no more time looking at it, nor made significantly more fixations on it. 
However, the pattern of her gaze when looking at this face was quite 
different. This time she spent considerably more time inspecting the 
upper half than the lower one. Because she had about as many fixations 
on each half of the face as she had before (thus her fixations were 
evenly spread), the difference was primarily in the length of her 
fixations on the lower half. Those on the upper half were about twice 
as long as before, whereas those on the lower half were extremely brief. 
The autistic boy's gaze behaviour was in even starker contrast to 
that which he exhibited to the previous facial display. Like the autistic 
girl, he now showed a tendency to inspect the upper half of the face; 
but all of his fixations were longer than before and especially those 
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TABLE 6.3 Details of the average number of fixations on, and 
average time spent looking at, the passive face and 
the one with its eyes closed for the two girls. 
(Note that the number of fixations on-from-off the 
face are given, and thus differ from those shown in 
figure 6.12 especially). 
Passive Eyes 
Staring face Closed 
Autistic girl 
(i) % time spent on the face 31.53 26.63 
(ii) no. fixations on the face 7.5 7.0 
ESN girl 
(i) % time spent on the face 77.84 98.46 
(ii) no. fixations on the face 2.5 1.5 
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on the upper half. He spent approximately half of the available time 
looking at the upper half of the face. However, his fixations on the 
upper half were still not as long as those displayed by the ESN girl. 
She again spent a lot of the available time looking at the upper half 
of the face and made as many, but much shorter, fixations on the lower 
half. Her fixations were both more frequent and shorter than they were 
when she looked at the face with its eyes open. Thus the effect that the 
closing of the eyes had on her gaze was to increase the number of her 
fixations on the face and to reduce their duration; consequently" 
she spent only a little longer looking at the face than she had done before. 
How do these results compare with those of Hermelin and O'Connor? 
First, it should be noted that the two autistic children responded similarly 
but the change in gaze activity between the two faces was more 
dramatic in the boy. It is uncertain to what extent this change might 
be attributed to the difference in their sex, verbal ability, or social 
responsiveness. However, considering just the two girls and reducing the 
data to the two measures used by Hermelin and O'Connor reveals an 
interesting finding. Table 6.3 shows the result of doing this. As can 
be seen, both children were fairly constant in the number of fixations 
they had to the faces and how long they spent looking at each one. This 
is in agreement with the findings of Hermelin and O'Connor. However, as 
was discussed above, the analysis of the pattern of fixations when the 
children were looking at the face differentiated the two types of child. 
Whereas the ESN girl tended to look at the upper half in both case, the 
autistic girl tended only to do so when the eyes were closed. 
Consequently, although it would be dangerous to draw conclusions 
based upon so little data, it seems possible that evidence has been obtained 
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Figure 6.13 The ESN girl's results. 
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Figure 6.14 The autistic girl's results. 
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Figure 6.15 The autistic boy's results 
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which both supports the findings of Hermelin and O'Connor and leads to 
an alternative interpretation of their findings. Clearly, the autistic 
children responded differently to the face when its eyes were open than 
when its eyes were closed, and the change in their gaze activity indicated 
that they were not tending to make gaze contact. In contrast, the ESN 
girl showed clear evidence for mutual gaze contact and a tendency to 
fixate the upper facial areas even when the eyes were closed. 
One may note that the fact that the autistic girl did not look at 
one of these faces more than the other implies that no simple theory of 
gaze 'avoidance' due to over-arousal can adequately account for the 
findings. 
3. The passive staring face and the smiling face 
Having found above that the autistic children tended not to look at 
the upper half of faces with open eyes, one would also expect them to 
show similar gaze behaviour when looking at a smiling face which was 
also looking at them. In fact, it might be argued that a smiling face 
is even more arousing than a passively staring one (this was reasoned 
above, and the problems of reducing arousal to a simple factor were 
noted). Moreover, if Hutt et al. were correct in their hypothesis that 
autistic children avoid looking at faces because it arouses them too 
much, then greater avoidance should occur when they view a smiling face. 
Figures 6.13,6.14 and 6.15 show the results of the eye movement 
recordings for the smiling face. 
The gaze behaviour of the autistic girl reinforced the above 
conclusion that she tended not to make gaze contact. She spent even 
less time looking at the face. However, the reduction in the amount of 
time she spent looking at the face was almost entirely restricted to 
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the upper area. She looked as long at the lower area as before, but her 
fixations were fewer and longer. Her fixations on the upper half, in 
contrast, were as long as before, but very few. Leaving the results of 
the autistic boy for the moment, one may note that the ESN girl's gaze 
when looking at a smiling face was fairly similar to that when she looked 
at the face with its eyes closed. That is, she looked as long at the 
face as when the eyes were open and the face expressionless, but her 
fixations were shorter and more frequent. It is possible that the ESN 
girl was more excited by the smiling face and hence her gaze was more 
erratic. But it is also possible that frequent eye movements are more 
appropriate when looking at a face expressing feeling (this will be returned 
to later). 
The results of the autistic boy confuse the picture so far constructed. 
Although he had about as many fixations on the smiling and passive faces, 
he spent considerably longer looking at the smiling face, hence, his 
fixations were longer. Such a finding was quite contrary to the predictions, 
as was also the fact that when he looked at the smiling face he tended to 
almost exclusively fixate the upper area. These results do not conform to 
an interpretation that he was tending to avoid gaze contact, and thus doubt 
must be shed upon the interpretation of his results in the above comparison 
between the face with its eyes open and the one with them closed. 
The picture is thus unclear as to which predictions (if any) the 
experiment so far supports with certainty. Once again, the results of the 
autistic girl conformed to the prediction that autistic children tend not 
to make gaze contact. Her results might also be taken as evidence that 
the lack of gaze contact is due to 'over arousal' because she looked at 
the eyes even less when viewing a smiling face. However, it has been noted 
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above that a simple theory of arousal cannot explain the autistic 
child's gaze behaviour. This was illustrated by the results of the 
autistic boy, who actually increased his fixations on or near the eyes 
when the face was smiling. It was of particular interest that the present 
results are not at variance with those of Hermelin and O'Connor (1967) 
when one reduces the measures taken to those which they used. Finally, 
it is noted that the difference between the two autistic children's 
results cannot be explained in terms of accuracy of diagnosis, for both 
of them were equally 'classic' in their symptoms and history. 
4. The talking face 
The results of the eye movement recordings when the children looked 
at a face which was talking to them are shown in figures 6.13,6.14 and 
6.15. It was expected that the talking face would be more arousing in 
ethological terms than the other faces, and thus would give rise to 
greater gaze avoidance if the theory of Hutt et al could be upheld. It 
was also suggested that autistic children might tend to look at the lower 
half of a talking face in an attempt to compensate for an inability to 
process auditory information. 
The autistic girl's gaze behaviour when looking at this face was 
similar to that when she was looking at the smiling and staring faces. 
The major difference was that she tended to have fewer fixations off the 
face and on the board just below the chin. It is thus difficult to 
attribute her tendency to fixate the lower area to the fact that the face 
was talking. There was an increase in the number of her fixations which 
were off the video screen, which may be due to the more arousing or 
demanding nature of the stimulus. 
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The autistic boy, in sharp contrast, responded to the talking face 
by tending to look at the upper facial features more frequently and longer 
than he had when presented with the passive staring face. In fact, his gaze 
behaviour when viewing the talking face was most like that when he viewed 
the smiling face. This finding is not in line with prediction. As with 
the passive staring face, though, more than half of his fixations were non- 
directed and off the video screen. The literature does not contain any data 
on children's eye movements when looking at people when they talk, however, 
there is some data on infant perception of talking mothers. Haith et al 
(1977) found, contrary to their predictions, that infants of two to three 
months looked at their mother's eyes even more intensely when she started 
to speak than they had when she was passively staring at them. Haith et al 
were unable to come to any conclusions as to why this might have been so. 
However, they offered the possible interpretation that the eyes have 
acquired signal value in social interaction, and possibly the infant in 
increasing his mutual gaze encourages his mother to continue talking by 
showing that he is attending to her. The factor of intention implied 
here is questionable, yet nonetheless it is possible that a similar process 
leads to the heightened mutual gaze noted in these infants. Can such an 
interpretation be applied to the present data of the autistic boy? If it 
can, then one might expect that the ESN girl would also show such heightened 
fixation on the eyes of a talking face. 
The results of the ESN girl, however, were quite different. She tended 
to look nearly all of the time at the mouth area of the talking face, with 
few but extended fixations. Thus her results support the view proposed 
in section 3.1, that movements of the mouth attract one to look at it in 
order to obtain information about the visual component of speech; thus 
the performance of the ESN child offers no support for the explanation 
given above for the results of the autistic boy. 
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Figure 6.16 The ESN girl's results. 
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Figure 6.17 The autistic girl's results. 
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Figure 6.18 The autistic boy's results. 
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Apart from the possibility that the autistic boy was very immature 
in his gaze behaviour, it may be the case that when he looked at faces 
he tended to fixate those areas that were least arousing. Consequently 
when looking at a passive staring face he fixated the lower half most 
often, and when looking at faces which involve mouth movements - smiling 
and talking - he tended to fixate the upper areas. Whilst feasible for 
these conditions, it is not clear how such an explanation can account for 
his tendency to look at the upper areas of the face with closed eyes or 
his pattern of gaze at the two averted faces (see below). 
S. The passive and sad averted faces 
The results obtained when the children saw the averted faces are 
shown in figures 6.16,6.17 and 6.18. It was hypothesised that the 
children's gaze should not differ when looking at these faces unless they 
have some appreciation of the meaning of the sad face. The fact that all 
of the children showed different gaze behaviour when looking at the sad 
than when looking at the passive averted face is thus of significance. 
The ESN girl only spent about 58% of the time looking at each of 
these faces, which was less than she had spent looking at each of the 
previous faces. The major difference in the way in which she looked at 
these two faces was that her fixations in the upper half were more frequent 
and briefer when the face was passive and averted than when it was sad. 
The time spent on each half and the length of the fixations in the lower 
half did not differ between the two conditions. However, in contrast to 
her fixations on previous faces, the brevity of her fixations on the lower 
half stood out against all but those on the lower half of the smiling 
face. It is also worthy of note that in response to the sad averted face 
she spent some 40% of the time gazing out of the screen area, quite far 
from the face, while she spent less than 15%, and typically 10%, of the 
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time doing this with the other faces. This constitutes the longest 
period of non-directed gaze recorded for the ESN child. A possible 
explanation is that she was troubled by the unhappy face, while the 
other faces were either unthreatening or actively friendly and sociable. 
All of these differences in the way in which she looked at the passive 
and sad averted faces may be taken as evidence that she appreciated that 
the sad face conveyed something about the inner state of the person. 
The autistic boy also spent about half of the total time looking 
at the upper half of the passive averted face. He displayed fairly long 
fixations compared to those he generally exhibited. However, his fixations 
in the mouth area were neither as infrequent nor as brief as those 
displayed by the ESN girl. This pattern of gaze most resembled that of 
his looking at the face with its eyes closed: these findings are once 
again difficult to marry with the idea that he was avoiding the most 
arousing facial areas. 
Contrary to his gaze-pattern when looking at the passive averted 
face, when looking at the sad face he made as many fixations on the upper 
half as on the lower half. Those on the upper half were generally longer; 
thus he spent a little more time looking at this half. However, the 
difference between the time spent on each half was by no means as large 
as that for the other averted face. Like the ESN girl, the number of 
fixations which went off the screen area when he was presented with the 
sad face was greater than when he was looking at any other face. 
When she was shown the passive averted face, the gaze behaviour 
of the autistic girl was quite different from that of the other two 
children. She spent very little time looking at the face at all (a total 
z, 1 
of about 12% of the time). When she did look at the face she tended to 
fixate on the lower area. The outstanding feature of her gaze pattern 
was that she spent a lot of time looking at the area below and to the 
right of the face (about 43% of the time), and her fixations in this 
area were the longest that she displayed during the experiment. Although 
the face was averted in this direction, it will be noted that she displayed 
a tendency to look at this area whenever a face with eyes open was 
presented to her (cf. her results for the smiling face, for example). 
When she looked at the sad averted face she spent very little more 
time looking at the upper half of the face than the lower and although she 
spent more time looking at this face than the last, she nonetheless only 
looked at it for about 20% of the time. She spent about 60% of the time 
engaged in non-directed gaze which was outside the camera's view. Still, 
note that she also responded in this way to the talking face and the one 
with its closed eyes. For this reason it would not seem possible to 
connect the amount of time she spent in such non-directed gaze with the 
different arousing properties of the faces. In consequence, one cannot 
necessarily conclude that she possessed any appreciation of the meaning 
of the sad face from this face alone. However, her gaze was certainly 
different when looking at this face than at the passive averted one, and 
this might indicate that she possessed the rudiments of understanding 
emotional expression in faces. 
6. The schematic houses 
Two hypotheses were formulated with relevance to the perception of 
the houses: first, if a child views faces as qualitatively different fron 
other stimuli, then this should show in the change in his gaze patterns 
when looking at the houses; second, as was suggested in section 3.1, 
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Figure 6.19 The results of the three children when viewing 
houses. 
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autistic children might tend to look at the lower half of all things, 
and thus they should tend to look at the lower half of the houses. 
The results of the recordings when the children viewed the houses 
are shown in figure 6.19. As can be seen in the figure, there are 
differences between the responses which the three children gave, but 
still there exists a trend toward similarity. The ESN girl spent virtually 
all the time looking at the houses, and her gaze was characterized by 
long fixations on the upper half and more frequent - but briefer 
fixations (amounting to the same total time) on the lower half. She thus 
distributed her gaze in a more even fashion across these stimuli than she 
had across the faces, i. e. in terms of time she had no tendency to look 
at one half more than the other. It is not possible to say whether the 
fact that her fixations were typically twice as long in the upper half 
is due to her habitual manner of scanning all stimuli, or whether it is 
an acquired scanning strategy which has its roots in the processing of 
meaningful stimuli like faces. 
The autistic girl spent considerably longer looking at the upper half 
of the houses, and did so with fixations which were about three times longer 
than those of the lower half. Although she only engaged in non-directed 
gaze which went off the screen about 32% of the time, this does not 
represent a departure from her gaze patterns when viewing the faces. She 
also spent about the same amount of time in such non-directed gaze in 
response to the passive averted face and the passive staring face. However, 
in terms of the percentage of time she spent looking at the stimuli there 
were differences between her gaze when looking at the houses and at the 
faces. By spending some 42% of the time looking at the upper half of the 
houses she viewed this half of these stimuli at least twice as long, and 
ý4S 
typically three to four times as long as of any of the faces, hence 
it would seem that her tendency not to look at the upper halves was 
restricted to faces. It certainly does not seem true that she had a 
tendency to look at the lower half of all things, certainly not houses. 
The autistic boy also looked for longer and with longer fixations 
at the upper half of the houses than at the lower half. But the differences 
in the amount of time he spent looking at each half and the average 
fixation times in each half did not contrast so sharply as with the 
autistic girl. Neither the time spent looking at either half of the 
houses nor the time spent in non-directed gaze conclusively differentiates 
the manner in which the autistic boy viewed the faces and the houses. 
However, bearing in mind the varied responses he made to the various 
faces, it would be wrong to interpret this lack of difference in his 
gaze behaviour between faces and other stimuli in terms of 'asociability'. 
It is noted that both autistic children once again displayed relatively 
short visual fixations as compared with the ESN girl. 
In conclusion, then, it appears that the two girls both viewed faces 
in a different manner than they viewed schematic houses. The autistic 
boy showed less variation in his gaze activity depending on whether he 
viewed a face or a drawing of a house. But, the lack of a general 
difference may only reflect the wide range of gaze behaviour that he showed 
in response to the faces. All the children certainly shared the common 
feature of having longer fixations when looking at the upper half of the 
houses, which is contrary to the hypothesis that the autistic children 
tend to look at the lower halves. 
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7. Gaze shifts and non-directed gaze 
Hermelin and O'Connor (1967) found that autistic children tend 
to engage in fewer figure-to-figure gaze shifts and more figure-to- 
ground ones than do ESN or normal children. They also found that the 
autistic children differed from the others in that they tended to engage 
in a lot of non-directed gaze. 
The latter point has certainly been borne out by the present study. 
Both of the autistic children tended to spend less than half of the time 
looking at the stimuli, be they faces or houses, whereas the ESN girl 
typically spent some 70% to 80% of the time looking at the stimuli, at 
least. 
It was also possible to calculate the number of times each child 
shifted his or her gaze from stimulus to the background, or vice versa, 
and the number of times their gaze shift tended to be from one half of 
the stimulus to the other. The results of such analysis are shown in 
table 6.4. As can be seen in this table, the autistic children engaged 
in many more eye movements which went from stimulus-to-ground or ground- 
to-stimulus than did the ESN child. The ESN girl also showed between 
two and three times as many shifts of gaze from one half of the stimulus 
to the other. 
Hermelin and O'Connor have pointed out that a tendency not to 
'compare' stimuli and to only fixate on them for only brief periods means 
that the autistic child's visual learning, visual identification, and 
visual discrimination problems are even more acute than those of the 
subnormal child. If one considers that the perception of a face involves 
34R 
scanning it to ascertain its identity, expression, and so forth, then 
there is a need to 'compare' the various parts of the face in order to 
come to a 'meaningful' appreciation of it. The lack of such feature-to- 
feature gaze shifts in the autistic children could mean that they are 
more handicapped in the perception of the social aspects of faces - and 
this problem would only be exacerbated by their abnormally brief fixation 
times. 
Looking at the gaze shift measures for the individual conditions 
reveals that the autistic boy engaged in feature-to-feature gaze shifts 
most often when the face he was watching was either looking away or had 
*4. SQ wert 
its eyes closed. This might be taken to indicate that, the least threatening 
faces which allowed him to scan them in a more normal fashion, although his 
stimulus-to-ground scores for these two conditions were as high as ever. 
It is also of interest that both autistic children tended to do more 
feature-to-feature gaze shifts when looking at the houses than when 
looking at most of the faces; however, here again they tended to shift 
their gaze from figure-to-ground frequently too. 
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6.3 Summary and general conclusions 
Two autistic children and one ESN child were required to view various 
facial displays and some drawings of houses. Whilst they viewed these 
stimuli their eye movements were recorded onto video and superimposed 
upon a record of what they were seeing. By also recording a timing device 
on top of the video recording, it was possible to make detailed analyses 
of the children's gaze behaviour. The children saw a face which stared at 
them, one with its eyes closed, one which was talking to them, an 
expressionless face with averted gaze, a sad face with an averted gaze, 
a smiling face looking at them and two drawings of houses for comparison 
purposes. The results for each of these conditions may be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Fixation times 
The autistic children both had much shorter average fixation times 
than the ESN girl. 
2. Staring face and the one with closed eyes 
A comparison of the children's gaze behaviour when looking at these 
two faces indicated that the autistic children tended not to look at the 
upper half when the eyes were open, but they looked more at this half when 
the eyes were closed. In contrast, the ESN child looked mainly at the 
upper half of the face in both cases. 
3. The smiling face 
The autistic girl once again tended to look at the lower half of a 
face which was looking at her. The ESN girl continued to prefer to look 
at the upper half of the face. On the other hand, the autistic boy's 
gaze went against prediction, and he looked more at the upper half than 
the lower half. 
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4. The talking face 
When looking at a face which was talking to her, the autistic girls' 
fixations resembled those she evinced when the person smiled at her or 
just stared. That is, she tended to look more at the lower half of the 
face. In contrast, the autistic boy responded to the talking face looking 
more at the upper half. Thus he looked at it in the same way he did the 
smiling face but differently from the staring face. The ESN girl tended 
to look at the mouth of the talking face. 
5. The passive and sad averted faces 
All three children responded differently to these two faces, but they 
all showed that they regarded an emotional face as distinct from an 
expressionless one. The ESN girl looked less at these faces than any of 
the former ones. Her fixations on each were similar and mainly on the 
upper half, but those to the passive averted face were shorter and more 
frequently. The autistic boy's gaze behaviour was similar to the ESN girl's 
insofar as he also spent more time looking at the upper half of the faces. 
He also had more frequent fixations on the passive averted face. However, 
he spent more time overall looking at the passive face because he spent 
longer looking at the upper half of that face. 
The autistic girl's gaze behaviour differed from the other two 
children. She spent very little time looking at the faces. When she 
looked at the passive averted face she tended to fixate the lower area, 
but when she looked at the sad face she fixated on both areas almost 
equally. 
6. The schematic houses 
The ESN girl spent as long looking at the upper and lower halves, but 
her fixations on the upper half were much longer (and thus less frequent). 
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The autistic girl spent considerably longer looking at the upper half 
of the houses, and did so with fixations that were much longer than those 
to the lower half. The autistic boy also looked more at the upper half 
of the houses than the lower half, but the difference in time spent on the 
two halves and the difference in length of fixation on the halves was 
much less marked. 
7. Gaze shifts and non-directed gaze 
The autistic children spent much more time in non-directed gaze - that 
is gaze directed away from the stimuli. The ESN girl, in contrast, spent 
most of the available time looking at the faces and houses. The autistic 
children tended to shift their gaze from stimulus to background and back 
again, rather than from one part of the stimulus to another. The reverse 
was true for the ESN girl. 
8. The results of Hermelin and O'Connor 
Both Hermelin and O'Connor findings of shorter fixation times by 
autistics and of the autistics having more non-directed gaze with fewer 
comparative gaze shifts were supported by the present study. Their results 
regarding the children's fixations on faces with open and closed eyes were 
also confirmed, but the interpretations were extended. If the data was 
reduced to the number of fixations on the two faces, then both girls had 
an equal number to each face. But analysis of the halves of the faces on 
which their fixations fell differentiated the two types of children. The 
ENS child looked always more at the upper half of the face, whereas the 
autistic girl looked at the lower half more when the eyes were open and 
more at the upper half when they were closed. 
6.4 General discussion 
Do the results support the theory that autistic children avoid gaze 
contact? Had one only compared the children's gaze when looking at the faces 
with open and closed eyes, then it might have been possible to conclude that 
autistic children do indeed avoid mutual gaze. Both autistic children looked 
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more at the lower half of the face when the eyes were open and more at 
the upper half when the eyes were closed. The ESN child, in contrast, 
always looked more at the upper half. However both types of children 
made about equal numbers of fixations on both of the faces. Moreover, 
the autistic children's relatively brief periods of viewing were held true 
not just for their perception of faces, as they made very brief fixations 
upon the drawings of houses too. More important, the autistic boy spent 
more time looking at the upper half of a face which was smiling at him 
and trying to gain gaze contact. Because this face might be seen as more 
'arousing' or 'threatening' (in ethologists' terms, and hence in terms 
of Hutt et al. 's and Tinbergen and Tinbergen's theoretical framework), one 
would have expected more gaze avoidance to this face than to the passive 
staring one. Furthermore, the most sociable face might have been the one 
which was talking to the child and trying to make gaze contact, too. Still, 
the autistic boy also spent more time looking at the upper half of this 
face than at the lower half. 
The autistic girl showed gaze behaviour which was more in line with 
a theory of gaze avoidance insofar as she spent more time looking at the 
lower facial features whenever the face was looking at her. When the 
face's eyes were closed she had a slight tendency to look more frequently 
and for longer at the upper facial area, but the tendency was not great. 
In addition, when the face was averted (with and without expression displayed 
on it), she looked at it far less than when it was smiling, talking, staring 
passively or had its eyes closed. In terms of Hutt et al. 's theory, one 
would have expected the averted faces along with the one with the eyes 
closed to offer the least threat and be the least 'arousing'. Indeed, 
Hutt and Ounsted (1966) claim that autistic children monitor people's faces 
when the other's face is averted, and avert their gaze as the other turns 
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toward them. The present study found no evidence to support this. 
Thus, even though the gaze behaviour of the autistic girl offered more 
support for the contention that she avoided mutual gaze, her results 
nonetheless contained elements which are difficult to explain within a 
simple 'gaze avoidance' theory framework. 
It was not possible to explain the difference between the two 
autistic children in terms of the girl being 'more autistic' than the 
boy. In fact, although both children were chosen as fairly classic in 
their symptoms and history, the boy was a little more distant and less 
sociable than the girl. While the boy was mute, the girl had a few 
words which she used in an obsessional manner. It may be noted that 
neither of the autistic children were indifferent to the fact that a face 
was looking at them or whether or not it was expressive or expressionless, 
thus it may be that the explanation of the autistics' results lies in a 
consideration of their ability to understand what gaze contact and 
facial 
expression can be used for. This point will be returned to later. 
Did the autistic children have an abnormal tendency to look at the 
lower half of all stimuli? Clearly not. They were in fact found to fixate 
the upper half of-the drawings of houses, and their fixations on the 
halves of the faces were not independent which face they looked at. Thus 
the hypothesis proposed in section 3.1 to explain the autistics' good 
ability to recognise the lower halves of faces is not supported. 
Was there any evidence that the autistic children had an abnormal 
tendency to look at the mouth area of talking faces? Once again, this 
was clearly not so. The ESN child did look at the 
lower area of the 
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talking face. This she did not do in response to any of the other 
faces. Thus some support is gained for the contention made in section 3.1 
that a tendency to lip-read whilst another is talking may lead one to 
fixate the mouth area. However, neither of the autistic children tended 
to look more at the lower half of the face when it was speaking compared 
to when it was not. Whilst the autistic girl did have a slightly greater 
tendency to look at the lower half of the talking face than the upper 
half, she also possessed a similar tendency when looking at the smiling 
and passively staring faces. In contrast, the autistic boy differed 
most from prediction in that he tended to fixate the upper half of the 
talking face. In fact he responded to it in much the same way he had 
to the smiling face. No firm explanation emerged to account for the 
autistic boy's results. It was mentioned that Haith et al (1977) 
found that babies tend to gaze even more intensely at their mother's 
eyes when she starts to talk to them; but it seems unlikely that the 
autistic boy's gaze activity reflects such extreme immaturity. It 
is 
more likely that he views both the smiling and talking faces in a similar 
asocial way, not as stimuli which possess information relevant to 
inerpersonal communication. He may have found the movement in the upper 
facial areas more interesting when the face was smiling or talking than 
when it was staring passively. Hence his differential response to the 
passive, smiling and talking faces might reflect an inability on his 
part to process faces for meaning but to tend to look at the most 
attractive features regardless of their potential value as sources of 
information about interpersonal communication. The lack of difference 
between the way the autistic girl looked at the smiling, passive and 
talking faces might also be explained by a similar argument; thus, she 
too may lack the ability to understand what facial expression is used 
for, but by possessing a rudimentary appreciation of it she may tend to 
avoid facial features which are puzzling to her. 
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But was there any evidence that the autistic children perceived that 
some of the faces displayed emotional expression? The critical tests 
for this were thought to be whether the children viewed the passive and 
smiling faces differently and whether they viewed the passive and sad 
averted faces differently. Both autistic children responded differently 
to the two averted faces. The autistic boy responded differently to the 
smiling face than to the passive staring one, but the girl responded the 
same to both. Obviously there is some evidence for the supposition that 
the autistic children saw the expressive faces as being distinct from the 
expressionless ones, but the evidence was stronger in the case of the boy. 
However, the data is confounded by the fact that in both the above 
comparisons the expressionless face was motionless whereas the expressive 
face contained some movement. It is thus possible that the autistic 
children's differential responses were due to the factor of movement. 
More circumstantial evidence may be gained from the results of the ESN 
child. When she viewed the smiling face she made many more comparative 
eyes movements between the upper and lower halves than when she saw the 
passive staring face. This might have been due to the fact that comparative 
eye movements are more appropriate when one is processing a face for 
meaning. Such comparative gaze shifts may gain a gestalt impression of the 
face. Neither of the autistic children increased the number of their 
fixations in this manner. They certainly did not increase their comparative 
gaze shifts which were uniformly very infrequent. However, the fact that 
the autistic girl spent less time looking at the smiling face than the 
passive one may be due to her having a rudimentary appreciation of facial 
expression but an inability to understand it may lead to her having more 
erratic gaze behaviour. That is she might be 'troubled' by the expressive 
face. The fact that she scanned the sad averted face more than the 
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expressionless averted one may be seen as support for this idea. 
In summary then, it is uncertain whether the autistic boy's responses 
were due to his attraction to the movement in the expressive faces or due 
to his appreciation of their expressive character. The autistic girl, 
on the other hand, may have had a rudimentary appreciation of facial 
expression which affected her gaze behaviour. These conclusions are noted 
to fit with the clinical observation that the girl was a little easier 
to make contact with than the boy. 
The finding that the autistic children had both shorter fixation 
times and fewer comparative (feature-to-feature) gaze shifts may be of 
great theoretical value. It has been suggested several times in this 
thesis that autistic children have an inability to integrate their 
perceptions into meaningful wholes or themes. Their low fixation times 
and lack of comparative gaze shifts supports this contention. Hermelin 
and O'Connor. (1970) have pointed out that a tendency not to compare 
stimuli and to only fixate on them for brief periods, means that the 
autistic child's visual learning, visual identification, and visual 
discrimination problems will be even more acute than the subnormal child's. 
Scanning faces and comparing the various features is essential if one is 
to ascertain what its expression is, thereby coming to a meaningful 
appreciation of it. Determining who a person is does not require such 
comparisons, for one need only detect a known feature. 
There are, consequently, two aspects of integrative ability that 
should be reflected in one's gaze activity. First, to gain a meaningful 
appreciation of the stimuli presented one needs to compare and contrast 
the various features, taking into account their relative positions and 
relations. However, it is also critical that one compare the data in 
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one's present perceptions with that gained from previous ones. To 
do this surely requires that one fixate features for a reasonable length 
of time. In addition, given that one must compare past and present 
relative dispositions of features to determine expression, for example, 
then fairly lengthy comparative scans would be appropriate. There are 
other factors, too, of course: the comparison of past and present 
internal states with the perception of expression in others (as discussed 
in previous sections), calls for fairly sustained comparative gaze 
fixations. 
The results of this study have thus been pertinent to almost all 
the foregoing experiments reported in this thesis. They have broadly 
confirmed the results of the previous studies, and have allowed one to 
expand upon some of the theories previously proposed. In brief, it 
seems that the most parsimonious explanation of the autistic children's 
results throughout this thesis is in terms of their possessing an 
inability or poor ability to integrate their perceptions into meaningful 
wholes and themes. It further seems that this inability prevents the 
autistic child being able to understand the uses to which facial display 
can be put in interpersonal communication. Chapter Seven will deal 
with the theoretical aspects of these contentions in greater detail. 
It will also deal with various issues which relate to the findings 
of this thesis and which are of theoretical interest to the study of 
autism. Finally, Chapter Seven will present suggestions for further 
research on autism. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PRESENT FINDINGS, THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
TO FURTHER RESEARCH 
Science is always wrong. It 
never solves a problem without 
creating ten more". 
- George Bernard Shaw 
7.1: Introduction 
Inevitably, this thesis has thrown up more questions about the nature 
of autism than it has answered. The purpose of this chapter is thus to 
summarise the results of the twelve studies, and to outline the questions 
which should now be asked. As was concluded in Chapter One, autism is most 
likely due to some form of brain damage or dysfunction which gives rise to a 
cognitive deficit having specific characteristics. It is thus pertinent 
to ask whether the results of the present studies point to any particular 
neurological impairments in the autistic child, and to discuss what the 
findings imply with regard to the delineation of the features and boundaries 
of a cognitive deficit. 
Thus, the following section will present an overview of the present 
findings, and secondly outline the questions which these findings raise 
The third section will then consider the theoretical implications of the 
findings in the light of present knowledge about neurophysiology and 
cognitive functioning. Finally, a fourth section will deal with suggestions 
for further research. 
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7.2: A summary of the present findings 
The first study investigated normal, subnormal and autistic 
children's abilities to identify upright faces from isolated features 
and from inverted presentations. The autistic children had a more complete 
knowledge of the faces, and in this sense they were better than the non- 
autistic children at face recognition. In particular, both the younger 
and older autistic children were better than the other children at 
recognising the lower facial areas. The younger autistic children 
found the lowermost features easier than the uppermost ones (which they 
identified less well than their control subjects), whereas the older 
autistics had a homogeneously good ability to identify all the facial 
areas. The older autistics' complete knowledge of faces extended to 
the inverted mode, too, because they were also better at recognising 
upside-down photographs than were any of the other children. It was 
noted that neither the younger nor the older autistic children were 
abnormally poor at recognising the eye area of the faces. Thus, it 
seems unlikely that the autistic children avoided gaze contact, for 
this would have led them to know the eye area less well. 
The results can be viewed in one of two ways: either the autistic 
child has something akin to the normal child's tendency to view the 
upper halves of faces and has an additional reason for looking at, and 
hence knowing well, the lower facial areas; or the autistic child 
lacks the normal child's tendency to focus upon the eye area of faces, 
but instead views faces as a collection of unrelated features rather 
than as a whole. These two possibilities thus led to several predictions. 
In terms of the first of the two alternatives, it was suggested that 
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autistic children might either tend to look at the lower half of all 
stimuli or that they might have an abnormal tendency to use lip-read 
information in face-to-face interactions. 
With regard to the suggestion that the autistics might tend to look 
at the lower half of all things, it was noted that the older autistics 
did know the uppermost areas of faces very well. This observation, 
coupled with the finding that the autistic children did not sort schematic 
houses according to their lower features, led to the conclusion that 
it is extremely unlikely that the autistics' abnormal knowledge of 
faces is due to them focussing on the lower half of all stimuli. 
A study of hard-of-hearing subject's abilities to identify faces 
from the upper and lower halves found that they too knew the lower 
facial features better than normal hearing subjects. Thus evidence 
was gained to support the idea that lip-reading might lead to an 
enhanced knowledge of the mouth area. However, the hard-of-hearing 
subjects' ability to identify lower features was not as outstanding 
as that of the autistic subjects, and hence it was concluded that a 
tendency to lip-read probably could not totally account for the 
autistic children's face recognition performance. 
A test of the autistic children's ability to lip-read supported 
the above conclusion, and found them to be as (but not more) able as 
ESN children who were matched for age and general intelligence. The 
lip-reading test also allowed one to gauge each child's reliance upon 
either the visual or auditory modalities whilst lip-reading. While the 
ESN children tended to have a fairly equal reliance upon both modalities 
when the modalities were presenting conflicting information, the autistic 
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children tended to report what they heard more than what they saw. 
In addition, the autistic children needed more noise in order to lower 
their ability to report the heard-only words to a level which was equal 
to that of their seen-only ability (and also equal to that of the ESNs). 
The meaning of these findings was not clear, but the most parsimonious 
explanation was that the autistic children were poor at integrating 
the seen and heard aspects of spoken communication. 
The older autistics superior ability to identify inverted faces 
was further investigated in comparison to the ability of matched ESN 
subjects. It was noted that two explanations were possible as to why 
the older autistics were so good at this task. First, the autistic 
children had already been shown to know the lower facial features 
better than the ESN children. It was thus possible that because the 
mouth may be an easier feature to 'rotate mentally', the autistics' 
greater knowledge of this area might suffice to enable them to be 
superior at identifying inverted faces. Second, the literature on 
face perception strongly suggests that normal subjects view faces as 
perceptual gestalten, and it is because this holistic impression of the 
face is difficult to rotate mentally, that normal subjects find inverted 
faces exceptionally difficult to identify. Thus the normal subject 
perceives faces not only in terms of their individual features, but 
also in terms of the inter-relationships between them - he is integrating 
his perceptions into a unified gestalt. When the normal subject is 
asked to view an inverted face he is confronted with the task of not 
only trying to imagine what the features look like upside-down, but also 
what their disposition would appear like. The normal subject is thus 
not especially adept at identifying individual features. In contrast, 
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there was evidence from the first experiment that autistics have a much 
more evenly distributed knowledge of facial features. If this is true, 
then a tendency for the autistic child to view faces as a collection of 
parts rather than integrating them into gestalten might paradoxically 
lead him to be better able to recognise inverted faces. 
To test these two ideas the children were required to identify 
inverted upper and lower halves of faces. If it is the autistics' 
knowledge of the mouth which enables him to be better at recognising 
inverted faces then one should find that he is considerably better at 
recognising inverted lower halves than inverted upper halves. If, on 
the other hand, it is because the autistic child has a more piecemeal 
knowledge of faces which enables him to identify inverted faces, then 
there should be little difference between the effect which inversion has 
on his ability to identify upper halves and the effect it has on his 
recognition ability to lower halves. Further, if the above proposal 
about the relationship between the tendency to view faces as gestalten 
and finding them difficult to identify when inverted is true, then one 
may hypothesise that this would be reflected in the results of this 
study. That is, it seems reasonable to suggest that for the normal 
subject the mouth area might be easier to identify when upside-down 
because there are fewer elements involved for one to rotate in one's 
mind than when viewing the eye area. The eye area, then, presents a 
more complex collection of parts which the normal subject 
integrates 
into a whole. In consequence, the non-autistic child can expect his 
recognition ability of upper halves to be more radically affected by 
inversion of the face than his ability to identify lower halves. In 
contrast, the second hypothesis above indicated that once again the 
autistics' ability to recognise each facial half should 
be equally 
affected by inverting the faces. 
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The.: results revealed that inverting the faces had much more affect 
upon the ESN children's ability to recognise upper halves than lower 
ones. In contrast the autistic children were equally handicapped in 
their ability to identify both halves. Moreover, their ability to 
identify inverted halves was not greatly different from their ability 
to identify inverted whole faces. The results of the ESN children thus 
supported the proposition that they tend to view faces as gestalten, 
and that the eyes form a more complex perceptual gestalt which is 
difficult to rotate mentally. The results of the autistic children, 
by contrast, support the contention that they view faces in a more 
piecemeal manner and not as meaningful wholes. The superior ability 
of the autistics was thus not simply due to their better knowledge 
of the mouth area. 
If the autistic children's superior ability to identify inverted 
faces is due to their being poor at integrating the various features 
of a stimulus into a gestalt, then this effect should be observable from 
their ability to identify other stimuli upside-down which are also 
usually integrated into meaningful wholes by normal subjects. An example 
of such stimuli are words. When a child has learnt to read he no longer 
views words as a collection of individual graphemes, instead he 
perceives a perceptual gestalt which he 'reads' as a single sound entity. 
Inverted text can be difficult to read because one has a natural tendency 
to view words as wholes and it can pose great problems when one tries 
to rotate mentally a line of letters and their relationship to each 
other. Inverted script can be exceptionally difficult to read for 
this reason. If, on the other hand, one was to have a propensity to 
read words in a more piecemeal manner then inversion of them should have 
far less affect upon one's ability to read them. It was thus decided to 
test the autistic and ESN children's abilities to read inverted text. 
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On testing the children's reading ability in the normal fashion (with 
upright words) it was found that the two groups of children had almost 
identical average reading ages. However, the autistic children were 
much more able to read the inverted words. Moreover, whereas the ESN 
children made mistakes which reflected that they were trying to rotate 
mentally a perceptual gestalt (such as mistaking a 'n' for a 'u', or 
a 'd' for a 'b'), the autistic children showed very few such errors. 
It seems, then, that autistic children view faces and words in a 
similar way - as collections of unrelated features rather than as 
unified meaningful wholes. 
As a consequence of the above findings, it was decided that the 
autistic child's ability to identify facial expression should also be 
investigated. There is strong indication in the literature that the 
normal subject's tendency to view faces as conveying meaningful 
expression is bound up with his proclivity to view faces as gestalten. 
That is, in order to discern the expression of a face one must be able 
to integrate the disposition of the various facial features into a 
meaningful whole - indeed this is what one is referring to by the phrase 
'meaningful whole'. If the autistic child has difficulty in integrating 
his perceptions into meaningful wholes then one can predict that he 
will be poor at identifying facial expressions. However, it is possible 
that the autistic's ability to discern facial expression may not be so 
poor when the expression may be gauged fairly accurately by the shape 
or disposition of a single feature such as a smiling mouth. 
In a test of their ability to sort photographs of happy and sad 
faces into two piles, younger autistic children were found to be worse 
than either older ones or a comparison group of ESN children. However, 
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the older autistic children were as good as the ESN children at sorting 
whole faces. Both the older autistic and the ESN children found it 
harder to sort the faces by the upper halves than the lower halves, but 
the older autistic children had notably more trouble sorting the upper 
halves than did the ESN children. Similarly, the younger autistic 
children found it easier to sort the lower facial areas, and in fact 
performed at a chance level when sorting the upper halves. 
The ability of the children to sort inverted happy and sad faces 
and halves of faces was also studied. Both the older autistic and the 
ESN children could sort the lower halves equally well when they were 
seen upside-down. But when they had to sort inverted upper halves the 
performance of both groups dropped to chance. The younger autistic 
children's sorting ability was not affected by inversion of the faces; 
they too could sort the inverted lower halves as well as they did the 
upright halves, and their ability to sort upper halves remained 
predictably at chance. 
The results thus did offer support for the contention that it is 
easier to tell facial expression from inverted lower halves of faces 
than from inverted upper halves. What was noteworthy, though, was 
that the older and more sociable autistics were better at identifying 
facial expressions and thus, presumably, better at integrating facial 
features. However, there does remain the possibility that the older 
autistics are still poor at integrating features into wholes, but that 
they have developed strategies to cope with the identification of 
expression in the eye area which do not involve the ability to integrate 
their perceptions. What mil: it, ates against this, though, is the finding 
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that like the ESN children the older autistics ability to identify 
facial expression in upper halves of faces falls to chance level when 
the area is viewed in the inverted mode. 
To test the contention that autistics have problems with perceptual 
integration in more depth, the children were required to sort photographs 
of faces which contained two emotions into two piles according to whether 
they appeared sad or happy. These composite faces were made up of the 
upper half of either the happy or sad face used in the last experiment 
together with the lower half of the opposite expression posed by the 
same person. In this way it was possible to compose faces which had 
genuinely 'sad eyes' with 'happy mouths' and vice versa. Two versions 
of the composite faces were made. In one there was no gap between 
the upper and lower halves and every attempt was made to make each 
face not look like a composite of two others. In the second kind a 
gap of about one inch was left between the upper and lower halves. 
It was argued that this gap had the effect of disrupting the holism 
of the face. 
The ESN children's responses showed that although they mainly 
sorted by the mouths they took into account the expression conveyed 
by the eyes when sorting both types of composite face. Further, they 
performed differently when sorting the composite faces which were made 
to look complete than when sorting the ones with a gap in them. When 
sorting the former type they sorted less according to the eyes' 
expression than when sorting the latter type. The ESN children were 
also more likely to point out that they thought that there were two 
expressions present when the faces were split apart than when they were 
joined together. All these results indicated that the ESN children were 
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able to take into account the expression of both halves of the face when 
the halves presented conflicting information, and that they tended to 
view the faces in a gestalt manner. 
The autistic children's results were quite different. The younger 
autistic children's -responses agreed with those in the previous experiment 
insofar as they appeared to be unable to sort according to the upper 
halves. Hence for both composite faces they sorted as if they were just 
judging by the mouth's expression alone. The older autistic children, 
in contrast, once again showed that they had a rudimentary ability to 
tell the expression in the eye area. They sorted both types of composite 
faces with some reference to the expression conveyed by the eyes. However, 
the older autistics differed from the ESN children in that they did not 
sort the two types of composite face differently. Thus there was some 
evidence that the older autistic children were not perceiving the faces 
as gestalten which could be disrupted by a gap between the upper and 
lower halves. Further evidence that this was true came from the fact 
that the autistic children did not tend to report that there were two 
expressions present any more frequently when the faces were split apart 
than when they were joined together. Finally, whilst the ESN children 
tended to report that, for instance, a person looked happy but was 
really sad (when there was a smiling mouth and sad eyes), no autistic 
child reported anything like this. This was taken as additional evidence 
that, -the 
ESN children alone were perceiving the faces as gestalten. 
Although it was only a trend, it seemed significant that the autistic 
children were more likely to report that two emotions or faces were 
present when the halves of the face were made to appear complete than 
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did the ESN children. This may also reflect the autistic's lack of 
ability to integrate his perceptions, and may indicate that autistic 
children have a better than normal ability to distinguish a figure from 
its ground. 
It was noted that in normal development the ability to identify 
expressions is concurrent with the ability to express them. Hence the 
autistic children's abilities to display emotions were also tested. 
The children had to pull happy and sad faces and their ability to do so 
was compared with that of matched ESN children. The autistic children 
were poorer than the ESN ones at pulling happy faces. Both groups were 
equally poor at pulling sad faces though; but the ESN children's poor 
ability on sad faces was partly due to them conceptualising sadness as 
an emotion to be kept within (and hence not scored highly as sadness 
by the raters who saw the photographs), whereas the autistic children 
seemed to have genuine difficulties with pulling this expression. 
A surprising finding was that a few of the autistic children had their 
attempts at one of the expressions rated as the opposite by a panel of 
scorers. In fact, one autistic. child had her attempt at a happy face 
rated as a good attempt at a sad one. None of the ESN children's attempts 
were confused in this manner. 
It was noted that the above study required that the children understand 
what was asked of them. Consequently it may have been that the autistic 
children were handicapped by the verbal nature of the task's instructions. 
Hence the childrens' abilities to copy a facial expression was studied. 
This was done under two conditions: in one situation the child faced 
the model, and in the other the model was by the child's side and both 
looked into a mirror. In the first case the child had no visual feedback 
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as to how well he did, whereas in the second case such feedback was 
available. Both groups copied the model equally well when no visual 
feedback was available. However, when the children could see how well 
they were doing only the ESN children benefited from this knowledge 
and improved their performance. Thus, the autistic children's limited 
repertoire of facial expression is unlikely to be mainly due to their 
being unable to imitate other's expressions. Also, their inability to 
take advantage of the visual feedback may be seen as further evidence 
that they tend not to integrate their perceptions. 
It was noted that a survey of the clinical and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that autistic children are generally able to display 'reflex' 
emotions, but are very poor at acquired facial expressions which are 
intended to communicate their inner feelings to others. Hence their 
limited repertoire of facial expressions may be seen as part of their 
more general inability or poor ability to communicate with others. It 
was noted that normal babies may learn how to express their inner state 
to others through early interaction with adults. Part of this early 
interaction involves the baby being able to perceive contingencies 
between his behaviour and that of the adult, and between ongoing events 
and those he has experienced in the past. Thus, once again the possible 
importance of the child's ability to integrate his perceptions into 
meaningful wholes and themes was highlighted. Not only may the autistic 
baby be poor at recognising the relationships between his perceptions, 
but he may also produce far fewer consistent expressions of emotion for 
the mother to react to. In consequence the autistic child may be 
abnormally unresponsive to interact with, and thus abnormally unrewarding 
for the mother too. 
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Finally, a computerised study of children's eye movements whilst 
looking at faces was reported. Although this study could only take an 
exploratory form, the results were nonetheless of pertinence to most 
of the above findings. Two autistic children and one ESN child had to 
look at various faces, some of which expressed emotion whereas some did 
not, and some tried to make eye contact whilst others did not. They 
were also required to look at some schematic representations of houses. 
The results were fairly complex, but seemed to offer no clear evidence 
for gaze avoidance in autistic children. One of the clearest results 
was that both autistic children had far briefer fixations times than 
the ESN child. 
The autistic boy spent a greater proportion of his time looking at 
the upper halves of faces which were talking to him or smiling at him 
than the autistic ýýrL However, this could not be explained by the 
girl being more 'autistic' than the boy, for the boy was if anything 
less sociable. 
The ESN child tended to look more at the mouth of talking faces 
than of other faces, and thus provided support for the idea that people 
tend to switch their attention to other's lip movements when they talk. 
However, neither of the autistic children showed any unusually strong 
tendency to fixate the lower facial area of talking faces. In fact the 
autistic boy looked mostly at the eye area of talking faces. 
The responses of the children when viewing the expressive faces 
indicated that the ESN child had an understanding of their expressive 
nature. However, it was suggested that whereas the autistic girl had 
a rudimentary comprehension of facial expression (which occasionally 
led to more erratic gaze), the autistic boy's gaze behaviour was 
determined by less socially guided stimulus properties. 
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None of the children showed any tendency to look at the lower 
halves of the houses. Thus there was no support for the above mentioned 
idea that autistic children tend to fixate the lower half of all things. 
The brievity of the autistic children's gaze fixations was also true for 
looking at houses, too. Thus one cannot conclude that they tended to 
only look at faces for a very brief time. It was noted that these 
findings concur with those of O'Connor and Hermelin (1967). It was also 
noted that the autistic children generally made fewer feature-to-feature 
gaze shifts than the ESN child. Instead, they tended to look from a 
feature to the background and back to a feature again. This manner of 
looking at things is inappropriate for the extraction of information 
which might help a child's visual learning, visual identification, and 
visual discrimination problems. In particular it is inappropriate if 
the child wishes to compare the various aspects of his perceptions and 
gain an overall gestalt view of an object. Such gestalt perception of 
stimuli is undoubtably important in the identification and appreciation 
of facial expressions. 
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7.3: Theoretical implications 
The two major findings of this thesis are that autistic children 
are particularly good at recognising faces but they are rather poor 
at identifying facial expressions. The purpose of this section is to 
consider these findings in the light of what is known about the way the 
brain functions and the psychological implications of its functioning. 
For instance, is there any particular area of the brain which has been 
connected with the ability to recognise faces, or which is known to deal 
with the identification of expression? First, then, the evidence which 
has been provided to suggest that face perception is an innate ability 
will be discussed. 
7.3.1 Is face perception innate? 
In Chapter Two the possibility was mentioned that babies may possess 
an innate tendency to seek out 'dot patterns' which resemble eyes. It 
was concluded that the evidence for such an innate tendency specifically 
geared to the development of gaze contact is weak. Although the area 
of study is as yet still confused, it seems that the infant is born 
with certain tendencies to seek out stimulation such as brightness, 
contrast, critical levels of complexity, movement, and contingency on 
his own behaviour. Human beings are almost unique amongst the stimuli 
that the newborn encounters in possessing these qualities - and in 
particular people's eyes. As a consequence of tending to fixate other's 
eyes it seems possible that the baby comes to appreciate the significance 
of faces and gradually learns to extract more and more information from 
them. Hence, such evidence suggests that there is nothing innate about 
perceiving faces per se. Thus early face perception may help one 
understand why the autistic child fails to understand expressions (this 
will be returned to later), but does not relate to the matter of why 
they are so good at recognising faces. 
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7.3.2 Is face perception unique? 
Other workers have searched elsewhere for evidence of the uniqueness 
of faces as perceptual stimuli. For instance, some have claimed that 
transformations of faces (such as viewing them upside down or in photographic 
negative) make them harder to identify than any comparable stimuli. 
Galper (1970) has tested people's ability to identify faces which are 
seen in photographic negative, and reported that her subjects found 
negative faces very hard to recognise. She argued that the same pattern 
information is available in both positive and negative photographs of 
faces, thus the difficulty in identifying the negative ones must be due 
to factors other than the ability to identify pure pattern. However, 
her conclusion that it is solely the difficulty in recognising the 
expression of negative faces which causes the difficulties is not 
defendable. As Phillips (1972) has pointed out, transforming a photograph 
into a negative changes the whole range of brightness relationships. He 
argued that it might be the changes in these brightness relationships 
which causes one to 
find negative faces harder to identify (although he 
agreed with Galper that the expression of photographic negatives of 
faces is difficult to discern). His attempt to reconcile the question 
involved requiring subjects to view lithographic positive and negative 
photographs of faces. The lithographic process turns all the darker 
greys into black and all the lighter ones into white, thus producing 
an entirely black and white picture with no half tones. His argument 
was that if the brightness relationships led Galper's subjects to find 
negative faces hard to identify, then negative 'lith' pictures should 
not be harder to identify than positive ones because the brightness 
relations remain the same. However, he found that subjects made more 
errors when trying to identify famous people's faces from 'lith' 
negatives than from 'lith' positives. Nonetheless, this should not be 
seen as evidence against the validity of Phillips' initial criticism, 
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for it is still possible that brightness relations play a part in the 
exceptional difficulty one has in identifying negatives 
faces. Phillips 
was not justified in inferring that the problem his subjects would 
encounter when viewing 'lith' negatives was merely that they were reversals 
of 'lith' positives already seen. Considered in terms of information 
processing, there is undoubtably a certain amount of redundant information 
present in a face; this means that it may still be reasonably easy to 
identify if it has been partly degraded in some fashion as it is in the 
lithographic process. However, whilst this process might be equivalent 
to seeing "THS CRT SAT ON THD MAT" (a degradation of THE CAT SAT ON THE 
MAT), the negative of this process would be more like "TAM DHT NO TAS 
TRC SHT" (the reverse of the degraded version), than white print on black 
as Phillips implies. One has only to consider that a simple schematic 
face drawn in black ink upon white paper would be equally easy to identify 
in the negative. 
To date no one has undertaken a thorough study of people's ability 
to identify other equally complex stimuli in photographic negative, thus 
it is unlikely that this can be seen as evidence that faces are exceptional. 
It has also been noted that the same pattern information is present 
when a face is seen upside down, and yet recognition of upside down 
faces appears to be exceptionally difficult. The face has been referred 
to as a 'mono-oriented' stimulus because it is usually seen only in one 
orientation. Such mono-oriented stimuli are reknown for being difficult 
to recognise when seen upside down compared to right way up (Ellis, 1975). 
However, it seems that faces are particularly difficult to recognise in 
the inverted mode (Hochberg and Galper, 1967; Yin, 1969). Yin (1969) 
reported that his subjects found recognition of faces was more affected 
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REAL! TY/FANTASY, upside-down design, by Henry M. Swope, 
Braden, Tenn. 
Figure 7.1. Examples of the difficulty one experiences 
in perceiving identity and meaning in complex 
inverted stimuli. 
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by inverting them than was recognition of houses and matchstick-men 
designs. He also noted that his subjects reported viewing the upright 
and inverted faces in different ways, whereas they viewed the other 
stimuli in the same manner regardless of orientation. That is, they 
viewed all the stimuli but the faces by looking for individual features 
to recognise them by, whereas they viewed upright faces as gestalten 
and switched to trying to identify some individual feature when the 
faces were seen inverted. This point is important and will be returned 
to later. 
Rock (1974) has pointed out that inversion of faces alters sp(ktial 
relations which are very familiar, and this could result in a disruption 
of subject's scanning strategies. He goes on to note that other stimuli 
are also very difficult to identify upside down, such as written script, 
and this might be for similar reasons (see figure 7.1 for examples of 
the difficulties involved in identifying inverted stimuli). Circumstantial 
support for Rock's ideas comes from several sources; writing is usually 
read from left to right, and many workers have claimed that faces are 
scanned from top to bottom (Noton and Stark, 1971; Smith and Nielson, 
1970; see Ellis, 1975 for a review). However, it has yet to be shown 
either that people scan other 'mono-oriented' stimuli in radically 
different ways, or how a scanning strategy specific to the viewing of 
faces might be peculiarly affected by transformations of the stimulus. 
One might also question whether the other mono-oriented stimuli that have 
been used in studies (such as planes, houses, matchstick-men; see Ellis, 
1975) are solely seen only in one orientation. Children frequently view 
pictures in their books upside down and such pictures are often of the 
kind chosen by researchers. Although this does not mean that children can 
equally easily recognise the pictures in either modality (Ghent, 1961), 
it certainly throws doubt on the claim that such stimuli are purely mono- 
oriented. 
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Figure 7.2. Facial expression can look very different 
depending on whether the face is upright 
or inverted. 
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Bradshaw and Wallace (1971) argued that the difficulties in recognising 
inverted faces may just be because they are rarely seen that way up. They 
attempted to train their subjects to identify inverted faces, and found 
that they could eventually achieve almost as high a recognition of inverted 
faces as of upright ones. However, the method they employed suggests that 
the training of the subjects to recognize inverted faces involved an 
enhancement of their ability to identify faces from isolated features, 
rather than by identifying faces as gestalten both ways up (see Homa, 
et al., 1976). 
It is thus not possible to conclude from the above evidence that faces 
are exceptional as visual stimuli. Stronger evidence for the 'specialness' 
of faces comes from a consideration of the fact that faces also carry 
expression, and the related consideration that the right cerebral hemisphere 
has been implicated in the processing of both spatial and emotional material. 
7.3.3 Facial expression and its relation to identity 
Yin (1970), Galper (1970) and Galper and Hochberg (1971) have argued 
that facial expression is important in one's recognition of faces. Yin 
(1970) suggested that the reason people have great difficulty recognising 
upside down faces is because they cannot discern facial expression in them 
(see figure 7.2). Galper and Hochberg (1971) supported their claim that 
facial expression plays a large role in facial recognition by testing 
subjects' retention of identity and expression of faces over a period of 
a few days. They found that the subjects could recall both the faces and 
the expressions with a high accuracy, but that their ability to recall 
the faces was better than recall of expressions. However, to conclude 
from this, as they did, that the difference between the recall scores is 
indicative of a role played by the faces' expressions is a non sequitur. 
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If the subjects had been unable to recall the expressions then one may 
have made a case for the independence of recall of expression and 
identity. But the fact that the expressions were recalled does not 
provide evidence that they were used to aid recall of identity. 
There is, in fact, a basic difficulty in arguing that one recognises 
faces according to the expressions which they usually produce. By 
definition the identity of a face must be relatively independent of 
the expression it conveys or of paraphernalia (such as beards, glasses, 
etc. ), or else one would have to relearn who someone was each time 
their facial features shifted position or were covered by something. 
Put simply, Joe Smith looks like Joe Smith whether he's smiling or 
scowling( even if one has only seen him once before when he was fairly 
expressionless). Thus, to say that recognition of inverted faces is 
difficult because identification of expression in inverted faces is 
hard is also a non sequitur. Certainly though, recognition of identity 
and expression are related, for expression is the spatial disposition 
of the individual features which are also used in recognition of identity. 
7.3.4 Hemispheric processing and face recognition 
A host of studies have demonstrated a right hemisphere (left visual 
field) advantage in the processing of photographs or schematic depictions 
of faces (Geffen et al., 1971; Rizzolatti et al, 1971; Hilliard, 1973; 
Ellis and Shepherd, 1975; Patterson and Bradshaw, 1975; Klein et al, 
1976; Moscovitch et al., 1976; Young and Ellis, 1976). This is in 
addition to other visio-spatial abilities possessed by the right 
hemisphere (Corkin, 1965; Warrington and Kinsbourne, 1966; Levy et al., 
1972), and contrasts with the verbal and analytical abilities attributed 
to the left hemisphere (Milner, 1971; Gefen et al., 1972; Kimura, 1963; 
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Marcel and Rajan, 1975). Gazzaniger (1970) and White (1969) both give 
reviews of the literature on the cerebral hemispheres. 
There is some doubt, however, whether the left hemisphere is devoid 
of ability to identify faces. Marzi and Berlucchi (1977) provide evidence 
for the left hemisphere being better than the right at identifying well 
known faces. Other studies have reported similar results (for instance, 
Marzi et al., 1974). Marzi and Berlucchi suggest that the reason for 
this superior recognition by the left hemisphere is that when viewing 
well known faces one may rely upon the detection of isolated features, 
which the left hemisphere is found to be good at. They support their 
ideal by referring to Patterson and Bradshaw's study (1975) in which 
they found that schematic drawings of faces were discriminated better 
by the right hemisphere except when the faces had to be discriminated 
on the basis of a single facial feature. It therefore seems that the 
left hemisphere too can identify faces, and it does so better (or quicker) 
than the right one when detection of a single feature is critical. 
There is also some doubt as to whether the right hemisphere's ability 
to identify faces is just due to it possessing a good ability to deal 
with spatial material in general, or whether it indicates the presence 
of 'face-specific analysers' in the right hemisphere. The main evidence 
for the possible existence of face-specific analysers being present in 
the right hemisphere comes from studies of brain damaged patients. In 
particular evidence has been drawn from studies of patients suffering 
from 'prosopagnosia' which is the inability to recognise the faces of 
even near relatives or friends. 
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People suffering from prosopagnosia may complain of an overall 
blurring and a difficulty in interpreting fine shadow and soft forms 
of the face. They may be able to identify individual features but 
be quite unable to gain any idea of the expression being conveyed by 
a face. Hence they may try to identify people by their voice, gait, 
clothes, hair length, and so on (see: Bay, 1953; Pallis, 1955; Macrae 
and Trolle, 1956; Beyn and Kayazeva, 1962; Cole and Perez-Cruet, 1964). 
Although the syndrome is rare, several cases have been reported since 
Charcot first described it (see Hecaen and Angelergues, 1962). Bodamer 
(1947) labelled it prosopagnosia in order to underscore his belief that 
a face-specific process is damaged in such patients. This apparent 
specificity has led workers to postulate the existence of face- 
specific analysers which are impaired in prosopagnosic patients 
(Hecaen and Angelergues, 1962; Konorski, 1967; Yin, 1970). However, 
as Ellis (1975) points out, there are a number of objections which can 
be raised to the simplicity of this idea. 
First, the patients usually also suffer from other 'agnosias' 
such as: an inability to tell one chair from another (Bay, 1953; Critchley, 
1953), or problems identifying food and animals (Pallis, 1955), or being 
unable to tell a cow from a dog (Macrae and Trolle, 1956), or frequently 
colour agnosia (Bay, 1953; Pallis, 1955; Beyn and Knyazeva, 1962; 
Cole and Perez-Cruet, 1964; Gloning et al., 1970). Visual field defects 
are not unknown in such patients (Bay, 1953), and some experience 
distortions of patterns such as crosses and swastikas (so called 
'metamorphosia'; Benton and Van Allen, 1968). As Ellis (1975) notes, 
it is hardly surprising that clinicians and patients most frequently 
mention the difficulty with faces (De Renzi et al., 1969), but the fact 
that this aspect of the patient's problems gives most concern is not 
an argument for the presence of a face-specific analyser system. In 
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the absence of a pure case of facial agnosia it remains a possibility 
that the patient's visual processing problems are causing facial agnosia 
as one among many symptoms. 
Second, it is noted that there is no single area of the brain which 
has been implicated in prosopagnosia. Damage has been reported in the 
parietal-temporo-occipital junction (Hecaen and Angelergues, 1962), 
bilateral occipital lobes (Beyn and Knyazeva, 1962) and right temporal 
lobe (Cole and Perez-Cruet, 1964), and in bilateral parieto-occipital 
regions (Gloning et al., 1966). Whilst is is true that most of the damage 
implicated has been to the right hemisphere (Hecaen and Angelergues, 1962), 
it seems unlikely that one specific area is involved. Rather it seems 
that there may be several sub-processes in the identification of faces, 
governed by several areas of the brain, and that damage to any one part 
of the process can lead to some form of facial agnosia. The many different 
reports of what patients have described their vision of faces to be like, 
and the theories that have been built upon such descriptions, also implicate 
several processes that may be involved in face perception (Faust, 1947; 
Bay, 1953; Pallis, 1955). 
Experimental studies of patients suffering from unilateral brain 
damage have shown that damage to the right-hemisphere more radically 
affects a person's ability to identify faces than damage confined to the 
left-himisphere (De Renzi and Spinnler, 1966; Warrington and James, 1967; 
Benton and Allen, 1968; Milner, 1968; De Renzi et al., 1969; Jones, 
1969; Tzavaras et al., 1970; Yin, 1970). The important question, of 
course, is whether such damage ever only affects a person's ability to 
recognise faces. Tzavaras et al. (1970) believe that the 
damage may be 
restricted to problems with facial recognition. They compared right- 
hemisphere lesioned patients with left-hemisphere damage ones and normal 
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subjects for their abilities to recognise faces which had been disguised 
in various ways (with beards, shadows etc. ), and their abilities to 
recognise particular stimuli from amongst an array of similar stimuli. 
They found that the right-hemisphere lesioned patients were much poorer 
than the control subjects at recognising the disguised faces. The right- 
hemisphere damaged subjects were also worse at the other non face-like 
patterns, but the effect was not so great. There was, however, no control 
for the difficulty which each task provided for the subjects. For instance, 
the controls had very few problems with any of the tasks except the one 
involving faces. It is therefore possible that the task with faces was 
simply harder than the rest, and showed up the right-hemisphere lesioned 
patients' problems with spatial tasks in general. Tzavaras et al. 's 
findings cannot thus be taken as evidence that there are face-specific 
analysers in the right hemisphere. 
Yin (1970) showed that patients with damage to the posterior sector 
of the right hemisphere did significantly less well on a test of face 
recognition than did either left posterior hemisphere damaged patients 
or normal controls. However, the patients with right posterior hemisphere 
damage were able to do as well as those with left side damage at 
recognising pictures of houses. Yin took this to be further evidence 
for his previous (1969) contention that the right-hemisphere is specialised 
in perceiving faces. He supports his argument with the results of the 
same subject's performance at recognising inverted faces and houses. In 
this case the right posterior hemisphere damaged patients did better 
than any of the subjects with other unilateral brain damage at recognising 
inverted faces (in fact, the left posterior hemisphere damaged group 
did worse than chance). But once again they were about as good as the 
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controls at recognising inverted houses. In consequence Yin argued 
that there is a face-specific analyser in the right-hemisphere which 
is also orientation specific. However, Yin omitted any discussion 
of the interesting results of the left posterior hemisphere damaged 
group. Whereas the right-hemisphere lesioned patients were about as good 
as normal controls at recognising inverted faces, the left-hemisphere 
lesioned patients were considerably worse. This may indicate that 
there is an important element of verbal coding or analytic processing 
involved in the identification of inverted faces. This may also relate 
to Marzi and Berlucchi's (1977) finding, mentioned above, that the 
left hemisphere is better at identifying well known faces. They argued 
that this might be because the left-hemisphere is specialised at 
analytical processing of information, and thus is more able to detect 
critical features by which to recognise faces. The suggestion that 
one may adopt different strategies for looking at upright and inverted 
faces is also of relevance here (Yin, 1970; Ellis, 1975; see above). 
If one tends to view upright faces as gestalten but inverted faces as 
a collection of individual features, then it is possible that damage to 
the right hemisphere would affect identification of upright faces more 
than inverted ones, and damage to the left hemisphere would have the 
opposite effect. This is in accord with the findings of Yin's work, 
and does not implicate the presence of face-specific analysers in the 
right hemisphere. 
More recent studies have provided evidence which develops Yin's 
findings. Leehey et al. (1978) noted that Yin's finding that damage 
to the posterior sector of the right-hemisphere does not effect patient's 
ability to identify inverted faces, does not mean that other areas of 
the right-hemisphere are not crucial to the identification of inverted 
faces. To test this possibility they used a tachistoscopic technique 
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to present upright and inverted faces to the left and right visual fields 
(LVF and RVF). They argued that if the right-hemisphere is s? ecialized 
in the recognition of upright faces then faces presented in the LVF should 
be recalled well when upright but poorly when inverted. In contrast, the 
faces presented in the RVF should be reported equally poorly regardless 
of their orientation. This was in fact what they found, and they thus 
concluded, "This pattern of results supports the existence of a right- 
hemisphere specialization for upright faces in addition to the right- 
hemisphere specialization for visuo-spatial patterns. " (Authors' 
emphasis). They note that their results are at variance with Ellis and 
Shepherd's (1975) work in which they found a LVF advantage for both 
upright and inverted faces. Leehey et al. claim that the reason why 
their results support Yin's (1970) - whereas Ellis and Shepherd's do 
not, is that the latter used too brief fixation times. Ellis and Shepherd 
only allowed their subjects to see that faces for iSms and Leehey et al. 
argue that this was insufficient time to allow enough depth of processing 
(Craik and Lockhart, 1972) such that the stimuli were not viewed as faces. 
Stated thus Leehey et al. 's criticism of Ellis and Shepherd's procedural 
method is nonsensical for the subjects certainly reported that the stimuli 
were faces. Nonetheless, the fact that the subjects recalled vastly more 
faces in the LVF when allowed a longer fixation time is indicative of 
the nature of the process which can give the right-hemisphere its advantage 
over the left one. 
Leehey et al. 's claim that the right-hemisphere has a specialization 
for upright faces in addition to one for visuo-spatial patterns can also 
be criticized. The basis for this claim in their conclusion is unclear 
but would seem to rely upon the assumption that upright and inverted faces 
represent equally complex figures, and thus perception of them by a 
hemisphere specialized in visuo-spatial material should not be better for 
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one than the other. However, there is ample evidence in the literature, 
as noted above, that inverted and upright faces may not be equated in 
terms of their objective difficulty as patterns:,, 
clearly upright faces are much more familiar than inverted ones, any 
scanning patterns appropriate for an upright face will not be appropriate 
for an inverted one, and subjects have reported viewing upright faces 
as gestalten and inverted ones in a more piecemeal manner. In summary, 
then, neither of Leehey et al. 's conclusions can be agreed with. There 
is neither evidence provided by their study for the right hemisphere 
being specialized for upright faces in particular, nor for it being 
specialised for face perception above and beyond its specialized perception 
of other visuo-spatial patterns. 
7.3.5 Hemispheric processing and the identification of facial expression. 
Bradshaw and Wallace (1971) have pointed out that ".... the human 
face can be viewed as a complex visual pattern subserving two purposes: 
communication and identification. " The above studies have generally dealt 
with subject's abilities to identify faces, but is there any evidence for 
asymmetry in the brain's processing of communicative aspects such as facial 
expression? There is in face a wealth of evidence to suggest that the 
right-hemisphere is more involved than the left in the processing of 
emotional stimuli (for example: Goldstein, 1939; Hecaen et al. 1951; 
Denny-Brown et al., 1952; Perria et al., 1961; Gainotti, 1972). Early 
evidence was gained from brain damaged patients, and Goldstein was the 
first to note a common emotional response to left-hemisphere lesions, 
which has been attributed to a freeing of the 'emotional' right hemisphere. 
Goldstein termed this the 'catastrophic reaction'. Later, Hecaen et al. 
and Denny-Brown et al. described a complementary pattern of emotional 
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response after right-hemisphere lesion which has been termed the 
'indifference reaction'. Gainotti's work with unilaterally brain damaged 
patients has confirmed these earlier reports. The catastrophic reaction 
was found by Gainotti to include anxiety, crying, hostility and 
compensatory boasting, whereas the indifference reaction included 
jocularity, minimization, anosognosia, and a lassez faire attitude. 
There has also been evidence for hemispheric asymmetry of affective 
memory processes. Wechsler (1973) found that unilaterally brain damaged 
subjects short-term memory for the affective aspects of stories was worse 
when they had right- and left-hemisphere lesions. Haggard and Parkinson 
(1971) also gained evidence for right-hemisphere processing and emotional 
stimuli. They found that judgements about emotional tone of sentences 
(anger, boredom, happiness, distress) heard in one headphone whilst 
'babble' was heard in the other, were significantly more accurate on 
left-ear presentations (which are processed by the right-hemisphere). 
Carmon and Nachson (1973) also used a dichotic listening procedure to 
investigate hemispheric asymmetry when perceiving nonverbal sounds such 
as cries, shrieks and laughter. They also found a slight but nonetheless 
significant left ear advantage for these emotional sounds. 
Safer and Leventhal (1977) required subjects to listen to taped 
passages of text which were of three emotional kinds: positive, negative, 
and neutral. These passages were then read in three tones of voice, with 
the positive passages being read in a happy manner, the negative ones 
read in a strong almost angry manner, and the neutral ones read in an 
objective way. Whilst the subjects were not told which cue to use to 
rate the passages, 29 of the 36 subjects who listened to the left ear 
used the tone of voice to rate the passages. Conversely, 21 of the 36 
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subjects who listened to the right ear rated the passages according 
to their linguistic content. This provides further evidence that the 
right-hemisphere is involved in processing stimuli which have emotional 
content carried by intonation, pitch and rhythms. 
Dimond and Farrington (1977) showed subjects films which were either 
unpleasant or humorous, and measured their heart rate as they viewed 
them. They were able to present the films to either one hemisphere 
(visual field) or the other and consequently gain evidence for 
asymmetry of response by the two hemispheres. They found that the 
subjects' heart rate was higher when the unpleasant film was presented 
to the right-hemisphere than to the left one. In contrast, the heart 
rate was higher when the humorous film was shown to the left-hemisphere. 
Despite this left-hemisphere effect they interpreted their findings as 
support for the right-hemisphere bearing "responsibility for 'emotion' 
viewed in the broad sense" (p. 259). 
Suberi and McKeever (1977) presented subjects with faces in a 
tachistoscope in such a way that the faces were off-set and fed to one 
hemisphere or the other. The faces were either emotional or neutral 
as judged by independent raters. Suberi and McKeever found that the 
subjects' reaction times when identifying previous seen faces were 
faster when faces were seen in the left visual field (LVF). Moreover, 
the reaction times favoured the LVF more strongly for subjects who had 
memorised emotional faces than those who had memorised neutral ones. 
Whilst this does not show that a LVF superiority for processing emotional 
stimuli, it nonetheless indicates that faces are generally better 
identified by the LVF when affect is present in the stimuli. 
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Ley and Brydidn (1979) also presented faces unilaterally to subjects 
by using a tachistoscope. Subjects saw cartoon drawings of men's faces. 
There were five different cartoon characters and each was shown displaying 
each of five different facial expressions. These expressions ranged from 
a very 'positive' one to a very 'negative' one (happy to angry) with the 
stages between being judged as distinguishable and valid steps by 
separate raters. After presentation subjects were later asked to compare 
a presented face with the ones seen before and to say whether they had 
seen the character before, or the expression. As with the above studies, 
Ley and Brydon found a significant LVF superiority for both character 
and emotion recognition. However, statistical analysis revealed that 
the two effects were independent. That is the LVF superiority for 
emotions was correlated with the degree of affective expression, 
whereas that for character recognition was not. 
Ley and Bryd8n note that there are many characteristics for right- 
hemisphere functioning that may uniquely bias it for the processing of 
affective information. For instance, Semmes (1968) has proposed that 
elementary functions are focally represented in the left-hemisphere and 
more diffusely represented in the right-hemisphere. This diffuse 
organization is hypothesised to lead to a more proficient integration 
of dissimilar units and a specialization for multimodal coordination, 
such as visuo-spatial abilities (see Corkin, 1965). Ley and Brydon 
suggest that the recognition of emotion entails an integration of 
stimulus information from a variety of sources (both sensory and motor) 
and across space and time. Semmes' model would argue that such synthesis 
would take place in the right-hemisphere. This right-hemisphere superiority 
for synthesising diverse units of information is closely allied to its 
often described 'holistic' or gestalt processing capabilities (Bogen, 
1969; Levy, 1972; Ornstein, 1972; Safer and Leventhall, 1977). Ley 
391 
and Bryn go on to note that a third characteristic of emotional 
processing can also be associated with right-hemisphere 
functioning, 
namely its involvement with processing and forming 'images' 
(Davidson 
and Swartz, 1976). Safer and Leventhall (ibid. ) made the point that 
imagery is often associated with emotions. Hence, Ley and Bryson 
conclude, ".... synthetic and integrative characteristics, a 
holistic 
and gestalten nature, the imagic associations are three features of 
processing affective material that would differentially favour right- 
hemispheric mediation of the task. " 
Thus one may understand the right-hemisphere's excellent performance 
at processing emotions in terms of its more basic mode of functioning. 
What is interesting here (and Lee and Bryson omit to mention it) is that 
precisely these right-hemisphere abilities to integrate and synthesis 
information have been referred to by other workers as possible reasons 
why it is so good at recognising faces. Their experiments with brain 
damaged patients led De Renzi and Spinnler (1966) to speculate that 
individuals with right-hemisphere damage are deficient in the high-level 
integration of visual data. In support of this view, Jones (1969) 
reports that right-hemisphere damage can impair visual search efficiency. 
Jones argued that because many tests of face recognition involve patients 
having to decide which of an array of faces they have seen before, the 
patients inability to extract meaning from complex arrays might cause 
them to appear to be less able to recall faces than they in fact are. 
Jones backed up his argument by showing that such patients were more 
able to recall faces when they had to choose between two faces, one 
of which they had seen earlier, than when they had to pick which the 
face was from a large array of photographs. 
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Clearly, the deficiency suggested above is not face-specific, and 
might be expected to reveal itself in response to the perception of any 
complex stimulus which tends to be viewed in a global rather than 
analytic manner. Moreover, by reverse argument one may posit that the 
right hemisphere is normally superior at recognising faces simply because 
it possesses an integrative mode of functioning. Thus, not only does 
it seem that there is little or no evidence for 'face-specific analysers' 
in the right-hemisphere, but that the reasons why the right-hemisphere 
is so good at face perception and good at processing emotional information 
may be identical. That the right-hemisphere's ability to integrate and 
synthesise information may be central to both recognition of faces 
and emotional expression is borne out by Bodamer's (1941) description 
of one of his prosopagnosic patient's view of faces: 
"(He) could disciminate the various parts of the 
face but all faces appeared to him to be spiritless 
and lacking in expression, individuality and meaning. 
Mimicked expressions were clearly perceived but could 
not be interpreted". 
(Quoted in Hecaen and Angelergues, 1962). 
It is notable that the assumption that the right-hemisphere's 
ability to process information holistically and the left-himisphere's 
tendency to process data analytically can account for nearly all of the 
above mentioned findings about face recognition and identification of 
expression. If the ability to integrate sensory information is 
fundamental to both the perception of identity and expression, then it 
is predictable that both of these activities will be impaired by inversion 
of the stimuli. That is, when looking at inverted faces it is difficult 
to make use of a 'gestalt' mode of perception, because the gestalt as it 
is normally viewed has had all its relations inverted in an unfamiliar 
manner. 
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It thus becomes unnecessary to postulate that faces are difficult 
to recognise when upside down because one cannot discern their expressions. 
Equally, it becomes unnecessary to assign any special significance to 
the fact that the hemispheres are differentially affected by inversion 
of the stimuli. The left-hemisphere's analytical mode of processing 
information is as appropriate for upright faces as inverted ones, for 
the detection of an individual feature does not depend upon its 
disposition with respect to other features. Equally, it accounts for 
the left-hemisphere's inability to perceive emotion in faces (of the 
reference to Bodamer's patient above), for to do so requires a synthesing 
and integrating mode of processing. However, this view does not 
indicate that the left-hemisphere cannot identify faces, only that it 
will be better at doing so when an analytical mode of perception might 
be advantageous. Such a mode would be advantageous when viewing inverted 
faces, and seemingly when looking at highly familiar faces as Marzi 
and Berlucchi (1977) found. 
In conclusion, one is drawn to propose that the manner in which 
one views faces is related to the fact that one usually wishes to 
extract meaning from them about the inner states of other people. 
Because this is a primary reason for fixating others' faces, the 
manner in which we look at them is bound to favour a holistic mode of 
processing. In consequence when one fixates others' faces one rarely 
focuses attention upon the individual features, and thus one's ability 
to recognise them when they are seen upside down will be impaired. 
This is not true for almost every other visual stimulus which human 
beings perceive in daily life, and hence it is little wonder that 
there might misleadingly seem to be 'face-specific analysers' in the 
brain. It is possible that written words come closest to faces as 
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complex stimuli which require holistic processing (although they are 
neither so complex nor require the same degree of gestalt perception); 
thus it is noteworthy that researchers are unable to agree as to whether 
'dyslexia' represents a 'specific word blindness' or is only one aspect 
of a more general problem that such people have with processing visual 
stimuli (Griffiths, 1972). The above argument suggests that the latter 
may be the case, but it is outside the domain of this thesis to speculate 
further. 
Thus, whilst there is no unequivocal evidence that face perception 
is innate, it seems that the innate tendency of the right-hemisphere to 
process information in a gestalt and integrative manner allows it to be 
superior at the recognition of faces and their expressions. 
7.3.6 Neurological aetiologies of autism suggested by other authors 
Many theories about the neurological aetiology of autism have been 
proposed, but this section will confine itself to those which have a 
bearing upon person perception in relation to possible hemispheric 
asymmetries. 
First it should be noted that in at least one study about a third of 
autistic children who were followed up from early childhood to adolescence 
showed some signs of brain damage such as epileptic fits (Rutter, 1970) 
and this has been supported by others (Lotter, 1966,1967). There is 
thus good evidence for detectable brain damage in a sizeable number of 
autistic children. Even in the remaining two thirds of autistic children 
it seems most likely that they were born with some form of brain dysfunction, 
as psychogenic theories of causes of autism have received no empirical 
support to date. The apparent specificity of the syndrome has led many 
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workers to suggest certain areas of the brain as locii of dysfunction. 
For instance: Crawley (1971) has suggested damage to the association 
areas, Hermelin (1966) and Ricks (1972) have suggested damage to the 
dominant hemisphere and Wing (1969) has indicated the possibility of 
damage to other areas concerned with language. 
Gellner (1959) has suggested that autistic children suffer damage 
to the corpora quadrigemina, the medial and lateral geniculate bodies, 
and tracts carrying exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive 
impulses to and from these ganglia. She hypothesised that such lesions 
would lead to a failure of incoming stimuli to be integrated with 
interoceptive impulses from the autonomic nervous system. Such a lack 
of integration might lead to difficulties with comprehension and with 
perception. Whilst Gellner's ideas are noteworthy for attempting to 
explain many of the symptoms of autism, they are nonetheless highly 
speculative and unproven. Indeed, many of the functions that she has 
assigned to the above areas of the brain have more recently been 
associated with other areas such as the posterior sector of the right 
hemisphere, the frontal lobes, and so forth (see Luria, 1973). 
Several theories have implicated the recticular formation as being 
the locus of damage (MacCulloch and Sambrooks, 1972; DesLauriers and 
Carlson, 1969; Hutt et al., 1964,1965; Hutt and Hutt, 1970; Rimland, 
1964). The major reason for this is that damage to this area can lead 
to abnormalities of arousal and attention. However, it has frequently 
been noted (Wing, 1976a; Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970) that a simple 
theory of abnormal arousal cannot account for the diverse symptoms seen 
in the autistic child. This is particularly true for those with near 
normal intelligence. More specifically, it does not seem that an arousal 
theory can account for the autistic child's manner of perceiving people. 
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Perhaps the most immediately attractive theory of autistic 
fee 
behaviour has been that there is damage to the left hemisphere $Prior 
and Bradshaw, 1979). Autistic children invariably have poor language 
skills, but they may excell at spatial, mathematical, musical and rote 
memory tasks. Autistic children are also noted for their lack of symbolic 
thought. Viewing the dichotomies suggested for the two hemispheres 
reveal the reason for thinking that autistics possess mainly rig k 
hemisphere abilities. 
Left-hemisphere 
linguistic 
verbal 
symbolic 
discrete 
logical 
Right-hemisphere 
visual-spatial 
mathematical 
diffuse 
musical 
(after Bogen, 1969) 
But some doubt may be shed on any simple theory immediately, by 
considering a few more of the dichotomies. 
Left-himisphere 
rational 
numerical 
digital 
sequential 
analytic 
Right-hemisphere 
emotional 
geometric 
analogic 
imaginative 
integrative 't 
(again after Bogen, 1969) 
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Thus if one considers the hemispheres to be specialized for 
language and symbolic functioning (left) and visuo-spatial, musical and 
mathematical abilities (right), then there seems to be some sense in 
proposing that autistic children possess almost entirely right-hemisphere 
abilities and virtually no left-hemisphere ones. However, this is not 
true. Autistic children are very conscious of order, as is revealed 
by their rote memory abilities, want for sameness and repetitive 
behaviours. In addition, they tend to learn language in a one-to-one 
fashion and not in the holistic-categorical manner characteristic of 
the right-hemisphere. Moreover, they are noted to lack imaginative 
and affective abilities both of which have been attributed to the right- 
hemisphere. Although the topic will be returned to later, it will also 
be noted here that the normal child tends to be good at face perception 
and identification of facial expression mainly because he perceives faces 
in a holistic fashion utilising his right hemisphere's advantages in 
these areas. The autistic child, by contrast, would seem to be poor 
at the identification of expression because he lacks the normal ability 
to integrate perceptions, and his relatively good performance at face 
recognition tasks seems, paradoxically, to be due to his tending to 
process faces as collections of disparate features rather than as 
gestalten. Hence, this data also argues against the autistic child 
performing as 'a right-hemisphere processor'. 
More important to theories of damage to higher cortical functions 
is the face that theorists have been unable to account for the fact that 
autism typically begins in the first thirty months of life when the 
brain is still relatively 'plastic'. If the child were born with right- 
hemisphere damage the left-hemisphere should take over the functions of 
the right in addition to those of its own. The only reason why this might 
not happen would be if the corpus collosum is damaged too, and there is no 
evidence that autistic children have such damage. 
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Nonetheless, a few workers have attempted to search for asymmetrical 
functioning in autistic children (Kugler, 1975; Libbard, 1979; Prior 
and Bradshaw, 1979; Blackstock, 1978). Kugler presented her work 
as a pilot study, giving little detail. However, she claimed to have 
obtained preliminary evidence that autistic children do not possess a 
normal left-hemisphere superiority for verbal material as measured by 
ear advantage in a dichotic listening test. 
Libbard (1979) did further work on autistic children's cerebral 
processing abilities. She too used dichotic listening tasks. She 
describes three experiments with a group of autistic children in which 
she compared the performance of these children with that of matched 
groups of subnormal and normal children. In her first study she presented 
pairs of words simultaneously, one to each of the child's ears. The 
words were carefully prepared to be in synchrony and all were single 
syllable nouns having a common middle vowel and a common final consonant 
(eg: pet, met, net). Both the normal and subnormal children showed a 
preference for reporting the word which they heard in their right ear 
(and which was presumably being processed by their left hemisphere). 
In contrast, the autistic children showed no ear preference. This 
finding thus supported the contention that autistic children have a 
left-hemisphere deficit. The autistic children also made more errors 
overall than did either of the other groups, which further supports the 
observation that they have problems with the processing of verbal input. 
However, Libbard did not discuss the possibility that other language 
impaired children might also fail to show a right-ear advantage in 
this type of paradigm. In the absence of any results from dysphasic 
children on a similar task it is difficult for one to conclude that 
Libbard's results show anything more than that language impaired children 
do not show a 'normal' response on a language related task. 
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In her second study, Libbard presented non-verbal sounds 
dichotically to the children's ears, as the right hemisphere is purported 
to be specialised in processing such non-linguistic sounds. Thus one 
would expect a subject to report those sounds heard by his left ear 
more frequently than those heard by his right and the experiment 
therefore sought evidence for a possible right-hemisphere deficit. 
However, no such evidence was obtained for any of the three groups. 
In fact, all the children failed to show an ear preference for the non- 
verbal sounds, including the normals. This absence of the expected 
response pattern from the normal children makes this experiment difficult 
to interpret, and it would be interesting to repeat this study with 
stimuli which were first determined to elicit a left-ear advantage 
in normal children. Only by doing this could one come to any meaningful 
conclusions about the absence of such an ear advantage in autistic 
children. 
Libbard's third study involved the children of matching by touch 
alone various grades of sandpaper according to, which was roughest. She 
had the child feel the two pieces of paper whilst they were out of sight, 
and required him to feel the pieces once with just one hand and then 
later with a different hand for each piece. Because the left hand feeds 
information to the right-hemisphere and the right hand feeds information 
to the left-hemisphere, it was thus possible to compare the children's 
tactile discrimination abilities both unilaterally and cross-laterally. 
She found that all the children were quite able to discriminate the 
pieces of sandpaper regardless of whether they were compared with the 
same hand or different ones. It thus does not seem that autistic 
children have any callosal problems, at least for tactile information. 
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Blackstock (1978) claimed to provide evidence from two studies 
that autistic children are 'right-hemisphere processors'. Blackstock 
defines a right-hemisphere processor as one who has relatively intact 
visuo-spatial skills but poor language skills. His reason for inferring 
left-hemisphere damage in autistic children is thus solely because 
they tend to have poor linguistic skills and yet are good at visuo- 
spatial tasks. This simplistic view of hemispheric function was 
discussed and rejected above as being inadequate. His first study was 
based upon the clinical observation that autistic children seem to like 
listening to music. His hypothesis was that given the choice between 
listening to music and listening to a spoken story autistic children 
would choose the former and normal children would choose the latter. 
Autistic and normal children were selected and matched for chronological 
age. The result of this matching, though, was that the language skills 
of the normal children were considerably higher than those of the 
autistics. The child was shown an apparatus which had two levers on 
it, the pulling of one allowed the child to hear a burst of music and 
the pulling of the other caused a burst of spoken text to be heard. 
The child could not pull both levers at the same time. 
Blackstock claimed that the results of this study clearly revealed 
that the autistic children preferred to hear music whereas the normal 
children preferred to hear spoken words. However, his analysis of the 
data is open to many criticisms as is his choice of control subjects. 
He reported that the mean frequency of pulling each lever differed 
between the groups and went on to test the differences between the 
mean frequencies using a Chi squared test. But it is not adequate to 
test mean frequencies in this manner. Further, he gave no idea of the 
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total number of pulls each type of child produced in the session. 
If the normal children gave many more such responses than the autistics 
(as seems quite possible from clinical knowledge of these children) 
then this would further complicate Blackstock's analysis of his results. 
More important, his choice of normal children as 'controls' who were 
linguistically far more able than the autistic children tends to 
invalidate any comparisons between the groups. How can one be certain 
that any child with as little linguistic competence as the autistic 
children would not also choose the music in preference to the speech? 
Perhaps better controls would have been subnormal children matched on 
verbal IQ, or better still, dysphasic children matched in a similar way. 
Blackstock's second experiment also investigated the possibility 
that autistic children prefer to listen to music rather than speech. 
However, the added dimension of ear preference was introduced by 
playing the music and speech as a very low level and thus requiring 
the child to put his ear to a loudspeaker to hear anything. Two tables 
were placed in the middle of a room, and there was a loudspeaker on 
each of the sides of both tables (eight in all). One table had three 
speakers producing musical sounds with a fourth speaker remaining silent, 
and the other table had three speakers emitting spoken words, and a 
fourth which remained silent. The silent speakers were included for 
control purposes only. There were three types of music (rhythmic, 
melodic and harmonic) and three types of speech (a Russian lesson, a 
story, and some poetry). The children were allowed to wander in the 
room for a period of time, first having been shown that by putting 
their ears up to the speakers they could hear the various sounds. As 
they wandered a note was made of which speaker they listened to, for 
how long and which ear they put up to the speaker. 
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Both Blackstock's predictions and his results are puzzling. He 
predicted that it would be normal for a child to put his left ear to 
a speaker playing music and his right ear to one playing speech. 
However, Blackstock offers no reason as to why this should be expected, 
nor does the literature contain any evidence for supporting such a notion. 
Unless there is competition between the inputs to the two ears, sound 
entering one ear will go equally to both hemispheres and not to the 
contralateral one. Moreover, Blackstock seems to presume that 
information fed to one ear is processed by the contralateral hemisphere 
even in the absence of any competing information to the other ear. 
Blackstock's predictions, then, that normal children would tend to 
spend more time listening to the words than the music and do so mostly 
with their right ears, whereas the autistic children would spend most 
time at the music table and show no ear preferences is rather difficult 
to justify. 
His results are also puzzling. In this study the normal children 
failed to show any preference for listening to music or speech. The 
autistic children, in contrast, were found to prefer to listen to the 
music. However, what is puzzling is that Blackstock did report ear 
preferences when there is no reason to expect them. He found the 
normal children preferred to listen to the story and the poetry with 
their right ear, but failed to show any preference when listening to 
the other four sound sources. The autistic children tended to use 
their left ears to listen to the three music sources and to the Russian, 
but showed no clear preference when listening to the other two spoken 
sources. However, the picture is less clear when, instead of analysing 
the mean number of times each type of child put his ear to any speaker 
he analysed according to the difference score for each subject when 
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listening to each speaker by subtracting the percentage of listening 
time with the right ear from that with the left ear. The means for 
the groups were then treated by an analysis of variance. When this 
was done the only group differences were on the musical melody source 
and the story telling. While normal children tended to listen to the 
story with their right ears, the autistic children tended to listen 
to both sources with their left ears. Blackstock offers no suggestions 
as to why this should be so, or why there were no group differences 
for the other four sound sources. The results are thus very unclear, 
and certainly do not, as Blackstock maintains, allow one to conclude 
that autistic children tend to listen to sounds primarily with their 
left ears whereas normals tend to listen with their right ears. 
In conclusion to Blackstock's experiments, it is very difficult 
to agree with his contention that he has provided evidence that 
autistic children are 'right hemisphere processors'. His evidence 
at best suggests that differences exist between autistic and normal 
children of similar age in their use of one ear or the other to listen 
to certain sound sources. However, the data does not even allow one 
to say that a normal child listens to speech with his right ear and 
music with his left, let alone to conclude that autistic children lack 
such a tendency. It remains quite possible that many of the group 
differences which Blackstock found were due to the normal children 
being far more linguistically competent than the autistic children. 
The only other experimental work on hemispherical processing by 
autistic children was undertaken by Prior and Bradshaw (1979). Like 
Libbard (1979) they too gave a group of autistic children a dichotic 
listening test, and they also gave several tests for handedness to 
the children. They used five measures of handedness, cleaning teeth, 
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writing on paper, throwing ball, kicking a ball, and striking or 
pretending to strike a match. Their performance on both the hnndedness 
measures and the dichotic listening task were compared with that of a 
group of normal right-handed children matched for mental age. They 
found that of twenty-three autistic subjects seventeen were clearly 
right-handed, none were left-handed and six showed a mixture of hand 
preferences (the criterion being taken as at least four of the five 
tests indicating the same handedness). 
On the dichotic listening task the children were presented with 
competing words to each ear and had to repeat what they heard. As 
predicted, the normal children tended to repeat what they heard in 
their right ears. However, there was considerable variance in the 
autistic group. Five autistic children showed a clear right ear 
advantage (out of nineteen who took part), seven showed a left ear 
advantage, and the remaining seven showed no ear preference. There 
seemed to be some indication that ear preference (and hence laterality) 
was more common for the higher IQ children who also tended to be those 
who gained speech before five years of age. 
Prior and Bradshaw's results on the dichotic listening test were 
thus similar to those obtained by Libbard and lend support to the 
conclusion that as a group autistic children tend not to show strong 
ear advantages for verbal material. However, Prior and Bradshaw also 
found that about a third of the autistic children that they tested 
nonetheless evidenced a right-ear advantage for verbal material, thus 
one cannot simply conclude that such an advantage is absent in autistics. 
The question of accuracy in matching controls also arises in Prior and 
Bradshaw's work. While they matched for mental age and thus controlled 
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to some extent for verbal ability, it is still possible that dysphasic 
or subnormal children might resemble autistics in showing a lack of ear 
preference for dichotically presented verbal material. 
The results that Prior and Bradshaw obtained from meausres of 
handedness reflected those obtained by other workers (Hauser et al., 
1975; Boucher, 1977; Colby and Parkinson, 1977). In general, while 
some researchers have noted that autistic children may be left-handed, 
there is little evidence that the incidence of left-handedness in 
autism is greater than would be expected in the general population. 
In summary, there seems very little evidence to suggest that autistic 
children's problems are primarily due to their having sustained damage 
to their left cerebral hemispheres, although there is some indication 
that speech does not become as strongly or as early lateralised in 
their left hemispheres as it does with normal children of similar 
mental ability. 
As was mentioned above, there still remains the problem that autism 
begins in the first year of life at a time when the brain is still 
relatively 'plastic'. It is thus difficult to explain why a lesion of 
the left-hemisphere would not lead to the right-hemisphere taking over 
the damaged area's functions. One possible explanation lies in the 
consideration of the subcortical areas as the site of the damage or 
dysfunction (Hauser et al., 1975; De Long, 1978). Hauser et al. proposed 
that autism might be due to damage to the hippocampal/limbic system 
areas of the brain, and noted that damage to these areas on one side of 
the brain may not be compensated for by equivalent areas on the other 
side. 
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Hauser et al. and DeLong draw parallels between the behaviour of 
animals which have suffered temporal lobe damage and the behaviour of 
autistic children. They note that both the animals and the autistics 
tend to show repetitive and stereotyped behaviour. A problem here, 
though, is that such activities alone are not unique to autism and thus 
the parallel is perhaps rather tenuous. They also note that there are 
similarities between adults with the Kluver-Bucy syndrome and Korsikov's 
syndrome and autism. Both of these adult syndromes are due to damage 
to the temporal lobe area. More important, Hauser et al. were able to 
report that fifteen of their seventeenlanguage impaired autistic subjects 
had abnormal pneumographic recordings which indicated enlargement of 
the left ventricular horn. These findings have yet to be replicated, 
but as yet stand as the strongest evidence available that at least some 
autistic children have sustained damage to the left temporal area. 
Lastly, it is worthy of note that the function of the limbic system 
has been linked to memory processes and that Boucher and Warrington 
(1976) have provided at least some suggestions which link autism with 
amnesia in childhood. This topic will be returned to later. 
7.3.7: Some Theoretical Considerations 
I can't believe that: said Alice. "Can't you? said the 
Queen in a rituina tone. "Tru again- draw a long breath 
and shut i, 'our eyes. " Alice Zauahed. "There's no use 
trying", she said: "One can't believe impossible things". 
"I daresay you haven't hach practice, " said the Queen. 
"When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour a 
day. Why sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible 
things before breakfast". 
(Lewis Carrol: Alice Through The 
Looking Glass) 
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This section will attempt to draw together the findings presented 
in this thesis. There are five main areas it will address itself to: 
the possibility and consequences of autistic children possessing a 
perceptual integration deficit; the implications of possible cognitive 
and perceptual deficits to the acquisition of language; the subject of 
the possession and understanding of abilities in contrast to the use of 
them; the implications that the results have for theoriejS of possible 
sites and mechanisms of brain dysfunction; and finally, a discussion 
of the extent to which autistic children may be born without certain 
normally 'innate' factors which lead a child to be empathic, 
inquisitive and gain communicative competence. 
Given that the areas of perceptual processing, language acquisition 
and brain functioning are still relative 'grey areas' in psychological 
theory, this section will be necessarily somewhat speculative. Moreover, 
it should be borne in mind that many of the considerations presented 
here are not to be understood simply as logical extensions of the 
experimental findings presented in this thesis. Although implications 
of the findings will be discussed, the discussions will also range 
somewhat beyond the results obtained in order to indicate ways in 
which -future research might profitably develop. 
a) Perceptual integration deficits in autism 
Section 7.2 summarised the findings of this thesis and concluded 
that the most parsimonious explanation of the results obtained from the 
autistic children was that they were not tending to integrate their 
perceptions into meaningful wholes. That is, whilst the normal child 
is capable of both holistic and analytic processing of sensory input, 
it seems that autistic children tend to only operate in a limited 
408 
analytic mode. Their main problem then, seems to lie in the formation 
of perceptual 'gestalten', either of inputs from two or more modalities 
(hence intermodal integrations; see the lip-reading study and studies 
reported by Hermelin, O'Connor and Frith), or various perceptions 
arriving at the same time through the same modality (hence intramodal 
integration; see the other studies in this thesis). 
The normal child seems to begin life by having a relatively global 
and holistic view of his world, and only later is he able to break up 
his perceptions into meaningful inter-related parts. These perceptions 
by virtue of their relations are later perceptually integrated once 
more, but now imbued with meaning which stems from his knowledge of 
his world. For instance, young children have great difficulty identifying 
'figures' from complex 'grounds' in standard gestalt perception tests 
(Ghent, 1956). But later they are able both to discriminate the parts 
and integrate them back into a whole again. Bower (1979) has also 
suggested that a normal baby is born having a high degree of perceptual 
synthesis such that he will turn his head and eyes and reach towards 
a noise which he hears. Bower suggests that the baby may only be 
coding at first that 'something happened to my right', and not 'whether 
it was felt, seen, smelt or heard. Moreover, the normal baby seems to 
possess an innate tendency to seek out relations and associations between 
perceptual inputs - he is born trying to simultaneously differentiate 
and integrate his perceptual world and attach semantic cue value to 
what he perceives. 
Autistic children, by contrast, seem to be born tending to view 
the world as a collection of disparate parts rather than as being comprised 
of integrated wholes. Thus for them perceptual 'events' both within a 
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modality and between two or more, may begin and remain relatively 
separate. Yet it is only by the realisation of possible interrelationships 
of such 'events' that a meaningful perception of the world can emerge. 
Clinical and anecdotal evidence supports this view. For instance, 
autistic children may be seen to put jigsaw puzzles together with 
the pieces upside-down or face-downwards, and they may do so with 
great ease. There is frequently a notable lack of trial and error 
in the way that they place each piece as if being able to see precisely 
which space any given piece fits into. 
Autistic children also exhibit so called 'want for sameness' and 
they may throw a tantrum if, upon returning to a room, one small object 
is not quite in the same position it was in when they were last there. 
Such unerring ability to notice one detail of a complex whole again 
tends to support the suggestion that autistic children perceive the 
world as a collection of parts. 
Concomitant to this ability, to identify isolated parts of complex 
wholes is the tendency to store perceptions without interpreting them, 
i. e. to store them exactly as they were experienced. Thus some autistic 
children have been known to have phenomenal rote memory abilities, 
such as being able to recall the birthdays of a long list of unfamiliar 
people, or the names on a randomly chosen page of a telephone directory. 
This last example is typical of their tendency to recall (and to become 
obsessed with recalling) lists of items for no practical reason. Even 
less able autistic children may show some ability to recall what they 
have perceived very accurately, throwing a tantrum if something or some 
routine in their life is changed. Islets of special ability in autistic 
children are frequently rote memory feats or mathematical abilities which 
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entail a good memory (c. f. the accounts of idiosavants). One child, 
for example, was claimed to be able to multiply and divide large 
decimal numbers in his head very quickly. The boy was very bright 
and seemed to have gained his ability since acquiring a calculator 
for Christmas. However, when the present author asked him a few 
problems it was noted that of a range of equally difficult ones he could 
do some extremely quickly and others he laboured over extensively. 
Discussing his ability with him was possible and very revealing. It 
appeared that he spent a great deal of his time running through many 
calculations on his calculator and memorising the answers. This ability 
to memorise his calculator display together with his not mediocre 
mathematical abilities meant he could frequently surprise people with 
quick answers to lengthy problems - but the answers were only very 
quick when he had run the particular calculation before and memorised 
the answer. 
But if this boy had a fairly good comprehension of the number 
system together with his memory ability, often autistic children will 
at first seem to have a grasp of a concept when they actually do not. 
For instance, it is quite possible that an autistic child of low 
intelligence could not only lay a table for six people with all the 
correct cutlery, etc., but also lay one place setting in green plastic 
ware, another in red and so forth, exactly as had been demonstrated to 
him. Although there may be better examples, abilities like this can 
lead an inexperienced person to assume that the autistic child in 
question understands the quantity 'six', the colours involved, and 
so on. In fact, it is very likely that this is not so beyond his basic 
ability to discriminate and reproduce what he has seen. Indeed, had 
one demanded that he lay a similar table with similar coloured cutlery 
then one may have found that he would have been totally at a loss. 
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This ability to recall things exactly as they were experienced 
(even down to surprisingly accurate copies of others vocal pitch and 
characteristics) has also been noted in the experimental literature. 
Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) noted that the autistic children they 
tested exhibited an 'echo-box' type memory. This type of memory 
system is characterised by a recall of only the last items heard and 
a failure to make use of structure present in the input to aid recall 
beyond one's digit span. Echclalia occurs frequently in autism and 
is often the cause of much frustration when trying to interact with 
the autistic child: 
Teacher: "... and now what? " 
David: "All the things. " 
Teacher: "All the things? " 
David: "The dreams. " (mishears) 
Teacher: "The dreams! Did you mention a brick? " 
David: "A brick. " 
Teacher: "Okay, a brick. Should I move the brick? " 
David: "Move the brick" 
Teacher: "Okay, is that better? " 
David: "Better". 
(From a study reported elsewhere: Langdell 1980a, b, 1981). 
It is of interest in the above example that both teacher and child 
are echoing each other, but whereas the child's echoing is devoid of 
communicative intent, the teacher is using her echoing in an attempt to 
confirm that she had understood the child correctly. This topic of the 
use of ones abilities will be returned to later. 
412 
b) Possible connections between an integration deficit and language 
and thought 
Accompanying such memory characteristics in autistic children is the 
rigid and concrete nature of their thought processes. Autistic children 
usually acquire language in an inflexible manner, taking words to be 
labels or 'signs' for specific objects which they saw at the time when 
they heard the word, rather than as generic (categorical) nouns for 
many objects with similar qualities. Hence an autistic child may not 
understand that a tall blue cup with straight sides and a white handle 
is called a 'cup' as well as one which is smaller, red, has sloping 
sides and has no handle. Even variations in colour alone can lead some 
autistics to refuse to use the same label. This is reminiscent of 
incidents in which some autistic children fail to recognise even their 
own mother simply because she has had a new hairstyle. Autistic children 
may also become distressed if told that the same object can have two 
different labels (a pail and a bucket for example). Such lack of 
flexibility can cause great difficulties where, for instance, one 
person can have several different 'names' such as 'sister', 'Sally', 
'daughter', 'cousin', 'neice', and if she's married, 'wife'. The 
normal child quickly grasps that his sister, named Sally, is older 
than him and married and is called by other terms according to how 
the person who is speaking is related to her. Such systems of naming 
may evade even brighter autistic children who are otherwise very able 
in terms of their performance on standard IQ tests and so forth. 
Some autistic children have been noted for the extremely literal 
way in which they interpret what is said to them. Many mothers have 
cursed the day that they unintentionally said phrases like "Don't cry 
your eyes out". Two autistic boys at school one day showed how they 
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both interpreted what the teacher said literally when she left the 
room absent-mindedly saying that they should "brush the paper off 
the table onto the floor" (meaning for them to knock it off with 
their hands). When she returned some while later the boys were 
wandering around aimlessly. She enquired what was the matter and 
why the paper was still on the table. "Oh, " replied one of the boys, 
"We're looking for a brush to brush it off with. " Even more amusing 
perhaps was the anecdote about another autistic boy who, upon being 
shown around a house, was asked if he needed the toilet as they were 
near it. His reply was "No thank you, we already have one at home". 
What is interesting is that all of these linguistic errors are 
primarily in the pragmatic realm rather than the syntactic, semantic 
or phonological realms(although overlaps between pragmatic and semantic 
aspects are inevitable). That is, autistic children seem to mainly 
have problems understanding what language is used for, and what is 
likely to be communicated in a given context. In linguistic terms 
it means that they may have a basic grasp of the production of signs/ 
symbols (phonology), of the relationships between signs (syntax), 
and of the relationships between signs and their referents (semantics), 
but lack the ability to comprehend the use of signs in human social 
context (pragmatics). However, there is some reason to believe that 
autistic children may also have difficulties in the semantic and 
syntactic realms, too (see Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970; Simmons and 
Baltaxe, 1975). 
Another way in which one can refer to the mode of thought which 
autistics exhibit is as 'all-or-none' rather than as relativistic. 
Names of things are learnt in a one-to-one fashion with little 
* Footnote: Morris (1938) who defined these divisions between the 
realms, referred to linguistic 'signs' but perhaps 'symbols' is 
the more correct term because of the arbitary nature of the 
relationship between words and their referents. 
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generalisation, and rules once acquired or generated tend to be 
applied by the autistic child with excessive rigidity. This is in 
marked contrast to the young normal child who seems to 'play' with 
language, and who gives many different things or events the same vocal 
label as if by way of experimentation. Whereas for the autistic child 
perceptions are stored as separate entities, for the normal child they 
seem to be processed and stored in a relativistic manner - relative 
to what the child already knows and to what else is happening or can be 
perceived at the same time. 
However, the normal child's relativistic manner of perception 
cannot simply involve attempts on the child's part to compare incoming 
information with past perceptions or other ongoing perceptions. Such 
a view is too mechanistic and does not account for the active seeking 
of specific stimuli and the spontaneous labelling which young normal 
children engage in. It is thus important to emphasise the forward 
looking anticipatory element of cognitive perceptual processing. The 
normal baby, it is suggested, may be better regarded as a 'hypothesis 
tester' rather than as a passive integrator of past and present 
experience. It is further suggested that some autistic children may 
lack this mode of processing whilst others are deficient in their 
development of it. The hypotheses which infants form may be seen as 
precursors to later 'concepts' and thus early perceptual processing 
can be regarded as 'protoconceptual'. 
One also cannot regard the normal child as simply attempting to 
integrate specific stimuli, or comparing those in ongoing experience 
with those specific ones already perceived. No two stimuli are ever 
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exactly the same (or rarely sees even the same cup from precisely the 
same viewpoint twice), and moreover the context of the perception will 
always be different, both in terms of what else can be perceived at the 
time, and in terms of the knowledge (the internal context, if you will) 
that the child brings to the moment of perception. It is thus in the 
nature of the normal child's perceptual processing that he is 
predisposed to encode his perceptions in a relativistic manner; and the 
perceptions are encoded as relative to other ongoing perceptions, other 
internally stored past perceptions, and the relationships between such 
stored items. 
Thus it may be proposed that the question a young child is asking 
is not "Have I experienced this before? " but, "What is the probability 
that I have experienced this before? ". That is, because the child is 
processing his perceptions in a relativistic manner, his hypotheses about 
what he is perceiving will be probabilistic rather than absolute. An 
example of the normal process would be if one were to walk down a 
country lane at twilight and see out of the corner of one's eye a 
movement in the hedgerow. The context is that of the countryside where 
one is likely to see small animals or birds and so on. If one has 
noted that the air is fairly still with no breezes then one might 
interpret the movement as being due, say, to a small bird in the 
undergrowth. Moreover, for a fraction of a second one might actually 
'see' a small bird. But perhaps then a faint breeze is detected, and 
one glimpses fallen leaves in the vicinity. Very suddenly one interprets 
the situation quite differently (the context has changed because one 
has attended to different internal and external cues), and one sees 
that it was merely a leaf shifting in the wind. 
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The consequence of this mode of processing, then, is that the 
child begins life as a categoriser who is effectively making covert 
propositions about the world he experiences. Such covert propositions 
may become overt when the child begins to indicate aspects of his 
perceptual world to his caregiver by pointing and otherwise drawing 
his partner's attention to a common point of reference. Such behaviour 
on the child's part has been referred to as 'protodeclarative' (Bruner 
1975a, b; Bates, 1976, for example). But the suggestion being made 
here is that the nature of the child's mode of perceiving the world 
means that such gestures to another also possess a 'protopropositional' 
quality. The infant is not merely 'declaring' that he has seen something 
he is also seeking confirmation that what he has indicated is actually 
an entity worth indicating. This is not to say that the child is aware 
that the adult can provide feedback as to the appropriateness of his 
gesture (and later his utterances). Nonetheless the adult thus 
has the 
role of marking the child's experience and helping him to make sense of 
what he perceives, and by doing so the adult is effectively giving the 
child clues as to what the socially and culturally 'correct' 
hypotheses 
are to make. The caretaker will thus respond to an infant's proto- 
declarative acts with such phrases as "Yes, that's a doggy isn't it? ". 
Later the caretaker's feedback can help the child improve upon his 
hypotheses, such as when a child points to a cat and says "Doggy! ", 
whereupon the adult remarks something like, "No, it looks like a doggy 
doesn't it? But we call it a cat". 
This has as its consequence that one will tend to encode perceptions 
as being integrated with each other rather than disparate. 
For the 
normal child it becomes as important to be able to 
differentiate the 
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parts from wholes as it does to be able to integrate the various parts 
back into wholes again. In this manner the child is able to 
simultaneously hold in his mind both the 'ground' or 'context' and the 
'feature' or focus of his attention. For example, he becomes able to 
focus upon one feature of a person's face and yet still maintain a 
global impression of the entire face, and consequently of its expression. 
Language is also very much connected with the ability to consider 
both parts and wholes or contexts. For instance, it is vital that a 
child is able to know what is likely to be said to him in a given 
situation in order to interpret what is actually being said. Many 
errors which autistic children make with language were noted above 
to be pragmatic in nature, and they result from their inability to 
know what language is used for and what another is likely to be saying 
in a given context. This topic has been discussed more fully elsewhere 
(Langdell, 1980a, b, 1981) and will be returned to in the next subsection. 
It seems likely though from the above discussion that the autistic 
child's problems with language reflect a more basic problem he has 
with processing his perceptions. 
To gain further insight into how the autistic child's problems 
might have begun, one needs to turn to a consideration of his development 
in the first year of life. It is known that autism starts within the 
first thirty months of life, and it was argued earlier that there is 
every reason to believe that in most cases the child is born with the 
syndrome. Autism thus begins at a preverbal stage in development. 
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Bruner (1975a, b) has outlined several stages which he feels a 
normal child must progress through before being able to acquire language 
or, at first, primitive speech acts. The first stage Bruner calls a 
'demand mode' and it refers to the baby's earliest communicative routines 
such as crying when hungry. Bruner notes that in practice the needs of 
the child are usually responded to with the effect of establishing 
expectancies in the child. When such expectancy is established changes 
occur (see Bruner, 1975a) which mark the start of the 'request mode'. 
In this mode the primitive egocentric demanding of the infant is 
transcended and routines begin whereby the baby can request attention, 
feeding, and so on. In this mode, where the baby's acts may be said 
to be 'protoimperatives', it is notable that the baby now shows signs 
of expecting a response to his behaviour. There is thus indication 
that, although Bruner does not emphasise the point, the baby has made 
the important transition from communication without intent to 
communication with intent. This intent may also be interpreted as 
reflecting the beginnings of hypothesis-testing (i. e. "when I cry in 
a certain way I'm more likely to get fed). Although Bruner does not 
discuss it, there are other ways in which the baby now starts to show 
that he is expecting certain things to happen and certain patterns to 
ensue. For instance, babies start raising their arms in anticipation 
of being lifted up. Elsewhere (Ratner and Bruner, 1977) though, Bruner 
does refer to the making and breaking of expectancies as forming an 
essential aspect of early mother/infant play (peek-a-boo, for example). 
After the 'request mode' Bruner suggests that the child enters an 
'exchange mode' in which the beginnings of turn-taking emerge, and then 
a 'reciprocal mode' which is characterised by turn-taking. The 
reciprocal mode may be said to form the basis for human communication 
proper. 
41 9 
Several aspects of autism are relevant here: first, there is a 
wealth of anecdotal and clinical evidence suggesting that autistic 
babies differ from normal ones in important ways. Autistic babies are 
noted to be either particularly 'good' babies who rarely cry or seem 
to need attention, or they are extremely difficult babies who cry and 
scream unconsolably (Wing, 1976b). Their babble has also been noted 
to be diminished and/or abnormal (Bartak et al., 1975; Ricks and Wing, 
1976), and their preverbal utterances are frequently very idiosyncratic 
(Ricks, 1972). They have also been noted to fail to form an 
anticipatory position prior to being picked up, or to accommodate 
their position to the shape of the mother when lifted. 
It will be recalled that in order to enter Bruner's 'request mode' 
the infant must first begin to expect certain behaviours on his part 
to have predictable outcomes. If the autistic child has a poor ability 
or deviant ability to predict events, as was suggested above, then 
it is unlikely that his progression to even this early stage of 
development will occur without abnormality. The autistic child will 
thus tend to be very rigid about his ordering of the world, or he will 
fail to order it in a coherent manner, this being the consequence of 
his making too rigid hypotheses or failing to make them at all. 
Consequently, the autistic child may be exceptionally unpredictable 
to his mother or paradoxically quite predictable but in idiosyncratic 
ways (this was reflected in Rick's work, 1972 ) If the child is 
unpredictable then her responses to him, no matter how constant, cannot 
establish shared exchanges and predictable sequences of demand- 
satisfaction-reward (smiles, passivity, etc. ). Such a baby would be 
very unrewarding to interact with, and this in turn could not help 
but impair further the quality of the mother/baby relationship. 
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It was mentioned above that the normal baby may be thought of as a 
hypothesis tester who is constantly processing his input in a 
relativistic, manner, both in terms of whatever else he is experiencing 
and what he has experienced before. It is inherent in this mode of 
processing that the normal child selectively attends to the familiar 
and the unfamiliar. Moreover, one may posit that perceptual events 
which challenge his hypotheses will receive most attention. Consequently 
the baby can be expected to selectively attend to those stimuli which 
are progressively less and less similar to his prior encoded 
perceptions. Language may arise partly as a tool for the management 
of this process. One may see a connection here with the contention 
that the child's earliest one-word utterances are chosen according 
to the 'principle of informativeness' whereby the child selects for 
encoding (and production) that element he perceives to be needed to 
resolve uncertainty (Greenfield and Smith, 1976). The one word stage 
may thus be seen as an extension of an earlier stage in which the 
child is forming and testing hypotheses. Most important, such a mode 
of thought presupposes the importance of distinguishing the old from 
the new, and thus may be linked to the ordering of early two-word 
utterances (which occur in a new/old order) and the precursors of 
backgrounding and foregrounding of information, deixis, anaphonic 
reference, etc. 
earl) 1: F2 
It is noted that from the normal child may be regarded as 
an active user of language and an active processor not only of his 
perceptions but of the hypotheses which underlie his perceptual 
realisations. Such processing of the hypotheses underlying perceptions 
is akin to the later activity of treating language as a 'problem space' 
(Karmiloff Smith, 1979) and to the presence of reflective thought, 
or 'inner language' (Vygotsky, 1962). 
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The child, then, who has a defect in such a mode of functioning 
will beimpaired on many fronts. He may, for example, not encode 
perceptions according to similarities but rather as isolated from 
each other. This in turn may lead to a failure to take context into 
account or paradoxically to take it too much into account. That is, 
he may be willing to call a cup a 'cup' only if it is seen in the 
particular situation it was in when first seen, or he may fail to 
account for the change in usage of terms depending on context (the use 
of 'I' and 'you' when the speaker changes, the fact that certain phrases 
are appropriate to say to one's mother but not to a stranger etc. ). In 
consequence the child may produce inappropriate or irrelevant speech, 
or may be exceptionally rigid about his labelling of objects and events. 
This rigidity of thought patterns, and a tendency to learn words in a 
one-to-one fashion were mentioned above as uniquely characteristic 
of the autistic child. A too rigid manner of processing may also lead 
him to fail to break up some utterances which he hears (even though 
he may have shown himself able to break up utterances at other times) 
and thus incorrectly use long word strings where a simple label would 
suffice. Equally, the words may become linked to events in a stimulus/ 
response manner without gaining semantic cue value. 
A failure to integrate experience and consequently to form inadequate 
hypotheses about his world, may lead the autistic child to wish to 
experience the same input over and over again. That is, the cognitive 
mechanism which effectively says "I've experienced this before and need not 
attend to it again" may be malfunctioning. Want-for-sameness as well 
as strerotyped and repetitive behaviours may also be seen as examples 
of the result of this malfunction. Most important, it is very unlikely 
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that a child with such deficit would be able to comprehend what 
language (and linguistic coding) may be used for. Communication is 
largely context-dependent and relies heavily upon one's ability to 
take former knowledge into account and form efficient hypotheses about 
possible shared understandings and others' points of view. Indeed, 
it may be difficult for a child with such a deficit to appreciate that 
others do have a separate point of view. This in turn may lead to 
problems of use of personal pronouns and other deictic terms of reference. 
That is, personal pronouns are relative insofar as who is 'I' and who 
is 'you' are dependent upon who is speaking and who is 
listening. An inability to process inputs in a relativistic manner 
would cause great difficulties in the understanding of the relativity 
of frames of reference in interpersonal situations. In addition, the 
child's cognitive mode will lack a dynamic forward-looking aspect 
which characterises the inquisitive nature of the normal child. 
To recapitulate the main points, the normal child is conjectured 
to process his perceptions in a relativistic manner, making probablistic 
hypotheses about the nature of what he perceives. Thus it is suggested 
that the mind does not process absolute items of perceptual data, but 
rather concerns itself with the relationships between stored perceptions 
and also between these and ongoing experience. The natural consequence 
of such a manner of processing is that perceptions are necessarily 
integrated to some extent from the beginning, for they are stored and 
processed relative to each other rather than as isolated perceptual 
events. In contrast, it is proposed that autistic children have problems 
with integrating perceptions and that this is connected with a deficit 
of forming efficient hypotheses about the nature of their perceptions. 
It also seems to lead them to store perceptions as discrete entities 
rather than as parts of a related system of percepts. 
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C) Speculations as to the nature of brain dysfunction in autism 
It will be noted at the outset of this subsection that the present 
author claims no expertise in neurology, and thus any speculation will 
be very tentative. In fact, no attempt will be made to claim a specific 
area of the brain as the site of dysfunction, but sites which may be 
involved will be suggested. 
Perhaps the most important thing an experimental/clinical 
psychologist can do is to define the limits of observed consequences 
of the brain disorder. From the above it would seem that autistic 
children have problems with the formation of hypotheses about their 
perceptions and with the integration of their experience. It also 
appears that they have in consequence some problems with determining 
whether perceptions are novel or familiar. It has been argued above 
that such a deficit may account for the autistic child's problems with 
language and thought, but one is left unable to account for their 
problems in relating to others and expressing emotion. Although it 
seems possible that such a deficit may also go some way towards 
explaining the autistic's lack of sociability and empathy, but to state 
this categorically would be to go beyond the data obtained. 
In considering possible sites of brain damage the above deficits 
must therefore be accounted for. It was noted in section 7.3.6 that 
a simple hemispherical-damage theory cannot suffice to explain the 
autistic child's problems. Whilst language deficits and problems 
with symbolic thought might implicate damage to the left-hemisphere, 
problems with perceptual integration, holistic processing, and 
emotional expression all (if anything) implicate damage to the right- 
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hemisphere. Indeed, it seems that the right-hemisphere is reputably 
good at recognising faces and determining facial expressions for the 
sole reason that it specialises in the synthesis and integration of 
perceptions. It is good at both of these types of task because of its 
proclivity to view objects as meaningful 'gestalten'. This is precisely 
the area of functioning that the autistic child seems to have trouble 
with, and his good ability to identify faces appears to be due to him 
adopting the strategy of identifying individual parts rather than 
looking at the whole. It was noted in section 7.3.4 that the left 
hemisphere does in fact have some ability to identify faces, but that 
it only exhibits an advantage in doing so when the identification of 
a single feature is called for. There are thus some grounds for 
viewing the autistic child's manner of perceiving faces in terms of 
a left-hemisphere mode of processing. 
Other reasons for discounting a simple hemispheric-lesion theory 
include the fact that autism begins in the first year of life when the 
brain is still relatively 'plastic', and any damage to one hemisphere 
should be compensated for by the other. It has been noted that one 
area of the brain which might prove to be damaged in autistic children 
is the old cortex, and in particular the temporal lobes. Evidence has 
already been presented to support the choice of this area as a location 
of dysfunction by Hauser et al. (1975). A prime reason for the choice 
of this area is that unlike damage to one hemisphere, unilateral 
temporal lobe damage need not lead to the undamaged side taking over 
the functions of the damaged area. 
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Credence for considering the temporal lobe as a site of damage 
or dysfunction is gained by consideration of the work of such Russian 
scientists as Luria (1973) and Vinogradova (1969,1970) and that of 
ýLe AoKer. cu" 
Pribram (1971). Vinogradova (ibid) has suggested that the hippocanpus 
serves to compare incoming stimuli with those already perceived in 
order to differentiate those which are novel from those which are 
familiar. Luria also ascribes this kind of function to the frontal 
lobes, so caution should be exercised before taking this as clear 
evidence for a temporal lobe deficit. Nonetheless, Luria is in 
agreement with Vinogradova's ideas on the temporal lobes and points 
out that this process is essential for selective attention and that it 
is non-modality specific. Moreover, the temporal lobes (and particularly 
the hippocampus) have been associated with one's ability to bxtinguish 
tendencies to orient toward and attend to previously perceived inputs. 
It is thus involved in the process of habituation. Once again, though, 
it should be noted that the frontal lobes may also serve as a similar 
function. 
Given that some area of the brain does seem to be concerned with 
the detection of novel and familiar stimuli, it is important to note 
the point made above that no two perceptions are ever exactly the 
same. Consequently it seems unlikely that any part of the brain is 
asking "have I seen this before? ", but rather "what is the probability 
that I've seen this before? ". Logically, then, the aforementioned 
literature on the function of the limbic system gives some support to 
the possible existence of a mechanism for hypothesis testing. Given 
that such areas are also noted to be related to the ability to 
extinguish old behaviours, one may postulate that damage to them may 
explain why the autistic child frequently repeats certain behaviours 
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in a stereotyped fashion. It may also go some way toward explaining 
why many autistic children become so 'stuck' on the first example of 
anything they perceive (as when an autistic child accepts the label 
'cup' for the first such object he is shown, but refused to use the 
term for any other cups he sees, no matter how physically similar). 
Further reasons for considering the regions of the temporal and 
frontal lobes are drawn from Pribram's work (1971). It is of particular 
interest to the study of autistic children to note that Pribram has 
said, 
"There is a special of ýinidteyý , gtýv eery M mbpls bea 
üc ýef obi Nxt 
dependent behaviours, such as thoseý, 
Iinvölved in symbolic 
behaviour (the fronto-limbic forebrain, which includes the 
frontal cortex and the .... amygdala and hippocampus) are 
those which are involved in monitoring feelings - appetitive 
and affective interests.... " 
(Pribram, 1971; p. 308). 
The characteristic symptoms of autism include an inability to 
form symbols and a lack of affective behaviour, and thus the possibility 
of a relationship between these deficits and damage to the fronto-limbic 
system is most compelling. However, one must bear in mind that not all 
neurologists are in agreement with Pribram's formulations -Nonetheless, 
it may be of importance to note that some areas of the brain are 
concerned with 'context dependent' processing and that such processing 
is indeed essential to symbol formation and much that is involved in 
interpersonal communication. This point has already been dealt with 
above, so suffice it to note at this juncture that autistic children 
seem particularly poor both at taking the context of events into 
account and being able to ignore the context when it is appropriate 
to do so. 
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d) The possession of abilities versus the use of them 
At several points in this thesis it has been noted that autistic 
children possess certain abilities but seem to fail to use them. For 
instance, it was concluded from the studies of face perception that 
autistic children do not necessarily avoid eye contact with others so 
much as fail to understand what mutual gaze may be used for. Again, it 
was found that they are able to imitate facial expressions and their 
repertoire of spontaneous expressions seems unusually limited. They 
are particularly poor at using facial expression to communicate feelings 
to others. Anecdotal evidence also indicates that they are able to 
produce gestures to order, but they fail to use them spontaneously 
(Langdell, 1980a, b, 1981). Bartak and Rutter (1976) reported that 
this was the case; and recent studies by Attwood (unpublished) have 
provided evidence that autistic children may be able to produce on 
demand and understand many simple gestures, and yet they fail to know 
how to use their knowledge and ability. Autism thus seems to be a form 
of "apragmatism". 
Several findings presented in this thesis suggest that the autistics' 
difficulties in the use of their abilities may be related to their 
cognitive/perceptual deficit. In Chapter Two it was suggested that the 
most parsimoneous explanation for the infant's attraction to another's 
eyes was in terms of the contingency of the eyes' movements to the baby's 
behaviour. That is, along with the human voice (which also elicits 
attention early on in the infant) the caretaker's eyes are unique 
insofar as they change in accordance with the baby's movements and 
vocalisations, and thus presumably bear some relationship to the baby's 
inner state. A failure to integrate perceptions would lead to an 
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inability or poor ability to perceive that the eyes' movements possessed 
contingency on one's behaviour, and in turn lead to a failure to 
comprehend the meaning which the eye area can convey about another's 
inner state, their direction of attention, etc. 
Similarly, the autistic child's failure to integrate facial features 
into a meaningful gestalten which reveals expression may also lead the 
child to fail to perceive what facial expression might be used for. 
That is, in order to see the potential use of facial expression a child 
would need to comprehend that an expression on another's face 'goes 
with' a certain feeling which one has experienced. It was tentatively 
suggested earlier in this thesis that the caretaker's tendency to 
imitate the infant may lead to a pairing of the infant's inner state 
with an appropriate expression displayed on the adult's face. Hence 
if the child is processing his perceptions in a relativistic manner he 
might well form the hypothesis that 'that expression goes with this 
inner feeling', and this was suggested to be a possible basis for the 
emergence of empathy. 
The picture of the autistic child's abilities and disabilities is 
thus one of a child who is able to store discrete bits of information 
and accurately recall them, and even accurately link various bits of 
perceptual data in a one-to-one fashion, but is less able to integrate 
his perceptions and perceive the relationship between them. In consequence, 
he may be able to recognise faces very well, but because he fails to 
form them into a perceptual gestalt which he notes to have some connection 
with his inner states, he is unable to understand how one might use 
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facial expression communicatively. However, this does not leave him 
totally unable to know what certain expressions mean, for he can link 
certain discrete details (the shape of the mouth for instance) to 
certain labels (up-curved mouth means happy). A similar process of 
linking small details with certain labels may also enable the autistic 
child to have a limited understanding of others bodily gestures (as 
Attwood has noted) and as noted above this may explain the rigid one-to- 
one fashion in which autistic children acquire, use and seem to understand 
spoken language. 
e) Do autistic children lack any normally 'innate' behaviours? 
In the chapter on facial expression a distinction was made between 
those expressions which may be innate and those which are most probably 
learnt. Many emotional expressions make their debut in the child's 
first year of life, but it is difficult from the observations made to 
date to say conclusively that any but the expressions of crying and 
smiling/laughter are unequivocally innate. Nontheless, many facial 
expressions are extremely similar from culture to culture (Ekman, 
1973) and whilst people from quite different cultures are not able 
to speak each other's verbal language on first meeting, they may 
usually be able to communicate to a large degree by gesture alone. 
Such observations are suggestive that many facial expressions and 
bodily gestures may be innate and pan-cultural. 
If the above is true, then autistic children certainly seem to 
lack certain usually 'innate' patterns of behaviour. They display a 
deficient repertoire of spontaneous facial expression and bodily 
gestures from early in life. These deficiencies stand in marked 
contrast to those of other children with 'language handicaps' (those 
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with receptive dysphasia, for example) insofar as these children 
usually possess a fairly normal range of facial expression (see Bartak 
and Rutter, 1976). It is noteworthy, too, that although blind children 
resemble autistic children in many ways (Fraiberg, 11977) in that they 
also exhibit stereotyped behaviours and abnormal social responses, they 
nonetheless seem to be born with a fairly normal range of spontaneous 
facial expression (see Chapter Four). It may be, though, that the 
similarities between the social incompetence of some blind children 
and that of autistic children reflects the fact that the source of 
many of the autistic's problems may not lie in damage to part of the 
brain usually concerned with affective behaviour, such as the amygdala, 
but rather in their problems with perceptual processing. 
It thus seems possible that autistic children lack certain 
normally innate affective behaviours and expressions, but it also 
remains a possibility that their problems in these areas may be due 
to their inborn cognitive and perceptual deficits. 
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7.4: Suggestions for further research 
Several hypotheses have been generated by the experiments reported 
in this thesis, and each might be profitably explored using experimental 
methods. For instance, it was suggested that there is ontogenetic 
(and possibly phylogenetic) advantage in looking at another's eyes. It 
was suggested that in order to gain all the information one requires 
about another's inner state from the eye region one needs to fixate 
the eyes foveally. By contrast, it was proposed that in order to 
extract meaning from the mouth area one need only scan and monitor 
the lower facial features with non-foveal vision. It was further 
argued that this is because the determination of expression in the 
eye area requires one to integrate one's perceptions to a much greater 
degree than does the determination of the mouth's expression, and that 
the perceptual analysis required for integration demands foveal vision. 
This could be investigated by showing normal subjects expressive faces 
in a tachistoscope. By setting the point of focus either in the lower 
half of the face or nearer the eyes and having a brief presentation 
time, one would be able to compare the subjects' abilities to tell 
expression of such faces when forced to fixate on one half or the 
other. A similar method to that used in Chapter Four might be employed 
whereby the faces would contain two expressions, one in the upper half 
and another in the lower half. One would thus be able to gain some 
idea of the extent to which the expression in the area of the face 
not in foveal vision affected his description. 
It was suggested that autistic children possess a deficit in 
perceptual integration, and first experimental evidence has been 
provided to suggest that this extends to intramodal perceptual 
integration, too. Further tests of this might be made by using 
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Figure 7.3 Example of the type of stimulus one might 
present to children to test their 
figure/ground 
perception. (Gregory, 1971) 
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standard tests of gestalt perception. For instance, one might use 
methods similar to those employed by Ghent (1956) in which children had 
to detect simple shapes amidst complex 'grounds'. It should be 
hypothesised that autistic children would be unusually capable at 
detecting the shapes because unlike non-autistic children they would 
not have their performance marred by a natural proclivity to integrate 
their perceptions into wholes. 
One might also compare autistic and non-autistic children's 
abilities to recognise stimuli which require a degree of perceptual 
integration to be clearly discerned. For instance, photographs of 
stimuli may be 'degraded' by processing them as lithographs (in which 
all the greys are made either pure white or black). In this way it 
may be difficult to discern what the picture is of unless one is able 
to integrate the various patches of pattern into a complete whole 
(see figure 7.3). Another method would involve the use of blurred 
pictures. This method has the advantage that one can vary the degree 
to which the pictures are blurred and hence test degrees of integrative 
ability. The autistic children would be hypothesised to perform less 
well when required to recognise familiar objects which are either 
presented in degraded photographic form or seen out of focus. 
Inter-modality integration might also be examined. For instance, 
McGurk (1977) has reported that one can create an auditory/visual 
illusion by presenting subjects with disparate visual and auditory 
information. This technique resembles that used by Dodd (1977) and 
used in this thesis too. Subjects are required to watch a television 
screen and are shown a film of someone speaking, but whereas they see 
one phoneme being mouthed they hear at the same moment a different 
*Footnote: Since writing this the author's attention has been drawn to the 
work of Shah (1980), who has independently followed up this line of research. 
Shah, A. "Integration and Perception in Autistic Children" Masters' thesis, 
University of Surrey. 
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phoneme. It is found that rather than report either the phoneme that 
they heard (say 'ka') or the one they saw mouthed (say 'pa') they 
report a synthesis of the two which is different from either ('ta' 
for instance). The hypothesis, were such an experiment to be run with 
autistic and non-autistic children, would be that this effect would be 
demonstrated by the non-autistics, but the autistic children would 
show little or no synthesis of the two inputs. It would probably be 
important, however, to use real words carefully matched for phase and 
synchrony rather than nonsense phonemes with such children in order 
to ensure cooperation. 
The possibility was raised in the last section that autistic 
children may be poor at using their knowledge of the world to anticipate 
events. Work has been carried out on this topic (Hammes and Langdell, 
1981) and has supported the contention. However, further tests need 
to be done. For instance, it might be possible to study the autistic 
child's 'contingent negative variation' 
(CNV) when put in a situation 
in which it would be usual to expect certain events to follow one 
another. The CNV 
is a slow potential brain wave which is recorded 
from the frontal lobes (a possible site of dysfunction in autism , 
it 
will be recalled). In tests where a subject 
is required to press a 
button a set time after a light has been lit, the CNV increases during 
the period between the light coming on and the button needing to be 
pressed (Small et al. 1971). Small has already carried out some tests of 
autistics CNVs and 
found that they can produce them in the type of 
situation described above. However, her experiments were not 
designed 
to investigate thoroughly the autistic child's ability to use 
his 
perceptions to predict his world. Such experiments may well provide 
revealing data. 
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It was also suggested in the above section that autistic children 
may be poor at taking contextual cues into account. One way that this 
might be tested would be to first show autistics the same picture of 
something, say a dog, over and over again. If they habituate (that is, 
if 'proactive inhibition' is set up), then this should be measured by 
psycho-physiological techniques. If one is then able to train them to 
habituate to many presentations of different dogs then it may be 
inferred that they have some concept of 'dogginess' (obviously this 
would need to be undertaken with relatively high level autistics). One 
would then be in a position to present a blurred picture of a dog and 
see whether the autistic child is able to use the context, in which he 
has just seen and habituated to many different dogs, to facilitate his 
identification of the picture. As a cross-check on the child's ability 
one would need to also show similar blurred photographs out of context 
too. The hypothesis would be that perceptual integration is enhanced 
for the non-autistic child by the presence of strong contextual clues, 
whereas the ability of the autistic child is equally poor in both 
situations. 
It would also be of interest to gain further information about the 
autistic child's ability to use the knowledge that he gains. To this 
end, it might be plausible to set up a situation wherein a child would 
need to utilise a tool or an apparatus to achieve a goal and receive 
a desired reward. One may then train the same child to achieve the 
same goal and reward using different means. Finally, one would create 
a situation in which the goal could only be obtained by a combination 
of the prior two means or methods. It would be hypothesised that 
whilst the non-autistics would be able to make such use of their prior 
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knowledge, the autistics would not. However, it might be rather 
difficult to control for the intelligence of the two types of children. 
To the extent that 'problem solving' is a measure of intelligence, 
it might be somewhat circular and unproductive to match the children 
for general intelligence. 
Perhaps a more informative and more natural version of the above 
study could be undertaken with an adult being present to act as a 
possible provider of a means. In fact, an interactional version of 
the study of context effects could be performed where an adult could 
provide the contextual clues which a child could utilise to improve 
his performance. 
Finally, although there seems little reason to suspect that 
autistic children possess a hemispherical deficit, it is noted that a 
fairly simple test might be carried out to investigate this. It has 
been found (Campbell, 1978) that people express emotion more extremely 
with the left halves of their faces (camera-right) than with their 
right halves. This is due to the fact that the normal person's left 
half of his face is governed by his right hemisphere and this hemisphere 
deals with emotional expression. It is possible to make left-left 
photographic composites and right-right ones too, and one finds that 
the faces made up of left-left (posers sides) are rated as having 
more extreme expressions than the right-right composite faces. 
One would therefore need to take photographs of autistic children 
expressing emotion and prepare such composites. One would also need 
to prepare such photographs of non-autistic subjects. Getting the 
photographs of autistic children expressing emotion could present 
problems, but as was discovered when the present author undertook 
experiments in this realm, the difficulties are not as great as one 
first expects. 
437 
The foregoing is aselection of further experimental studies which 
this thesis's results suggest should be carried out. However, there 
would no doubt also be great value in attempting to investigate further 
the nature of the autistic child's 'apragmatism' and the possible 
connections of such disabilities with problems in the cognitive and 
perceptual realms. Perhaps the most rewarding method of investigating 
such possible interconnections would be by the study of autistic infants 
and very young autistic children. It would be of interest to see if 
like normal children -autistic children are born with highly organised 
behaviours (Condon, 1974), having many features in common with the 
behaviours of the caretaker. It would also be of interest to investigate 
possible problems with the timing and phasing of behaviours in the 
autistic infant and the possible maldevelopment of such prelinguistic 
features as 'protoimperitives' and 'protodeclaratives'. Undoubtedly, 
it would be difficult to find a sample of autistic infants simply 
because there is no known easily identifiable characteristic which 
would allow their detection. In addition, the very low incidence of 
autism (about 4 in 10,000 live births) may also mean that on purely 
statistical grounds they would be difficult to find early in life. 
Nonetheless, it might be possible to set certain 'best guess' limits 
on the features an autistic infant might possess. For instance, one 
might screen a large population of babies who are all either extremely 
passive or virtually unconsolable (these being features which many 
mothers of autistic children reported retrospectively that they 
possessed). One might also hypothesise that autistic children have 
problems with timing behaviours and thus may not show normal patterns 
of forming routines or 'burst/pause' patterns in their feeding behaviour. 
Such screening restrictions might possibly increase one's chances of 
detecting an autistic child to one in a thousand or perhaps even 
considerably better. 
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To end on an optimistic note, if it is indeed the case that 
autistic children are born exhibiting behaviour which behrays their 
handicap, then by refining the presently available behavioural 
observation techniques, through such means as the computer analysis 
of slowed-down video taped recordings, one may be able to detect 
autism in infancy and develop methods for more adequate intervention. 
APPENDIX 1 
438r 
Seen Heard Related Distractor Unrelated Distractor 
Chair House Hat Book 
Ball Hat Cat Tree 
Cup Plane Cat Shoe 
Car Book Boy House 
Clock Shoe Cake Dog 
Dog Hen Frog Tree 
Bed Girl Boy Hen 
Boy Cat Hat Train 
Train Fish Tree Boy 
Frog Horse Dog Cat 
Bird Cake Cat House 
Ship Tree Shoe Clock 
House Chair Hat Ball 
Hat Ball Girl Shoe 
Plane Cup Ship Dog 
Tree Ship Shoe Cat 
Book Car Cat Hause 
Shoe Clock Cake Ball 
Hen Dog Hat Cup 
Girl Bed Boy Train 
Cat Boy Hat Frog 
Fish Train Plane Bird 
Horse Frog House Bird 
Cake Bird Clock Hat 
Appendix 1: The words which were presented Orally and 
visually in the test of the contribution of lip - 
reading to speech perception. See Chapter Three. 
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